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Abstract 
In England, flooding in recent years has had a detrimental effect on the economy, the 
environment and the health and wellbeing of people. Climate change research suggests 
that the occurrence and consequences of flooding may worsen in the future. Therefore, 
effective flood risk management (FRM) is crucial. Traditionally, mainly structural 
measures, such as barriers and embankments, were taken to prevent flooding. In recent 
times, the emphasis has shifted to managing the risk of flooding by using non-structural 
methods as well, such as spatial planning. Simultaneously, there has been a shift from 
government to governance. Due to privatisation, agentification and decentralisation, 
decision making increasingly takes place in local governance networks. Actors with 
differing interests and responsibilities interact and negotiate in order to influence FRM, 
such as local authorities, the Environment Agency (EA), which has national 
responsibility for FRM, and developers. 
This PhD research explores the nature of network governance in FRM in England. The 
research focuses on local planning processes to examine the development and 
functioning of governance networks, in order to identify key factors that influence 
FRM. To achieve this, a multiple case study approach was applied, comprising two 
cases of local planning processes. The first case is a major mixed development in the 
North-East of England that has issues with river and surface water flooding, whilst the 
second case is a major redevelopment of a cricket ground in the South-East that is at 
significant risk of river flooding. 
The findings show that in both cases governance networks were formed to make 
decisions on FRM. In the first case, the actors cooperated and were able to implement a 
sustainable method of FRM. In the second case, the actors were unable to agree and the 
decision was referred to central government, which granted permission for development 
against the EA’s advice. One key factor influencing FRM was the actors’ ability to align 
interests, in particular the developers, the local authority and the EA, causing either 
conflict or cooperation in the governance network. The individual interests were derived 
from various factors, such as legislation, financial benefits and personal preference. The 
actors then used their agency to reach collaborative or individual objectives by utilising 
knowledge and structures to their advantage. Therefore, the nature of network 
governance influences the functioning of these networks, which in turn impacts on the 
way flood risk is managed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research topic and rationale for this research, which is 
composed of the changing approach to flood risk management (FRM) and the way in 
which it is governed. Section 1.2 briefly introduces the problem of flooding in England, 
where various floods in the past years have caused much disruption and damage. 
Section 1.3 explains how the nature of FRM and the way it is governed has been subject 
to changes over the years, such as the increasing roles of the planning system and 
governance networks. Section 1.4 introduces theory on governance networks, after 
which, section 1.5 outlines the research aim and questions, followed by the 
methodological approach in section 1.6. Then, section 1.7 describes the academic field 
this research is part of, as well as the contribution it aims to make. Lastly, section 1.8 
contains the structure of this thesis. 
1.2 The problem of flooding 
In recent years, England has suffered from multiple floods. For instance, flooding 
during June and July 2007 caused much damage and disruption in many parts of 
England and a heavy rainstorm in the summer of 2012 caused widespread flooding in 
Newcastle upon Tyne. Not only does flooding have a great economic cost – for 
instance, the 2007 floods cost an estimated £3.2 billion (Chatterton et al. 2010)  – it also 
has a great social cost. Flood waters are treacherous and people whose houses flood 
may suffer from physical and psychological problems (Whittle et al. 2010). In addition, 
much disruption is caused by the loss of potable water, electricity and transport, whilst 
many people are unable to return to their damaged homes. Therefore, flooding forms a 
great problem to society. 
A flood can be defined as a temporary covering by water of land not normally covered 
by it (European Commission 2007). There are six types of flooding. Firstly, fluvial 
flooding is related to flooding from rivers. Secondly, pluvial flooding is also called 
surface water flooding, caused by rainfall that is not absorbed in the ground or directed 
away by a drainage system, thereby submerging the ground surface. Thirdly, 
groundwater flooding occurs when the groundwater level rises above surface levels; this 
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also includes structures underground such as basements. There is a lack of knowledge 
about this type of flooding (Macdonald et al. 2012), with data on groundwater floods 
only starting after the year 2000 (British Geological Survey 2012). Pluvial and 
groundwater flooding caused many problems across England in 2012, which was the 
wettest year since 1910, with many locations receiving more than 135% of the annual 
average of rain (Met Office 2013). Fourthly, coastal flooding refers to land that 
becomes covered by seawater at times of flood. Fifthly, sewer flooding occurs when the 
sewerage is engulfed by heavy rainfall or becomes blocked, forcing water and sewage 
up the drains into roads and buildings. This most often occurs during extreme rainfall 
events, when surface water sewers and foul sewers are combined into one sewer system, 
which as a result becomes overwhelmed. Sixthly, when reservoir banks overtop or fail, 
a reservoir flood takes place. These floods occur very rarely in England. 
In 2008, it was estimated that 2.4 million properties in England were at risk of flooding 
from rivers or the sea and 3.8 million were at risk of surface water flooding. One 
million properties of these had all three flood risks (Environment Agency 2009c). It is 
estimated that approximately 1.6 million properties in England and Wales are 
susceptible to groundwater flooding (British Geological Survey 2012), whilst 1.1 
million properties are situated in the vicinity of reservoirs and are therefore at risk of 
reservoir flooding (Defra and Environment Agency 2011). According to Ofwat, in 2011 
approximately 4,700 properties were registered with wastewater companies for being at 
risk of internal flooding1 at least once every ten years (Ofwat 2011). However, these 
figures do not consider combination flood events, such as in Newcastle in 2012, where 
overwhelmed drains and sewers and ground saturation together contributed to flooding 
(Newcastle City Council 2013b). 
In recent years, the question has been raised whether the problem of flood risk is likely 
to become worse as a result of climate change. Research suggests that climate change is 
causing a global temperature rise, rising sea levels and an increase in extreme rainfall 
events, which are factors that can exacerbate flooding.2 There is much uncertainty on 
the way the climate will change and the potential effect on flooding, but recent research 
suggests that the future increase in flood risk is significant (see Table 1). In particular 
the heavy rainfall in 2012 raised the question whether this was climate change induced. 
Although it is complicated to attribute individual weather and flood events to climate 
                                                
1 Caused by sewage water flowing into a property through the internal drains. 
2 See section 3.3.3. 
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change, according to the Adaptation Sub-Committee (2012) it is likely that the extreme 
weather of 2012 will occur more frequently in the future. If the occurrence of flooding 
rises in the future, its economic, social and environmental consequences will also be 
exacerbated. Moreover, new development is still taking place in areas at risk of 
flooding, which will add to the consequences and costs of flooding (Parker 1995, 
Adaptation Sub-Committee 2012). 
Type of 
flooding 
Number of 
properties at 
significant 
risk 
Number of 
properties 
2080, climate 
change 
induced 
Number of 
properties 
2080, 
including 
population 
growth 
Estimated 
annual 
damage 
Estimated 
future annual 
damage (2011 
prices) 
River 230,0003 Between 
320,000 and 
580,000 
Between 
350,000 and 
1,100,000 
£0.7 billion Between £0.9 
billion and £6.9 
billion by 2080 
Coastal 100,0004 Between 
310,000 and 
570,000 
Between 
330,000 and 
840,000 
£0.3 billion Between £1 
billion and £3.7 
billion by 2080 
Surface 
water 
50,0005 Not estimated Not estimated £320 
million 
Between £510 
million and £1 
billion over next 
50 years 
Table 1: Predictions of future significant flood risks in England 
Source: Adaptation Sub-Committee 2012, Ramsbottom et al. 2012 
Flooding represents a major problem for England at present and is likely to be 
increasingly so in the future; therefore, effective FRM is crucial. Managing flood risk 
entails taking the probability and the consequences of flooding into account. The 
probability of flooding is usually communicated as an annual percentage or a return 
event; for instance, an area might have an annual 1% chance of flooding, which is the 
same as being at risk of a flood event once in 100 years. The consequences of flooding 
                                                
3 With an annual probability of 1.3% or greater. 
4 With an annual probability of 1.3% or greater. 
5 With an annual probability of 3.3% or greater. 
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are the effects on, for instance, people, property, the environment and the economy. In 
addition, FRM does not only consider current flood risks, but also aims to adapt to the 
effects of climate change. The next section discusses the various ways in which flood 
risk can be managed. 
1.3 The governance of flood risk management 
There are many ways in which flood risk can be managed. Traditionally, the approach 
used was to defend against flooding with structural measures, for instance by modifying 
existing rivers, building embankments, controlling the flow of water through installing 
barriers or by creating areas for flood storage (Jha et al. 2012). During the last decades, 
however, this approach has changed to using integrated methods comprising structural 
and non-structural measures (Johnson and Priest 2008, Butler and Pidgeon 2011). 
Examples of non-structural methods are flood awareness campaigns, flood insurance, 
emergency planning, warning and evacuation systems and spatial planning (Parker 
1995, Jha et al. 2012, Meyer et al. 2012). An integrated approach is considered more 
sustainable, efficient and effective than structural measures alone (Van Herk et al. 
2011). In addition, there is a growing realisation of the effects of land use on the risk of 
flooding,6 thereby increasing the role of spatial planning in FRM (Wheater and Evans 
2009). Through planning, the location, type, design and function of development can be 
influenced and flood risk can be avoided, reduced and managed (White and Richards 
2007). Finally, by taking flood risk and climate change into account in the planning 
process, proactive action can take place, which is more cost-effective than responding to 
flood events retrospectively (Wilson 2006a). 
The way FRM is governed has evolved as well. There has been a shift from government 
to governance, which entails that decisions on policy formation and implementation are 
no longer solely made by the formal institutions of central government. Processes of 
decentralisation, privatisation and agentification (Kjær 2004) mean that central 
government has lost power upwards, downwards and sideways (Jessop 1999) and policy 
decisions are made at a distance from central government in relatively autonomous 
networks (Rhodes 1997). This has also occurred in FRM, where flood problematisation 
and decision making is influenced by the action of individuals and collectives (Butler 
and Pidgeon 2011). However, the power of central government has not disappeared, as 
                                                
6 Explained further in Chapter 3. 
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there are national policies, legislation and funding structures that frame decision making 
in networks. Therefore, governance in practice often has hybrid characteristics that 
include hierarchical, network and market arrangements (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). 
In England, the hybrid character of the governance of FRM is identifiable in for 
instance the fragmentation of responsibilities. Whereas in the past central government 
and regional water authorities held the responsibility for FRM, now non-departmental 
public bodies, private water companies, local authorities, developers and residents all 
have some responsibility in delivering or funding FRM, creating what Hooghe and 
Marks call a Type II multi-level governance (2003, 2010).7 To tackle flood risk, 
multiple authorities with differing responsibilities interact in network arrangements. 
These responsibilities are often set in legislation, which can impact on the flexibility of 
this type of governance to respond to new flood problems. This became apparent in the 
floods in 2007, when pluvial flooding affected large parts of the England but no 
authority could be held accountable or take responsibility (Pitt 2008). One solution to 
this type of flooding would be to make use of sustainable drainage systems (SuDS), 
such as ponds that store rainwater, but no authorities are willing or able to be held 
accountable for maintenance and adoption (Wheater and Evans 2009). Even though the 
governance system is evolving and new opportunities for managing flood risk are being 
developed, structures created in the past can stand in the way of generating effective 
solutions. Therefore, decisions made in networks are framed by structures that are part 
of hierarchical or market arrangements. 
Another influence in the changing governance of FRM is the increasing role of 
planning. Local planning processes provide the arenas in which actors involved in 
managing flood risk and planning frequently meet. These actors with varying 
responsibilities and interests interact and make decisions in a network setting. A key 
question is how responsibilities and powers are divided and how this impacts on the 
way FRM is delivered in practice, particularly in the case where flood risk conflicts 
with other aims such as development (Butler and Pidgeon 2011). This question is partly 
addressed by Pardoe et al. (2011) who examined the delivery of FRM in planning and in 
particular the conflict between ‘land and water, water and people’ (Pardoe et al. 2011: 
2898). They conclude that in the UK this conflict is articulated in particular on a case-
by-case basis. Actors involved in decision making, such as planners, the Environment 
Agency (EA) and developers are mutually dependent, creating a ‘sensible process of 
                                                
7 See section 2.2.2. 
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negotiation, where both sides are balanced in terms of power’, which allows 
‘compromises to be made that balance the inherent conflicts of water and people on 
land’ (Pardoe et al. 2011: 2900). However, another study by Tunstall et al. (2009) 
shows that these different actors may have diverging perceptions and definitions of 
flood risk, which complicates this process of negotiation more than Pardoe et al. 
suggest. 
The actors do not form the only element that influences FRM, because the wider context 
in which decision making takes place also plays a role. Richards (2005) researched 
institutional influences on flood risk policy and development control decisions, and 
identified three key factors that most likely contribute to how local authorities set 
requirements to mitigate flooding and approve development in flood risk areas. These 
include: flood experience in a local authority, stakeholder practice and development 
pressure. If a local authority has flooding experience, it is more inclined to request 
structural measures as part of its policy instead of non-structural measures. The effect 
on development control decisions was less apparent, as in some cases development was 
still allowed in flood risk areas. In particular, Richards (2005) found cases where local 
planning authorities approved developments based on the EA’s advice, even if it was 
not compliant with their own local policies. Therefore, the influence from actors and 
how they interact is apparent. Furthermore, local authorities tended to permit 
development more in urban areas than in rural ones, which can be an indication that 
development pressure influences building in flood risk areas. Lastly, Richards noted 
interactions between the three factors, where flood experience increases the number of 
stakeholders involved, but development pressure lowers the importance attached to 
flood risk by stakeholders. This implies that there is a relationship between the decision 
makers and the wider context. At the same time, exceptions were found, which is in line 
with research by Pardoe et al. (2011) that shows that every local planning process is 
different and multiple processes can have diverse outcomes. 
Building upon the results of research in FRM and in order to explore how decisions are 
made on FRM and which key factors have contributed to these decisions, the influence 
of the governance system and the wider context should be considered. The governance 
system is composed of multiple actors with varying responsibilities and interests, who 
interact within a network set at a distance from central government. By examining 
decision-making networks in detail, the impacts of the actors and their interactions can 
be identified. In addition, the impact of the wider context, such as structures, and the 
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interaction between the network and the wider context, can explain the FRM outcomes 
as they are observed in practice. In order to understand these relationships in the context 
of FRM, this research draws on network governance theory, which is briefly outlined 
below and elaborated on in Chapter 2. 
1.4 Network governance theory 
Decisions on FRM are made in the local planning process within governance networks. 
Therefore, what occurs in these networks influences the delivery of FRM. There are 
various theories, ideas and concepts of governance networks, but the main features 
commonly ascribed to a governance network are as follows: 
• It is a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but 
operationally autonomous actors; 
• Actors are from the public, semi-public or private sectors, or civil society; 
• Actors interact through negotiations; 
• The network operates within an institutionalised framework of rules, norms, 
shared knowledge and social imaginaries; 
• The network is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies, such as 
central government; 
• The network contributes to the production of public purpose (Sørensen and 
Torfing 2007, 2009). 
These features show that actors are influenced by structures, such as rules and norms, 
but also have some discretion in making decisions. Therefore, both actors and structures 
influence the outcome. Structures can be divided into informal and formal structures. 
Informal structures are social structures such as norms and values, whilst formal 
structures are rules and policies, which can impose limits on decision making in a 
network. For instance, central government can exert influence on the network by 
creating structures of legislation, policies, strategic lines, procedures and financial 
resources (Jessop 1995b, Cowell and Murdoch 1999, Whitehead 2003, Swyngedouw 
2005, Grix and Phillpots 2011). 
Sørensen and Torfing (2007) argue that governance networks are important parts of 
contemporary governance processes. In their contribution to the network governance 
debate, they distinguish two generations of governance networks research. The first 
generation, such as research by Rhodes (1996) identified the existence of networks as a 
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type of governance. The second generation has acknowledged the existence of these 
governance networks, but places emphasis on the workings of governance networks and 
their consequences for policy making. The second-generation research mainly attempts 
to address the following gaps in knowledge: 
• How can the formation, functioning and development of governance networks 
be explained? 
• What are the sources for failure and success of governance networks? 
• How can self-regulating networks be regulated? 
• What are the democratic problems and potentials within governance networks 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 14)? 
Even though the second-generation research of network governance mainly focuses on 
the same gaps in knowledge, there is no universal application to conduct this research. 
Sørensen and Torfing, whose work has made major contributions to the debate, 
advocate the need for examining concrete, empirical cases of governance networks by 
combining various theoretical perspectives (Sørensen and Torfing 2007), such as 
governance theory, network theory and institutional theory (Osborne 2010). In addition, 
analysis of governance networks often focuses on common themes, such as actors, 
interdependencies, interactions and institutions (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). This can 
help to identify the influence of actors and structures on an outcome, not only through 
the network arrangement, but also by including hierarchical and market influences 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Relating the outcome to actors and structures may 
contribute to an explanation of why even though governance networks have the ability 
to create effective and efficient solutions, a network can fail, resulting in decisions that 
are poor, biased or not based on consensus (Torfing 2012). 
The research aims to contribute to network governance theory by applying the network 
governance perspective to FRM. It aligns the key questions in network governance 
theory with those that concern FRM. First-generation network governance research has 
already engaged with FRM; for example, Butler and Pidgeon (2011) identified the 
presence of governance networks in FRM. This research aims to contribute to second-
generation research, by examining two cases of governance networks and identifying 
what influences decision making on FRM. The next section translates these intentions 
into a research aim and questions. 
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1.5 Research aim and questions 
The overarching aim of this research is to explore the nature of network governance in 
FRM in local planning processes in England and its influence on the outcome of FRM. 
More specifically, the research aims to address the following questions: 
1. How has network governance of FRM developed? 
2. How do governance networks in FRM function?  
a. How do governance networks in FRM form? 
b. What actors are present? 
c. What are the characteristics of these actors (e.g. roles, responsibilities, 
interests, resources, perceptions and preferences)? 
d. How do actors interact? 
e. How do the wider context and the governance network interact? 
3. What are the key factors in network governance that influence FRM? 
1.6 Methodological approach 
This research applies a stratified ontology,8 based on critical realism (Bhaskar 1975, 
Sayer 2000). In this perspective, the world is composed of structures and mechanisms, 
events and non-events and people’s perceptions. Structures are natural and social 
phenomena that exist independently of how people perceive them, but people will try to 
understand the real world and manipulate structures and mechanisms to produce desired 
events. Social structures are related more closely to agency, as these structures would 
not exist without agents, but at the same time, when a social structure is created it exists 
whether or not people are aware of it (Mingers 2004). People can affirm or reject social 
structures, but different people might perceive structures differently, or might have 
different awareness of the barriers and opportunities they present, which impacts on 
their behaviour. Therefore, both agents and structures matter. As a result, the outcome 
of a decision-making process is not only influenced by natural and social phenomena 
and events, but also by the way agents have experienced them and acted upon them to 
create a desired effect. 
This research adopts a network governance approach, which involves studying concrete, 
empirical cases (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). In addition, the nature of this research 
                                                
8 As opposed to a purely foundational ontology, leading towards a positivist epistemology; or an anti-
foundational ontology, leading towards interpretive approaches. 
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requires detailed examination of a decision-making process and the influence of 
structure and agency. Therefore, the choice has been made to adopt a case study 
approach. The chosen cases are two local planning processes in which decisions are 
made on how to manage flood risk in new, major, mixed-use developments. The first 
case focuses on Newcastle Great Park, a large housing and commercial development on 
former green belt land in the North-East of England. This development is at risk of 
flooding from the rivers Ouseburn and Letch and from surface water flooding. The 
second case examines the redevelopment of a cricket ground in Chelmsford in the 
South-East of England. The development includes cricket-related facilities and housing, 
but is at significant risk of flooding from the river Can. The data has been collected 
through semi-structured interviews, document analysis and site visits. The analysis of 
the cases entails a detailed investigation of the governance network, the wider context 
and the key factors that have influenced FRM. 
1.7 Academic field and contribution 
This research is grounded in the social sciences and more specifically in spatial 
planning. It aims to contribute to the development of theories on network governance, 
whilst also gaining knowledge on how FRM is managed in practice as part of the 
planning process and how key factors influence this. 
Research conducted on FRM and planning is composed of a variety of orientations. 
Firstly, policy-oriented research has been carried out on for instance national policy 
development by analysing the shift from flood protection to FRM and the role of 
planning (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988, Tunstall et al. 2004, Butler and Pidgeon 
2011). Other policy-oriented research has been conducted towards the implementation 
of national FRM policies at the local level (Richards 2005, White and Richards 2007, 
Tunstall et al. 2009, Pardoe et al. 2011). A study by Tunstall et al. (2009) focused on the 
adoption of national policy in practice by examining a planning application and public 
inquiry relating to a development in a flood zone. It discussed the interpretation of 
policy wording, disagreement over flood risk calculations and models and arguments in 
favour of development as part of wider sustainability benefits. It showed an example of 
how the planning authority, applicants and the EA failed to reach an agreed outcome, 
after which the application was decided by central government. However, the focus was 
not on the actors, the decision-making process and contributing factors that led to a 
failure to reach an agreed outcome. It did not examine the process, but the content of the 
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decision. It also mainly focused on the policy framework and not on other structures or 
the influence of agency. 
Secondly, FRM research has been conducted in the field of problem-oriented policy 
research, which is concerned with the causes of problems, potential solutions and the 
effect a policy intervention has on the problem and the wider environment (Scharpf 
1997). There is a vast amount of research on technical aspects of flood risk and flood 
protection, originating from geography or engineering disciplines. These examine 
methods for establishing the risk of flooding, the prediction of flooding and methods for 
protecting against flooding. In addition, the social science literature has focused on the 
role of planning in reducing the problem of flood risk (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 
1988, Parker 1995, Howe and White 2004). 
Thirdly, interaction-oriented policy research focuses on the actors involved in decision 
making and the process they go through. This was the focus of much of the research 
conducted by Scharpf (1997), but not in the context of FRM. Hence, there is a gap in 
knowledge on governance networks in FRM and the key factors that influence FRM, 
which this research aims to address by focusing on the influences of actors and 
structures on decision making in planning processes. 
This research also aims to contribute to network governance theory, in particular by 
contributing to knowledge about the development and functioning of governance 
networks. It builds on existing research by for instance Sørensen and Torfing (2007), 
who apply a multi-disciplinary approach. Network governance theory does not prescribe 
any universal rules for analysis, therefore a study that aims to apply network 
governance would benefit from developing a guiding theoretical framework (Lewis 
2011). In this research, a theoretical framework is developed in Chapter 2 by drawing 
on some aspects of governance theory, network theory and institutionalism. By 
analysing two governance networks, using this theoretical framework, a contribution is 
made to governance network theory and to knowledge on governance networks in 
practice. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
After this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a literature review, focusing on the notion of 
governance and networks. Using established theories, a theoretical framework is 
proposed that informs data collection and analysis. The framework sets out how a 
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governance network functions by being set within a wider context in which institutions, 
structures, events and other agents may influence a network. The governance network 
itself forms a structure as well, within which various agents interact and make decisions. 
The agents perceive the structures, experience barriers or opportunities from them and 
affirm or defy them, thereby affecting interaction, behaviour and policy outcomes. 
Chapter 3 analyses how the governance systems for FRM and for planning have 
evolved from being two separate systems towards a combined arrangement. It focuses 
on how the nature and governance of FRM and planning have developed. This 
development also includes the emergence of governance networks and therefore this 
chapter proceeds to describe the main actors and structures involved in FRM. 
Chapter 4 describes the ontological and epistemological perspective on which this 
research is founded and explains the applied research design and methods in more 
detail. It also lays out the method for case selection, data collection and analysis and 
discusses ethical considerations. It concludes with a section on reflexivity. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on two cases of governance networks that were formed as part 
of a local planning process, in which decisions were made on how to manage flood risk 
in a new development. Each case chapter tells the story of the planning process. It looks 
at the wider flood risk and planning context in which the network is situated, the actors 
involved, their interactions and the ultimate outcome. 
Chapter 7 analyses the outcomes of the case studies and relates this to the used 
theoretical framework. It thereby contributes to the further development of network 
governance theory and adds to knowledge on the governance of FRM in local planning 
processes. 
Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to the research. It summarises the results, answers the 
research questions and discusses limitations of this research and recommendations for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 From government to network governance 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by exploring general governance theory in section 2.2. The main 
focus is on descriptive debates within governance, which examine the organisations and 
rules involved in policy formation and implementation. Scholars participating in these 
debates have identified a shift taking place from government to governance. This shift 
entails that government is making less use of hierarchical arrangements of governing 
and instead promotes collaborative decision making. As a result, policy formation and 
implementation increasingly takes place within networks of public and private actors. 
Therefore, section 2.3 further explains the concept of networks and discusses several 
network approaches and theories, including network governance theory. Based on the 
literature covered in this chapter, a theoretical framework is developed in section 2.4, 
which is used to collect and analyse data and to answer the research questions. 
2.2 Governance theory 
The debate on governance has been prominent within the social sciences for some 
decades. There is a concurrence that governance refers to a process of governing that is 
not defined by hierarchy, but rather based on the interaction of multiple public and 
private actors (Stoker 1998a). However, in literature the term ‘governance’ is used in a 
variety of ways with different definitions and meanings (Stoker 1998a, Davoudi and 
Evans 2005). For instance, some debates are normative, focusing on how the 
government should manage its collective affairs. These debates are based on ideologies, 
such as those derived from Marxism and regulation theory. In regulation theory, the 
state has a key role in guiding economic development by using various forms of 
governance (Jessop 2008), such as rules, laws, regulations and policies. Due to the 
interdependent relationship between economic, social and political features of society9 
these rules and policies are present in many sectors (Stoker 1998b), including urban 
politics (Judge et al. 1995). The shift from government to governance is explained by 
moving away from Fordism towards post-Fordism (Davoudi and Evans 2005). Fordism 
aims for mass production by separating the production process into small and 
                                                
9 For instance in a Fordist regime, social welfare can maintain a healthy labour force and sustain 
consumption (Stoker 1998). 
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specialised tasks. In post-Fordism, flexibility and automation in the production process 
is achieved by using technology and allowing for specialisation by smaller firms (Judge 
et al. 1995). The process of globalisation is not only evident in the economy, but also in 
politics. The state system is denationalising and is losing power upwards, downwards 
and sideways, coupled with a movement away from top-down governing towards more 
decentred governance mechanisms (Jessop 1999). 
Other debates on governance are descriptive, examining the agencies, interests and 
regulatory systems that are involved in making and implementing policy (Davoudi and 
Evans 2005). This research focuses on this descriptive debate, in which the argument 
made is that a shift from government to governance has taken place. The term 
‘government’ represents a hierarchy, in which central government has control over 
policy formation and implementation. Governance is a new type of coordination that 
has taken the place of government, characterised by public and private agents who are 
involved in policy making through coalitions, partnerships and networks with an 
increased autonomy from central government. The number of public, semi-public and 
private agents that are involved in policy is increasing, as European, regional and local 
authorities and external agencies become involved in the decision-making process.  
Kjaer (2004) explains this shift through the emergence of New Public Management 
(NPM), in which the public sector incorporates private sector management techniques, 
such as decentralisation, privatisation and agentification. Decentralisation can occur 
through deconcentration, which is the decentralisation of policy implementation to local 
levels, whilst central government still formulates the policies. Decentralisation can go 
further, when devolution occurs, which stands for a decentralisation of all authority. The 
process of agentification comprises the establishment of various semi-public agencies, 
which are non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). Whilst the government still 
designs policy, the implementation of certain policies is managed by agencies (Kjær 
2004). 
According to Rhodes, a transformation of the public sector has taken place, which 
‘involves “less government” (or less rowing) but “more governance” (or more steering)’ 
(Rhodes 1996: 655). State functions are lost through privatisation, agentification, EU 
policy making and NPM, but the discretion of public servants remains limited and as a 
result, the state becomes hollowed out (Rhodes 1997). Therefore, governance takes 
place in ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ (Rhodes 1996: 660), where 
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interdependent organisations undertake game-like interactions and have certain 
autonomy from the state.  
In academic and political circles, the term ‘governance’ is most often used to signify a 
new mode of governing that is distinct from hierarchy and instead signifies a 
cooperative mode where public and private actors participate in networks (Mayntz 
2003). These networks are relatively self-regulating, meaning that there is a degree of 
freedom to decide on public policy without being directly controlled by a state (Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004, Torfing 2005). However, that does not mean that 
networks are autonomous from central government or that indeed central government 
has lost power to govern. Jessop argues that within modes of governance, the state 
exercises power to organise networks in order to achieve their goals. For instance, 
central government might develop a strategic line, which is then translated into regional 
and local action through institutional arrangements (Jessop 1995b, Cowell and Murdoch 
1999). 
Whitehead (2003) and Swyngedouw (2005) also claim the government has not 
disappeared from governance, but the two co-exist. In an attempt to retain an influence 
in policy outcomes, the government adapts to new forms of governance and fills in the 
hollowing out of strategic capacity, thereby creating a hybrid form of governing (Bache 
and Flinders 2004). Central government’s power has therefore not disappeared, but has 
been adapted to new forms of governance in order to retain control over public policy. 
For instance, any networks that are formed as part of a mode of governance, often 
operate in the shadow of the hierarchy (Scharpf 1994). Decisions made in networks are 
often subject to approval of a higher-level authority, whilst this authority might also 
have created the network itself and the procedures the network has to follow. 
Some scholars have used specific cases to counteract the conceptualisation that there 
has been a shift from government to governance. Skelcher (2000) has observed that 
within partnerships in urban regeneration, training and health, central government 
heavily influences networks. It for instance stimulates the creation of these partnerships 
or networks, it creates inducement through financial resources, gives preferential 
treatment in access to other resources, or sets up rules, such as programme approval and 
monitoring procedures. By creating partnerships and controlling resources, central 
government strategically forces networks in a strict framework, to ensure central 
government’s objectives will be met. Laffin (2009) examined the social housing sector 
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as an example where the influence of central government is still high, although the 
means through which central government exerts power have changed. 
Grix and Phillpots (2011) argue that some governance arrangement may at first seem to 
be based on multi-agency decision making, but if these arrangements are examined in 
more detail, an underlying hierarchical power structure becomes visible. Central 
government has much influence in these networks, for instance by controlling resources. 
The other actors involved as part of governance, have in reality little power to influence 
decision making. This results in what Grix and Phillpots call ‘asymmetrical network 
governance’, which is effectively a strategy to enhance control over policy. They 
illustrate this claim by examining the sports policy sector, where most of the NDPBs are 
controlled by central government through linking financial resources to set criteria and 
only if targets are met is funding released. Grix and Phillpots’ study demonstrates the 
importance of gaining a deep understanding of governance networks, by not assuming 
that just because a network is created, actors have an equal say. Instead, underlying 
power structures must be taken into account to explain interactions and outcomes. 
Apart from hierarchy forming an important influence within a network, the presence of 
private actors also introduces a market element into networks. The neo-liberal climate 
and NPM have caused privatisation and deregulation to promote competition in 
providing public goods and services and as a result, the government has lost power to 
the market. However, even though neo-liberalism stands for ‘less state, more market’, 
market failures such as imperfect competition, unaccounted market externalities and 
inequality still require the state to command and steer (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). 
Market forces in networks will therefore be balanced through hierarchy and cooperation 
in networks, which means that ‘the invisible hand will be combined with a visible 
handshake’ (Jessop and Sum 2006: 268). As a consequence, governance structures and 
practices are often of a hybrid constitution, in which hierarchical, network and market 
arrangement are combined (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). 
On the presence of hierarchy and market influences in network arrangements, Jessop 
concludes that ‘markets and hierarchies still exist, of course; but both operate in a 
context of negotiated decision-making’ (1999: 13), balancing market and hierarchical 
forces through actor interaction. Jessop therefore concludes that ‘it is for these reasons 
that the negotiated economy can be described as a “third way, between market 
economics and central planning”’ (Jessop 1999: 13). In other words, governance is a 
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new way of governing that is different from hierarchy and market coordination, but at 
the same time this does not mean these forces are absent in governance processes, due 
to privatisation and the state trying to keep some control in decision making. 
In addition, even though trends in governance can be identified, there is no one specific 
type of governance. Central government applies many different styles of governance 
with many different purposes and arrangements can vary between policy fields or even 
between individual issues. There is no governance in general, but rather specific 
instances of governance in action, and every case is unique (Cowell and Murdoch 
1999). Governance therefore does not constitute a whole; instead there are different 
arrangements which are governed through a form of self-organisation (Jessop 1995a). 
2.2.1 Meta-governance and network management 
Meta-governance is a term developed by Jessop (e.g. in his 1999 work) to describe 
government influence within governance arrangements in order to keep control over 
policy. Meta-governance relates to the ‘practices and procedures that secure 
governmental influence, command and control within governance regimes’ (Whitehead 
2003: 4), by organising self-organisation, also labelled the governance of governance 
(Jessop 2009), or in Foucault’s terms, the conduct of conduct (see section 2.2.3). The 
government applies meta-governance to define the procedures of any governance 
arrangements as well as the specific outcomes that are to be achieved (Cowell and 
Murdoch 1999). 
Jessop (1999) argues that meta-governance is not just applied by the government, but by 
any actor who wants to influence the decision-making process. According to Jessop, in 
a decision-making network the government is just an equal actor amongst all other 
actors. Even though it has its own distinctive resources that other actors do not have, 
such as public money and law, other resources, such as private money, knowledge and 
expertise, also carry weight in negotiation. This creates interdependence between 
government actors and other actors. The government holds unique resources others rely 
on, but simultaneously, other actors hold resources that are equally important to the 
government; for instance political support, cooperation with implementation and private 
investment (Compston 2009). Furthermore, resources that are vital, such as knowledge, 
are dispersed between public, semi-public and private actors. Therefore, in a governance 
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arrangement the government has to adapt the way it can influence decision making by 
using a wider range of resources: 
The exchange of information and moral suasion become key sources of 
legitimation and the state's influence depends as much on its role as a 
prime source and mediator of collective intelligence as on its command 
over economic resources or legitimate coercion. 
(Jessop and Sum 2006: 268) 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the government is not an equal actor, but 
has more powers than any other actor. Grix and Phillpots (2011) made this observation 
as part of their research into governance and created the term ‘asymmetrical network 
governance’. They argue that the government holds special powers; for instance central 
government can use hierarchical direction to influence networks, in order to set the 
agenda and predetermined goals (Peters and Pierre 2004), in addition to determining the 
rules a network has to abide by. Moreover, the public actor has characteristics that are 
different to other actors in the network. Instead of there being one public actor, there 
might be multiple individuals present that represent different governmental authorities 
or departments with varying interests. Moreover, there might also be semi-public actors 
present, for instance NDPBs that are semi-autonomous from the state, but have some 
public interests. Therefore, government is a divided actor and cannot be treated as a 
unitary actor. 
Meta-governance can be applied exogenously, for instance by rule setting, or it can be 
used to influence the network internally, for instance by direct participation or process 
management (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Dutch scholars such as Klijn, Koppenjan and 
Termeer (1995) have specialised in these forms of meta-governance using the term 
network management. Network management is a form of steering in networks that is 
aimed at promoting joint problem solving or policy formation (Kickert et al. 1997). It is 
aimed at ‘initiating and facilitating interaction processes between actors, creating and 
changing network arrangements for better coordination’ (Kickert et al. 1997: 10). As a 
result, actors with divergent goals and preferences will work towards harmonising their 
strategies. According to Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010b) network management can 
contribute to improved outcomes, especially when the network is dealing with a 
difficult problem. 
Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer (1995) make the distinction between network structuring 
and game management or process management. Network structuring alters the network 
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itself, for instance by introducing or excluding actors, changing the existing distribution 
of resources, the rules of the network and existing perceptions. Through game or 
process management, the network structure remains untouched. For instance, the group 
of actors remains the same, but there may be a selective activation of some actors in a 
policy game to reach an agreement. The resources are not changed, but instead there 
could be a strategic mobilisation of resources. To aid the decision-making process, 
some networks appoint a network manager who manages the process. This can be a 
public actor, an actor delegated by a public authority or by the network as a whole, or a 
single actor who takes the lead (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). Network managers can 
improve the decisions that are made, help to overcome any conflicts and will keep track 
of the time it takes actors to reach an outcome. 
The type of network management applied by a public actor can depend on the 
preferences of that actor. If a governmental actor has strong views on the type of 
outcome it wants to achieve, it might use network structuring by hierarchical direction 
to control the actors. However, if the government perceives process rather than the 
outcome as being the ideal, it may want to try and manage the process if it becomes 
stagnant or entrenched. Therefore, there is a difference between governance being 
interpreted as a means or as an end, which will determine the role the government plays 
in a network. 
2.2.2 Multi-level governance 
A separate but overlapping part of the governance debate is the notion of multi-level 
governance. In the early 1990s, multi-level governance emerged in academic literature 
to analyse the European integration process (Enderlein et al. 2010). In 1993, Marks 
observed a new system of negotiation between nested governments at various territorial 
tiers, with some of central government’s decision-making power moving up to the 
supranational level and some moving down to the regional and local level. He used the 
term ‘multi-level governance’ to describe the notion of several tiers of governments 
interacting and making decisions (Marks 1993). The term has since been applied on 
many occasions, especially to the subjects of European integration, comparative 
federalism and international relations. Multi-level governance is often applied to public 
authority arrangements, but it can also be widened to include non-political actors 
(Enderlein et al. 2010). 
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Hooghe and Marks (2003, 2010) argue that multi-level governance is the most efficient 
governance arrangement to adapt to policy issues that can vary enormously in scale, 
from global issues such as climate change to local-level issues, such as city services. 
How multi-level governance is organised can be categorised into two types. The first 
type of multi-level governance, simply called Type I, is characterised by the dispersion 
of authority to a limited number of levels, which are of general purpose. There are 
international, national, regional, meso-level and local authorities with multiple 
functions, whose boundaries do not intersect. This type of governance is usually stable. 
In Type II governance, authority is divided between task-specific jurisdictions, resulting 
in a large number of authorities, with no set boundaries (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 
2010). Tasks are divided between a variety of organisations, which means that if a new 
issue arises, there might be a possibility that no organisation is willing or able to take 
responsibility for it. However, Type II governance should in theory be flexible, with 
new organisations being developed or existing ones absorbing new tasks if needed. The 
result of Type II governance is that there will be a wide variety of actors involved in 
decision making, which could complicate the process. It also increases complexity for 
citizens when they want to raise an issue, as they will not deal with a single authority, 
but rather with a range of agencies. In that case, it may be difficult to find the agency 
that is responsible for an issue, or none may be willing to take up the issue. 
The core of multi-level governance is the presence of multiple actors, who may be all-
purpose public authorities on different territorial levels, or task-specific actors from 
public bodies, agencies or the private sector who are involved in forming and 
implementing policy. Therefore, multi-level governance is linked to network 
governance literature. Kohler-Koch and Eising even prefer to speak of ‘network 
governance’ in the European Community rather than multi-level governance (Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). They see governance in the EU as a network in 
which state and societal actors interact together in highly organised social sub-systems. 
Central government is in that case: ‘vertically and horizontally segmented and its role 
has changed from authoritative allocation “from above” to the role of an “activator”’ 
(Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999: 5). The notion of governance, multi-level governance 
and network governance are therefore closely related and overlap can often be found in 
the literature. 
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2.2.3 Governmentality 
The change in the manner of governing, from hierarchy to governance, may also be seen 
as a new governmentality. The term ‘governmentality’ was used by Michel Foucault as 
a guideline to analyse the government and how it governs society from Ancient Greek 
times through to modern neo-liberalism (Lemke 2001). It therefore refers to how we 
think about governing (Davoudi and Madanipour 2013). Governmentality is expressed 
through a discourse, or a collection of ideas centred on a certain belief, which 
rationalises the use of direct and indirect power by the government. Indirect control over 
organisations and individuals is used to steer conduct that affirms the discourse 
(Burchell 1996). The government attempts to shape our behaviour through ‘the conduct 
of conduct’. This government is composed of a plurality of governing agencies and 
authorities, which aim to influence a wide variety of behaviour according to particular 
but various norms and for various outcomes (Dean 1999). To do this, the government 
uses a combination of specific techniques and procedures (regimes of practices) and the 
use of local or regional sites of power articulated into mechanisms for producing 
knowledge, whether for accumulating knowledge on individuals or on subjects (Jessop 
2008). Knowledge therefore plays an important role to exert power and to shape an 
individual’s identity. 
The mechanisms that are used to govern and achieve outcomes are referred to as 
technologies (Davoudi and Madanipour 2013). Two technologies are important to 
Foucault: firstly, the technologies of power, which ‘determine the conduct of 
individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the 
subject’ (Foucault et al. 1988: 18); and secondly, technologies of the self, which ‘permit 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being’ 
(Foucault et al. 1988: 18). The technologies of power are methods and knowledge used 
to dominate over others, for instance by the government. The technologies of self, 
which can be individuals in government or those being governed, show that individuals 
are able to think and behave on their own account and can resist existing constraints or 
structures. Dean (1999) calls this the technologies of agency, which is aimed at enabling 
an individual to use their freedom and capabilities to achieve certain outcomes, for 
instance through empowerment, consultation and negotiation. The contact point 
between the way people are being driven by others and the way people conduct 
themselves is what forms the government (Lemke 2001). 
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The current trend of governance is the result of a neo-liberal governmentality (Lemke 
2001). Neo-liberal forms of government utilise direct intervention through state 
apparatuses, but also through indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals 
without being responsible for them. Individuals are deemed self-responsible for social 
risks, such as illness and unemployment, and are supposed to be moral, responsible and 
economic-rational. By creating apparatuses and also by making individuals and groups 
self-responsible, governance takes place within networks with a plurality of actors, who 
govern other groups and individuals (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). As individuals adopt 
the neo-liberal governmentality, these self-regulating networks are expected to produce 
results in line with the predominant discourse. The technologies of self mobilise 
individuals’ agency and capabilities, whilst the technologies of power are used to ensure 
that behaviour and outcomes achieve government’s ends (Davoudi and Madanipour 
2013). 
Foucault addresses the same subjects as governance theory, examining the way in which 
the government controls society. He states that the government is not a centralised 
authority; rather, its powers are diffused. By creating a governmentality that individuals 
believe in and adopt, the government can still have influence over the decisions that are 
being made outside central government. The government does this using a mixture of 
measures; it applies top-down methods, such as rule making, but also uses the ability of 
individuals to make decisions for them, for instance within networks. The use of top-
down methods controls agency and ensures that decisions made are in line with 
government ends. In the words of Cowell and Murdoch (1999) and Jessop (Jessop 
1995b), the state creates a strategic line that is extended into regional and local decision-
making processes through institutional arrangements. Therefore, Foucault’s work links 
to literature on governance and networks, as he states that in a neo-liberal climate 
governing occurs at a distance, away from the state, through actors working together in 
networks. 
2.3 Network theory 
The previous section discussed contemporary governance and various strands of 
governance theory. Governance involves multiple actors interacting to make decisions 
on policy, and networks therefore play an important role. This section examines several 
network theories. In policy science, network theory is seen as one of several approaches 
to researching policy, amongst other theories such as institutional approaches and 
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rational choice approaches (John 1998). It also provides an alternative to pluralist and 
corporatist models. Whilst pluralism states that power is dispersed amongst a large 
number of groups and the government plays a passive role in policy formation, in 
corporatism, a limited number of organisations hold power and are recognised or 
created by central government. These two models do not exist in reality in pure form, 
which is why the concept of networks was created.  
A unitary network theory does not exist; instead there is a wide variety of perspectives 
of what a network constitutes and how this can be applied to research. Börzel has 
organised this ‘“Babylonian” variety of policy network concepts and applications’ 
(Börzel 1998: 253) and claims that the common characteristic of networks between 
disciplines is that it encompasses a variety of interdependent actors with relatively 
stable patterns of interaction, who exchange resources and who share common interests 
with regard to a policy (Börzel 1998). However, these common interests usually refer to 
an interest in an outcome being reached, whilst actors could still have conflicting 
interests. Therefore, actors might not pursue the same goals, but they are willing to 
negotiate, because not reaching an agreement would be less beneficial to them than 
making concessions. 
Börzel (1998) and Marsh and Smith (2000) distinguish between different types of 
network research. Firstly, some theories are quantitative and others qualitative; these 
two forms are not mutually exclusive, but complimentary. The quantitative approach 
analyses networks in terms of their relationships, looking at factors such as cohesion 
and centrality. The qualitative approach focuses on the process and the content of 
interactions between actors as opposed to the structure. Secondly, a distinction can be 
made between theories that treat networks as a typology of interest intermediation, 
which are part of a decision-making process in policy formation and implementation, 
and theories that regard networks as a specific form of governance. The former uses the 
term ‘network’ as any kind of relation between public and private actors, where the 
network is formed to mobilise resources. The latter type falls under the category of 
‘network governance’ and views networks as a specific form of governance that is an 
alternative to hierarchy and market (Börzel 1998, Marsh and Smith 2000). However, 
this distinction is fluid and not always clear. Research that considers networks as a 
typology of interest intermediation can also be extended to become part of network 
governance theory, by considering wider issues of policy formation and 
implementation. 
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2.3.1 Regime theory 
The first theory that examined governance networks is regime theory, which formed the 
foundation of network theory. It was Stone who developed regime theory whilst 
studying informal networks between the local authority and local businesses in Atlanta, 
US. He called this relationship a regime and defined it as: ‘the informal10 arrangements 
by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to 
make and carry out governing decisions’ (Stone 1989: 6; emphasis in original). The 
characteristics of a regime are as follows: 
• Regimes include public and private economic parties; 
• Regimes have common policy agendas, usually the economic development of a 
city; 
• Regimes are relatively stable; 
• Regimes are relatively autonomous; 
• Actors are interdependent and have access to institutional resources; 
• Regimes do not need to share the same beliefs and values, but achieve a 
consensus on policy (Stone 1989, Mossberger and Stoker 2001, Davies 2003, 
Stone 2005). 
Regime theory is based on political economy (Stone 2005). It acknowledges that 
economic forces play an important role in decision making, but emphasises that political 
forces shape decisions as well (Imbroscio 1998). Where the theory describes the 
privileged position of business in governmental decision making, it uses elements of 
neo-Marxism (Judge et al. 1995). However, it moves away from it as well by rejecting 
the structuralist assumption that economic forces determine policy (Mossberger and 
Stoker 2001, Davies 2002), by acknowledging that ‘politics matters’ (Judge et al. 1995: 
56) and by being less state centred (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Furthermore, power 
plays an important role in regime theory; not as a way to exert social control (power 
over), but rather as a tool for creating social production (power to) (Imbroscio 1998). 
Stone links regime theory to governance by stating that ‘governance through informal 
arrangements is about how some forms of coordination of effort prevail over others … 
it is not about absolute control’ (Stone 1989: 5–6). Another characteristic that regimes 
and governance share is that complexity is central, as it acknowledges that actors are 
                                                
10 The arrangement is regarded as informal, because it is formed voluntarily (Stone 1989). 
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involved in a complex network of interdependence. The state cannot have complete 
control, but must combine its capacities with non-governmental actors (Judge et al. 
1995). Some scholars specifically place regime theory under the umbrella of 
governance, such as DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999) and Mossberger and Stoker 
(2001). Regimes can therefore be seen as a type of governance, with a specific set of 
actors (local government and businesses) and a specific policy agenda (urban economic 
development) (Pierre 2005). Others, such as Bassett (1996) and Mossberger and Stoker 
(2001) specifically mention the regime as a type of network. A regime would then be a 
network with strong relations between the local government and businesses, which still 
can be interpreted as a type of governance. 
The application of regime theory in the UK proved to be more limited than in the US, 
because, whilst in the US local government depends more on business to implement 
policy, in British policy processes the market is less influential and the state plays a 
larger role (Bassett 1996, Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Local authorities in the US are 
more dependent on business for tax revenue and experience greater economic 
competition amongst themselves (Judge et al. 1995). In the UK, local government is 
more influential and the business sector less influential, which means that regime theory 
would lose in strength and descriptive and explanatory power if applied to UK cases. 
Regime theory was more of a starting point in examining the influence of multiple 
actors in a policy process. The second step was the development of network theory, 
which does not limit itself to the influence of businesses on policy decisions, but 
includes a variety of public, semi-public and private actors. However, many of the 
characteristics of regimes are still applied to networks, as will become clear in the next 
few paragraphs. 
2.3.2 Rhodes’ network theory  
Rhodes developed a prominent version of network theory by describing governance as 
‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ (1996: 660). These organisations have 
mutual dependencies based on resources, causing a need to exchange resources and to 
negotiate, resulting in game-like interactions (Compston 2009). According to Rhodes, 
these networks are not accountable to the government and therefore have a significant 
degree of autonomy. However, Rhodes concedes that the state does have some influence 
to ‘indirectly and imperfectly steer networks’ (Rhodes 1996: 660), even though this 
influence is limited. 
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As Rhodes argues that governance is equal to networks, the analysis of governance 
should take place on a micro level and should focus on individuals within networks.11 
That is why Rhodes, together with Bevir and Richards, developed the decentred 
approach (Bevir and Rhodes 2001, Bevir and Richards 2009). This approach focuses on 
the diverse beliefs and practices of political agents (Goodwin and Grix 2011). These 
individuals make a choice about what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform. 
Individuals can choose to adopt a certain belief or tradition, but they can also choose to 
reject or modify it. This is also valid for beliefs about institutions and the government. 
The way in which individuals adopt or modify government traditions will shape the type 
of governance, which explains differences in governance between countries. 
Network analysis based on the decentred approach focuses on the individuals present in 
a network and the ability to create and act on beliefs and meanings (Bevir and Richards 
2009). The approach is therefore based on an anti-foundational ontology and an 
interpretive epistemology (Goodwin and Grix 2011), because the focus is on the 
meanings individuals within a network attribute to the world around them and the action 
they take as a result. It therefore rejects the influence of structures on decision making. 
2.3.3 Networks and institutions 
Whereas the decentred approach looks at the influence of agents in networks, other 
theories focus on the influence of structures and institutions. These theories are founded 
on institutionalism, which perceives institutions as being the main determinant of policy 
outcomes. Networks can also be an institute or structure in themselves (Bevir and 
Richards 2009). 
As with governance and networks, there are many different definitions of what 
institutions are. March and Olsen define an institution as: 
A relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning that explain and justify behaviour – roles, identities 
and belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs. 
(Marsh and Olsen 2006: 691; emphasis in original) 
These rules and practices can both be formal and informal. Formal institutions are 
official rules, laws and policies, whilst informal institutions are unwritten rules that 
                                                
11 This is contrary to some research that focuses on governance at the macro level, in order to produce a 
single narrative of the development of governance. 
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guide human interaction, such as conventions, codes of behaviour and the norms and 
values that are present in society. These informal ways that structure human interaction 
are more complex to define, describe and analyse than formal rules (North 1998). 
Institutional change is an incremental process through a continuous creation and 
evolution of institutions over time. Within a formal institutional framework, formal 
rules can change on a short-term basis as the result of political decisions, but informal 
institutions such as traditions and codes of conduct generally only evolve slowly over 
time (North 1998). Institutions influence the roles, identities, powers and resources of 
actors and organise the interactions between actors. Institutions in a policy process 
therefore guide decision making. Due to institutional change, the constraints and 
opportunities for behaviour and thus the possible strategies for agents continually 
change as well. 
There are various strands of institutional theories with different ontological and 
epistemological foundations in existence, such as historical, sociological and rational 
choice institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism focuses on the informal norms and 
rules actors choose to abide by, to avoid social disapproval or exclusion (Helderman 
2007). Within historical institutionalism, institutions are perceived as a system of formal 
and informal rules that regulate political action. Institutions in this approach are 
enforced through the state. Political struggles take place within an institutional 
framework, but the outcome of these struggles will also impact on this framework 
through incremental change (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Political structures provide 
constraints to agents, but agents also play a part in maintaining and changing these 
structures. Rational choice institutionalism presupposes that individuals make rational 
decisions based on expected costs and benefits. Individuals develop strategies and play 
games to ensure the best outcome. Therefore, if the institutions are identified, agents’ 
behaviour and the outcome can be predicted. 
In addition, Scharpf (1997) developed an actor-centred institutionalism with elements of 
rational choice theory and applied it to decision making in policy processes. He argues 
that policy is the result of interactions of bounded rational actors, who will act on the 
basis of their perceived reality and their subjectively defined interests. The purpose of 
their action is to achieve maximisation of self-interest and they will play strategic games 
with each other in order to reach their goals. The institutional setting – for instance, a 
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network – influences the actors’ behaviour, and by defining this institutional setting and 
the actors, the policy games and outcome can be predicted. 
Some actors are individual actors and only represent themselves in the process, whilst 
others are composite actors who are representatives of the organisation they work for. 
Scharpf (1997) also characterises actors by their orientations, which comprise 
perceptions and preferences, and the capability to deploy resources. An actor’s 
perception is formed by their cognitive orientation, which is the observation of facts 
such as cause and effect relationships. An actor’s knowledge is derived from their 
institutional framework, which is shared by other actors. The more orientations differ, 
the more difficult interaction between actors will become. 
Figure 1: Actor-centred institutionalism  
Source: Adapted from Scharpf 1997: 44 
Preference is categorised into interests, norms, identities and interaction orientations. 
There are five different interaction orientations, namely: individualism, solidarity, 
competition, altruism and hostility. The second characteristic of an actor in addition to 
the orientations is the ability to deploy resources. Resources, such as knowledge, labour 
and financial resources are needed to ensure that other actors within a policy process are 
dependent on the actor. Lastly, the constellation and mode of interaction influence the 
policy outcome. A constellation can be founded on coordination, mixed motives and 
conflicts, which influences the interaction between actors. The institutional setting also 
affects the interaction, for instance actors within a network interact through negotiations 
and/or unilateral action. This differs from a market setting with predominantly unilateral 
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action and from a hierarchy that involves majority voting and hierarchical direction 
(Scharpf 1994). 
Actor-centred institutionalism is a deductive, positivist and quantitative approach to 
analysing policy processes, which is based on very different ontological and 
epistemological beliefs compared to Rhodes’ anti-foundational decentred approach 
(Rhodes 2006). Scharpf’s model does not take the influence of agency into account as 
Rhodes’ approach does. It sees individuals as being ruled by institutions and their desire 
for self-maximisation. It assumes policy outcomes can be predicted if the institutional 
setting is known. However, even if human behaviour could be simplified in this manner, 
predicting any policy outcomes will still be complex, as it will be difficult to identify all 
relevant institutions. 
Even though institutionalism is often applied as part of network governance, it is not 
applied in the way Scharpf meant. Some scholars adopt a ‘non-formal, context-oriented 
and “thin” rational choice perspective’ (Hertting 2007: 45), presuming that actors in 
governance networks are more or less rational and understand and give meaning to their 
actions in specific contexts. The approach is ‘thin’ because actors are presumed to have 
perceived rationalities, rather than objective rationalities based on maximising their self-
interest. This perception is derived from the specific context they are acting in, such as 
social and cultural, political and administrative contexts. 
2.3.4 The dialectical model of networks 
The theories discussed so far focus either on the influence of agents or structures on 
decision making, but there are other approaches that examine the way agents and 
structures influence each other and therefore both influence policy making. For 
instance, structuration theory by Giddens (1984) is a well-known theory in the social 
sciences, in which agency and structure support each other and cannot exist without 
each other. Structures are maintained and created by agents, and they are dynamic, as 
their existence depends on the use of structures by agents. Individuals are purposive and 
reflexive agents, who have reasons for their specific action and can explain these 
reasons. Agents use resources, or structured properties of social systems, which provide 
agents with power as they can use them to control other agents. Power is not a resource 
on its own, but resources are media through which power is exercised. Not all resources 
are equally distributed and some resources are limited, such as authoritative resources 
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(control over people) and allocative resources (control over material resources). 
Additionally, the agent has to be able to use these structures. This can cause autonomy 
or dependency relations between actors, causing a continuity of power. However, 
Giddens states that even agents who are dependent on others still have some resources 
that they can utilise to influence the behaviour of their superiors (Giddens 1984, Parker 
2000). 
Structuration theory can be useful in explaining behaviour in policy networks. A 
network is formed within a social structure that provides opportunity and constraints to 
the actors within the network, including the presence of resources. If agents are able to 
use the resources available, they can exercise power over others. The structure and 
resources are independent from the agent and network, but it is the agent’s 
responsibility to use or reject and try to change them. Therefore, the structure influences 
the agent, but an agent can also influence a structure. 
Another theory using the dialectical structure/agency approach, but in relation to the 
state specifically, is the strategic–relational approach (SRA) by Jessop, which places the 
state and political systems in a broader environment of social relations. The state is not 
just a product of social development, but also an important influence on the structure 
and dynamic of social formations. SRA defines the core of the state apparatus as a: 
distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially 
accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions 
on a given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general 
will’. 
 (Jessop 2008: 9) 
SRA involves a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, which are 
interlinked by the use of strategy. Social structure is the result of structurally inscribed 
strategic selectivity by agents. Constraints or opportunities that structures provide to 
agents are dependent on time, space, agency and strategy. Agents are reflexive to their 
particular situation and undertake strategically calculated and structurally oriented 
action. Agents are able to modify some structures, providing them with conjectural 
opportunities, but they might also come across structural constraints that cannot be 
altered. Structures only exist within the temporal and spatial horizons of action pursued 
by actors, whilst actors always act within specific action contexts formed by institutions 
and the interaction of other social actors. A structural constraint for one agent may pose 
as a conjectural opportunity for another, but structures might also be different over time 
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or space. Furthermore, agents may adapt their strategies to their experiences. The study 
of specific agents that undertake specific action for the realisation of a specific goal, in a 
specific time and space, will result in an explanation of the exercise of power (Smith 
2000, Jessop 2008). 
SRA explains that agents are influenced by structure, but they have to use their agency 
to affirm or reject these structures. As it presumes structures are independent of agents, 
SRA is premised on a critical realist philosophy of social science (Jessop 2008). 
Structural conditions, including power, are ‘real’ and exist independently of our 
knowledge. However, it takes human agency for these structures to become an influence 
on behaviour and action (Fawcett 2011). 
Marsh and Smith (2000) also apply a critical realist approach, but with the aim to 
explain decision making in policy networks. In their dialectical approach, they identify 
three dialectical relationships: between the structure of the network and the agents, 
between the network and the context within which it operates and between the network 
and the policy outcome (Figure 2). Each of these relationships is dialectical, because it 
forms ‘an interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the other 
in a continuing iterative process’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 5). 
In a network, structures influence agents and the network, but agents interpret these 
structures and negotiate constraints and opportunities that are derived from these 
structures. Structures can be internal and external to the network. Internally, when 
interaction becomes institutionalised, the network itself forms a structure. Externally, 
the broader political and social–structural context forms a framework within which the 
network operates. Changing structures or other exogenous developments can therefore 
cause change in a network, but agents will interpret these changes and negotiate the 
effect it will have on the network. As a result, even though elements such as institutions, 
network structure or resources exist independently from agents, these agents will have 
to interpret and apply them and therefore these elements are all to an extent socially 
constructed. Although the model shows a relationship between the network and the 
outcome, this relationship is complicated and not causal; the model is neither predictive 
nor deterministic. The dialectical model does show the complexities involved in 
network decision making and the relationships between elements involved. One of the 
relationships between elements is feedback between the policy outcome, the structural 
context and the learning process of actors. The eventual policy outcome feeds back into 
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society by changing the broader context. Moreover, outcomes in a network can also 
affect agents that participate in other networks, for instance by learning or by acquiring 
new resources. 
 
Figure 2: Dialectical approach to networks  
Source: Adapted from Marsh and Smith 2000: 10 
Marsh and Smith (2000) explain that agents in a network have preferences or interests 
that are partly defined from the membership in that network, but they also have other, 
perhaps contradictory interests derived from the broader structure or from being a 
member in another network. They also claim that network members have innate skills, 
which affects their capacity to use opportunities or negotiate constraints, but what this 
entails is not clarified (Raab 2001). Furthermore, actors’ preferences are lacking in the 
model, even though for instance Scharpf (1997) argues that this affects the policy 
outcome. 
Another shortcoming of the model is addressed in a later article by Toke and Marsh 
(2003), who apply the dialectical model to analyse policy change for genetically 
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modified crops in the UK. They find that by applying the model to a case, some 
weaknesses are revealed. Firstly, there is no distinction between groups of actors and 
individual actors. Secondly, the influence of inside groups may be exaggerated at the 
cost of outside groups. In the case of genetically modified crops, environmental groups 
had much agenda-setting power and they also pressurised supermarkets into no longer 
selling these foods, which was not an outcome decided by the network. It can be argued, 
however, that outside influence is present through the dialectical relationship between 
context and network. The model would benefit from adding that, in the context, not only 
structural influences are relevant, but also influences from agents. This strengthens the 
dialectical relationship between structure and agency. After all, if a network is 
composed of structure and agency, it is only logical that the context would also 
comprise both structures and agents. 
In response to Marsh and Smith’s dialectical approach, Evans (2001) discusses how this 
approach uses macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis to examine policy networks 
and policy outcomes. He visualises the complex relationship between the network as a 
structure and the wider context comprising structure and agency. Evans’ model 
therefore excludes the micro-level analysis of relations inside the network. 
Figure 3 shows the network existing within a wider policy environment, in which 
formal and informal institutions, ideologies, history, culture and beliefs, macro-
economic variables, other networks and external agents and groups all influence the 
network. Simultaneously, the network itself affects the policy environment. Evans 
identifies the exogenous key factors that influence a network and its outcome by 
connecting macro structures to the meso structure of the network. The network itself is 
represented as a black box and does not show the impact the different elements of the 
environment have inside the network. It also fails to show the decision-making process 
between agents in a network and therefore lacks clarity on a micro level. 
A more comprehensive approach to analysing networks would include the dialectical 
relationship between the environment, the network, the actors and the policy outcome. 
Marsh and Smith’s approach (2000) forms a good starting point. It enables an analysis 
on three abstract levels: the macro environment, the structure of the network and the 
micro-level relationships between actors and their decision making. The governance 
network itself forms the network structure, which influences decision making. The 
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micro-level analysis inside the network shows the interaction between agents and the 
policy outcome. 
The dialectical model’s weakness is the lack of detail regarding what the structural 
context is composed of, but this has been addressed by Evans (2001). However, both the 
dialectical model and Evans’ model leave out some detail in the micro level. This is 
where actor-centred institutionalism can provide the missing elements, by identifying 
the institutions that are present in the structural context, but also by looking at actors’ 
preferences in more detail. The deductive nature of institutional theory would not be 
adopted, but instead the critical realist stance would remain in place, which allows for 
the influence of agency. 
 
Figure 3: Dialectical approach visualised by Evans 
Source: Adapted from Evans 2001: 544 
Marsh and Smith (2000) state that their dialectical model examines the roles networks 
play in policy development and implementation, as opposed to networks being treated 
as a new form of governance. However, that does not mean the model cannot be 
extended to form part of the governance debate. Governance can be treated as a 
structure that is part of the context of a network, being present in formal and informal 
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institutions, political structures and in external agents. This means that a political 
culture favouring network governance will influence the establishment of governance 
networks and could influence the agents in the network if they agree with this 
governmentality and strive for cooperation and autonomous decisions making without 
relying on central government. The predominant type of governance will influence the 
type of networks that are established and their outcomes. Type I multi-level governance 
will create small, tight networks in which responsibility is clear, which might stimulate 
cooperation. If Type II multi-level governance is prevalent, large networks are created 
that include many agencies with overlapping boundaries. As responsibility and authority 
may be muddled, decision making becomes complicated. On the other hand, there might 
be an increased flexibility, which increases the ability of agents to adapt to new 
circumstances. Furthermore, any policy outcomes will affect the network governance 
debate. If networks are successful, it will reinforce the idea that network governance is 
the desired arrangement, but if networks fail it may cause doubts, or a change in the 
way policy is decided upon. 
2.3.5 Network governance theory 
An additional strand of governance research12 examines governance arrangements that 
involve networks (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). In recent years, meta-
analytical literature on network governance has emerged (Lewis 2011), initiated by 
scholars from the Centre for Democratic Network Governance at Roskilde University 
(e.g. Sørensen and Torfing) and Dutch scholars with a background in network theory 
(e.g. Klijn and Koppenjan). The Centre for Democratic Network Governance focuses 
specifically on network governance research, whilst scholars at other universities have 
also contributed, resulting in a series of books on network governance with a collection 
of chapters by various authors (Marcussen and Torfing 2006, Bogason and Zølner 2007, 
Sørensen and Torfing 2007). 
Sørensen and Torfing (2007) argue that some of the past research on networks, 
institutions and governance can be classed as a first generation, because it focused on 
the emergence of governance networks, including work by Kooiman, Rhodes, Jessop 
and even Foucault. Even though these authors did not use the term ‘network 
                                                
12 Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden argue that there are nine approaches to governance: network 
governance, good governance, international relations, self-organisation, economic governance, corporate 
governance, NPM, multi-level governance and private network governance (2004).  
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governance’, Sørensen and Torfing argue that their research can be perceived as such, 
because they examined the formation of networks as part of a governance arrangement 
and the differences between networks and state and market-led coordination. Building 
on these past studies, Sørensen and Torfing seek to develop a second generation of 
research, which focuses mainly on four topics: research on the formation, function and 
development of governance networks, research on the failure and success of networks, 
research on meta-governance and research on democratic problems and potential in 
these networks. This second generation of network governance research aims to be 
multi-disciplinary, meaning that: 
Political studies of institutions, power and decision making are articulated 
with sociological studies of culture, communication and social control 
and organizational studies of cognitive frames, learning and resource 
exchange. Different theoretical approaches are drawn upon in the attempt 
to address research problems derived from studies of concrete, empirical 
cases of network governance. 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 6) 
Governance networks are seen as a specific form of governance (through networks) or a 
specific form of network (as part of governance).13 The networks are composed of a 
plurality of actors, such as politicians, administrators, interest groups, private companies 
and citizens, who interact and negotiate to achieve public outcomes (Torfing 2005). The 
definition of a governance network includes institutional influences, such as hierarchical 
rule, and agency influences, such as the culture and values of actors. It therefore 
attempts to combine network theory, institutionalism and governance theory by defining 
a governance network as: 
A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but 
operationally autonomous actors, who interact through negotiations, 
which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary 
framework, that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies, 
and which contributes to the production of public purpose. 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 9) 
The regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework is further explained as 
comprising: 
A regulative aspect, since it provides rules, roles and procedures; a 
normative aspect, as it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive 
element, given that it generates codes, concepts and specialised 
                                                
13 The terms ‘network governance’ and ‘governance networks’ are often used interchangeably. Network 
governance can be seen as the type of governance that is realised through networks, whilst governance 
networks can be seen as those networks that are established as part of a governance arrangement. 
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knowledge, and an imaginary aspect, seeing as it produces identities, 
ideologies and common hopes. 
(Torfing 2005: 308) 
The definition focuses on networks being relatively autonomous, but it also recognises 
that even though it is a network governance arrangement, outside authorities are likely 
to have an influence: for instance government imposing rules onto a network. In 
addition, it combines thoughts about the bounded reality actors live in and their agency, 
by referring to cognitive and imaginary frameworks. Lastly, it acknowledges the 
influence of institutions and structures by including the regulative framework and 
normative framework. This use of four different frameworks can also be found in actor-
centred institutionalism through formal and informal institutions and actors’ preferences 
and perceptions. Therefore, this network governance theory borrows heavily from 
established theories, which is its strength. It promotes the application of a variety of 
established theories, founded on the dialectical approach, in which both structure and 
agency influence the production of public purpose. 
Even though network governance theory is producing more knowledge on governance 
networks and addresses issues regarding their function and their failures, it does not 
provide a unitary method to research governance networks. Therefore, when applying 
the network governance lens to a research, there is no restriction to certain theories or 
research methods. Moreover, if a scholar uses the term, it does not always imply that a 
combination of thoughts on networks and institutions has been applied; network 
governance is a relatively flexible concept. 
Lewis (2011) also argues that even though network governance theory has made a 
contribution to research in this field, for instance by defining the governance network, 
there is still a need to establish a theoretical framework to guide analysis. However, 
Lewis sees this openness as a strength, offering a diversity of approaches and providing 
researchers with a choice in what method they find best to apply. Simultaneously, Lewis 
states that synthesising different approaches will be the most rewarding approach to 
increase knowledge on governance networks, by regarding these networks both as 
structures and cultures. 
Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) find that even though network governance theory does not 
provide a universal approach, common concepts and assumptions can still be identified. 
Firstly, network governance research examines actors, their perceptions and their 
interdependencies. Secondly, as a consequence of perceptions and interdependencies, 
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complex interactions and patterns of negotiation emerge between actors, which will 
influence the outcome. Thirdly, the interaction patterns become institutionalised, 
forming a certain network structure of social interaction and patterns of rules. Lastly, 
when network processes become complex, guidance and management of interactions 
are required. This concept of network management is another element that is examined 
as part of network governance research. 
However, even though network governance provides guiding elements in what 
influences decision making, it does not explain how these elements are interlinked. For 
instance, how does the constellation of actors determine what normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework is being tapped into to make decisions? Can the frameworks 
explain what public purpose is being produced? Moreover, network governance theory 
does not explain change. How can frameworks that actors are using change? What does 
that mean for the policy outcome? Where does this change come from? Network 
governance theory still leaves many questions unanswered and network governance 
research should therefore also be aimed at identifying relationships between the 
elements of governance networks. 
Other scholars have observed more substantive issues with network governance theory. 
For instance, Davies (2011, 2012) argues that network governance is part of a 
hegemonic strategy based on a neo-liberal perspective. He acknowledges the existence 
of networks as a type of interest intermediation and an arena for exchanging resources, 
but states that network governance as an ideal type of governance, built on 
collaboration, trust and empowerment, does not exist. Instead, he states that network 
governance is based on hierarchy, closure and coercion. Davies – inspired by Marxism 
– claims that this hierarchy and coercion is vital for the maintenance of social order. He 
therefore argues that the shift from government to governance has never taken place and 
that it is misleading to characterise institutions as ‘hierarchies’ or ‘networks’. 
However, previously discussed research is more balanced. For instance, scholars such 
as Jessop (1995b), Whitehead (2003) and Swyngedouw (2005) argue that even though 
elements of hierarchy have not entirely been eliminated, the shift from government to 
governance has taken place. Network governance is characterised by decision making at 
a distance from central government, where actors operate within a certain institutional 
framework, but with a degree of discretion. Governance networks and the actors within 
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the network have the ability to influence the outcome and are therefore not completely 
coerced. 
Moreover, even though Davies argues that governance networks ‘have no special 
potential’ (2011: 152), other scholars such as Klijn et al. (2010a) and Agranoff and 
McGuire (2001) have discussed the opportunities that networks provide to collaborate, 
build consensus and create synergy, which will be further discussed in section 2.4.2. For 
instance, actors can share knowledge, resources and ideas and implement a decision 
together, but they would not do this without a degree of trust. This ideal type of network 
may not always be achieved, but it is certainly a possibility. Even though Davies’ 
perspective on network governance does not entirely reflect policy practice, it does 
emphasise the importance of understanding and identifying the hierarchical elements 
within a network and the effects on the actors and the outcome. 
2.3.6 Summary 
The theories covered in this section examine the way the government governs. The term 
‘governance’ is used to indicate a shift has occurred away from hierarchy, towards an 
arrangement that includes a variety of agencies and actors, dispersed over multiple 
spatial levels, from the public and private sector, such as discussed in the multi-level 
governance approach (e.g. in the work of Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010). Even though 
multiple actors are involved in decision making, central government is still able to exert 
control, for instance by using a combination of technologies of power and technologies 
of self (Foucault et al. 1988). 
Networks play an important role in governance and various approaches and theories 
have been developed to study these networks. Some theories focus on studying the 
beliefs and behaviour of individuals in networks. For instance, Rhodes developed an 
approach that studies individuals, their beliefs and behaviour to explain policy outcomes 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2001, Bevir and Richards 2009). Other theories such as actor-
centred institutionalism use the influence of structures to explain policy outcomes 
(Scharpf 1997). Finally, dialectical approaches take both agents and structures into 
account when analysing the influences on policy outcomes (e.g. in the work of Marsh 
and Smith 2000).  
Building on past theories on governance, networks and institutions, a network 
governance theory has emerged that specifically examines networks that are part of 
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governance arrangements. This emerging theory provides a definition of governance 
networks that includes the influence of agency and structures. Within a governance 
network, interdependent actors interact within a normative, cognitive and regulatory 
framework to produce public purpose. However, there is no explanation of how the 
agents, structures and outcome influence each other, even though there are existing 
approaches and theories on governance, networks and institutions that could provide 
this explanation. This research therefore includes a theoretical framework that combines 
several of these approaches and theories. The theoretical framework is founded on 
critical realism and focuses on the dialectical relationship between structure and agency, 
which is explained in the next section. 
2.4 The functioning of governance networks 
The purpose of developing a framework for analysing governance networks is to 
examine how governance networks are functioning and to guide data collection and 
analysis. The framework is based on multiple theoretical perspectives centred on 
concepts of governance, networks and institutions. It applies a dialectical relationship 
between the network and the environment, between the network and the agents, and 
between the network and the outcome, as applied by Marsh and Smith (2000). To 
provide more detail, elements from Evans’ approach (2001) and Scharpf’s 
institutionalism (1997) are included as well. 
Network functioning is dependent on influences from structure and agency, which 
affect the interaction within a network and the outcome. The theoretical framework, 
visualised in Figure 4, shows the functioning of a governance network once it is formed, 
by placing the governance network in a wider context. The network is not a closed 
structure, but is open to the wider structural context. This wider context influences the 
network, but the network influences the wider context as well. The governance network 
itself is composed of a policy problem, the actors, their interactions and the outcome. 
All elements are open to wider influences, visualised by the dashed lines, whilst the 
arrows represent the relationships between the different elements. 
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Figure 4: Functioning of governance networks 
The elements are dynamic and a change in one element will impinge on other elements 
and ultimately the outcome. Each change in an element is negotiated by the agents in 
the network and can alter the actors present in the network, their resources, perceptions, 
preferences and interactions. This section describes each element and their relationship 
with other elements. 
2.4.1 Formation of the governance network 
Networks can be formed for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the network might be formed 
as a response to the emergence of a policy problem that actors wish to address. A 
network can also be formed voluntarily; for instance, by a group of actors who share a 
common goal or vision or by the actions of a strong actor who mobilises others 
(Waddock 1989). Networks can also be the result of direct or indirect governmental 
direction. For instance, public authorities can create networks directly by creating a 
mandate or rules and policies to form statutory networks, in which agencies have to 
make decisions together. Networks are formed indirectly through creating conditions for 
  42 
the establishment of a network (Hoff 2003), for instance by offering financial incentives 
to those agencies that join a network, as is the case with for instance public–private 
partnerships. 
The way the network has formed can influence the structure of a network and its 
outcome. Firstly, the hierarchical mode of coordination can be of great influence in 
networks that have been indirectly created by government, as Grix and Phillpots (2011) 
and Laffin (2009) found in their research. The level of self-regulation and freedom can 
differ significantly between governance networks, which will affect the outcome. 
However, even when a network is formed under the influence of a public authority, 
there is usually still a degree of self-regulation within the limits set by external agencies. 
Secondly, the interaction may differ between voluntary and involuntary networks. If a 
network is formed voluntarily, the actors in that network will have agreed in advance 
that cooperation is fruitful. The voluntary network may be ideological in nature, 
focusing on the process of cooperation and thereby improving interaction. This 
improves the chance of synergy and an outcome all actors agree with. On the other 
hand, if a network is formed involuntarily, a positive interaction is not guaranteed. An 
involuntary network may be functional in nature, having been assigned externally. Its 
focus is on achieving a decision or outcome, whilst the process of negotiation and 
cooperation, instead of it being the starting point of interaction, is one that has been 
forced upon the network. 
Finally, the inclusion and exclusion of actors in the formation stage may affect 
interaction and the outcome. Edelenbos and Klijn (2005) argue that early involvement 
of actors stimulates joint decision making, increases support for the outcome and 
prevents the use of veto power. Even though including more actors may complicate 
decision making, overall it can save time when impasses are prevented. Therefore, 
excluding actors in the early stages when the network is formed may create problems 
later in the process, especially when the excluded actors have the power to block 
decision making. 
2.4.2 Policy problem 
The policy problem in a governance network can be a general policy problem (for 
instance, flood risk on a site), but the exact definition, boundaries and meaning are part 
of an actor’s perception (for instance, the exact flood levels or the consequences of 
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flooding). As actors define the policy problem, it is dynamic and might be redefined 
during the decision-making process. Therefore, the problem definition can differ 
between actors and can be contested (Brownill and Carpenter 2009). The policy 
problem can also be of a wicked nature and might have risks attached (Torfing 2005). 
Wicked problems are often surrounded by cognitive uncertainty (Van Bueren et al. 
2003). Firstly, there is uncertainty about the nature of the problem; the problem is 
complex and there is a lack of knowledge. In addition, there can be discrepancies 
between the problem definitions of various actors. Secondly, there will not be a true or 
false solution to a wicked problem. Thirdly, a wicked problem has no clear end to it; it 
is unknown when or if it will ever be solved (Rittel and Webber 1973). Furthermore, 
institutional uncertainty is created when various decisions on a problem are taken in 
different policy fields or governmental levels (Van Bueren et al. 2003). Additionally, 
actors will originate from different institutional backgrounds, which can cause conflicts. 
Lastly, actors working with a wicked problem make strategic choices, causing strategic 
uncertainty that can influence the problem-solving process (Koppenjan and Klĳn 2004). 
If a policy problem is wicked or associated with much uncertainty, actors can respond in 
various ways to deal with uncertainty. For instance, actors can start collecting 
information, conduct research or involve other actors to attempt to reduce uncertainty 
surrounding a problem (Koppenjan and Klĳn 2004). However, this approach is not 
always successful. For instance, research on the effects of climate change is still 
surrounded in uncertainty, which complicates decision making. 
Some scholars argue that networks can be effective in dealing with these wicked 
problems, because they have the ability to combine knowledge and generate better 
solutions, as well as increasing the chances of implementation (Parker 2007, Brownill 
and Carpenter 2009, Klijn et al. 2010a). Networks could even create a synergy, where 
multiple actors are committed to develop new alternatives that would not have been 
practicable through unitary action (Agranoff and McGuire 2001) and multiple actors 
will have greater resources and greater knowledge to tackle a problem. The network can 
also provide flexibility to adjust to complexities and uncertainties that occur during the 
process. Conflicts may arise between actors, but it is argued that the network develops 
their own ways of negotiating and overcoming conflict to create a consensus. 
Furthermore, when a decision is made, it is expected that the actors have developed a 
joint responsibility and will therefore put effort into implementing the policy (Sørensen 
and Torfing 2007).  
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However, it is inherent to wicked problems that knowledge may not be able to make a 
problem clearer. In a network, a plurality of actors stands for a plurality of perceptions 
and there is a chance that knowledge will be used as a strategy or as a way to exert 
power. For instance, they may produce research that supports their perception of the 
problem and their preferences, which is not constructive to solving the problem of 
uncertainty. Therefore, actors in a network may not be able to address the cognitive 
uncertainty, whilst they may struggle with the institutional uncertainty and may increase 
the strategic uncertainty. In this case, network management can be used to stimulate the 
opportunities that networks offer, in order to tackle policy problems and overcome any 
issues. 
Other issues that some networks encounter are problems and outcomes that have a 
degree of risk embedded. Risk can be defined as:  
the possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effects) may 
occur as a result of natural events or human activities. 
(Renn 2008: 98) 
Risk refers to a situation in which something of human value has been put at stake and 
of which the outcome is uncertain. In academic literature, the term ‘risk governance’ is 
used to describe the governance process in which risk is managed through the 
collaboration of multiple actors. These different actors all have their own perception of 
risk. A risk manager needs to consider these different perceptions when deciding if a 
risk should be taken and what risk reduction measures are appropriate. However, there 
could be a tension between the ‘facts’ and the ‘feelings’ of risk. Some question if 
science should be the main determinant of making risk-based decisions, or if the science 
perception is equal to subjective perceptions of risk held by other actors (International 
Risk Governance Council 2005). Obviously, a wicked problem can include a risk, 
which means that knowledge about this risk is limited, increasing the complexity of 
decision making. 
2.4.3 Actors and interactions 
A governance network has a variety of actors, which originate from the public, semi-
public, private and community sector. Which actors are included in the network is the 
result of the governmentality, which can be expressed through policies and regulations. 
In addition, the type of multi-level governance will also influence the network 
membership. Finally, the network constellation may also be the result of the problem 
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definition that requires certain actors to become involved or of the network interaction, 
for instance if an actor decides to leave the network due to conflict. 
Actors may be individual actors and only represent themselves in the process, whilst 
others are composite actors, representing the organisation they work for. In addition, 
any actor can belong to other networks or normative circles.14 The perception and 
preference of an actor is an individual factor, but is also influenced by membership. 
Individuals have causal power in their own right, but social groups possess causal 
powers that are greater than the sum of the individuals; this perspective is known as 
emergence theory (Elder-Vass 2010). The perception of an individual can be in conflict 
with that of their organisation or group. In addition, if the actor or organisation is part of 
other networks, interests may become incongruous. By regarding actors as being 
composite or belonging to other groups, one weakness of the dialectical model by 
Marsh and Smith (2000) is addressed, which was that in their model no distinction 
could be made between individual actors and groups. 
The description of the actors in a network includes their characteristics and their 
resources, to determine interdependence. Actors are characterised by their interests, 
preferences, perceptions and resources. An actor’s interest refers to what benefits this 
particular actor, which will influence their preference and strategy. Perceptions 
influence the actor’s definition of the policy problem, what type of outcome they can 
visualise and how they see other actors. Resources are structural elements that exist 
independently from the actor, but it is up to the actor to identify and make use of 
resources. The actors’ resources will influence the interdependencies in a network. 
Their resources can be, for instance, authority, financial resources, knowledge and 
labour that are present in their particular organisation. However, an individual’s 
resource can also be a person’s ability to cope with a network situation. This personal 
resource is similar to an actor’s skill from Marsh and Smith’s dialectical model (2000) 
and is an important part of an individual’s agency, as it allows an actor to reach their 
preferred policy outcome. 
One element that is implicit in this model is power. Power influences the capacities of 
actors to achieve desired outcomes (Morriss 2002) and this power is often not equally 
divided (Goodwin and Grix 2011). It is therefore important for actors to understand 
their own power, but also the power of others. Understanding your own power means 
                                                
14 A normative circle is a group of individuals who adhere to a shared social norm or rule, producing 
social power (Elder-Vass 2010). 
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that you understand how to use your agency to apply or change structures to achieve 
your goal. Understanding the other actors’ powers means that you can predict how 
others can influence the outcome in a beneficial or adverse way (Morriss 2002). 
However, power is not readily identifiable; for instance, it cannot be directly derived 
from the resources actors have: 
One should not measure the resources as an accountant, but make a 
qualitative assessment of the actions open to the partners and of the 
dynamics of their games. It is equally indispensable to focus on the 
relationship as such and not on each partner's respective power. Even if 
one partner appears completely to dominate the other, the dependence 
remains reciprocal—no matter how absolute the right of life and death is 
held by masters over their slaves. Masters are dependent on their slaves' 
survival in order to retain lordship over them. 
(Crozier and Thoenig 1976: 562) 
Identifying power in a network therefore goes beyond listing available resources or 
observing behaviour. Lukes suggests applying an agent-centred approach that not only 
considers the power agents exercise, but also the power that they do not exercise 
(Hayward and Lukes 2008). He argues that there are three dimensions of power. The 
first dimension entails the power to prevail over the opposition of other actors, which 
can be identified by examining overt behaviour in decision making. The second 
dimension entails the power to control participation and set the agenda. In a network, 
this includes the power to alter the network structure. The third dimension focuses on 
the power to influence the preferences and perceptions of other actors. An example of 
the third dimension of power is the conduct of conduct as discussed by Foucault (for 
instance 1991). To ensure that individuals and groups take decisions that are in harmony 
with government’s ends, government influences behaviour by using technologies of self 
and technologies of power. 
The third dimension of power also considers latent conflict and the ‘real’ interests of 
those excluded by the process (Lukes 2005). Even if power is not exerted, it can still act 
as a barrier to other actors, when they feel that they need to behave in a certain way to 
prevent another actor from showing their authority. This power is difficult for a 
researcher to identify: 
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This third dimension of power is usually hidden from direct observation; 
it has to be inferred via the postulation of relevant counterfactuals, to the 
effect that but for the exercise of the power in question those subject to it 
would have thought and acted otherwise, in accordance with their ‘real’ 
interest. 
(Hayward and Lukes 2008: 6) 
In these dimensions of power, structures play an important role. Power is not located in 
structures, but is the effect of structures. Power is not structurally deterministic, but 
there needs to be an agent with the choice to exercise this power. It can be presumed 
that the person who exercises power takes a conscious choice to do so and is aware of 
the consequences of their actions. Therefore, to locate power is to ‘fix the responsibility 
for consequences held to flow from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable agents’ 
(Lukes 2005: 58). Furthermore, power is not limited to the network itself, as structures, 
‘real’ interests and power relations outside the network can also influence decision 
making. 
The actors’ characteristics, interdependence, and if and how they use power all 
influence their interactions. On the one hand, an actor can use their skills and resources 
to create a collaborative working environment (Edelenbos et al. 2013). On the other 
hand, an actor can use their resources to exert power by limiting other actors or block 
decision making. In addition, the actors can design a decision-making process that is 
counterproductive. A slow process without progress causes inertia and no decisions are 
made. On the other hand, too much action or decisions made too fast can cause 
suboptimal outcomes (McGuire and Agranoff 2011). The network may also be too 
focused on being successful in their process and achieving cooperation instead of 
conflict, whilst producing poor outcomes. For instance, the ex post satisfaction might be 
high, but the problem might not be effectively or efficiently solved. 
Furthermore, structures can affect interaction. By examining a network in the Thames 
Gateway, Brownill and Carpenter (2009) conclude that Type II governance causes too 
many different agencies to become involved, which complicates interaction and 
decision making. Moreover, Skelcher (2000) argues that due to governance and the 
process of hollowing out, an organisational and political fragmentation has taken place, 
which complicates matters of responsibility, accountability and authority. In addition, 
the political focus has shifted towards intractable problems cutting across sectoral and 
organisational boundaries, complicating decision making further. 
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However, actor constellation still plays a crucial role. If the actors’ interests are 
compatible, it can be expected that the interaction will be characterised by cooperation, 
resulting in a policy outcome that actors are content with. If there are large 
discrepancies between actors, this could result in conflict and the lack of an agreed 
policy outcome. However, the actors’ characteristics and their interactions are not 
necessarily constant, because throughout the process changes may happen that will 
affect the actors. For instance, actors can learn from experiences, or events may occur in 
the wider context. 
Finally, a network may form a structure of its own when formal or informal rules for 
interaction are developed which are specific to that network. A strong network structure 
forms an institutional capacity, which allows the actors to share information, knowledge 
and understanding (Healey 1998) and leading to collaboration (Edelenbos et al. 2013), 
for instance, because trust is developed between the actors, or because imperatives are 
created to maintain the network (Toke and Marsh 2003). The network structure 
influences interaction and policy outcomes. As an example, developing shared values 
over the desired outcome stimulates joint decision making, but will also privilege 
certain policy outcomes (Marsh and Smith 2000). The network structure can also 
influence the wider context; when actors from a previous network meet in another 
network, they may adapt the old network structure. 
2.4.4 Wider context 
The actors and the network operate within a wider context composed of structures and 
agents. Structures are composed of formal institutions, informal institutions, or other 
structures, such as the political, economic, social, technological or environmental 
situation and events. Structures exist independently of people’s interpretation and 
people will perceive these structures using their senses and their minds (Bhaskar 1975, 
Sayer 2000). Therefore, even though the actors in a network are all part of the same 
structural context, they might have specific perceptions and preferences derived from 
the policy field they work in, the organisation they work for or their individuality. 
Part of the context is the governance structure or the governmentality. Through this 
structure a certain type of governance will be favoured, which can impact on the 
network structure and the actors within. The governance structure can for instance be 
characterised by Type I or II multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010), 
  49 
which may determine the size of the network and the division of the actors’ 
responsibilities. In addition, the level of hierarchical rule or the influence of market 
forces impacts upon the network. A political culture favouring network governance will 
influence the establishment of governance networks, whilst the actors, if they agree with 
this governmentality, will strive for cooperation and autonomous decision making at a 
distance from central government. These factors in turn affect the interaction between 
the actors and the outcome. Moreover, policy outcomes will affect the network 
governance debate. If networks are successful, this will reinforce the idea that network 
governance is the desired arrangement, but if they fail the arrangement may be 
undermined. 
Structures are part of the ‘real’ world and may cause events or non-events to occur. 
These events are the result of structures or mechanisms being triggered, causing an 
observable effect. For instance, if weather, water and landform are triggered, extreme 
rainfall is created, causing a flood. Even though the structures are always present, it is 
the weather and flood event that people observe and find undesirable, thereby causing 
action to be taken. Therefore, even though the initial trigger is in a structure, agents 
matter as well, because structures cannot act, only agents can (Toke and Marsh 2003). 
Agents can affirm or reject structures, or sudden change and events can change the 
perceptions and preferences of agents, which will affect the outcome. Simultaneously, 
by their actions, agents can in turn shape structures as well. Therefore, agents and the 
wider context are in a dialectical relationship. 
2.4.5 Policy outcome 
Lastly, policy outcomes are the result of the decision-making process in the network. 
Actors may have differing preferences on what their desired outcome is. When an 
outcome is eventually reached, both the network structure and the wider structure can be 
affected. Firstly, a particular network outcome can change the existing network’s 
membership or resources. Secondly, the policy outcome can change the broader context 
through any element, such as a change in regulations, a change in other networks or a 
change in the environment. Moreover, outcomes can change agents if they learn from 
experience or change their perceptions (Marsh and Smith 2000). Lastly, a policy 
outcome can change the policy problem, for instance by solving the problem, or 
changing the factors in the wider context that affect the problem. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed various strands of governance theory, resulting in the 
development of a theoretical framework that provides a method for analysing the 
functioning of governance networks. By applying this theoretical framework, the key 
factors that impact on FRM, which are derived from influences from structure and 
agency that are present in the governance network or in the wider context, can be 
identified. This theoretical framework will inform data collection and analysis of two 
cases of governance networks. However, before this takes place, the next chapter 
discusses how network governance of FRM has developed. 
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Chapter 3 Network governance of flood risk management 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question, which is: ‘how has network 
governance of FRM developed?’ The aim of this research is to explore the nature of 
governance networks in FRM in local planning processes in England; therefore the 
main focus of this chapter is on where the governance systems of FRM and spatial 
planning in England overlap. 
 
Figure 5: Governance of flood risk management and spatial planning 
To do this, section 3.2 describes the development of FRM and spatial planning 
chronologically. Section 3.3 looks at the characteristics of the governance networks in 
FRM in more detail. This will provide a context for examining two cases of governance 
networks later in the thesis. Lastly, conclusions are drawn. 
3.2 Governance of flood risk management and spatial planning 
This section describes the development of FRM and spatial planning chronologically. It 
is divided into six eras, starting with the pre-war era and ending with the end of 2013. 
By describing the development of the governance system for FRM and spatial planning, 
it becomes clear how the two fields converged and how the shift from government to 
network governance took place. 
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3.2.1 The pre-1945 era 
Flooding has always occurred as a natural process and people have always attempted to 
manage the impacts of flooding. For instance, historic cities were often established in 
advantageous areas near vital resources, such as water, but with development located in 
areas safe from flooding. An example is Tewkesbury with its historic core located on a 
hill (White 2010). Another early form of FRM took place in rural areas by draining land 
to create sufficient farmland for food supply. 
At first, government was not involved in FRM, but that slowly changed over time. For 
instance, in 1427 one of the first regulations on FRM was created: the Sewers Act, 
which established the commissioners of sewers15 appointed by the king. The 
commissioners levied drainage rates from land with defences or drainage systems. 
Drainage was a localised function, and as a result, a large number of organisations were 
in existence (Watson et al. 2009). As the population grew, draining agricultural land 
became more important, and in the 19th century, public money was made available to 
fund this. This continued into the 20th century (Bowers 1998). The power of central 
government in drainage increased in 1930, through the Land Drainage Act, when the 
commissions were transformed into catchment boards and Internal Drainage Boards 
(IDBs), which were under the control of central government (River Stour (Kent) 
Internal Drainage Board 2009). 
In the meantime, the industrial revolution caused rapid changes in the landscape during 
the 19th century and a desire for government intervention grew. Population became 
concentrated in industrial towns, where industrial land use and housing were in close 
proximity. Development was market-led, and there was a lack of building control or 
regulations regarding sanitation, causing poor quality of life for residents and outbreaks 
of diseases. The desire for government interference into planning grew. In 1848, two 
Acts of Parliament were passed that restricted the freedom of landowners and 
development, whilst local acts gave councils the authority to set standards for housing 
and deal with unsanitary houses, but the scope and effect was limited (Duxbury and 
Telling 2006). Therefore, to increase the role of government in planning, the first 
Planning Act was passed in 1909, with further Acts in 1919 and 1931. These Acts 
authorised local authorities to prepare planning schemes for development land, set 
                                                
15 The term ‘sewers’ referred at this time to water drainage rather than sewerage. 
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standards of amenity and convenience, and control change of use in existing buildings 
(Duxbury and Telling 2006). 
During the Second World War, the planning system developed further. A central 
planning authority was established and planning was formally given a role in state 
affairs through the Minister of Town and Country Planning Act 1943. The minister was 
responsible for developing a national policy that was aimed at the use and development 
of land. The framework of the modern planning system was established with the passing 
of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. As part of this Act, local authorities 
had to adopt development plans, and development was dependent on the obtaining of 
planning permission. The adoption of this system proved to be slow, as it would take 
over ten years after the Act for the minister to approve the first local development plans 
(Tewdwr-Jones 1997). 
3.2.2 1946–1980 
During the war, domestic food production contributed to Britain’s survival, and after the 
war, self-sufficiency remained an important goal (Tunstall et al. 2004). Therefore, in the 
period after the Second World War until the 1970s, land drainage and flood defences 
were mainly used to protect agricultural land. However, their contribution to protecting 
urban areas was increasingly recognised (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988). At the 
time, flood defences were characterised by hard engineering solutions with little regard 
for the natural environment (Tunstall et al. 2004). Nature was to be controlled; for 
instance, through the channelling of rivers and draining of wetlands. Therefore, FRM at 
the time was aimed at reducing the probability of flood risk, and as a result, the 
consequences of flood risk were reduced as well. There was no overall drainage 
strategy, as flood issues were addressed on a site-by-site basis. 
In 1947, the Thames flooded, causing one of the worst floods England had experienced. 
That winter there had been much snowfall, and after a thaw set in during a period of 
heavy rainfall, the rainwater did not drain into the frozen ground, whilst snowmelt 
caused rivers to rise quickly. The floods that followed damaged infrastructure, farmland 
and more than 100,000 properties, at an estimated cost of between £3 billion and 
£4.5 billion at 2007 levels (Wainwright 2007). As a consequence, there was a public 
outcry to improve protection against flooding. The chief engineers of the catchment 
boards responded by demanding more financial resources to improve existing flood 
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defences and develop new ones. The action that was taken was in line with the paradigm 
of the time, which focused on finding engineering solutions by controlling the 
environment. In addition, the flood defences that were developed were mainly aimed at 
protecting agricultural land with protection of urban areas as a secondary benefit 
(Tunstall et al. 2004). Moreover, further changes were made in the institutional setting 
with the replacement of catchment boards by river boards in 1948 (National Archives 
2012). 
This period also signified the emergence of the first policies that embedded FRM in 
planning. As FRM had been aimed at agricultural land, there had been no restrictions on 
developing within floodplains and, as a result, prior to 1947 much development had 
been taking place within areas at risk of flooding (Richards 2007). In 1947, a series of 
government circulars was released to control development within floodplains. The 
circulars stated that planning authorities should consult with drainage authorities (river 
boards at that time) in order to identify which parts of a development could create 
problems with drainage. The planning authorities were responsible to set up an effective 
system of liaison with the authorities responsible for FRM (Parker 1995); therefore, the 
implementation of these policies were heavily dependent on the priorities of local 
government. 
Another greatly damaging flood occurred in 1953 on the east coast of England. A 
committee was established that looked into the probability of a similar flood recurring, 
which recommended strengthening the flood defences to be able to cope with similar 
conditions that caused the floods of 1953. In addition, the committee reported on the 
flood risks in the London estuary and recommended developing flood defences there as 
well, which ultimately led to the Thames Barrier being built (Penning-Rowsell and 
Handmer 1988). Again, due to the engineering paradigm of the time, FRM focused on 
decreasing the probability of flooding by raising flood defences. 
Some years later, attempts were also made to strengthen the liaison processes between 
planning authorities and water authorities by publishing further circulars on 
development in flood risk areas in 1962 and 1969. Again, planning authorities were 
responsible for controlling development and adhering to the circulars, meaning the 
levels to which the circulars were adhered to varied greatly per local authority (Parker 
1995, Tunstall et al. 2004). 
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Concurrently, the institutional setting of the water sector went through another change 
when the Water Resources Act 1963 created river authorities, which took over powers 
from the existing river boards and introduced water abstraction permits. This 
institutional change was in response to a severe drought in 1959 and flooding in 1960. 
However, problems with managing water resources and the segregation of 
responsibilities for water and sewage treatment resulted in a large restructuring of the 
water sector through the Water Act 1973. The large number of river authorities was 
merged into ten regional water authorities, which were responsible for the whole water 
cycle, including water supply, sewage treatment and drainage.16 Therefore, through the 
new Act, various water functions were integrated (Ofwat and Defra 2006). The regional 
water authorities remained under control of central government and they received 
funding to carry out flood defence measures, without the need for cooperation from 
local authorities (Watson et al. 2009). As a result, local authorities were not involved in 
any issues of drainage and flooding. 
Meanwhile in the planning field in the early 1960s, there was a renewed discussion 
about the planning system, and in 1964, the Planning Advisory Group was established 
to review the development plan system. In 1965, they published their report, which led 
to the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 (Delafons 1998). With this Act, a new 
system of structure plans and local plans was introduced. Structure plans dealt with 
strategic issues and needed the approval of the Secretary of State (SoS);17 but even 
though local plans had to conform to structure plans, they did not need the approval of 
central government (Duxbury and Telling 2006). This gave local government authorities 
some discretion in developing local plans, which was seen as a move away from the 
centralised structure of the planning system (Delafons 1998). This development was 
therefore the opposite to the FRM field, which was controlled centrally. 
3.2.3 1980–1990 
In an attempt to strengthen the role of planning in FRM, a new circular on development 
in flood risk areas was released in 1982, with the aim to stimulate interaction between 
the local planning authority and the water authorities and to prevent development in 
floodplains (Parker 1995, Tunstall et al. 2004). Research into the effectiveness of this 
circular was conducted by Penning-Rowsell and Handmer (1988) who found that in 
                                                
16 With the exception of 29 small, private companies that remained in existence. 17 The Secretary of State replaced the minister in his duties. 
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practice, the influence of the water authorities was often limited. Their role was 
primarily advisory, but at the same time they also lacked the personnel to be able to 
respond to planning queries within the statutory 28-day time limit. The arrangement was 
considered too informal, which meant that planning authorities could prioritise 
employment-generating development over flood risks, whilst the water authorities did 
not have the power to stop development. In an interview, a planning officer felt that the 
circular was too weak and it needed additional formal agreements. Engineers from the 
water authorities expressed their frustration with development in floodplains, which 
subsequently required flood alleviation works paid for by government. This meant that 
private development was effectively subsidised, whilst it also prevented coherent FRM 
to take place (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988). Therefore, even though circulars 
were released, much development still took place in floodplains and in areas that were 
known to flood (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988, Tunstall et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, in the 1980s the water industry became part of a wider process of 
privatisation, in which governmental tasks were transferred to private companies. In 
1986, the first proposals were made to set up privatised water companies with a 
transferral of all tasks, but there was much criticism about giving private companies 
environmental regulatory functions. The plans were withdrawn, revised and resubmitted 
in 1989, through the Water Act 1989. The assets and personnel of the regional water 
authorities were transferred to limited companies, which would be responsible for water 
supply and sewage treatment. The ten private water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) 
would provide water to 78% of all connected properties in England and Wales (Saal and 
Parker 2001). In addition, three separate bodies were established to regulate water and 
sewage treatment: the National Rivers Authority (NRA), the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate and the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) (Ofwat and Defra 2006). The 
NRA became responsible for the quality of inland, coastal and underground waters, 
controlling pollution, the management of water resources, land drainage, flood 
protection and fisheries (National Archives 2012). Ofwat became mainly concerned 
with prices, profits and the quality of services (Saal and Parker 2001) and with 
regulating the WaSCs’ investments. Even though central government lost some control 
through privatising the water companies, they still retained power by being responsible 
for these NDPBs, as well as providing some funding and setting legislation. 
Upon establishment, the NRA started to develop ideas of sustainable water 
management. For instance, they identified a need for storm water source control, now 
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known as sustainable drainage systems, although it struggled to develop these in 
collaboration with local authorities (Howes 2007). As Howes, who worked at the NRA, 
described: 
While there was a great deal of progressive thinking on more sustainable 
ways of managing the water environment this was failing to make itself 
felt, not only with Local Planning Authorities but also within the more 
hidebound parts of the organisation. 
(Howes 2007: 23) 
Therefore, the NRA did not make sufficient use of the planning system to achieve their 
goals on FRM. They had a reactive approach by responding to planning applications, 
which often did not contain firm recommendations and was written in scientific 
language that planning officers had trouble understanding and integrating into their 
reports. At that time, they were not yet proactive by influencing policy or development 
plans and as a result, they had difficulty implementing their vision (Howes 2007). 
Concurrently, throughout the 1980s the influence of the agricultural sector in 
governmental affairs decreased, as a result of its diminishing contribution to the national 
economy. This meant that FRM for agricultural land became less of a priority compared 
to that for urban areas. In addition, environmental issues grew in importance, which 
meant that environmental effects of flood defences were now taken into account 
(Tunstall et al. 2004). 
The planning system, in the meantime, was set for another institutional change. 
Procedures for approval and adoption of structure and local plans were again considered 
to take too much time.18 From 1986, in Greater London and metropolitan areas the 
structure and local plans were replaced by unitary development plans, which did not 
normally require the approval of the SoS. Moreover, due to the Planning and 
Compensation Act of 1991, amendments to structure plans were no longer required to 
be submitted to the SoS (Tewdwr-Jones 1997). This development that started with the 
1968 Act and continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as a move away 
from rowing to steering, as central government loosened its reins. However, this does 
not mean that central government lost much power, because the SoS still developed 
national policies that had to be taken into account by local authorities. These policies 
were released through departmental circulars until 1988, when Planning Policy 
Guidance (PPG) was introduced. PPG did not have a statutory status, but Local Plans 
                                                18 For instance, in 1988 only 20% of areas in England and Wales that were outside London were covered 
by a formally adopted local plan (Duxbury and Telling 2006). 
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had to be consistent with national and regional policies and any inconsistencies could be 
used by developers as grounds to outweigh the provisions of a Local Plan (Tewdwr-
Jones 1997). Therefore, even though national policies were not statutory, they still 
greatly influenced Local Plan making. 
3.2.4 1990–2000 
In the field of FRM, in 1992 another circular was published on development and flood 
risk. It stressed that the NRA had only limited powers to prevent development and the 
planning authorities were expected to take up the responsibility. Central government 
expected the local authorities to ‘use their planning powers to guide development away 
from areas that may be affected by flooding and to restrict development that would 
increase the risk of flooding’ (DoE et al. 1992: para 4, in: Parker 1995: 358). To 
emphasise the importance of resisting floodplain development, it addressed how climate 
change would increase flooding. Furthermore, as a tool to prevent local authorities from 
permitting floodplain development, central government would no longer fund the 
upgrade or construction of defences necessary for new development in flood risk areas. 
However, again it was felt that the circular was not effective in preventing floodplain 
development. According to Parker (1995), there was evidence that regular liaison did 
occur, but developments were considered in isolation, with no long-term view or 
attention to cumulative effects. In addition, information on flood risk from the NRA was 
imprecise and unreliable, making it difficult for planners to identify if proposed 
development would be at risk of flooding (Parker 1995). 
Furthermore, central government wanted to create a single agency that would protect 
and enhance the environment and that would contribute to sustainable development. 
The Environment Act 1995 was passed, replacing the NRA by the Environment Agency 
(EA). The new EA not only took over the functions of the NRA, but also the functions 
of waste authorities concerning pollution and environmental protection. 
One of the objectives of the EA was to improve the translation of sustainable 
development into practice. They improved their responses to planning applications by 
taking the needs of planning officers into account and developed a more proactive 
response by becoming involved in local and regional policies and plans (Howes 2007). 
Being involved in planning became much more of a priority for the EA, for instance 
signified in the 1997 study on best practice in liaising with planning authorities, which 
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recommended more consistency in consultation responses and more involvement in pre-
application discussions (Environment Agency 1997). 
During Easter 1998, major flooding occurred in Warwickshire, Northamptonshire and 
northern Oxfordshire, caused by heavy rainfall on saturated soil. These flood levels 
proved to be higher than the 1947 floods and, as a result, over 4000 properties and 
businesses flooded and five people lost their lives. Insured and uninsured losses were 
estimated at approximately £500 million (Horner and Walsh 2000). After the floods, the 
EA was criticised because many people had not received a flood warning. There were 
two reasons for the lack of flood warnings in some areas. Firstly, the EA had been in 
existence for two years when the floods occurred and it had not had time to change the 
fragmented flood warning system that was in place (Tunstall et al. 2004). Secondly, 
many flooded areas had not been considered to be at risk of flooding previously and in 
those areas no warning arrangements were in place (Horner and Walsh 2000). 
As the floods had been damaging, there were calls for an inquiry and in response the EA 
commissioned an independent review to be carried out (Bye and Horner 1998). This 
review identified that, at that time, FRM relied on structural engineering solutions. A 
more holistic approach would be more effective, including various non-structural 
solutions, such as improvements in the identification of flood risk areas and in the flood 
warning system. As a consequence of this realisation, a new and improved national 
warning system was set up (Tunstall et al. 2004). Surprisingly and in contrast to earlier 
conceptions, the review found that planning authorities were sufficiently regarding the 
EA’s advice to resist development in floodplains. The only exception was caravan 
parks; some large caravan sites were flooded with minimal warning and the largest loss 
of life took place here; therefore, regulations needed to be improved (Bye and Horner 
1998). 
During this decade, awareness of environmental limits and climate change continued to 
grow. The planning system became increasingly concerned for the environment (Vigar 
et al. 2000). In FRM, the environmental effects of structural flood defences were taken 
into account and climate change was included in future flood risk. Furthermore, non-
structural measures were gaining popularity. FRM was now not just aimed at reducing 
the probability of flooding. Increasingly, measures were taken aimed at the 
consequences specifically. In addition, as awareness on climate change and the effects 
on flooding grew, FRM and the adaptation agenda developed together. 
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3.2.5 2000–2010 
In the autumn of 2000, much of the UK experienced prolonged and above average 
rainfall, resulting in various flood events between October and December. These floods 
were much more widespread than the 1998 floods and affected many properties, but 
also caused railway closures (Kelman 2001). The floods resulted in much discussion 
concerning the cause and who was to blame (Richards 2007). For instance, after 
flooding in Uckfield and Lewes that cost £130 million and damaged over 1000 
properties, the EA consulted an engineering firm to compile a report on the causes and 
impacts of flooding. The report concluded that even though most of the built 
environment in the floodplain was historic, some new development had taken place that 
had increased surface water runoff and reduced flood storage (Binnie, Black and Veatch 
2001). This was a common situation, because although policy tools had been in place 
via the circulars, in practice, planning authorities found that the economic and social 
benefits of developing outweighed the costs of flooding (Richards 2007). In particular, 
if a local authority had no flooding experience in the past, flood risk would be a low 
priority, which was easily outweighed by benefits of development. In addition, costs 
may have been underestimated in previous decades, for instance by not taking 
intangibles such as health implications into account, but also by using wrong data to 
gauge flood losses between 1977 and 1988 (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988). As a 
consequence, the effects of flooding may have been underestimated, tipping the scales 
in favour of development and revealing the true cost only after a flood took place. 
These floods of 2000, which had come only two years after the previous flood event, 
were described by the Deputy Prime Minister as a wake-up call (Tunstall et al. 2004). 
Whereas the government found FRM and planning policies satisfactory after the 1998 
floods, it was now decided to review these policies. As a result, PPG25 was published 
in 2001, which made flood risk a material planning consideration. It also introduced a 
sequential test to be carried out, prioritising development in areas at low risk of 
flooding. Development in floodplains was considered exceptional, although in some 
cases still possible. The EA had a lead role in advising on flood risk issues, but were not 
a statutory consultee. It was also agreed to monitor the implementation of PPG25 and 
review this policy in 2004 (Tunstall et al. 2004, Richards 2007). 
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Returning to the planning system, there had been concerns for some time about delays 
in adopting the development plans (McDonald 1997);19 therefore, another fundamental 
change occurred through the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. The 2004 
Act replaced PPG with Planning Policy Statements (PPSs), which were material 
planning decisions that had to be taken into account by local authorities (Duxbury and 
Telling 2006). If a local authority decided to ignore a PPS, they had to have clear and 
convincing reasons to do so (DCLG 2008a). The Act also abolished structure and local 
plans and introduced a two-tier system of Regional Spatial Strategies and Local 
Development Frameworks (LDFs). LDFs, which are still in use, are composed of 
statutory and non-statutory documents. Statutory documents are called Development 
Plan Documents, which have to be submitted to the SoS for approval. Supplementary 
Planning Documents are non-statutory and do not have to be submitted to the SoS. They 
can provide further detail to policies in a Development Plan Document, but cannot be 
used to allocate land. Examples are master plans, design guides or development briefs. 
All documents have to be consistent with national policies (Duxbury and Telling 2006). 
Planning permissions and refusals have to be consistent with the LDF, but the SoS can 
revoke or modify planning permissions or call in planning decisions. In addition, when 
a planning decision is appealed, the SoS decides on the case. 
There was also an important change in scope for the planning system. The new Act 
introduced a statutory duty of the planning system to contribute towards sustainable 
development, which went beyond traditional land use planning. The planning system 
became more proactive in strategically coordinating all interests and sectors involved in 
spatial development. This provided the opportunity for other sectors, including FRM, to 
become incorporated into planning. 
In the meantime, the awareness of environmental limits and climate change had 
continued to grow steadily. For instance, there were debates on whether the 2000 floods 
were the signs of things to come (Tunstall et al. 2004). The effects of climate change on 
flooding were researched as part of the Foresight Future Flooding project, which 
concluded that flooding and flood losses were expected to increase under all climate 
change scenarios (Evans et al. 2004). In addition, the government developed a 
sustainable development strategy, containing five guiding principles to permeate 
through various policy fields: living within environmental limits; ensuring a strong, 
                                                19 In 1997, 57% of local authorities had yet to adopt local plans, although 50% of those were in the 
inquiry stage (McDonald 1997). 
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healthy and just society; achieving a sustainable economy; promoting good governance; 
and using sound science responsibly (Defra 2005b). 
The issue of climate change also started to percolate through the planning system. 
Central government commissioned planning guidance on climate change in 2000, but 
the release of this guidance was delayed, due to the changes that were occurring in the 
planning system and the conflict between ‘the traditional planning stance of discretion 
and enablement, as against the climate change community’s arguments for urgent and 
authoritative action’ (Wilson 2009: 128). The guidance was eventually published in 
2004, but in the form of advice, which did not have the same status as a PPS (ODPM 
2004). Later, climate change became a material consideration in planning decisions 
through the publication of PPS1 and a supplement on climate change (ODPM 2005, 
Wilson 2006b, DCLG 2007). 
In the field of FRM, the government’s guiding principles for sustainable development 
influenced policy through the development of a comprehensive approach for managing 
future flood and coastal erosion risk, called ‘Making Space for Water’ (Defra 2005a). 
The aim of this approach was to make FRM cross-sectoral, whilst taking environmental, 
social and economic implications into account. The consultation process for ‘Making 
Space for Water’ took place in parallel with a review of PPG25. It had become clear 
that development was still taking place in areas at risk of flooding against the EA’s 
advice and PPG25 was replaced with PPS25 that included revisions and a practice 
guide20 (DCLG 2006, 2008b). The EA became a statutory consultee through the Town 
and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Amendment) (No.2) 
(England) Order 2006. The EA now had to be consulted during the planning process for 
any development of land of one hectare or more, for development within 20 metres of 
main rivers, for development other than minor development in areas at risk of flooding, 
or for developments in areas with critical drainage problems. The EA also received a 
new power to issue a call-in direction.21 If the local planning authority planned to grant 
an application permission that was contrary to advice given by the EA, the local 
planning authority had to notify the SoS. In that case, the SoS would decide whether the 
application needed to be called in. 
                                                
20 An update to the Practice Guide was released in 2009, followed an updated PPS25 in 2010. 
21 First determined in Circular 04/06 (Communities and Local Government): the Town and Country 
Planning (Flooding) (England) Direction 2007, which was later replaced by the Town and Country 
Planning (Consultation) (England) Direction 2009: Circular 02/2009. 
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In 2005, further flooding took place in Cumbria, caused by prolonged rainfall. In 
particular Carlisle, Appleby, Cockermouth and Keswick were affected, causing the 
deaths of three people and £250 million in damage (BBC News 2005, Met Office 2012). 
Again, in the summer of 2007, extreme levels of rainfall in a short time caused river, 
sewer and surface water flooding across England. In June, it was South Yorkshire and 
Hull which were mainly affected, whilst in July, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire and 
the Thames Valley flooded (Pitt 2008). These 2007 floods caused much damage; around 
55,000 properties were flooded, 500,000 people had no water or electricity and 13 
people were killed as they were attempting to cross or clear away floodwaters. In total, 
14,500 households could not return to their properties after the water had retreated, and 
a year later, 4,750 households still had not moved back into their properties. The 
economic costs were estimated to be £3.2 billion (Chatterton et al. 2010). Insurers 
received 180,000 claims for damage to properties, businesses and vehicles, costing 
approximately £3 billion (Association of British Insurers 2008). In addition, the floods 
impacted on public health and welfare. In a study of the social impacts of the 2007 
floods in Hull, where 8,600 properties were flooded, participants were asked to keep a 
diary over a period of 18 months. Diarists responded that the floods had caused much 
stress, leading to a range of physical and mental problems. Examples given were skin 
irritations, chest infections, and exhaustion and depression, which could manifest or 
remain many months after the flood occurred (Whittle et al. 2010). 
Due to the severity of the floods, an independent review was conducted, which resulted 
in the Pitt Review (Pitt 2008). In this report, 92 recommendations were made on how to 
tackle flooding and how to adapt to heavy rainfall caused by climate change. For 
instance, the report identified that surface water flooding had been a large problem in 
the 2007 floods, but no authority was actually responsible for dealing with it. There was 
no clear coordination structure and responses to flooding were piecemeal and 
inadequate, causing confusion between authorities and the public. The report called for 
the EA to take on a strategic overview for all types of flood risk on a national level, 
whilst the local authorities should take the lead on local FRM. In addition, a new Act on 
FRM should be adopted that clarifies responsibilities. 
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Figure 6: The 2007 floods in England 
Source: Pitt 2008: xix 
Furthermore, the review examined the relation between planning and FRM. It found 
that, since 2000, 11% of new houses were built in a floodplain. In 2006, around 16,000 
homes were built in high-risk flood areas. However, ending all development in 
floodplains or flood zones would not be realistic, as many areas that have high 
development demands are in flood zones, such as London. Moreover, flooding in 2007 
also occurred in areas that were not in a floodplain, through surface water and sewer 
flooding. Simultaneously, the fact that around a quarter of the houses flooded were 25 
years old or less meant that more regard to all sources of flooding should be taken 
during the planning process. PPS25 could help to achieve this, but removing the 
automatic right to connect surface water drainage of development to the sewer system 
would encourage sustainable drainage and reduce pluvial flooding (Pitt 2008). 
In 2009, heavy rainfall again caused flooding in Cumbria, with Cockermouth and 
Keswick in particular being badly affected. Many properties and businesses suffered 
flooding, but the event is mostly remembered because of the death of PC Barker who 
was directing motorists off a flood-damaged bridge when it collapsed (BBC News 
2009b). This event showed that the problem of flooding was still urgent and also had 
devastating consequences. 
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3.2.6 2010–2013 
The government implemented some of the recommendations from the Pitt Review by 
adopting the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. This Act established Lead Local 
Flood Authorities (LLFAs) formed by the unitary authority or the county council. The 
LLFA became responsible for developing a local strategy to manage all types of 
flooding. The Act also required the EA to develop a national strategy for all types of 
flooding; this strategy was published in 2011 (Defra and Environment Agency 2011). 
Furthermore, Schedule 3 of the Act strengthened the use of sustainable drainage in new 
development. Sustainable drainage systems (SuDS) are site-specific structures that aim 
to mimic natural drainage as close as possible. SuDS control the quantity of surface 
water runoff, but can also improve water quality by providing treatment, and enhance 
biodiversity and amenity. Examples are permeable paving, swales, basins, ponds and 
wetlands (Howe and White 2001, Woods-Ballard et al. 2007). Applicants must apply to 
SuDS Approval Bodies (SABs) to gain permission for the drainage system. For 
approval by the SAB, drainage must be designed to comply with the national standards 
(Defra 2011). After permission is granted, developers are allowed to start works and 
receive the right to connect to the sewer, whilst the SAB adopts and maintains the 
SuDS. However, there have been some issues with the pending implementation of 
Schedule 3. For instance, the Home Builders Federation was concerned about the costs 
to developers and claimed it would present a significant risk to the delivery of new 
houses. Some local authorities also expressed concerns on the cost of maintaining and 
adopting SuDS. This has caused a delay in the implementation of Schedule 3 (Booth 
2013), which is expected to take place in 201422 (Defra 2013d). 
In the same year as the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, the planning system 
underwent a major reform led by the new coalition government comprising the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The debate on the planning system was 
similar to those held in the past, where the system was perceived to be too slow and too 
complicated. According to the coalition programme, the new government set out to ‘end 
the era of top-down government’ (HM Government 2010: 11) and replace it with a 
bottom-up approach, with more involvement of local people in the development and 
land use of their area. For instance, the regional tier of government was abolished and 
the Regional Spatial Strategies were no longer considered relevant. The government 
                                                
22 Predicted implementation date as of December 2013. 
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also set out to simplify the planning system and stimulate development by replacing the 
PPSs with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and technical guidance. 
The NPPF, which is currently still valid, aims to develop a presumption in favour of 
sustainable development. In its definition of sustainable development, the NPPF builds 
on the UK sustainable development strategy from 2005, but also includes the three 
dimensions of sustainability: economic, social and environmental. The planning system 
is expected to contribute to a strong economy, to support strong communities and to 
protect and enhance the natural, built and historic environment (DCLG 2012a). In 
addition, the technical guidance contains detailed policies, such as on FRM, which are 
similar to those in PPS2523 (DCLG 2012b). 
The first three months of 2012 were very dry compared to averages, but in April rainfall 
increased. In fact, the months April and June were the wettest since records began in 
1910 and many locations in the UK received more than 135% of the annual average of 
rain (Met Office and JBA Risk Management 2012, Met Office 2013). The continuous 
rainfall saturated soils and produced a combination of fluvial, pluvial and groundwater 
flooding. In addition, there were intense thunderstorms, producing much water in short 
periods of time. One of these events occurred in the area around Newcastle upon Tyne 
on 28 June. In two hours 50 mm of rain fell, equivalent to the expected rainfall of the 
whole month of June. These short bursts of rain caused rapid pluvial and sewer 
flooding. This event was unique; according to a survey conducted by Newcastle City 
Council, 66% of those whose houses had flooded had never experienced flooding before 
(Newcastle City Council 2013b). However, there are also concerns that climate change 
may increase the occurrence of these extreme weather events in the future. The 
Adaptation Sub-Committee states that even though it is not possible to attribute current 
weather events to climate change, ‘the latest climate models tell us that extremes of the 
kind seen this year [2012] are likely to become more common in the future’ (Adaptation 
Sub-Committee 2012: 6). Moreover, Peterson et al. (2013) examined the events in more 
detail and found that natural variability played an important part, but human influences 
on sea surface temperatures and low levels of Arctic sea ice may have contributed as 
well. Therefore, it is likely that extreme rainfall and rapid flooding will occur more 
frequently in the future. 
                                                
23 An exception is that the NPPF includes the use of SuDS, but does not explain these in as much detail as 
PPS25 did, because they are catered for in the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 and the national 
standards that are to be published. 
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Lastly, in recent years debates on flood insurance have resurged. Flood insurance is 
perceived as a non-structural approach to FRM by managing the consequences of 
flooding and improving recovery. In addition, the cost of insurance can promote risk 
reduction (Jha et al. 2012), for example, if a policyholder takes flood risk measures to 
reduce their premium or if developers only build houses outside flood zones, ensuring 
they are insurable and therefore saleable. In England, flood insurance is included in 
domestic property insurance provided by private insurance companies. Most of the cost 
associated with repairing damaged property is therefore borne by private insurance, 
instead of compensation provided by the government. This arrangement is the result of 
an agreement between the government and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
(Lamond et al. 2009). In this agreement, called the Statement of Principles, insurance 
companies have agreed they will continue to provide insurance for properties at risk of 
flooding if the government reduces flood risks (HM Government and Association of 
British Insurers 2008). The statement was initiated as a temporary measure to cover 
properties at risk of flooding until the risk was reduced after flooding in 1998 and 2000. 
The statement was revised over time (Association of British Insurers 2010), with the 
most recent one originally running out in June 2013. 
Negotiations for a new agreement proved to be difficult. The insurers felt that flood risk 
had not reduced over time and that the government was not doing enough to abate such 
risk. As houses were still built in flood risk areas, they stated that the planning system 
should be more rigorous and take insurability into account. It should direct development 
away from areas of high risk, and when development is necessary, vulnerability should 
be reduced through flood-resilient design and flood alleviation schemes (Association of 
British Insurers 2010). Therefore, the insurers threatened to remove cover for properties 
at risk of flooding (Lamond et al. 2009), which would render insurance very costly for 
houses in flood risk areas. The ABI estimated that 78% of the properties in areas of high 
flood risk paid less insurance than they would if the risk was fully reflected in the price. 
The estimated under-pricing was 165% on average (similar to £430 at 2010 prices), but 
in some cases the price was estimated to be more than 500% lower that it would have 
been if it was risk-based (O'Neill 2011). 
The government, on the other hand, felt that the NPPF was a strong enough policy to 
avoid unnecessary building in floodplains (Defra 2012) and continued to negotiate a 
new agreement with the ABI. As a result, plans were presented to establish a not-for-
profit entity, named Flood Re, to provide flood insurance for houses in flood risk areas. 
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The concept is based on capping the insurance cost for houses at risk of flooding based 
on council tax band. Houses built after 2009 are excluded in order to deter further 
development in flood risk areas. The insurers pay into the new fund and pass on this 
cost to all customers. Therefore, the cost of insuring houses at risk of flooding is 
distributed amongst all policyholders in Britain. The new agreement was consulted on, 
and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) was reviewing the 
proposals as of December 2013 (Defra 2013a, 2013b). 
To summarise this section, key events and policy developments that occurred in FRM 
are listed in Appendix B. In addition, the current regulations, plans and policies on FRM 
and planning are detailed in Appendix A. 
3.3 Governance networks of flood risk management 
The previous section described the development of FRM and spatial planning 
chronologically. This section continues with the examination of the development of 
network governance in FRM and the functioning of governance networks by applying 
the theoretical framework (see section 2.4). Firstly, the formation of governance 
networks is discussed, followed by the policy problems governance networks may 
encounter, the actors that may be present in these networks, the wider context in which 
the network is set and the outcomes of FRM that have been observed in the past. Lastly, 
conclusions are drawn, exploring the key factors that may affect FRM. 
3.3.1 Development of network governance in flood risk management 
As previously discussed, the nature of FRM has developed over time. Until the 1970s, 
FRM was mainly a measure to control drainage in order to improve agricultural land. It 
was aimed at controlling nature by using engineered solutions. In recent decades, FRM 
started to change as awareness grew of environmental effects and the need to adapt to 
the changing climate. Flood events, such as in 1998, 2000 and 2007, created more 
urgency to manage flood risk and acted as a stimulant for change. Currently, the nature 
of FRM entails accepting but also managing flood risk through a combination of 
structural and non-structural techniques (Tunstall et al. 2004). One non-structural 
measure is spatial planning. Understanding of the effects of land use on flood risk has 
increased, and as a result, FRM is now to a significant extent decided within the 
planning system. 
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The planning system has experienced various developments as well. Firstly, the 
planning system changed from a land use system to a spatial planning system that 
coordinates different sectors. In addition, there has been a growing awareness of climate 
change and environmental limits. Secondly, the current planning system is founded on a 
neo-liberal governmentality. Network arrangements are included in planning through 
partnerships and various forms of formal and informal networks (Tewdwr-Jones 2012), 
which facilitate decision making at a distance from central government. Central 
government is stimulating the involvement of communities and the rate of development 
by increasing market freedoms (Davoudi 2011). The role of planning is to facilitate 
growth and overcome any barriers that may inhibit this, thereby increasing the influence 
of private actors in planning. As a consequence, multiple actors are involved in the 
planning process, such as planners, various departments and sectors from local 
government, NDPBs, applicants and communities. These actors have some discretion to 
make decisions and interact with each other in governance networks in order to make 
planning decisions. 
The move towards spatial planning and the increasing influence of communities is 
reflected in national rules and guidance on engagement with the public and involvement 
of authorities in the planning process. However, in planning practice the level of 
involvement differs (for a typology on community participation, see Arnstein 1969). At 
times, participation is restricted to sharing ideas, whilst in other cases stakeholders are 
directly involved in shaping policies and making decisions (Tewdwr-Jones 2012). 
Networks may be more ideological in nature, focusing on the process of sharing ideas 
and creating an integrated vision. Networks may also be more functional in nature, only 
‘ticking the boxes’ on consultation, but without the aim to create a synergy and form a 
shared solution. 
The predominant governmentality influences the type of governance networks that are 
created. For instance, the involvement of the community in planning through 
neighbourhood planning has been developed by government as an aim to meet 
government objectives: 
In the context of neighbourhood planning, the agency of individuals is 
mobilised by the construction of a new identity as a member of 
neighbourhood forum. Their capacity is then redeployed to achieve 
government’s objectives which are currently centred on increasing the 
rate of house building and development in general. 
(Davoudi and Madanipour 2013: 555) 
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Even though more power to local governments and communities should stimulate 
planning decisions being made in local networks, central government still influences 
planning practice directly and indirectly (Vigar et al. 2000, Moore 2007). In the 
example of neighbourhood planning, the residents are limited in their decision making 
by mandatory compliance with higher-level spatial plans and rules that do not allow the 
rejection of development (Davoudi and Madanipour 2013). Using Foucault’s concepts, 
the government uses technologies of agency and of power to achieve their ends. 
Therefore, planning has moved towards a hybrid system, in which central government 
encourages networks for policy formation and implementation and increases the 
influence of the market, but at the same time remains its influence through hierarchy 
(Brownill and Carpenter 2009). Networks play an important part in planning, as both 
the nature of planning and the governance system enable network arrangements, but 
these networks operate within a framework of hierarchy and market influence. 
FRM in itself has also experienced a shift from government to governance and has been 
subject to processes of decentralisation, agentification and privatisation. Throughout 
history, FRM has been the responsibility of specialised authorities, often under control 
of central government. In the 1980s, privatisation caused water supply and sewerage to 
become the responsibility of private companies, whilst the EA was given a strategic 
overview of water quality and FRM. In addition, local authorities gained responsibility 
for all sources of local flooding through the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. 
Furthermore, the EU started to create directives for its member states on the topic of 
water management and flooding. Therefore, FRM is a form of multi-level governance, 
with decisions made at the EU, central and local levels. FRM has a complex structure of 
legislation, policies and plans required by the EU and central government.24 As a result, 
the local level is required to develop multiple plans to manage flooding, which often 
overlap. This means that for authorities, developers and the public it can be a confusing 
exercise to identify a local authority’s stance on flooding and how this is to be managed. 
To be more specific, FRM is a Type II governance, in which responsibility and 
accountability is dispersed amongst multiple authorities on various spatial levels 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010). These responsibilities are set in legislation, which has 
caused the flexibility usually associated with this type of governance to be diminished. 
An example is the inability of any authority to take responsibility for dealing with the 
surface water flooding in the 2007 floods in England, which had to be resolved by 
                                                
24 This structure is explained in Appendix A. 
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creating new legislation through the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. However, 
some new responsibilities set out in the Act are incongruent with the interests of some 
actors, such as developers, causing reluctance and delay in adopting new legislation on 
sustainable drainage. In addition, the Type II governance increases the complexity of 
decision making as more liaison and negotiation between authorities is needed. It can 
also frustrate communities and individuals who are experiencing flooding when they 
feel that the local authority has not done its duty in protecting them against flooding 
(Butler and Pidgeon 2011); when they have an issue that needs resolving but are 
referred from one authority to another; or when no authority is able to address their 
concerns. 
In addition, FRM can also be seen as being part of a neo-liberal climate that shifts 
responsibility from the state to others. FRM within planning has become the 
responsibility of local authorities, whilst the developer is responsible for assessing, 
mitigating and funding flood mitigation for proposed developments. Central 
government is also changing funding for FRM by increasingly seeking partnership 
funding for new flood schemes (Defra and Environment Agency 2012) and by making 
£5 million of funding available for communities to arrange and realise local FRM 
schemes (Defra 2013c). In addition, flood damage is covered by private insurance, 
meaning that central government does not provide compensation after flood events. It is 
the citizen’s responsibility to ensure their property is adequately insured against flood 
losses. Therefore, central government is passing responsibility and the financing of 
FRM to others. Moreover, individuals are encouraged to live with a flood risk (Butler 
and Pidgeon 2011). This emphasis on individual responsibility is an important element 
of neo-liberal governmentality, but is often referred to as ‘resilience’ by government. 
Even though it has not been made clear what this resilience entails (Davoudi 2012), 
there is a risk that when resilience becomes hegemonic or is over-emphasised, it may 
lead to ‘social Darwinism’ and ‘survival of the fittest’ (Davoudi and Madanipour 2013: 
557). 
In conclusion, governance of FRM takes for an important part place on the local level. 
Individuals are responsible for protecting against any future flood losses and are 
increasingly being encouraged by the government to manage local flood risk. In 
addition, private developers have the onus of assessing and mitigating flood risk on site. 
The local authority is responsible for managing flood risk in the area, whilst cooperating 
with other authorities that have responsibilities for FRM and thereby forming 
  72 
governance networks. These networks operate within guidelines set by central 
government through policies and targets, in order to govern the governance. Moreover, 
this neo-liberal governmentality is also present in the planning system, where decisions 
are taken at a distance from central government, with an increasing role for private 
investment and responsibility. At the same time, central government keeps control 
through legislation and policy. Therefore, decisions on FRM in the planning process are 
taken within governance networks that are influenced by hierarchical and market 
arrangements. 
3.3.2 Formation of governance networks in flood risk management 
Governance networks in FRM can be formed for a variety of reasons. Firstly, a group of 
actors may interact as a result of a flood event that created an urgent policy problem 
they wish to address. Secondly, the network may be formed voluntarily; for instance, by 
a group of actors who wish to develop a flood risk measure together. Thirdly, a network 
may be the result of direct or indirect governmental direction. An example is the 
involvement of statutory consultees in the planning process, thereby creating a network 
of actors who interact to make decisions on FRM. 
New development regularly takes place within areas at risk of flooding, which means 
that in these cases, governance networks are formed to manage flood risk as part of the 
local planning process. According to the Adaptation Sub-Committee (2011, 2012), 
approximately 12,000 to 16,000 new houses were built in flood zones each year 
between 2000 and 2009. Development inside floodplains grew by 12% between 2002 
and 2012, compared to an increase of development outside floodplains of 7%. An 
explanation for this might be development pressure in floodplains, as some areas with 
the greatest demand for housing and development also have large areas at risk of 
flooding, such as the south of England and London in particular (Howe and White 
2004). 
3.3.3 Policy problems concerning flood risk 
In 2008, it was estimated that 5.2 million properties in England, which equates to one in 
six properties, were at risk of flooding from rivers, sea or surface water (Environment 
Agency 2009c). The problem of flooding and flood risk is therefore current and real, but 
is also likely to worsen in the future as a result of climate change. According to figures 
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by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change is already 
noticeable through an increase in global land and ocean surface temperature by 
approximately 0.85ºC over the period between 1880 and 2012. Additionally, snow and 
ice in certain regions are melting, the average sea level has increased and temperature 
extremes and wind patterns are changing (IPCC 2007b, 2013). Around the UK, the sea 
level has risen approximately one millimetre per year in the 20th century, whilst 
temperatures in central England have risen by 1°C since 1980. The annual average of 
rainfall has not changed, but although seasonal rainfall is highly variable, there seems to 
have been in an increase of precipitation in the winter and a decrease in the summer25 
(Jenkins et al. 2009, Murphy et al. 2010). 
According to the IPCC, changes in the climate system have been caused by humans, for 
instance through the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC 2013). Even if 
climate change is mitigated, its effects will continue in the future. Future predictions are 
that the sea level is expected to rise between 13 and 76 cm by 2080 (high confidence) 
and that storm surges may increase (low confidence). This not only affects coastal flood 
risk, but rising sea levels may also cause groundwater flood risk to increase (Rotzoll and 
Fletcher 2013). Furthermore, a rise in peak river flows between 7% and 60% and an 
increase in rainfall intensity between 15% and 30% by 2080 are predicted (Adaptation 
Sub-Committee 2012), impacting on fluvial, pluvial and sewer flooding. 
As a consequence, the risk of most types of flooding is expected to increase in the 
future. This will affect the built environment: not only does it raise the risk of areas near 
the coast or in floodplains, it also makes settlements vulnerable to flooding caused by 
intense rainfall overloading sewers and drainage systems. Surface water flood risk is not 
easily identified and some areas not currently at risk may be in the future. In addition, 
once identified, the risk is also difficult to manage (White 2010). 
It is estimated that the number of properties at significant risk of river flooding will rise 
from 230,000 currently to up to 580,000 in 2080, excluding population growth. Coastal 
flood risk will increase from 100,000 properties currently to up to 570,000 in 2080, 
purely due to climate change (see Table 1 on page 3). Population growth in areas at risk 
of flooding will increase these figures still further (Adaptation Sub-Committee 2012). 
                                                
25 Largest changes in winter precipitation: increase of up to 33% in the west of the UK; small decrease in 
Scottish highlands. Wettest day of winter: no change in parts of Scotland to a 25% increase in parts of 
England. Largest changes in summer precipitation: decrease of 40% in the far south of England and no 
change over northern Scotland. Wettest day of summer: decrease of 12% in southern England to an 
increase of 12% in parts of Scotland (Murphy et al. 2009). 
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However, there is much uncertainty surrounding the severity of future flood risk (IPCC 
2012). As flood risk is a local to regional effect of climate change, there is great 
difficulty gathering evidence on this small scale, whilst there is no agreement either on 
the evidence that has been collected: 
There is limited to medium evidence available to assess climate-driven 
observed changes in the magnitude and frequency of floods at regional 
scales because the available instrumental records of floods at gauge 
stations are limited in space and time, and because of confounding effects 
of changes in land use and engineering. Furthermore, there is low 
agreement in this evidence, and thus overall low confidence at the global 
scale regarding even the sign of these changes. 
(IPCC 2011: 6) 
Moreover, assessing the probability of flooding is of limited usefulness in FRM: 
Whilst information on recurrence intervals can be of use in providing a 
retrospective indication of the relative strength of an event in comparison 
to past floods, its veneer of scientific certainty regarding future risk 
should be viewed as illusory. In reality, the urban system is subject to 
such significant variability that its value in aiding strategic decision 
making is actually of limited value. 
(White 2010: 45; emphasis in original) 
Flood risk does not only regard the probability of flooding, but it also considers the 
consequences (Tunstall et al. 2009). Flooding can have economic, environmental and 
social implications. Firstly, damage to properties, infrastructure, crops and the loss of 
business has an economic cost. Secondly, floodwater and the potential pollution caused 
by sewage or chemicals can adversely affect flora and fauna. Lastly, flooding can have 
severe and lasting impacts on people’s health and wellbeing. Physical effects of 
flooding, such as shock, virus infections and headaches usually occur temporarily, but 
psychological impacts can be long lasting, most commonly causing depression, anxiety, 
stress and sleep problems (Tunstall et al. 2006). The annual cost of coastal, fluvial and 
pluvial flooding is expected to increase from £1 billion currently to between £2.4 billion 
and £11.6 billion annually by 2080 (Environment Agency 2009e, Adaptation Sub-
Committee 2012). 
Planning can exacerbate the problem of flooding. Bad planning has the potential to raise 
the probability and consequences of flooding. For example, development in floodplains 
cause a loss of water storage, whilst drainage systems that drain water into sewers or 
rivers can increase flood risk elsewhere (Howe and White 2004). Moreover, 
development and urban creep cause a loss of land through which rain may have been 
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absorbed. In an urban area, 30% to 50% of rainfall on a paved area turns into runoff, 
meaning that any development could increase surface flood risk. Currently, 7% of the 
surface area in the UK is urbanised, but 23% of this urbanised area includes open space. 
However, it is estimated that every year, there is a 0.1% increase in impervious surfaces 
and the potential national increase in urban area by 2080 could be between 7.5% and 
30% (Evans et al. 2004). 
There also needs to be caution that solutions aiming at flood risk and climate change 
adaptation to abate the problem in the short term may exacerbate flood risk in the long 
term (IPCC 2011). Parker (1995) has named this consequence the escalator effect. 
When a new flood defence has been constructed, the area is safer, expected flood losses 
are lower and the desirability of the area is increased. This may stimulate more 
development to take place in the area. If extra development takes place and if the flood 
defence is breached, the consequences will be much larger than before construction. 
Moreover, flood defences are usually designed with a protection level justified by 
existing development. The cost-benefit analysis does not take future development into 
account, and any new development will require a higher level of protection. If the flood 
defence is upgraded, this may activate the escalator effect again. Placing restrictions on 
development in flood zones in order to counteract development pressure may prevent 
the escalator effect. 
The problem of flood risk is dependent on many uncertain factors and the relationship 
between these factors and flood risk is unknown. As a consequence, in terms of policy 
making, the problem of flood risk is wicked, surrounded by uncertainty on the nature of 
the problem, problem definition and solutions (Van Bueren et al. 2003). Current and 
future flood risks are not easy to predict. Flood risks are calculated using data and 
models, but data is limited and at times not accurate or detailed enough, whilst models 
are simplifications of reality and cannot predict flood risk exactly. Moreover, different 
models produce different results. Finally, knowledge on flood risk also changes when a 
flood occurs that was not expected. 
Wicked problems also have no clear end (Rittel and Webber 1973), which is an issue 
with flood risk as well. Flooding will always occur and there will always be properties 
at risk of flooding. The difference is whether we can predict the probability and 
consequences of flooding, as well as deciding what risk we find acceptable. Also, how 
we protect against flooding has changed over time, from protecting against water in the 
  76 
past to living with risks currently. This approach may be adapted again in the future, 
when perceptions or solutions to flood risk change. Moreover, flood risk is a long-term 
problem, but planning decisions are often taken with a medium term in mind. Decisions 
taken now include predictions of climate change in the far future, but at the same time 
these figures are uncertain. It can also be difficult to envisage how a development may 
in the future suffer under the consequences of a flood. 
Flood risk’s relationship with climate change aggravates its wicked character. Climate 
change is a highly complex and wicked problem for multiple reasons. Knowledge about 
the nature of climate change is uncertain and contested, including the effects of climate 
change on flooding. In addition, there is much institutional uncertainty, with various 
decisions on a problem taken in different policy fields or governmental levels (Van 
Bueren et al. 2003). Policy formation and implementation on climate change takes place 
in multiple policy sectors, such as water management, energy and spatial planning, and 
in several spatial levels, from international to local. This increases the complexity of 
climate change adaptation, even more so because the emerging field of adaptation lacks 
a structured policy domain. There are no clear goals, solutions or responsibilities for 
adapting to climate change, which complicates implementation (Termeer et al. 2012). 
Moreover, there is often a mismatch in spatial and time horizons between policy makers 
and climate change research. Plans and policies are designed for a much shorter term 
than climate change scenarios, whilst policy makers may struggle with the lack of 
knowledge on the precise impacts of climate change in their local area (Wilson 2006a). 
This wicked nature of flood risk will affect the actors in a network addressing this 
problem. Flood risks have a great impact on the location, viability and layout of 
development, but there is uncertainty surrounding calculations and outcomes of current 
and future flood risk. This means there is room for different applications and 
interpretations of data and models, whilst various actors calculate flood risk for varying 
purposes. The EA has much expertise on flood risk and uses its own models and maps. 
Developers are obliged to assess flood risk in their development and therefore have the 
opportunity to calculate flood risks as well. Local authorities have often lost in-house 
drainage expertise through privatisation, budget cuts and outsourcing (Porter and 
Demeritt 2012) and may have difficulty interpreting technical information, especially 
when two parties disagree on figures. Knowledge on flood risk can therefore provide 
actors with power and they will produce this knowledge to support their interests. 
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Finally, the definition of the problem of flooding varies between parties (Tunstall et al. 
2009); for instance, between the EA, which only considers flooding; the local planning 
authority, which considers it as part of sustainable development; the developer, who 
sees it as a barrier to development; and the community, who consider the impacts a 
flood may have on their lives. In the case of FRM, it is not just flood risk that is 
uncertain, but there are also differing opinions on the level of acceptable risk. Moreover, 
the actors can change their perception of the policy problem during the decision-making 
process. 
3.3.4 Actors in governance networks in flood risk management 
There is a large variety of actors involved in managing flood risk. These actors do not 
function in isolation within the governance network. They have perceptions of each 
other, may have interdependencies and some interact with each other regularly. 
Therefore, they exist in complex interrelationships within and outside governance 
networks. However, for reasons of clarity this section describes the key actors 
individually. An overview is given in Appendix C and the current rules, regulations and 
policies made by some of these actors, which is referred to in the text, are included in 
Appendix A. 
European Union: The European Commission has adopted two directives that concern 
FRM, the Floods Directive and the Water Framework Directive, which have been 
transposed into British law. Therefore, the EU’s main influence is through these 
transposed laws. In some cases the EU also provides regional funding that could be 
directed towards projects that manage flood risk. 
Central government: Defra forms policy on FRM and is also the department to which 
the EA is responsible. Defra has no operational powers and therefore relies on other 
authorities for the implementation of policy. The Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) forms planning policy, which also includes FRM. Local 
authorities adhere to national planning policy and law and the SoS can in some cases 
decide on planning applications. Interests between these departments can conflict, just 
as development and flood risk can conflict, which can prevent integration of policies. 
Moreover, a change in government after an election often causes changes in policies. 
Local government: The planning department has some discretion in deciding on 
planning policy and planning applications, but they have to comply with national law 
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and policy. Under current planning policy, planners make decisions with a presumption 
in favour of sustainable development, taking economic, environmental and social 
aspects into account. Flood risk is one of the issues considered. As councils have often 
lost in-house drainage expertise, they use the technical expertise of the EA (Porter and 
Demeritt 2012), but planners also have to interpret the EA’s advice and balance it 
against other contributing factors to sustainable development. Flood risk could be 
viewed narrowly as an environmental factor, whilst local authorities give priority to 
economic and social benefits of development. On the other hand, it could be viewed 
more broadly, considering the effect a potential flood has on the economy, society and 
the environment, thereby increasing the role it plays in sustainable development. 
Moreover, the planners’ context is political. For instance, the elected members of a 
council also have influence over decision making in the council. In the case of planning, 
councillors will decide on major or controversial planning applications in the planning 
committee. The councillors represent the local people and therefore their decision may 
be incompatible with the advice of planning officers. 
The Environment Agency: The EA is an NDPB and a statutory consultee for local 
policies and for certain planning applications. They can object to a development on 
flood risk grounds and have the power to use the Flooding Direction if their objections 
are not resolved. 
The EA as an actor has inherited the technical and apolitical characteristics of their 
predecessors. FRM in the past was relatively self-governing and isolated from other 
policy areas, causing decision making to be relatively stable (Maloney and Richardson 
1995). For example, the NRA was known for being very technical and not 
communicating well with other authorities and communities. When the EA was 
established and many of the employees transferred, problems communicating with 
planners remained, who experienced the EA as a technical, scientific and regulatory 
authority (Davoudi 2000). When the EA’s role in planning increased, the planning 
officers felt that the EA did not understand that planners had to consider wider 
sustainability issues. Instead, the EA ‘reduced sustainability to a black and white issue 
[where] planners must be mad to allow developments in the floodplain’ (Porter and 
Demeritt 2012: 2370). The EA tried to improve their relations with planning authorities 
(Howes 2007), but at times negotiations between planners and the EA remained 
difficult, which was expressed in the number of objections the EA made to planning 
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applications. The introduction of policy and legislation, such as PPG25 in 2001, PPS25 
in 2006 and the Flooding Direction in 2007, may have caused the number of objections 
to rise, but in recent years, there has been a reduction (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Objections to planning applications by the Environment Agency 
Source: Environment Agency 2009c, 2010, 2011, 2012b, Porter and Demeritt 2012 
Legislation and policy on FRM – in particular the Flooding Direction – is an important 
resource for the EA. They use this resource to exercise power over other actors, placing 
more pressure on negotiating parties to resolve any outstanding issues, causing a 
reduction in applications decided against the EA’s advice. In their 2010–2011 annual 
report on development and flood risk, the EA stated that the introduction of the 
direction had lengthened discussions with planners and as a result improved the quality 
of developments and the supporting information submitted with proposals. When the 
EA objected to an application, this objection was usually resolved. When the EA 
sustained its objection, most of the cases were either refused or approved in line with 
their advice; only 9% of the planning outcomes were against their advice (Environment 
Agency 2012b). Most of these applications are referred back to the local authority to 
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make a decision, but in some cases the application is called in and decided upon in a 
public inquiry.26 
Year Referred under 
Direction and 
resolved  
Of which local 
planning authority 
decided and approved 
against advice 
Of which called in and 
approved against 
advice 
2007/2008 9 6 0 
2008/2009 15 5 2 
2009/2010 4 1 0 
2010/2011 2 0 1 
Table 2: Major planning applications on which Flooding Direction was used 
 Source: Environment Agency 2009c, 2010, 2011, 2012b 
Water and sewerage companies: WaSCs are responsible for foul and surface water 
sewers. Through Schedule 3 of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 they will 
become statutory consultees for drainage system applications. If they own reservoirs 
holding over 25,000 cubic metres of water above natural ground level, they will be 
consulted in local spatial policy as well. The WaSCs have a duty to prevent flooding if 
they can be reasonably expected to do so, but what is considered reasonable is not 
detailed (Johnson and Priest 2008, BBC News 2012). 
In addition, their interest in sustainable drainage is increasing. As more development 
takes place, the existing sewer system is placed under pressure. To prevent flooding, but 
also to prevent pollution through Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs), WaSCs are 
seeking to reduce the amount of rainfall going into combined sewers or are 
                                                
26 In 2007/2008, eight applications were referred back to the local authority and one application was 
called in by the SoS, but was withdrawn by the developer. In 2008/2009, 13 applications were referred 
back to the local authority and two applications were called in. For 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 this 
division is not provided (Environment Agency 2009c, 2010, 2011, 2012b). 
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disconnecting surface water sewers.27 Therefore, they are becoming more active in 
assessing flood risk from sewers and researching forms of sustainable drainage.28   
Internal Drainage Boards: IDBs manage water levels in areas of special drainage need. 
There are 120 IDBs in England, either in broad open areas of lowland or within the 
floodplains of rivers. Most of the IDBs are located within Cambridgeshire, Kent, 
Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Nottinghamshire, Somerset and Yorkshire. Under the Land 
Drainage Act 1991, IDBs exercise a general power of supervision over all matters 
relating to water level management within their district (Association of Drainage 
Authorities n.d.). They become involved in preparing a Strategic Flood Risk 
Assessment (SFRA), as well as applications for major developments in flood zones or 
applications affecting an IDB-controlled watercourse. Through Schedule 3 of the Flood 
and Water Management Act 2010, the IDBs will become a statutory consultee for 
drainage system applications. 
Highway authorities: Local planning authorities should consult the relevant highway 
authorities when preparing a SFRA and in applications regarding highway drainage. 
Highway authorities comprise the Highways Agency for main roads (A roads) and the 
county council or unitary authority for local roads. 
Marine Management Organisation: An NDPB established in 2009 that aims to 
contribute to sustainable development in the marine area. They are involved in FRM 
schemes in the marine area. 
Canal & River Trust: The former British Waterways and now a charitable trust, which 
is consulted by the local planning authority and developers regarding developments in 
areas that are near canals, especially ones above natural ground level, due to risk from 
breach inundation. 
Navigation authorities: There is a variety of local and regional navigation authorities 
for managing features, such as waterways, aqueducts, canals, rivers and ports. 
                                                
27 CSOs are a measure to prevent sewer flooding when the sewer system becomes inundated with 
rainwater. This leads to a release of sewage into rivers or the sea. If WaSCs are not attempting to keep the 
number of CSOs to a minimum, they may be contravening European regulations on treating waste and 
water quality. In fact, the European Court of Justice ruled that two UK CSOs contravened a European 
Directive on wastewater treatment (BBC News 2012). 
28 For instance, Northumbrian Water is conducting a sustainable sewerage study in partnership with local 
authorities and the EA to research sustainable drainage opportunities (Kennedy and Hyslop 2012). 
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Emergency services: Local planning authorities should consult emergency services 
when preparing local policy and about any applications that have implications for 
emergency planning. 
Insurance companies: Insurance companies have an interest in FRM, as it reduces their 
costs for insurance payouts. They stress the need for investments in flood defences, 
sustainable drainage and a planning system that avoids development in areas at risk of 
flooding. They want insurance costs taken into account in decisions on development in 
flood risk areas. The government is dependent on the insurance industry to fund flood 
losses instead of introducing government compensation (Green and Penning-Rowsell 
2004). 
Community: The community has opportunities to be involved in policy formation and 
policy implementation. Indirectly, they can vote in national and local elections, whilst 
directly, they are consulted in local policies and planning applications. Prospective 
residents of proposed developments do not usually have any input, as they are unknown 
at that moment. Additionally, after the development has been completed, flood risks 
may not be that obvious to new occupiers and sometimes only become known when 
applying for insurance. 
Perceptions of flood risk can differ greatly amongst people and are heavily influenced 
by both situational and cognitive factors. Flood risk awareness of an individual grows if 
they have direct experience with flooding or a great emotional response to flooding. 
Those without flooding experience may think that because their house was granted 
planning permission, it must be safe from flooding. In reality, the planner will have 
assessed the information available and considered that the benefits of development 
outweighed the risks of flooding in that area (White 2010). Moreover, actors 
communicate risk differently, which may be inferred in different ways by others. The 
public’s perception can differ greatly from the scientists’ perceptions who rely on 
knowledge (Bradford et al. 2012), creating a tension between the ‘facts’ and the 
‘feelings’ of flood risk. Communication of objective versus subjective risks between 
scientists, planners and the public is therefore vital, which will allow individuals to 
make their own decisions about what level of flood risk they find acceptable (White 
2010). 
Furthermore, the community also includes riparian landowners, whose land or property 
adjoins a river or other watercourse, including a culvert. They have a legal duty to keep 
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the watercourse or any structures in the watercourse free from obstruction and pollution. 
Any works that impact on the watercourse need consent (Environment Agency 2012c). 
Other landowners may also have an interest in FRM, such as farmers. 
CIRIA: This is a not-for-profit organisation that conducts research for the construction 
industry. It also deals with FRM and has developed guidance for the construction 
industry on flood resilience and SuDS, but also on incorporating FRM in the 
development control process. 
Developers and applicants: Developers and applicants are required to assess flood risk 
in a proposed development, create a site-specific flood risk assessment (FRA) if 
required and fund flood protection measures. Their interest is to develop and in most 
cases to make a profit. 
National Flood Forum: Charity established in 2002 with start-up funding from the EA. 
They help people to prepare for and recover from flooding, but they also campaign on 
behalf of flood risk communities and work with government and agencies on the 
national and local level. 
3.3.5 The wider context 
The actors that operate in the field of FRM and planning form governance networks to 
develop or implement policy. These governance networks are situated in a wider 
context, in which structures, but also other networks and actors, influence decision 
making. These structures differ from network to network, but some common structures 
can be identified, which take place mostly on a global and national level. These 
structures in the wider context will influence the governance network, although this 
influence is context and time dependent. The structures are visualised in Figure 1029 and 
are further discussed below. 
Formal institutions: These are the key regulations and policies that are relevant to FRM 
and planning, which are explained in more detail in Appendix A. Formal regulations 
can form barriers to actors, such as before 2010 when no authority had powers to take 
overall responsibility for the management of surface water flooding. In other cases, 
regulations may present opportunities or resources that can be used to exert power; for 
                                                
29 There are no relationships shown between the structures and actors in this figure, as it is only intended 
to illustrate these elements and not how they interrelate; this is shown in the theoretical framework. 
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instance, the Flooding Direction, which provided the EA with more power to influence 
decision making. 
Government and policy change: A change in central government can bring about a 
change in policies. For example, the UK coalition government has made changes to the 
planning system in England, which affects decision making in the planning process. 
Moreover, as the SoS can decide on referred planning applications, a change of SoS can 
cause a change in decision making. 
Climate change: The occurrence of climate change affects FRM; for instance, future 
flood risk is calculated by taking sea level rises and increases in rainfall into account 
(DCLG 2012b). Heavy rainfall events in 2012, together with above average rainfall, 
have heightened awareness of climate change and the impacts it can have. Therefore, 
climate change can change the perception of actors on the importance of addressing 
flood risk. 
Flood events: Flood events in the past have created urgency in addressing the problem 
of flooding and as a result have brought about policy change. Flood events also increase 
knowledge on flood risk and awareness amongst actors. Moreover, personal flood 
experience changes an actor’s perception of flood risk, whilst a local authority with 
recent flood experience may prioritise FRM more than those that do not have this 
experience (Richards 2005). 
Economic situation: The economic situation in a country can affect its policies; for 
instance, the recession in England has caused the coalition government to place much 
emphasis on the planning system encouraging development. 
Governance: Through the governance system, governance networks have formed that 
take decisions on how to manage flood risks. This governance system is a Type II 
multi-level governance with a neo-liberal perspective. Actors involved are a mix of 
public, semi-public and private actors, but responsibility, accountability and authority 
are fragmented. Moreover, decisions on FRM are taken on various spatial levels. Any 
decisions taken on a national level heavily influences implementation on a local level, 
whilst decisions taken in one local area can affect neighbouring districts. 
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3.3.6 The outcome of flood risk management 
The outcome of the governance network is the way flood risk is managed. The aim of 
FRM is to manage current and future flood risks. As flood risk is related to climate 
change, FRM has also become part of climate change adaptation. Adaptation is aimed at 
adjusting natural or human systems in response to the effects of climate change (IPCC 
2007a). In the case of FRM, adaptation is often anticipatory and the result of a 
deliberate policy decision. 
FRM can entail structural measures, non-structural measures or a combination of both. 
Spatial planning is a non-structural measure by considering flood risks of development 
inside and outside flood zones. If a planned development has flood risk issues and 
structural measures are needed to protect a development, planning ensures the 
development is safe and does not raise flood risk anywhere else. For instance, planning 
can influence the design and layout of a development and the buildings within it. The 
degree to which buildings are flood proof can be improved, space can be created for a 
river or the sea to flood without causing damage and SuDS can be incorporated to 
decrease the risks of surface water and sewer flooding (Evans et al. 2008, Neuvel and 
van der Knaap 2010). FRM can therefore be incorporated into a development and may 
even enhance it. However, at times, water, land and people may be mutually exclusive 
and conflicts may emerge between FRM and development. Finally, FRM in the short 
term may create problems in the long term, for instance through the escalator effect. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the development of network governance in FRM and the 
planning system. In the past, rural and urban areas were protected against flooding by 
building structural measures. In recent decades, this narrow view concerning the 
reduction of the probability of flooding broadened into a FRM that uses an integrated 
approach. This development is the result of changing views on controlling the 
environment and an increasing understanding of the effects of climate change. There is 
awareness that floods cannot be wholly prevented, and instead, structural and non-
structural methods are applied to managing the probability and the consequences of 
flooding. Planning contributes to modern FRM by influencing the location and design 
of developments. 
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Governance networks play an important role in developing and implementing FRM. 
This chapter has identified some of the actors present in these networks. Central 
government has shifted responsibilities for managing flood risk towards other agencies, 
local authorities, and communities and individuals. As a result, there is a plurality of 
authorities involved in FRM. These authorities, from the public, semi-public and private 
sectors, have different responsibilities for managing flood risk and cover various spatial 
levels. Therefore, the governance system of FRM is a Type II governance with neo-
liberal or free market influences. Policy development and implementation take place in 
local networks, whilst central government keeps control through a strategic line created 
by national policy and regulations. 
Inside the governance network, the actors will try to influence FRM outcomes, but 
diverging problem definitions, solutions and risk perceptions can complicate decision 
making. Furthermore, flood risk is an uncertain, difficult and technical problem and 
knowledge can be used to exert power. However, governance networks have the 
opportunity to produce unique outcomes that can address the problem of flood risk by 
combining the resources and problem-solving skills of actors. This would result in 
unique, high-quality developments in which FRM has become an integral part and 
which make them desirable places to live and work. 
The agents are also influenced by wider structures. An influential structure is the 
occurrence of flood events, which can create urgency amongst actors to produce FRM. 
On the other hand, a neo-liberal governmentality and the drive to overcome an 
economic recession can cause development to be prioritised over flood risk. In practice, 
even though the number of planning applications approved against the EA’s advice has 
fallen over time, development still takes place in areas at significant risk of flooding, 
particularly in regions with high development pressure. 
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Chapter 4 Research design and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methods that were used to design this research and collect and 
analyse the data. Section 4.2 outlines the ontological and epistemological foundation of 
this research. This is followed by section 4.3, which explains the case study approach 
and why this has been used for this research. It also includes a description of the 
methods and tools used for case selection, data collection and analysis. Furthermore, 
section 4.4 covers the ethical considerations of this research. Lastly, section 4.5 
discusses the issue of reflexivity. 
4.2 Theoretical foundation 
Research can be based on a foundational or an anti-foundational ontology. These 
ontologies lead to particular epistemologies; for instance, positivism is based on a 
foundational ontology, whilst interpretivism is based on an anti-foundational ontology. 
However, there is a third option that adopts a stratified ontology, which is critical 
realism (Bhaskar 1975, Sayer 2000). Critical realism distinguishes between the real, the 
actual and the empirical (see Figure 9). The real domain is composed of natural and 
social phenomena that exist independently from humans. The actual domain is formed 
by the events that are caused by mechanisms from the real domain, when certain 
triggers cause the event to occur. The empirical is the domain of experience; it is the 
observing of events by humans. An example to explain these three domains is the 
greenhouse effect. The real domain is the universe, including the earth, the sun and the 
mechanism that causes gases trapped in the atmosphere to heat up the earth. These 
phenomena have always existed, even when people were unaware of this. However, the 
increased production of these gases by human society has triggered the heating up of the 
earth. When people observed this change, the event became part of the empirical 
domain. People formulated the problem of climate change, which exists in the empirical 
domain. They gathered knowledge and formulated theories, again in the empirical 
domain, in an attempt to understand the real and actual domain. As a result, policy 
solutions were developed in an attempt to produce desired events. 
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The real domain is not only composed of natural structures, but it also includes social 
structures. However, there is a difference between the two. Whereas natural structures 
exist independently from humans, social structures have a closer relationship with 
agency (Mingers 2004). Social structure is the result of human agency and agents are 
able to reproduce or transform social structure. At the same time, social structure 
influences agency by enabling or restricting behaviour. Social structure exists whether a 
particular person is aware of it or not, but when a person acts it may affect the 
underlying structure. The agent can reproduce or transform a social structure on purpose 
or whilst being unaware, triggering expected or unexpected events. Therefore, to a 
certain extent social structures are seen as being independent. 
 
Figure 9: Critical realism's stratified ontology 
Source: Adapted from Mingers 2004: 92 
The type of ontology and epistemology used affects the research that is conducted, 
including research into policy processes. Policy processes and decision making take 
place in an open social world, with many different independent variables, which means 
that policy outcomes depend on specific contexts (Sayer 2000). Therefore, researching 
policy processes is complicated, because many independent variables influence the 
process and the outcome, which makes the identification of causal relationships 
between process and outcome problematic. However, if a policy researcher applies 
positivism to their research, complications may arise, as their empirical observation 
does not account for the open social world as critical realism does. In addition, it 
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produces causal relationships without asking ‘why’. Moreover, policy research often 
applies case studies with a limited number of cases, which is unacceptable within 
positivism (Easton 2010). Critical realism, on the other hand, enables the use of a 
limited number of cases and makes generalisation possible (Danermark et al. 2002). It 
also allows for a deep investigation of structures behind causal relationships to answer 
the ‘why’ question. 
In addition, applying interpretive approaches can create problems with evaluation and 
comparison with other research (Easton 2010). Critical realism agrees with 
interpretivism that social phenomena are concept dependent, but differs in that it 
acknowledges reality and causal explanation, solving interpretative problems with 
evaluation and comparison. However, an issue with critical realism is that in a case 
study with a complex context it may be impossible to identify all causal relationships. In 
addition, ‘what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times 
we have observed it happening’ (Sayer 2000: 14), and research outcomes from a case 
remain difficult to generalise. 
The theoretical framework used in this research is for an important part based on Marsh 
and Smith’s critical realist model (2000) that explains decision making by examining 
the dialectical relationships between structure and agency. In critical realism, human 
behaviour is influenced by structures and agency. However, critical realism is a 
philosophical position, which does not prescribe universal research designs (Yeung 
1997). Therefore, the research design depends on the type of research conducted. The 
next section discusses how the research design for this research has been chosen. 
4.3 The case study approach 
This research uses the case study approach to examine governance networks. The case 
study is a widely applied and accepted research design, which has been used in 
academic research for many years, but has experienced waves of popularity. In the 
United States, the Chicago School studied neighbourhoods at the Department of 
Sociology, University of Chicago from 1916 onwards and became a leader in the case 
study approach. Its research focused on problems provoked by urbanisation and 
immigration, using open interviews, observation and document analysis. This approach 
received much criticism, for instance concerning the validation of theory and 
generalisation. At the beginning of the 1940s, due to this criticism and a preference for 
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quantitative methods, case studies were used less frequently. However, in the 1960s, 
there was a renewed interest in case studies after scholars experienced problems with 
the confinement of quantitative methods (Hamel et al. 1993). Since then, the case study 
has remained a popular approach in the social sciences and has been widely applied in, 
for instance, sociology, anthropology, public administration and psychology (Noor 
2008, Iwakabe and Gazzola 2009). 
A case study examines a contemporary and real-life event in detail, using empirical data 
(Yin 2009: 18). A limited number of cases is examined, but a plurality of variables is 
used to collect data (Somekh and Lewin 2005). The research aim and questions 
determine whether a case study is suitable for particular research, for instance, if 
questions focus on ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin 2009). Two main research questions of this 
research focus on ‘how’, whilst the third is a ‘what’ question that is answered by 
analysing the findings derived from the first two questions. In addition, the research 
aims to explore the nature of network governance in local planning processes, requiring 
the examination of a real-life event in detail. Therefore, the case study is the most 
suitable research method that enables an in-depth investigation of governance networks. 
The cases used are governance networks that include a group of agents taking decisions 
on FRM. These networks exist independently from this research. In addition, as the 
decision-making process has taken place outside the research, its boundaries are 
predefined. Following the typology of cases by Ragin and Becker (1992), this research 
treats the cases as an empirical unit. However, as it also examines the structures that 
have affected decision making, there is no clear boundary to which structures and events 
may be relevant. On the one hand, it is vital that all influential structures have been 
included to identify dialectical relationships. On the other hand, the case should not be 
too broad in space and time, as this will produce an overload of data, making it near 
impossible to find relationships. There will also be a risk that it will result in long and 
complicated chapters, making key issues to be studied to become lost in the excess of 
text (Stake 1978, Eisenhardt 1989, Remenyi et al. 2002, Yin 2009). This balance 
between a case becoming too narrow or too broad and the inclusion of important 
structures was assessed during analysis, referring continually to the theoretical 
framework and the data collected. 
The case study is an empirical inquiry, which is based on quantitative methods, 
qualitative methods or a combination of both. In this research, two qualitative data 
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collection tools were used, namely interviews and document analysis. These are 
commonly used methods, because they create triangulation (Mangen 1999), benefiting 
the reliability and validity of the research and the robustness of the case study 
(Eisenhardt 1989). In addition, observation through site visits was used. These data 
collection tools are explained in more detail in section 4.3.2. 
In this research, two cases were examined. A multiple case study is more robust than a 
single case study, because there is comparable data. A disadvantage is that it requires 
time, effort and resources (Knight and Ruddock 2009, Yin 2009). To ensure greater 
depth of analysis, but taking into account resource availability, the number of cases was 
limited to two. Furthermore, in a multiple case study, replicating a design is important. 
Cases should be selected using the prediction that results are either expected to be 
similar or contrasting (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009). In this research, the cases were 
chosen to be different (see section 4.3.1). The aim is not to conduct comparative 
research, because the number of cases is small and cases are selected based on known 
outcomes, as opposed to random selection, which would lead to false findings (Dion 
1998, Bennett and Elman 2006). 
Another important consideration is generalisation. Case studies are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions, but not to populations or universes (Yin 2009). In addition, the 
limitations of the research need to be taken into account. For instance, studying a small 
number of cases forms a limitation, thereby restricting generalisation. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues that generalisation from a single case is possible; however, if multiple cases are 
included, replication logic is produced and generalisation becomes more reliable. This 
research used the results of the case studies for analytical generalisation, whilst taking 
limitations into account.30 For example, generalisation will focus on contributing to 
governance network theory and to knowledge on examples of decision making on FRM. 
Key factors influencing FRM can be identified from the two cases, but that does not 
mean they will occur again in another case, or that the outcome of future cases can be 
predicted. Structures and agents are dependent on the temporal and spatial context and 
every case is therefore unique. Therefore, no predictions are made concerning the 
outcomes of other networks in FRM. 
Finally, applying a case study produces various benefits. It provides a detailed analysis 
of specific, contemporary phenomena, producing insights that other research approaches 
                                                
30 A discussion of the limitations of this research can be found in section 8.4. 
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cannot provide. At the same time, through analytical generalisation, this type of 
research can contribute to academic knowledge and the formation of theories. Case 
studies can also be applied to many purposes, providing flexibility for the researcher 
and a great variety in academic research (Gomm et al. 2000). However, to ensure the 
research is reliable, the processes of case selection and data collection need to be 
explained and methodically applied in research. This is the focus of sections 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Case selection method and tools 
The research questions focus on governance networks in FRM within local planning 
processes in England. The choice was made to study development management 
processes, as opposed to local policy processes, as this enabled the investigation of the 
delivery of FRM in practice. In the local planning process, development management is 
the last step that influences the outcome of FRM, resulting in implementation, which 
affects the environment. It is the action people take from the empirical dimension, based 
on their understanding of structures and mechanisms, to prevent undesired events and 
create desired ones. Therefore, the development management process is a crucial 
process, in which important decisions are made that directly influence the way flood 
risk is managed in England. 
In order to study governance networks and the outcome of FRM, two planning 
applications were studied, in which a network of actors were interacting on a particular 
flood risk issue. There were several selection criteria to find and choose suitable cases. 
Firstly, the development had to be a housing development or mixed development that 
included housing. This criterion was chosen because flooding of residential dwellings 
usually causes the greatest impacts and controversy. Therefore, it was more likely that 
flood risk was an important issue in the governance network. Secondly, the 
development had to be major,31 because larger applications are more complicated, 
resulting in the involvement of multiple actors and providing the opportunity to analyse 
network interaction. It is also more likely that there is a larger flood risk issue in major 
developments. Thirdly, as one of the dialectical relationships includes the outcome, a 
planning decision had to have already been made. Fourthly, in order for actors to be 
able to recall the decision-making process, the network had to either still be active or 
                                                
31 Containing a minimum of ten residential dwellings. 
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had to have been dissolved in the recent past (five years). Fifthly, two cases were 
selected using the prediction that results will be contrasting, based on whether 
interaction was based on conflict or cooperation. Choosing contrasting cases enabled 
the study of differences in key factors, in order to form a conclusion on which factors 
may be the most crucial. 
To search for cases, a combination of methods was applied. An established method for 
finding cases was unknown to the researcher; therefore, a pilot search was conducted 
that was limited to the North-East of England. The reason for choosing this region was 
because the researcher was based there and it was easier to locate and communicate 
with people who were able to help with the search. For instance, one researcher at 
Newcastle University had in the past worked as a planning manager at the Association 
of North East Councils and was able to suggest potential cases. In addition, a meeting 
took place with a planning technical specialist from the local EA office. Furthermore, a 
regional list with planning application objections from the EA from 2007 to the 
beginning of 2011 was used. Lastly, an internet search was conducted, using various 
resources including the Planning Magazine casebook. After this initial search, two cases 
were found. One, which surfaced multiple times during the search, was Newcastle Great 
Park (NGP), but the other one was considered unsuitable as the application was 
withdrawn and no outcome was reached. 
After this, the search was broadened to the rest of England. The same employee from 
the EA was approached, who sent a request for help with cases to other EA offices, 
which resulted in further email contact with employees in various regions. Other key 
people from the EA and local authorities with flood risk issues were also identified 
through an internet search and contacted. In addition, to reach more people, a message 
was placed on the National Flood Risk and Water Management Community online 
group, which has members that work in the FRM field (Local Government Association 
2013). Again, the list of objections from the EA was used. As the dataset was large, this 
time the results were filtered to include only applications that were objected to on loss 
of flood storage, exception test not passed, or risk to the development. This way, the 
applications with the most pressing flood issues were selected and those that were 
objected to on the grounds of insufficient information or unsatisfactory FRAs were 
filtered out. However, where in the past the description of objections in England was 
included in High Level Target 5 reports, after 2008 this detailed information was 
replaced by summary reports. These new reports lacked information, including that on 
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the specific applications approved against the EA’s advice. This meant that finding 
suitable applications became more difficult. 
Figure 10: Map showing the location of the cases 
Source: Find 2013 
Due to the economic recession causing a slump in development and an increase in the 
number of withdrawn applications, the number of suitable cases found was lower than 
expected, but sufficient. A shortlist was devised with nine cases, which included the 
following characteristics for each: development type, the year the application was 
submitted, the type of interaction between actors, whether the EA approved the 
application, whether the application complied with FRM policy, the type of network, 
the type of flood issue and the current planning stage (this list is included in Appendix 
D). The selection criteria that were of greatest importance were the network size and 
actor interactions (conflict or cooperation) and the two cases deemed best for this 
research were selected in a discussion between the researcher and the supervisors. 
www.sk tchmap.co.uk
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As a result, the cases that were chosen were Newcastle Great Park (NGP) in the North-
East of England and the cricket ground redevelopment in Chelmsford in the South-East 
of England (see Figure 10). NGP is a large mixed development in the north of 
Newcastle upon Tyne. The development is on former green belt land and has issues 
with fluvial and pluvial flooding. The actors in the network are cooperative and the 
network is still active in the development’s implementation phase. The cricket club 
ground in the centre of Chelmsford is a redevelopment including new cricket facilities 
and residential dwellings. There is a significant fluvial flood risk on part of the site, 
where the residential development is planned. The actors in the network were in 
conflict; the network was partly dissolved in 2009 after planning permission was 
granted and the development is now in its implementation phase. 
4.3.2 Data collection method and tools 
In a multiple case study, replicating a design is important (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009). 
Therefore, for each case the same data collection method and tools have been applied. 
The data collection design has been based on past and current research on network 
governance, which has made extensive use of qualitative methods. This is also a 
suitable method for a case study approach. Data collection tools are, for instance, the 
analysis of reports and minutes from meetings between actors in a network. However, 
even though these provide much information, they lack the perspective of the actors and 
other informal aspects. Therefore, it is important to conduct interviews as well 
(Bogason and Zølner 2007). For this research, a combination of document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews was applied. Site visits to the development sites also took 
place. Table 3 relates the research questions, the chapter in which they are addressed 
and the data collection tools that were used. 
Document analysis served several purposes. Firstly, it provided a first insight into the 
policy problem, the actors involved, their perceptions, interactions and the outcomes of 
the process. This document analysis also guided the contents of the interviews, which 
were used to gather information lacking from the documents, to clear certain issues up, 
or to identify any other actors that may have been involved in the process. On the basis 
of these interviews, new documents were analysed or old documents reread in the light 
of new information. 
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For the case of NGP, planning applications relating to it, the accompanying original and 
revised master plan, and any other plans relating to the development were studied. 
Additionally, policy documents relating to spatial planning from Newcastle and the 
region were collected, such as regional spatial plans, the local Unitary Development 
Plan (UDP) and the emerging LDF, as well as any flood risk-related policy documents 
from the region and the local authority. Other reports and research on flood risk and 
FRM, reports from the residents’ association and newspaper articles were also collected. 
Lastly, minutes and reports from various committees and subcommittees from the local 
authority that discussed the NGP development were gathered from the years 1997 until 
2012. Documents were collected online, from Newcastle City Library, Newcastle City 
Council planning department, Tyne and Wear Archives and from participants. A list of 
all documents collected is included in Appendix E. 
Research question Chapter Data collection tool 
1) How has network 
governance of FRM 
developed?  
3: Network governance of flood 
risk management  
Literature review 
 
2) How do governance 
networks in FRM function? 
 
5: Newcastle Great Park 
6: Chelmsford cricket ground 
development 
7: Network governance in local 
planning processes 
Document analysis 
Interviews 
Site visits 
3) What are the key factors 
in network governance that 
influence FRM? 
7: Network governance in local 
planning processes 
None (analysis) 
Table 3: Research questions related to chapters and data collection tools 
For the cricket ground redevelopment in Chelmsford, policies, plans and reports were 
collected that formed the background to the case, such as local and regional spatial 
plans and flood risk documents. Additionally, documents forming part of the planning 
application, public inquiry documents and the inspector’s report were collected. Lastly, 
local news articles were gathered. Documents were gathered online, were downloaded 
  98 
from the PublicAccess system on Chelmsford City Council’s website or were provided 
by participants. All documents that were collected are included in Appendix F. 
In addition, interviews were carried out. The aim of interviewing was to find key actors 
who were involved in the planning process and FRM and to gain understanding of the 
decision-making process from the perspective of the participant. Firstly, an interview 
guide was developed, which was based on the theoretical framework. The questions that 
were derived from the theoretical framework are included in Appendix I. The interview 
guide also addressed any particular issues that had been identified from document 
analysis (see Appendices K and L). 
 
Figure 11: Newcastle Great Park development cells 
Source: Adapted from Newcastle City Council 2007: 13 
Secondly, the key actors to interview were identified by using the gathered documents 
and the method of snowballing: asking every participant if they could recommend 
another actor to be interviewed. The people involved were categorised and the aim was 
to be able to speak to at least one actor in each category. For NGP, the categories were 
the local planning department, the EA, the development companies, the WaSC, the 
airport, councillors and residents. In addition, to increase understanding of the 
controversy of development in green belt land, an interview was conducted with a 
member of the Green Party. Lastly, to gain understanding of the early stages of decision 
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making, two actors were interviewed that were part of this process. Even though this 
took place more than five years ago, the actors were still able to recall many details of 
the decision-making process. The majority of the interviews, however, were about the 
current process, which therefore met the case selection criteria. 
 
Figure 12: Drawing of the planned cricket ground development. 
Copyright: MCD 
Source: ECCC and MCD 2008 
For the Chelmsford cricket ground case, the categories of actors were the local planning 
department, the EA, the cricket club, the development company, the flood risk 
consultancy, the planning consultancy, councillors and residents. The aim was to 
interview similar categories in both cases, which was mostly achieved. However, in 
Chelmsford, the WaSC did not play a role, whilst the Green Party did not wish to be 
interviewed. The Green Party was not directly involved in the process, but was 
contacted to increase understanding of sustainability issues with development. In 
addition, in the Chelmsford case consultants played a more important role than in NGP, 
which is why they were included. 
Participants were contacted by email, by explaining the purpose of the research and the 
reason for approaching them. They were asked to reply if they agreed in principle. If no 
reply was given within two weeks, a reminder email was sent. If a reply was given, they 
were contacted again to arrange a date for the interview and to provide the interview 
questions.  
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Number Organisation Function Referenced in text 
1 Newcastle City Council Planning Officer Planning Officer A 
2 Newcastle City Council Planning Officer Planning Officer B 
3 Newcastle City Council Engineer Council Engineer 
4 Newcastle City Council Councillor Councillor A 
5 Newcastle City Council Councillor Councillor B 
6 Newcastle City Council Councillor Councillor C 
7 Environment Agency Flood Risk Officer EA Officer A 
8 Environment Agency Flood Risk Officer EA Officer B 
9 Consortium of Developers Project Leader Developer A 
10 Water and Sewerage Company Manager WaSC Officer 
11 Local Residents’ Association Chair LRA Chair 
12 Newcastle Airport  Planning Officer Airport Officer 
13 Newcastle Green Party  Party representative Green Party 
Representative 
Table 4: Case study interviews conducted for Newcastle Great Park 
In total, 41 people were contacted to request an interview.32 Of these, 16 people were 
unavailable for an interview for a variety of reasons. For the NGP case, four planning 
officers approached did not work for the council any more and were untraceable or did 
not have knowledge of the decision-making process, one employee of the consortium 
did not respond and one did not agree to an interview, one councillor was no longer 
working as a councillor, and one coordinator for the development and one flood risk 
expert did not respond. For the Chelmsford cricket ground case, four councillors did not 
have knowledge of the decision-making process or did not respond, one Green Party 
representative did not respond, one EA officer was on maternity leave and one resident 
was unable to attend the appointment made. 
                                                
32 Twenty-two people in the Newcastle Great Park case and 19 people in the Chelmsford cricket ground 
case. 
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Number Organisation Function Referenced in text 
14 Chelmsford City Council Planning Officer Planning Officer C 
15 Chelmsford City Council Planning Officer Planning Officer D 
16 Chelmsford City Council Councillor Councillor D 
17 Environment Agency Flood Risk Officer EA Officer C 
18 Environment Agency Flood Risk Officer EA Officer D 
19 Environment Agency Flood Risk Officer EA Officer E 
20 Cricket Club  Senior Manager Cricket Club 
Manager 
21 Development Company  Project Leader Developer B 
22 Flood Risk Consultancy Flood Risk Consultant Consultant A 
23 Planning Consultancy Planning Consultant Consultant B 
24 Local Residents’ Group Member LRG A 
25 Local Residents’ Group Member LRG B 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for cricket ground development 
In total, 25 interviews were conducted (see Tables 4 and 5 and Appendix G for more 
detail). The key participants interviewed all represented a group of actors in the 
decision-making process. Therefore, even though 16 people were unavailable for an 
interview, every actor group was represented by at least one participant, and thereby the 
interviews provided an overview of all interests in the process. Most interviews were 
conducted face to face, but in some cases due to location issues, the interview was 
conducted by phone. In one case, due to time restrictions posed by the participant, the 
interview was conducted by email. Face-to-face interviews lasted approximately an 
hour or longer, with phone interviews being between half an hour and over an hour 
long. Interviews were voice recorded and transcribed. However, meetings in public 
places restricted recordings. Due to noise levels, in one interview the choice was made 
not to record, whilst two others were recorded, but were of low quality, which was 
expected to be the case. In these three interviews, very detailed notes were taken on 
purpose and the interview was typed out the same day. 
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The interviews were semi-structured: the main questions and script were fixed, but the 
interviewer was able to improvise follow-up questions and to explore meanings and 
areas of interest that emerged. The interview questions were based on the theoretical 
framework. During the interview, the researcher referred to an interview guide with an 
introduction, the questions and a conclusion. The interview guide for NGP is included 
in Appendix K and that for Chelmsford’s cricket ground development in Appendix L. 
Lastly, site visits were conducted to NGP and Chelmsford’s cricket ground. The 
purpose of these visits was to gain understanding of the development, the flood risk, the 
flood risk sources and the potential flood consequences. In addition, the visits were used 
to gather photographs to include in the thesis. NGP had already been partially built on, 
with some areas under development and other areas still undeveloped. Three site visits 
were conducted, in February and July 2012 and in June 2013. The areas visited on both 
occasions were the developed areas of Cells H and I, including the SuDS and the 
Ouseburn in Cell I (the SuDS pond in Cell H cannot be reached by the public). Also 
visited were Cell C, including the SuDS and the Letch; and Cell G, which is partly 
developed, including the SuDS in Cell G and the Ouseburn. In addition, Cells D, E and 
F, which are under development, were visited (for a map of the cells see Figure 11 on 
page 98). Chelmsford cricket ground was visited in May 2012, but the development was 
not yet under way. The visit included the cricket grounds, the public car park that is part 
of the development, the river Can, the river Chelmer and the park opposite the 
development. On all site visits digital photographs were taken, which have been 
included in the case study chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) and Appendices M and N. 
Overall, the data collected has been sufficient for analysis and for developing useful 
conclusions and contributions. 
4.3.3 Data analysis method and tools 
Once data from the documents, interviews and site visits had been gathered, analysis 
was undertaken in order to answer the research questions. The foundation of this 
analysis was the theoretical framework and the questions that were derived from the 
theoretical framework in Appendix I. All documents and transcriptions of interviews 
were read carefully several times. Notes were taken continually to highlight certain 
themes or queries. 
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In addition, NVivo was used for part of the data. For the NGP case, the total of 
collected minutes and reports from committees over 15 years was numerous (over 400 
documents). Therefore, to efficiently filter relevant information on FRM, all these 
documents were uploaded into NVivo. In NVivo, documents were read through and 
coded. The nodes created are shown in Appendix H. Coding served two purposes: to 
collate information based on certain key words, and to catalogue actors present in the 
meetings. By selecting a certain node, for instance Cell G, all sources and references in 
which Cell G was mentioned were shown. In addition, a list was generated of each actor 
involved. As a result, the most relevant information was filtered and key actors were 
identified. 
The information from all the data was used to identify important events and to write the 
case chapters, in which a story is told chronologically about the development and the 
way flood risk is managed. In addition, the theoretical framework was constantly 
referred to in order to identify important themes and key factors that influenced FRM, 
which are included in the analysis chapter (Chapter 7). This was an iterative process, 
which required constant reference back to data from documents, interviews and the 
theoretical framework. Lastly, conclusions were drawn between the research findings 
and the governance debate, which are also included in Chapter 7. 
4.4 Ethical considerations 
Ethical issues are important considerations in any research. In the early stages of this 
research and as part of the project approval process, preliminary ethical approval by 
Newcastle University was gained. Full ethical approval was unnecessary as this research 
did not involve any vulnerable groups, participants were aware they were partaking in 
research and no sensitive topics were discussed. Moreover, six key principles of ethical 
research as developed by the Economic and Social Research Council were applied: 
1. Research should be designed and undertaken to ensure integrity, quality and 
transparency; 
2. Participants must be informed about the purpose of the research, what their 
participation entails and how their information is used; 
3. Confidentiality and anonymity of participants and information must be 
explained and respected; 
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4. Participants must take part voluntarily and they must be able to withdraw from 
the research at any time; 
5. Harm to participants and the researcher must be avoided; 
6. The independence of research must be clear (Economic and Social Research 
Council 2012). 
In response to the six key principles, firstly, this research has been designed aiming for 
the highest quality in designing the research questions, data collection and analysis and 
in writing the thesis. In addition, the supervisors have been involved in every step of the 
process, thereby creating transparency. Lastly, this research has been developed out of 
interest in FRM and planning; there are no other motives for this research and therefore 
integrity is ensured. 
Secondly, participants were informed from the first contact about the purpose of the 
research, what their participation would entail (an interview) and how the information 
would be used. In addition, informed consent was gained by providing the participants 
with an informed consent form. The consent form (see Appendix J) was based on the 
guide provided by Newcastle University’s Research and Enterprise Service (Newcastle 
University 2012). In face-to-face interviews, these forms were given in person and 
participants were given time to read them before signing. For phone interviews, consent 
forms were emailed in advance. Consent was provided by them agreeing by email to the 
statements in the form, typing their name in the form and returning it by email. 
Thirdly, measures taken to ensure confidentiality and anonymity were explained to the 
participants in advance and in the consent form, which were respected at all times. No 
names of participants are included in the thesis, only job descriptions. Recordings and 
transcriptions were anonymised by excluding names, and access to data was password 
protected. However, a limitation to this was that participants were involved in a 
planning process and often the names of people involved are publicly available. Even 
though only general job descriptions and the names of organisations are given, there is a 
possibility that specific people may be traced. This is not only a limitation to 
anonymity, but possibly also to the openness of the participants. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
Fourthly, all participants took part voluntarily. Those who did not respond to initial 
emails requesting an interview were contacted on a further occasion, but if there was 
still no response it was then assumed that they did not want to take part. If people 
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refused to be interviewed, this was respected. Participants were aware they could 
withdraw from the research at any time as this was stated in the consent form. 
Fifthly, there was no harm to participants. Harm to the researcher was prevented by 
conducting interviews in public places or places of work only and by informing another 
person of the time and place of interviews. 
Lastly, this research is independent. It was funded by the School of Architecture, 
Planning and Landscape at Newcastle University, but there were no criteria set 
concerning the content or the results of the research. Participants were aware that the 
research was conducted independently and the researcher remained neutral throughout. 
This neutrality is further explained in the next section. 
4.5 Reflexivity 
In this research, the key influences on FRM are found by examining structures and 
agents involved in governance networks. The agents are present in the empirical 
dimension and they experience, interpret and work with structures and events from the 
actual and the real dimensions. The aim is to find out what structures and events are 
relevant and how the agents interpret and use these structures and events in the decision-
making process. However, the researcher also exists in the empirical dimension and can 
only investigate all three dimensions through his/her own experiences and perceptions. 
The knowledge in this research (and all science in general) is produced in the transitive 
dimension (Bhaskar 1975); for example, theories attempt to explain phenomena that are 
intransitive to these theories. Social science is therefore a social product (Mingers 2004) 
and as a consequence, reflexivity is an important aspect. The term ‘reflexivity’ refers to 
the recognition that the researcher is unavoidably part of the phenomenon they study 
(Maxwell 1996). This means that the researcher is an active participant and 
(unintentionally) influences data collection and analysis, because of their own 
perceptions and relationships with the participants. 
In this research, the relationship with the participants was professional and neutral. 
Even though a researcher can never be completely neutral (Rose 1997), in this case it 
means that the researcher did not adopt a position or communicate a position to the 
participants during the research (for instance, agreeing or disagreeing with a 
development being approved). A potential barrier is that the researcher did not know 
any participants beforehand, which may have reduced participation. The number of 
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people who were involved in the planning process was limited to begin with; therefore, 
any refusal resulted in one fewer interview. However, in total, a sufficient number of 
participants were interviewed, representing a wide range of interests and perceptions. 
Furthermore, the researcher was an outside figure writing a publicly available thesis, 
which could have formed a barrier to participants providing information. Even though 
participants’ names are excluded, they could potentially be derived from the information 
about the location of the development and the public availability of documents. There is 
therefore a chance that people may be traced, which may have impacted on the 
openness of key people. However, despite this disadvantage, the information gathered 
has produced useful results. Lastly, another potential barrier is that English is not the 
researcher’s mother tongue, but the researcher is fluent in it; therefore, there are no 
expected implications. 
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Chapter 5 Newcastle Great Park 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a chronological description of the decision-making process concerning 
FRM that has taken place for Newcastle Great Park (NGP). This chapter has been 
informed by documents collected,33 interviews with participants and two site visits. The 
aim of this chapter is to describe the decision-making process; data analysis is part of 
Chapter 7. 
NGP has been used as a case study in various academic publications. For instance, 
research focuses on the failure of regional planning in the North-East of England 
(Benneworth and Vigar 2007) and planners’ capabilities of addressing local issues 
(Carmona 2003). Other research concerns urban sustainability (Bulkeley and Betsill 
2003) and an assessment of sustainability based on energy, land and water use (SUME 
2011). A study by De Roo (2007) examines how actors in the planning process perceive 
and work with fuzzy concepts such as sustainability. He includes the case of NGP by 
listing the actors involved and their perspectives on sustainability, and finds that actors 
share sustainability goals, which are, for instance, visible in the cooperation between the 
developers, the local planning authority and the EA on matters of drainage. Even though 
NGP has been included in past research, a detailed analysis of the governance network 
and decision making regarding FRM has not been examined; this will be the 
contribution of this research. 
5.2 Context and development of Newcastle Great Park 
NGP is a housing and business development in Newcastle upon Tyne. The development 
consists of 1,200 hectares, comprising 2,500 residential dwellings, 80 hectares of 
commercial development and 440 hectares of parkland. The concept of NGP started to 
become part of local planning policy in the 1980s and implementation is ongoing. The 
following paragraphs will describe this development, starting with the designation of 
NGP in the emerging UDP and ending with the situation as of July 2012. 
                                                
33 For a complete list of collected documents, see Appendix E. 
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5.2.1 Designation of Newcastle Great Park in the emerging UDP 
In the mid-1980s, Tyne and Wear County Council was abolished. The metropolitan 
authorities became unitary authorities, which were now solely responsible for planning 
in their local area. As a result, Newcastle City Council (NCC) became responsible for 
Newcastle upon Tyne, including the area of Newcastle Great Park. 
At the time, planning officers at NCC were working on a prediction of population 
growth and housing need for the city. After they calculated these figures, they were 
unable to find sufficient development land within the existing built-up area of 
Newcastle that could accommodate the number of houses needed. Therefore, they 
turned to look for potential sites outside the city boundaries (Planning Officer B 2012, 
interview). Planning officers found support for this idea in the Strategic Planning 
Guidance for Tyne and Wear that was published in 1989. The guidance was developed 
to stimulate the revitalisation of the economy and to provide for housing. Newcastle and 
North Tyneside were expected to plan for 12,600 dwellings between 1988 and 2001, 
whilst considering the adequacy of land available and giving ‘special attention to 
identifying attractive sites for both economic and housing development’ (DoE 1989: 2). 
Planning officers developed potential sites for development, which emerged formally in 
the UDP for Newcastle, of which the Consultation Draft was published in 1991. In this 
draft, two alternative development locations were included, which were both situated 
within the boundaries of designated green belt land. One of the areas was named the 
Northern Development Area, which was the same area that would later be called NGP. 
This development area was situated in the north-west of the city, near the A1 trunk road 
and Newcastle International Airport (Figure 13). Another area, the Western 
Development Area, was composed of two separate areas to the north and west of 
Westerhope in Newcastle (Newcastle City Council 2006). 
When the plans for a new development in green belt land became publicly known, much 
opposition was shown from residents, interest groups and political groups. Consultation 
on the UDP showed that it was the most contested issue: 45% of people surveyed did 
not support the release of green belt land for housing, business and leisure purposes. 
Moreover, the vast majority of respondents showed ‘total opposition to the proposal’ 
(Newcastle City Council 1992: 5). Many of these were residents in adjacent areas, but 
also, the Department of the Environment (DoE) and other local authorities in the region 
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showed concern about the scale of development proposed and the lack of justification 
for it. In addition, the Newcastle Green Party felt that building in green belt land was 
unnecessary and there were enough development opportunities in other areas. The party 
also accused NCC of planning for unsustainable development by prioritising constant 
economic growth over environmental concerns, including hydrology (Green Party 
Representative 2012, interview). 
Figure 13: Location of Newcastle Great Park in Newcastle  
Source: Adapted from Knight Frank 2008: 4 
In particular, the allocation of the Northern Development Area received a total of 975 
comments, with concerns on the loss of green belt land and valuable flora and fauna. 
NCC’s claim that the new development would have 600 hectares of green space was 
met with scepticism and it was felt this would not compensate for ‘unspoilt rural 
landscape’ (Newcastle City Council 1992: 16). It was also commented that the 
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development might negatively affect the Ouseburn and change the water flow into 
Jesmond Dene. 
Some of the issues that followed from consultation were included in the UDP deposit 
stage, which was released in 1993 (Newcastle City Council 1993). In this new version, 
the Western Development Area was not brought forward, but the Northern 
Development Area was still included despite the controversy, albeit on a smaller scale. 
The council felt that the development was vital in improving the city’s struggling 
economy, which had higher unemployment rates than any of the other local authorities 
in the region. Moreover, the development was expected to address the decline in 
population that was occurring at the time. In particular, economically active age groups, 
such as younger adults or families with young children, were moving to surrounding 
local areas, unable to find housing in Newcastle that suited their needs (Newcastle City 
Council 1998c). NCC found it was necessary to appoint an area for development 
outside the city boundaries that would enable the development of a large number of 
properties, but also because it would enhance the attractiveness of the development due 
to its more rural location. 
Therefore, the aim of NGP was to ‘create a coherent integrated development of the 
highest quality’ (Newcastle City Council 1993: 192). As opposed to the regeneration 
areas within the city that required much public investment, NGP was built with private 
investment. The residential development was composed of high-quality buildings –
primarily upper-market houses – in a low-density and attractive environment.34 NGP 
was to solve a large proportion of housing need in Newcastle: of a total of 10,000 new 
houses planned in the UDP, 2,500 of those were in NGP. To prevent compromising 
housing demand within the city, properties were developed and released in different 
stages over several years (Newcastle City Council 1998c). In the meantime, whilst NCC 
had been considering the development, NedaCin Limited purchased and secured long-
term options over land in NGP between 1989 and 1993 (Nathaniel Lichfield and 
Partners 1999). 
One of the issues discussed in the UDP was flood risk. Firstly, there was awareness of 
drainage issues in the development area. It was local knowledge that the fields in NGP 
were prone to surface water flooding: 
                                                
34 Gross land for economic development was 139 ha and net 80 ha. Gross land for residential 
development was 172 ha and net 83.3 ha. The remainder was planned as parkland (Newcastle City 
Council 1993). 
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There were many debates and there was much concern, because it was a 
well-known floodplain. Every winter you could see the fields full of 
water, so we all knew there was a problem that needed to be solved. 
(Councillor B 2012, interview) 
 
In addition, the Ouseburn was a known source of fluvial flood risk. This river is a very 
reactive catchment, meaning that an isolated thunderstorm can quickly cause high water 
levels in the river, causing flash flooding (EA Officer A 2012, interview). This problem 
is caused partly by development from the past 50 years, such as Kingston Park, Red 
House Farm and Brunton Park (see Figure 14), placing the river under pressure from 
surface water runoff. As NGP was to become part of the Ouseburn catchment, surface 
water runoff had to be managed to prevent additional flows into the river and an 
increase in flood risk downstream. 
Due to past flood events caused by the Ouseburn, flood risk was an important local 
issue. The council felt that if they allowed development, they would have to show how 
they were going to tackle surface water drainage in a way that would not exacerbate 
existing problems (Council Engineer 2012, interview). The planning officer involved in 
these early stages of planning in the 1980s and 1990s stated that: 
We were very conscious that there was a possibility for thousands of 
houses all draining into the Ouseburn. Whilst it did not have a huge 
drainage or flooding problem, we obviously did not want to make it any 
worse, so we talked to the National Rivers Authority. There was someone 
there who was really good and positive. As soon as we went to talk to 
them, he suggested to think about SuDS. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
Therefore, the planning officers and the NRA started discussions on how to manage 
surface water drainage. The NRA’s policy at the time required surface water discharge 
at greenfield rate, but runoff was usually dealt with through underground pipes and 
tanks, with hydro brakes to restrict the rate of discharge. A development the size of 
NGP would require extensive infrastructure to achieve greenfield runoff rates. 
Coincidentally, the representative of the NRA had just started to gain knowledge of 
SuDS after attending a conference in Sweden on source control. The NRA officer found 
that the UK was lagging behind other European countries in applying SuDS and 
subsequently tried to promote the use of SuDS in the North-East of England. NGP was 
considered a suitable development to apply this concept, in particular because large 
areas of green, open space were planned, including along the Ouseburn. This open space 
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made the creation of ponds and wetland areas possible and, therefore, the NRA officer 
suggested developing sustainable drainage (EA Officer B 2012, interview, Planning 
Officer B 2012, interview). The planning officers adopted this idea and the proposal to 
use open storage areas was included in the UDP deposit stage, although no detailed 
plans were made at this point (Newcastle City Council 1993). 
5.2.2 Public inquiry and adoption of the UDP 
As required by legislation, a public inquiry on the UDP was held in 1994 and 1995. In 
the report written by the inquiry inspector (Hollox 1996) it was acknowledged that the 
proposal to build in green belt was the most contentious issue. There were many 
objectors, of which most were represented by the Newcastle Action Group to Save the 
Green Belt. The group was formed to campaign against the proposals after the first draft 
of the UDP was published. They created newsletters, raised a petition against the loss of 
green belt land, organised public meetings and submitted a formal objection. The main 
objections were that the proposed number of houses was unnecessarily high and that 
wildlife would be harmed. Instead, development should take place on other land in the 
region (Newcastle Action Group to Save the Green Belt 1993). 
As part of the evidence presented to the public enquiry, prospective developers created a 
draft master plan for NGP. The council cooperated in developing the master plan and 
although planning officers indicated informally that the plan gave a good interpretation 
of policies and plans, there was no formal approval from the council. However, it was 
used by the inspector as an illustration of how the development might turn out. Based 
on all the evidence, the inspector decided to allow the development stating that: 
In my judgment, bearing in mind especially the high level of 
unemployment in Newcastle, the benefits to the City and region are of 
even greater consequence than the very serious harm which would be 
caused. I conclude therefore that the advantages of developing Green Belt 
land so outweigh the disadvantages that very special circumstances are 
demonstrated and they justify, in principle, the deletion of some land 
from the Green Belt for the stated purposes. 
(Hollox 1996: 103) 
The inspector also considered that even though green belt land would be lost, mitigation 
measures were in place. The development would be based on the general principles of 
sustainability and the low density of the scheme in combination with the green, open 
space would benefit wildlife in the area. In addition, sustainable drainage systems 
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(SuDS) were planned near the two rivers on site, namely the Ouseburn and the Letch (a 
minor stream in the north of the site). Storage ponds with a capacity of 60,000 m3 – the 
greenfield runoff rate – were proposed along the rivers to form an integral part of the 
development (Draft master plan for the Northern Development Area). The inspector 
found that the council and the NRA had been communicating well and he had no 
objections to the way flood risk was managed. He relied on the judgement of the NRA 
and was confident that the flood risk in the area had been identified sufficiently. 
Therefore, he felt that the objections that the development would increase flooding in 
the Ouseburn, and in particular in reference to Brunton Park, which had existing 
problems, had been taken into account and resolved sufficiently. He did not foresee any 
increased threat of flooding downstream, provided that appropriate measures were taken 
(Hollox 1996). 
On 28 January 1998, the UDP was formally adopted. The new UDP had a general 
policy for flood risk, which NGP would have to comply with. This policy specified that 
development that would be at direct risk of flooding or that would increase the risk of 
flooding elsewhere would not be allowed. In the UDP, the areas with the highest flood 
risks were considered to be in the upper reaches of the Ouseburn, which excluded NGP. 
However, any new development could create more surface water runoff, adding to flood 
risk downstream. Therefore, developers had to mitigate flood risk and might be required 
to enter into planning obligations to pay for flood risk measures (Newcastle City 
Council 1998c). 
5.2.3 Development of planning brief for Newcastle Great Park 
The planning officers used the years between the public inquiry and the adoption of the 
UDP to develop ideas with the EA (which replaced the NRA) about using sustainable 
drainage in NGP. However, they found that it would not have been useful to go into too 
much detail, because the development had not been formally approved yet (Planning 
Officer B 2012, interview).  
After the UDP was formally adopted and the development of NGP was approved, the 
council established a subcommittee to oversee the council’s involvement in the planning 
and development of NGP (Northern Development Area Sub Committee 1998f). In 
addition, an officer working group was established in 1997 to develop a planning brief. 
The aim of this brief was to formulate the council’s aspirations for NGP and to inform 
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prospective developers and create interest. During one of the working group’s meetings, 
it was noted that the council was being urged by the EA to persuade developers to adopt 
environmentally sustainable forms of drainage and to include these measures in the 
planning brief (Northern Development Area Officer Working Group 1997b). In 
December 1997, during a seminar at the EA attended by developers, regulators, utility 
companies, councillors and officers from the council, the issue of sustainable drainage 
was further raised and NGP was discussed as a possible demonstration site (Northern 
Development Area Officer Working Group 1997a). 
 
Figure 14: Plan of Newcastle Great Park within its wider environment 
Source: Newcastle City Council 1998d: 1 
The ideas developed on using sustainable drainage were taken forward into the draft 
planning brief, published in December 1997. In this draft it was stated that the potential 
developer had to ensure that the risk of flooding to properties would be at an acceptable 
  115 
level and that the risk of flooding downstream of the development would be no higher 
than at present. The brief also stated that the creation of a large development on 
greenfield land would create the opportunity to implement sustainable drainage by 
providing storage within the Ouseburn floodplain, thereby lowering flood risk 
downstream (Northern Development Area Sub Committee 1998e). 
In March 1998, the council held an informal meeting about the new development with 
residents in seven wards, in which issues with flood risk came up a number of times. In 
particular, residents in Brunton Park were concerned that NGP might exacerbate the 
incidences of flooding, which had caused residents damage and inconvenience during 
recent years. The prospective developers gave presentations as part of public meetings 
to address flood risk issues. Together with the EA, the developers informed residents 
that flood risk would not get worse downstream (Northern Development Area Officer 
Working Group 1998, Northern Development Area Sub Committee 1998e). The 
consortium of developers also gave a presentation to the subcommittee, claiming the 
development would be sustainable, taking into account environmental protection and 
LA21 considerations35 (Northern Development Area Sub Committee 1998a).  
Later that month, the EA and the water and sewerage company (WaSC) gave a 
presentation to the subcommittee, saying they had been discussing the proposed 
drainage system, but a number of issues remained, such as cost, maintenance and bird 
strike issues. The council fully supported the sustainable drainage approach. The 
importance of the development not increasing flood risk or possibly even reducing flood 
risk was stressed in the committee again (Northern Development Area Sub Committee 
1998e). Therefore, all involved parties (council, developers, EA and WaSC) were 
supporting NGP to become a sustainable development, using sustainable drainage 
methods, even though some practical issues still needed to be resolved. 
The planning brief that was released a month later included strategic aims for NGP and 
an invitation to prospective developers to submit draft proposals for inclusion in the 
forthcoming master plan. The aim for the development was not just to provide 
dwellings and employment, but also to offer an attractive setting and to promote best 
practice with regards to sustainable development techniques. Concerning FRM, the 
objective was to maintain the existing hydrology of the site and to promote the use of 
SuDS. The SuDS were not only to be used to address flood risk, but would also treat 
                                                
35 Local Agenda 21 was developed at the Rio Earth Summit 1992, as a framework for local strategic 
action towards sustainable development (Dooris 1999).
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diffuse pollution. Furthermore, flood risk downstream would not be worse than that 
existing at that time and if possible was to be reduced (Development Control Committee 
1998). 
5.2.4 First outline planning application 
The consortium of developers prepared a proposals document, which was submitted as 
part of an outline planning application in August 1998. Through consultation, NCC 
received 54 letters from local residents, 30 of which were from Brunton Park. Most 
objections were regarding development on green belt land (26 in total), but 
interestingly, even though there had been past concerns from residents regarding flood 
risk, no such objections were made this time. The EA welcomed the application, 
because it maintained the natural floodplain and all development was outside the 1-in- 
100-years flood zone. They also supported the use of sustainable drainage. The Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA), which was a statutory consultee for any applications near 
airports, examined the application in terms of bird strike risk. They did not foresee any 
problems with the SuDS, provided that, in the detailed phase, intentions in respect of 
bird control were adhered to (Development Control Committee 1998). 
On the basis of the consultation, the developers revised their proposal document, which 
was transformed into the master plan for NGP as a Supplementary Planning Document 
in November 1998. The agreement was that the developers would consult with and meet 
all statutory requirements of the EA in relation to flood control and surface drainage. 
The developers and the council would also work together to implement appropriate 
sustainable drainage techniques, in particular the use of ponds and wetlands for surface 
water storage and treatment. The council agreed in principle to maintain the SuDS as 
part of the strategic open space (Newcastle City Council 1998b). When the application 
was discussed in the Development Control Committee, they indicated that they 
recommended granting permission. However, the application had to be referred to the 
SoS on highway grounds (Development Control Committee 1998). The SoS called in 
the application on February 1999, but not on flood risk issues (Cahill 2000). The public 
inquiry was planned for September 1999 (Newcastle City Council 1999a, 1999b). 
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Figure 15: The development cells in Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Adapted from Newcastle City Council 2007: 13 
During the summer of 1998 there were several incidents of flooding near NGP, mainly 
in Brunton Park, which left residents increasingly angry (Northern Development Area 
Sub Committee 1998c). For instance, in public meetings residents living near the 
development area raised concerns that NGP might increase flood risk. The consortium, 
in the meantime, commissioned a drainage report on the use of sustainable techniques, 
which concluded that the most suitable measures for existing ground conditions were 
the use of ponds close to the Ouseburn and Letch. The visual appearance, maintenance 
and safety issues were being assessed. The EA checked the capacity of the ponds and 
was content (Northern Development Area Sub Committee 1998b, 1998d). 
5.3 Second outline planning application 
In August 1999, the master plan for NGP was adopted as Supplementary Planning 
Guidance. A month later and before the public inquiry was to take place, the consortium 
withdrew their planning application and submitted a new one the next day (Newcastle 
City Council 1999c, Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2001c). The Northern 
Development Area was now officially called Newcastle Great Park in press releases and 
in the council’s bulletins (Newcastle City Council 2000a). This revised application 
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solved the issues raised by the SoS on transport and sustainability and the application 
was not called in (Cahill 2000, Newcastle City Council 2000a, Woods 2000). 
Furthermore, NCC decided to take the development forward as part of the Going for 
Growth initiative. Going for Growth was a regeneration strategy applied by the council 
between 1999 and 2004 to address population loss and stimulate economic growth. 
NGP was seen as an important part of this strategy, by assisting in ‘reversing the trend 
of outward migration as part of city-wide regeneration initiative through a sustainable 
development’ (Newcastle City Council 1998a: 5) in addition to boosting economic 
growth. Therefore, NCC decided to develop NGP in parallel with demolition of existing 
housing stock and with regeneration projects in the city (Newcastle City Council 2000a, 
Cameron 2003). 
The issues with flood risk and drainage were investigated in the Environmental 
Statement submitted with the application (Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners 1999), 
which repeated existing knowledge. The Ouseburn was described as having a history of 
flooding, which together with the Letch might flood part of the site. Moreover, the 
runoff from the development was expected to greatly exceed greenfield site runoff and 
increase flood risk downstream. It was felt that traditional drainage would discharge 
surface runoff water into the watercourse more rapidly than would occur naturally. At 
the time no statutory standards existed for protection from flooding, but EA policy was 
followed, which protected urban areas against a 1-in-100-years flood event. 
The Environmental Statement claimed that the physical attributes of the site and the 
outline layout plans provided opportunities to include SuDS. Various sustainable 
options were listed, such as storage ponds, wetlands, swales, infiltration trenches, water 
butts and permeable car parks, drives and roads. The recommendation was to use storm 
water wetlands with storage in parkland areas adjacent to Ouseburn and Letch.36  
Additionally, the natural floodplain of the Ouseburn was to be preserved or widened to 
provide additional storage of floodwater (Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners 1999). 
Knowledge of flood risk in NGP at the time of the outline planning permission was 
mainly based on a flood risk map derived from a Section 105 study37 that was carried 
out in the 1990s. Another study in 1999 by the EA mapped the floodplain of the 
                                                
36 The use of infiltration methods was disregarded due to clay subsoil. 
37 Named after Section 105 of the Water Resources Act 1991, which required the EA to carry out surveys 
of key watercourses for flood defence purposes. 
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Ouseburn. Based on this information, the development of NGP was based outside 
floodplain boundaries. 
Consultation was carried out based on the outline planning application. The EA and the 
CAA upheld their original statements from the previous application. However, residents 
sent many more letters of objection compared to the first application: 330 compared to 
54. In total, 165 objections were against development in green belt land; 101 objections 
were about the development not being sustainable; and there were 99 concerns about the 
lack of consideration of local hydrological patterns and drainage issues and the 
subsequent increased risk of flooding. In addition, 333 residents, mainly in the Gosforth 
area, signed a petition, whilst other residents submitted 300 copies of a standard 
objection that was prepared by ward councillors from the Liberal Democrat party. This 
increase in objections, including objections on flood risk issues that were lacking in the 
previous application, may have been the result of successful lobbying of some residents 
and other interested parties. 
The Development Control Committee discussed the concerns relating to flood risk, 
stating there had been existing and longstanding problems in Brunton Park in storm 
conditions and more recently with water and sewage spillage in the Red House Farm 
Area. The committee felt that the developers, the EA and the WaSC had considered 
flood risk sufficiently and the committee relied on the EA’s statement that they were 
satisfied that the SuDS would contain runoff from the site. They therefore 
recommended granting planning permission (Development Control Committee 1999, 
Newcastle City Council 2000a). 
After another flood event in Brunton Park in the summer of 2000, councillors called a 
meeting between residents, the council, the EA, the WaSC and the local golf club, 
which had also suffered from flooding. It became apparent that residents were still 
concerned that NGP might increase flood risks, even though the EA indicated they were 
satisfied with the planned flood risk measures. During a subcommittee meeting a 
councillor conveyed the residents’ concerns, but other members argued that the 
subcommittee was not the right platform to discuss residents’ concerns and the problem 
should be dealt with outside the committee between the EA and associated parties 
(Northern Development Area Sub Committee 2000). 
The outline application was approved in October 2000 and the foundations for the use 
of sustainable drainage were laid. The outline planning permission required that for 
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each development cell (see Figure 15) a development site strategy statement (DSSS) 
would have to be submitted. The DSSS set out the overall strategy for development and 
public open space, including the SuDS. In 2001, the first cells received planning 
permission and construction commenced with Cells H and I, including the SuDS ponds.  
 
Figure 16: SuDS in Cell G, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
The SuDS are designed to a 1-in-100-years storm return period and are ‘end-of-pipe’ 
systems, meaning that in the development conventional drains and underground pipes 
are used, but instead of these entering the sewers, the water flows into the ponds. No 
permanent open water features are included, as this would increase the risk of bird strike 
at the nearby airport. In Cells B, C and H, two permanent wetlands have been created, 
which slowly release into the Letch. In Cell I, another permanent wetland is created that 
slowly releases into the Ouseburn. In addition, there is a permanent wetland installed 
adjacent to the A1, which would allow the highway to drain into this feature if it is 
widened in the future. In Cell G, the SuDS are located north and south of the Ouseburn 
and are connected to the river. At normal river levels, the ponds slowly drain into the 
river, but when river levels are high, the river is allowed to flow into the ponds (Figure 
16) (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2004j, Newcastle Great Park 
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Consortium n.d.). Lastly, the Letch was returned to a more natural, curved outline as 
part of new open space, instead of remaining a straight channelled ditch (Newcastle City 
Council 2003).38  
5.3.1 Revision of the master plan  
Soon after the outline planning permission was granted, a new PPG on housing was 
published. This policy strived for new developments to be built in greater densities 
(ODPM 2000), which conflicted with the lower housing densities in NGP. Therefore, 
the planners and developers agreed to develop a revised master plan to increase housing 
numbers and in January 2001 the developers produced revised concepts (Newcastle City 
Council 2001). 
The fragmentation of responsibility concerning surface water drainage inside and 
outside NGP became increasingly problematic. In November 2000, this issue was 
discussed in the subcommittee and the EA and the WaSC were present to answer 
questions. The WaSC made clear that they could not be legally responsible for SuDS. 
NCC stated that NGP was not expected to cause an increase in flood risk, but the 
developers could not be responsible for existing problems in surrounding areas. NCC 
compiled a report on responsibility for surface water drainage, stating that the 
fragmentation of responsibilities was a cause for concern and necessitated close liaison 
and cooperation on all sides. However, it also claimed there had been improvements in 
the integration of planning and flood prevention in recent years (Northern Development 
Area Sub Committee 2000, Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001f). In January 
2001, the planning department wrote a note on drainage issues, saying that they had 
received concerns from residents, who blamed NGP for increasing flood risk in their 
neighbourhood. They stated they were aware of the existing problem in areas 
surrounding NGP and that the EA was remodelling flood risk around the Ouseburn 
(Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2001b). 
In the meantime, the subcommittee had been abolished and the Newcastle Great Park 
Advisory Committee was established. This committee would oversee the 
implementation of NGP and would hold regular meetings where planning officers, other 
council officers, councillors, developers, the WaSC and the EA could discuss any issues 
arising, including drainage. The committee did not make any decisions, but provided a 
                                                
38 Additional photographs of the SuDS are shown in Appendix M. 
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forum for councillors and officers to talk about any concerns. These meetings were 
open to the public and on some occasions residents would speak, for instance to raise 
concerns with flooding (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2005g). In one of 
the meetings, the release of PPG25 was discussed. The committee formulated a 
response to central government in which they noted that a clarification of 
responsibilities for SuDS after construction was required (Newcastle Great Park 
Advisory Committee 2001a). The committee therefore used their experience with SuDS 
to comment on emerging national policy on FRM, by highlighting issues with 
maintenance and adoption. 
In the meantime, knowledge on flood risk in the Ouseburn developed. In 2000, the EA 
had commissioned a new Section 105 survey for the Ouseburn and, for the first time, its 
tributaries also, including the Letch (Newcastle City Council 2003). The final report 
was received in 2002 and was perceived to be more reliable than the previous Section 
105 survey from the 1990s, as it applied a more detailed physical survey combined with 
new data gathered during storm events, although it did not include any possible climate 
change effects. The new survey showed that flood risk was higher than previously 
thought for some areas along the Ouseburn and the Letch. This also affected parts of 
Cells G and I, which meant that development plans had to be altered and flood control 
in the Ouseburn became of higher importance (Development Control Committee 2002a, 
Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2005f). 
The DSSS for Cell I was submitted for planning permission in late 2001. The Ouseburn 
runs through the southern part of the site and during consultation, the EA and residents 
in the surrounding area expressed concern that some of the housing would be within the 
floodplain. The southern boundary was amended following a survey and all houses were 
moved out of the 1-in-100-years floodplain (Development Control Committee 2002a). 
In the media, the issue of flood risk had also come forward. In an article in the 
Newcastle Journal from 2001, it was reported that the developers ensured that no 
houses were built in floodplains and that the drainage system prevented any flooding 
(Hedley 2001). 
In 2004, several consecutive days of heavy rain caused flooding problems in Newcastle. 
The golf course adjacent to NGP and other areas experienced sewer flooding. Residents 
were concerned that the flood had been caused by the new development, but it was later 
found that these problems were not linked to NGP (Newcastle Great Park Advisory 
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Committee 2004e, Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2004i). Within NGP, the 
storage pond in Cell C overflowed and the water level of the Letch was very high 
(Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2004c). The ponds in Cells B and C were 
at or above their design depth for a 1-in-100-years storm, whilst the experienced rainfall 
had not been as heavy as this. Therefore, the EA and the council were concerned that 
the SuDS were not functioning properly. The construction of the SuDS was the 
responsibility of the consortium, but they claimed the SuDS had been built to the 
specifications of the EA and the WaSC. The council started considering introducing 
independent inspections and the EA asked for surveys that the ponds had been 
constructed as agreed. An investigation later revealed that the Letch had been leaking 
into the SuDS, which meant the pond was taking in river water and rainwater, which 
caused it to overflow (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2003b, 2004d, 2004h, 
2004j, EA Officer A 2012, interview). 
In the meantime, consultation took place on the revised master plan, showing that 
people’s concerns on NGP exacerbating flooding in the area had not been appeased. 
Two people indicated that they had concerns that the development would increase flood 
risk elsewhere (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2005b). Others claimed 
water was flowing faster through the Ouseburn after development had started, but the 
EA found no evidence for this (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2005e). 
5.3.2 Planning application for Cell G 
During the preparation for a detailed planning application for Cell G, flood risk again 
became an important issue. The plans for Cell G had been to build 450 residential units 
on 20 hectares of land between Kingston Park and the Ouseburn (Newcastle Great Park 
Advisory Committee 2003a). No pre-application discussions took place with the 
officers and the first application was not registered due to insufficient information. At 
this time, the relationship between the council and the developers had worsened, as the 
council wished to revise the master plan for the whole development, whilst the 
developers wanted to develop cell by cell instead (Gosforth and North Newcastle Area 
Committee 2003). After a meeting between the council and the developers, plans for 
Cell G were adapted, including a reduction in housing numbers to 320. Subsequently, a 
new application was submitted (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2004b, 
2004g). 
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At the time of the outline planning permission it had been known that Cell G was partly 
within the floodplain and that the low-lying fields of the wider area flooded after heavy 
rain (Council Engineer 2012, interview, Councillor B 2012, interview). At that time, the 
dwellings were planned outside the 1-in-100-years floodplain. However, when the EA 
carried out a new Section 105 study of the Ouseburn, part of Cell G became located 
within the floodplain (see Figure 17). Instead of changing the contours of the 
development, or reducing the numbers of houses to be built, the developers and EA 
agreed to raise the land for development above the 1-in-100-years floodplain level and 
to construct the properties on piles. Excavation in areas along the Ouseburn 
compensated for the loss of floodplain and provided lost water storage through SuDS 
ponds (Newcastle City Council 2004, Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 
2004a, 2004f, 2005a). As a result of these works, development Cell G would again be 
outside the 1-in-100-years floodplain (see Figure 18) and therefore the area did not 
require a sequential test as described in PPG25 (Newcastle City Council 2004). 
 
Figure 17: Flood risk according to Section 105 survey in Cell G 
Source: Newcastle City Council 2004: 43 
The SuDS ponds in Cell G are of a different nature than the other ponds on the site. 
They are end-of-pipe ponds, which collect surface water from the development cell. 
Before the SuDS were installed, the area still suffered from drainage problems, but 
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when the SuDS were finished, this flooding did not reoccur (Councillor B 2012, 
interview). However, they also enable the Ouseburn to flow into the ponds if the river’s 
water levels are high. This lowers flood risk downstream of the Ouseburn.39 
 
Figure 18: Current flood risk in Cell G 
Source: Adapted from Newcastle City Council 2013a: 10 
The SuDS did not appease the concerns of nearby residents. During consultation it 
became clear that some residents were still concerned that the development of Cell G 
would increase flooding in surrounding areas. Councillors requested confirmation from 
the EA that the proposed drainage system would not increase flood risk, even though 
the EA had already indicated this to the council (Development Control Committee 
2005). 
5.3.3 Subsequent flood events 
In April 2005, heavy rainfall produced high water levels in the Ouseburn, overflowing 
storage ponds in Cells B and C. This caused concerns with residents in NGP (Newcastle 
Great Park Advisory Committee 2005c, 2005d). An inspection revealed that the Letch 
was leaking into the SuDS, whilst the ponds had low spots that needed to be raised to 
the correct design specification. The ponds had therefore not been constructed as 
                                                
39 Photographs of the SuDS ponds are shown in Figure 16 and Appendix M. 
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requested and the developers had to rectify the problems (Newcastle Great Park 
Advisory Committee 2005g). In June and August of the same year, heavy rainfall 
caused sewer flooding in Gosforth and the Red House Farm estate, although not in 
NGP. Again, there were concerns that the new development exacerbated the problems 
with flooding. However, later investigations as part of a new study commissioned by the 
EA revealed that NGP was not to blame for flooding in nearby areas (Atkins 2006). 
 
Figure 19: SuDS in Cell I 
Imagery: Infoterra Ltd & Bluesky 
Source: Google Maps 2011 
In fact, the new study found that the Ouseburn had frequently flooded in the past. The 
worst flood events had been in 1900 and 1903, which were 1-in-100-years flood events 
causing much more damage than any later flooding events. Minor floods occurred in 
1978, 1979, 1992, 1993 and 2000, which were between 1-in-2 and 1-in-25-years flood 
events. However, even though these flood events were less severe, the consequences 
were much larger, because much more development had taken place along the 
Ouseburn. New developments were composed of large areas of impermeable surfaces, 
some of which were in the floodplain, whilst bridges and culverts were added and the 
river was narrowed. Surface water runoff from new estates built in Newcastle and North 
Tyneside, and from the airport, the A1 and other highways were all directed into the 
Ouseburn. In particular, Kingston Park and Red House Farm impacted directly on river 
flows; in one event in July 2007, surface water runoff from Kingston Park contributed 
to almost 80% of the total river flow. 
As a consequence, the Ouseburn now reacts very quickly to rainfall events. As river 
levels rise sharply in short periods of time, fluvial flood risk is created. For instance, in 
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Brunton Park, five houses and 60–70 gardens have fluvial flood risks. Moreover, some 
of the developments’ surface water sewers drain directly into the Ouseburn. When river 
levels are high, water is forced back into the sewer. This water will then flow into the 
foul sewer, causing sewage to come up through drains in roads and houses. This is what 
occurred at Red House Farm even after the WaSC had installed a large underground 
storage tank. However, the development in NGP had not increased flood risks in these 
areas (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2005c, 2005g, 2005h, 2010, Atkins 
2006, Climate North East 2008). 
5.3.4 Maintenance and adoption issues 
In the meantime, there were issues around responsibility and maintenance of the SuDS. 
The consortium was unsure who would be responsible for the SuDS and found that the 
WaSC and the EA were unable to adopt them: 
In the first years we did not understand who was going to adopt, but the 
Environment Agency does not adopt SuDS ponds and we never will. 
What our remit is has been clarified through the Floods and Water 
Management Act 2010: it is to provide a national overview of flood risk 
matters. 
(EA Officer A 2012, interview) 
We had meetings with the consortium around 1998, 2000 and 2001, 
where they kept asking the question [if the WaSC would adopt the SuDS] 
and they got a firm: ‘No, we won’t adopt them’. Section 104 of the Water 
Industry Act allows a developer to ask us to adopt sewers. There is 
nothing in the definition of the SuDS ponds that actually makes it a 
sewer, so we were unable to adopt them. 
(WaSC Officer 2012, interview) 
Neither the EA nor the WaSc were therefore able to take responsibility for the SuDS 
ponds. The EA was responsible for ensuring the ponds would manage flood risk 
sufficiently, whilst the WaSc was responsible for the underground pipes running into 
the SuDS ponds (WaSC Officer 2012, interview), but they would not be able to adopt or 
maintain them. 
Instead, responsibility was arranged in a Section 106 agreement, which was signed in 
October 2000. This agreement set out various obligations by the developers, including 
those concerning SuDS. The SuDS in the s106 agreement became part of the strategic 
open space, which the developers created and maintained for three years. However, it 
was still unclear if after three years the council or a management company would take 
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up the maintenance of the open space; this would be arranged in a revised s106 
(Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001g). 
 
Figure 20: Plan of Newcastle Great Park including SuDS 
Source: Newcastle City Council n.d. 
The s106 agreement was revised in 2010, because housing numbers had risen in the 
meantime. In this agreement, the responsibilities for SuDS were set out in more detail. 
NCC and the developers agreed that the developers owned the freehold of the land until 
the council took over and issued a certificate of adoption. NCC would take over after 
the developers had built the SuDS to a specified standard, confirmed by an independent 
survey. NCC also inspected the SuDS, funded by a provision of £200,000. Moreover, a 
management company was established to carry out the maintenance in the area of NGP 
west of the A1, where the majority of open space was located. This company was set up 
by the consortium and funded by fees paid by residents40 (Councillor B 2012, interview, 
LRA Chair 2012, interview). The maintenance of the SuDS was carried out according to 
a maintenance schedule set out in the s106 agreement, which also included maintenance 
                                                
40 The fee is dependent on the value of the property, for instance in Cell G the fee is typically between 
£500 and £600 per year (LRA Chair 2012, interview). 
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of reeds in accordance with the airport’s requirements. Finally, the agreement included 
health and safety reports to ensure the SuDS were safe for residents (Newcastle City 
Council 2000b, 2010, Development Control Committee 2002b, Newcastle Great Park 
Advisory Committee 2009a, 2009c, Council Engineer 2012, pers. comm., Planning 
Officer A 2012, interview). 
For both the original and the new s106 agreement, the future costs for the SuDS proved 
to be an issue. The planning officer involved in the original s106 agreement felt that 
lack of experience with SuDS and the pressure of proceeding with the development 
meant that not enough funds were secured to cover future maintenance of the SuDS 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview). The developer on the other hand felt that the 
council wanted much more than was justified when the new s106 agreement was 
negotiated. The developers had been maintaining the SuDS for several years and 
believed they knew what the yearly maintenance costs were, which were much lower 
than the council was requesting (Developer A 2012, interview). However, both the 
planner and developer agreed that maintenance issues were complex. According to the 
planner: ‘the cost of management and maintenance had been more of an issue of 
disagreement that the actual design’ (Planning Officer B 2012, interview), whilst the 
developer agreed that ‘who takes responsibility is more complicated than the actual 
mechanics of SuDS’ (Developer A 2012, interview). 
The maintenance and adoption of the SuDS caused concerns with councillors and 
residents. Firstly, because the developers created the management company, the quality 
of the maintenance of the open space and SuDS might be compromised: 
It is the management company that is going to have that responsibility 
and I really do not know what sort of expertise or knowledge they have. I 
think they are going to be more concerned about grass cutting, tree 
planting and litter bins than the SuDS … It needs to be someone who 
knows what they are talking about, not someone who just says: ‘They 
look all right’. 
(Councillor B 2012, interview) 
Secondly, residents found that because the management company is a private venture, 
they do not reveal their expenditure. Therefore, residents do not know how their fees are 
spent. In addition, they are unable to communicate with the management company 
directly. Thirdly, the fact that the council is not responsible for maintaining the open 
space causes confusion. The council, for instance, collects refuse, but the consortium 
maintains open spaces. As residents are paying council taxes and management fees, they 
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have concerns that they are paying double for services (Councillor B 2012, interview, 
LRA Chair 2012, interview). Fourthly, there are concerns over the maintenance 
schedule. The question is whether the schedule covers all eventualities: 
It is a little bit of a no man’s land at the minute. They [the SuDS] have not 
been in long enough to find out how much maintenance they actually 
need. They are still pretty new and modern and working, but 15 years 
down the line what is going to happen, or if cracks develop how do we 
cope with that? 
(Councillor B 2012, interview) 
Finally, adoption is taking much longer than originally planned. The SuDS are part of 
the open space, which is not yet finished and adopted, partly because of the issues with 
the operation of the SuDS. For instance, there were a few incidences of leaks, blockages 
and soapy water entering the ponds that took time to rectify, which delayed adoption 
(Developer A 2012, interview). The council and the EA wanted to ensure the SuDS 
worked properly before adoption took place, for instance through as-built surveys and 
independent inspections. Moreover, the council wanted to see the maintenance schedule 
in place and working before adoption (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 
2010). 
5.3.5 Continued development 
In the meantime, North Gosforth and the Ouseburn became an Integrated Urban 
Drainage pilot study in 2007, funded by Defra as part of the Making Space for Water 
strategy. This project examined the relationship between the sewers and the Ouseburn 
and aimed to develop an integrated approach by overcoming organisational barriers. 
Through workshops with residents in the Ouseburn catchment, issues with NGP arose 
again. Residents were still uncertain about the operation and the management of the 
SuDS (PURE Ouseburn 2006). Some still felt that NGP was contributing to flooding 
(Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2007a, 2007b). Residents also resented the 
fact that the developers had not attended any meetings, leading to ‘an “us and them” 
mentality’ (Ouseburn Catchment Steering Group 2009: 7). As a result, they thought that 
they could not raise issues caused by developers to them directly, but instead they had 
to report issues to the EA or to the council; however, they felt that the council was not 
enforcing any planning issues sufficiently. 
In September 2008, an important flood event occurred. Rainfall that caused flooding in 
Morpeth also impacted on the Ouseburn. The river broke its banks, and sewers 
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overflowed, resulting in the flooding of 30 properties. In Brunton Park, the Ouseburn 
overflowed and flooded a small area, but the overflowing sewers proved to be a greater 
problem (Councillor A 2012, interview). Although no houses were flooded in NGP, 
residents were concerned that the Ouseburn had flooded into the SuDS pond in Cell I, 
thereby increasing flood risk downstream (WaSC Officer 2012, interview). However, 
the developer claimed that even though the Ouseburn had been running at a very high 
level, the SuDS did not overflow (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2008a, 
2008b, 2009d). The council also claimed that the system had coped well; they 
considered it a good test of the SuDS, because the storm was almost a 1-in-100-years 
event, therefore testing the system’s limits (Planning Officer A 2012, interview, Council 
Engineer 2012, interview). 
 
Figure 21: Aerial photograph of Newcastle Great Park in 2008 
Imagery: Infoterra Ltd & Bluesky 
Source: Google Maps 2011 
In addition, this event provided the EA with much information about flood risk. As the 
WaSC officer stated: 
The flooding event of 2008 was probably the biggest event they [the EA] 
ever had to be able to measure. That gave a whole host of new data about 
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the levels to which the Ouseburn could rise and as a result, they have had 
to refresh the database. 
(WaSC Officer 2012, interview) 
The EA used the data from this event by including it into a remodelling of flood risk, 
which was completed in 2011. This modelling showed that the pond in Cell I thought to 
be outside the Ouseburn’s floodplain was now in fact within it. This meant that if water 
levels were high, surface water runoff retained within the pond could overflow into the 
Ouseburn and aggravate flooding downstream (WaSC Officer 2012, interview). In 
addition, in Cell G some of the green space turned out to be at risk of flooding (EA 
Officer A 2012, interview). Therefore, a public event was held on June 2009 to inform 
residents on progress with flooding issues (Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 
2009b). However, some residents and the media had formed a negative image of NGP 
and flood risk issues; for instance, one newspaper reported that the area was ‘being 
plagued with flooding’, even though it gave no examples of floods (Hughes 2011). 
 
Figure 22: Development in Newcastle Great Park Cell F 
Source: Author 2012 
In 2011, the Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee was abolished when the Labour 
Party took over control of the council from the Liberal Democrats and the number of 
committees was reduced. However, according to the planning officer, the committee 
had also run its course. It was originally established to discuss strategic issues, but had 
slowly developed into discussing day-to-day issues that were better resolved directly 
between the parties concerned. To compensate for the loss of the committee, regular 
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informal meetings still took place between the council, developers and councillors and 
regular reports were sent to ward committees (Planning Officer A 2012, interview). 
In 2012, development in NGP was still taking place. Cell G was under construction, 
whilst work also started on the town centre. In addition, more SuDS may be constructed 
in the future: 
Some of the development cells may change. At the moment we have 
planning permission for residential development and it is also possible 
that some of the business areas may well change in the future and become 
residential. The housing numbers will certainly increase over 2,500 and if 
that is the case then there may be a requirement to introduce new SuDS 
that are not showing on the plans so far. 
(Planning Officer A 2012, interview) 
The existing SuDS were now also working according to requirements. Since the SuDS 
went into operation, no fluvial or pluvial flooding has taken place in NGP (Councillor B 
2012, interview). For instance, after the heavy rainfall in Newcastle in June 2012, the 
SuDS ponds were approximately three-quarters full and did not overflow (EA Officer A 
2012, pers. comm., Councillor B 2012, interview). However, there were concerns that 
the development of Cell G caused surface water flooding in Kingston Park. The surface 
water runoff in this area used to run through the fields in Cell G and into the Ouseburn, 
but as the houses were built and land was raised, the runoff backed up into Kingston 
Park, requiring further drainage measures to be taken there (Councillor B 2012, 
interview). Therefore, knowledge of drainage and flood risk in NGP and the 
surrounding areas is continuously developing and flood risk measures are taken 
accordingly. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter described the development of NGP and the decisions made to manage 
flood risk. The concept of NGP started in the 1980s, when planning officers at NCC 
identified housing need, population loss and unemployment figures that were higher 
than surrounding areas. As they found there was inadequate land within the city for 
development, their solution was to create a development in green belt land north of the 
city that would include mainly higher-market housing, together with areas for 
commercial development. The development aimed to be sustainable to compensate for 
the loss of green belt land and to attract buyers. Even though there was much opposition 
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from residents and interest groups, planning for the development proceeded with 
support from central government. 
The planning officers were aware of flooding issues in the Ouseburn area. They were 
aware that a large-scale development created much surface water runoff, which if 
released into the Ouseburn would exacerbate problems with flooding downstream. In 
addition, there were some fluvial flood risks in NGP itself. The planning officers and 
the EA developed the idea to use SuDS to address the flooding problems, which the 
developers agreed with. As a result, end-of-pipe SuDS ponds were constructed that 
slowly released surface water into the watercourse. The SuDS ponds in Cell G were 
more advanced, as they also allowed the Ouseburn to flow into the ponds when water 
levels were high, effectively reducing flooding downstream. 
Over the years, various flood events occurred around the Ouseburn41 and residents were 
worried that the flooding was caused or aggravated by NGP. There was concern that the 
SuDS were not working correctly and there were instances when faults were found with 
the ponds. In addition, knowledge of flood risks developed over the years, in particular 
after a flood event in 2008, which meant that flood risks for the Ouseburn were greater 
than previously thought and some SuDS ponds had to be adapted. This reduced 
confidence amongst residents of surrounding areas and they had concerns that the 
authorities were not effectively tackling the problem of flooding. 
Another issue was with the maintenance and adoption of the SuDS. The local authority 
was the only body able to adopt them, but there was uncertainty concerning the costs of 
future maintenance. In addition, a private management company was established to 
maintain the SuDS using fees paid by residents. This created problems with 
accountability; for instance, if maintenance is needed that is not included in the 
maintenance agreement. Moreover, the residents preferred the local authority to be 
responsible for maintenance, because they feel that the management company is non-
transparent and communication is lacking. 
Chapter 7 will analyse the case of NGP according to the theoretical framework, to 
identify the key issues that influenced FRM. Before that, the next chapter describes the 
second case study of this research, which is Chelmsford’s cricket ground development. 
                                                
41 In the years 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2008. 
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Chapter 6 Chelmsford cricket ground development 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the second case study of this research, which is the 
redevelopment of the cricket ground in Chelmsford. Section 6.2 describes the decision-
making process chronologically, after which section 6.3 provides a short summary. This 
chapter has been informed by documents collected,42 interviews with participants and a 
site visit. An analysis of the data based on the theoretical framework is undertaken in 
Chapter 7. 
The borough of Chelmsford comprises countryside, villages and towns. A large 
proportion of the borough’s population resides in Chelmsford, the county town of 
Essex. Chelmsford originates from a Roman settlement at a river crossing and has been 
steadily growing in population ever since (Fuller and Home 2007). This continuous 
growth can partly be explained by the location of Chelmsford within the London 
commuter belt. In 2001, 17% of the resident workforce commuted to London 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008e, 2008i). In 2011, Chelmsford had approximately 
168,300 inhabitants (Office for National Statistics 2012) and gained city status in March 
201243 (Deputy Prime Minister's Office 2012, Nicholson 2012). 
The main watercourses that pose a flood risk in Chelmsford borough are the rivers Can, 
Wid and Chelmer (Scott Wilson 2008). The river Chelmer runs mainly through rural 
areas, with the exception of the town of Great Dunmow and Chelmsford itself. The river 
Can, which is the river running past Chelmsford’s cricket ground, is a major tributary of 
the river Chelmer and they join in the centre of the town. The Wid is a tributary of the 
river Can; they join west of the town (Environment Agency 2006). The presence of 
these three rivers cause approximately 1,000 to 1,500 domestic and commercial 
properties in town to be located in a 1-in-100-years flood zone, together with various 
brownfield sites that the council have earmarked for regeneration (Planning Officer D 
2012, interview). The cricket ground development has not previously been researched in 
academic literature. 
                                                
42 For a complete list of collected documents, see Appendix F. 
43 In this chapter, the local government of Chelmsford will be referred to by its previous name of 
Chelmsford Borough Council, which was in use at the time of the cricket ground development planning 
process, as opposed to its current name of Chelmsford City Council. In addition, as most of the events 
detailed in this chapter took place before March 2012, Chelmsford is referred to as a town throughout. 
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6.2 Context and development of the cricket ground 
Chelmsford has much experience with flooding. The rivers that run through the centre 
have flooded frequently in the past, and after damaging floods in 1947 and 1958, a flood 
relief scheme was implemented. This engineered approach to controlling flooding 
entailed raising flood embankments and installing sluice gates that retain a high water 
level in the centre for aesthetic purposes and allow water through at times of flooding 
(Environment Agency 2006). The scheme was designed to reduce loss of floodplain to a 
minimum; therefore, areas such as recreation grounds, tennis courts and the cricket 
ground beside the river remained unprotected. 
 
Figure 23: Aerial photograph of Chelmsford cricket ground 
Source: Chelmsford Borough Council 2004: 1 
In the town centre and adjacent to the river Can, several sports and leisure facilities 
were established. In 1925, the cricket club established their ground, which is one of 18 
first class county grounds in England and Wales (England and Wales Cricket Board 
2000, Essex Cricket n.d). In 1993, the cricket club added a car park on the banks of the 
river (Cushman and Wakefield 2008a). 
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6.2.1 Inclusion of the cricket ground in Chelmsford’s Local Plan 
In 1997, Chelmsford Borough Council (CBC) published a Local Plan, Chelmsford’s 
first borough-wide plan (Chelmsford Borough Council 1997). The plan described the 
development pressure present in Chelmsford, caused by economic growth and its 
proximity to London. Substantial new development had been taking place in the 
previous 40 years, mainly on the peripheries of Chelmsford. Therefore, the plan aimed 
to provide for the development requirements of the borough, within certain conditions, 
including the protection of green belt land and river valleys in the town centre and in the 
countryside. Even though the Local Plan encouraged housing in urban areas, it also 
wanted to avoid town cramming and no new housing sites were planned in the centre, 
but instead land was reserved for retail and employment uses. 
The risk of flooding was an important development consideration. Based on Circular 
30/92, the EA would be consulted before granting planning permission to a 
development in an area of flood risk or where there were drainage problems. Parts of the 
borough were at flood risk and CBC found it ‘unrealistic to expect that all such risks 
[could] be eliminated’ (Chelmsford Borough Council 1997: 188). In areas at risk of 
flooding there was a presumption against new development, but such areas were 
allowed to flood in order to protect others. 
Furthermore, the plan emphasised the importance of leisure activities in the town centre, 
because this ensured accessibility for the community and enhanced the attractiveness, 
diversity and liveliness of the town centre. Additionally, it was stated that the demand 
for most recreation facilities had increased considerably. CBC therefore wanted to retain 
these facilities, as they had: 
too often been lost as a result of over-intensive development and 
redevelopment. This has led not only to the loss of valuable open-areas 
but a cramped environment and town-cramming. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 1997: 90) 
In particular, the football club and the cricket club were considered vital. CBC stated 
that these two clubs made a significant contribution to the attractiveness of the town: 
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The two clubs occupy adjoining sites within the town centre with good 
access to public transport facilities. They are major spectator sports 
venues for the town of Chelmsford and, in the case of the Cricket Club, 
for the County of Essex. The Council will resist development proposals 
which do not ensure the continued existence of cricket and football at the 
New Writtle Street car park. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 1997: 90–91) 
Therefore, CBC intended to provide support to retain and improve these facilities and to 
resist any future development on these recreational sites. 
6.2.2 Development on recreational facilities near the cricket ground 
Even though CBC had included this policy in the Local Plan, the football club had to 
leave their ground soon after its publication and the football facilities on that site were 
lost. The football club had been based on a site adjacent to the river Can and next to the 
cricket ground since 1938. However, the football club fell into financial difficulties and 
they could no longer afford to maintain the facilities, causing Essex County Council to 
revoke the permit to use the spectator facilities in 1997 due to safety concerns. The 
receivers appointed by the mortgagees required vacant possession and the club therefore 
left the ground in that same year (Chelmsford City Football Club 2000). The land was 
sold to a developer who submitted a planning application to build, amongst other 
facilities, a health and fitness centre and 43 dwellings. CBC refused planning 
permission on the grounds that the site was identified as a recreation area in the Local 
Plan, causing the proposal to be contrary to policies aimed at retaining the football 
club’s facilities (Chelmsford Borough Council 1998). 
The applicants appealed this decision and a public enquiry was held. The inspector 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the football club would return to 
the ground, as it would not be viable. Development was considered more beneficial to 
the area than refusal and the grant of planning permission was recommended. However, 
the council had concerns that approval of the application would make it more difficult 
to resist development on other recreational grounds and in particular on the cricket 
ground, but the inspector found that there were no firm proposals for relocation at that 
moment in time as the grounds were still in active use. Any proposal in the future would 
have to go through the same process of weighing local policies and wider merits 
(Rowlands 1999). As a result, the application was approved, the football ground was 
developed and the club was relocated outside the centre of Chelmsford. 
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Not long after, in 2000, a planning application was received to develop the bowling 
greens: a 0.6 hectare site on the banks of the river Can, adjacent to and west of the 
former football ground. It was decided by the planning committee to allow residential 
development in spite of its policy on maintaining recreational and sport facilities in the 
centre, as long as the bowls club could be relocated in the north of the town. The bowls 
site was at risk of flooding, but the EA indicated that the site was protected by the 
existing flood defence scheme to the 1-in-100-years standard (Chelmsford Borough 
Council 2002). Planning permission for relocation of the club was granted and the 
development, entailing 60 flats, was completed in 2004 (Hall 2008). 
 
Figure 24: Map of Chelmsford with the location of the cricket ground 
Source: Find 2013 
In October 2000 and October 2001, open space, gardens, roads and commercial 
properties were flooded in Chelmsford. The 2000 floods were the result of a very wet 
autumn, causing high water levels in the river Can in particular. The 2001 flooding was 
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caused by rainfall, creating high water levels in the river Chelmer. In the centre, 
properties escaped being flooded when the river flowed only 100mm below the tops of 
the banks. However, the Rivermead industrial estate flooded and in the wider area of 
North Essex over 700 properties were affected (Halcrow Group 2007, Scott Wilson 
2008, Environment Agency 2009f). 
Following these flooding events, the EA initiated more research into flood risk to 
identify the current standard of protection and the potential to improve these standards. 
Their report was published in 2006, which showed that flood risk was greater than 
previously thought. In Chelmsford, 375 residential properties and 86 commercial 
properties were deemed at risk of flooding with a 1-in-100-years probability. The floods 
of 2000 and 2001, which were initially thought to be 1-in-200-years events, were found 
to have a return period of between 20 and 50 years. Areas within the town centre were 
discovered to have a standard of protection lower than the recommended44 range of 1 in 
50 to 1 in 200 years for intensively developed urban areas. Some sites proved to be at a 
1-in-25-years risk of flooding, including the residential development at the former 
bowling greens that were previously thought to have a 1-in-100-years chance of 
flooding. The report pointed out that it was important for Chelmsford to have an 
adequate standard of protection of at least 1 in 100 years. Various flood alleviation 
alternatives were investigated and the recommendation was made to develop a flood 
storage area upstream on the river Wid (Black and Veatch 2006, Environment Agency 
2006). 
This report was followed by a SFRA for the local councils in the Mid Essex area (Scott 
Wilson 2007), including a town-specific assessment for Chelmsford (Scott Wilson 
2008). The SFRA described the main sources of flood risk in the area and the flood 
defences in the town centre. It stated that the flood defence had a protection level up to 
1 in 20 years for the areas upstream of the confluence of the rivers Can and Chelmer, 
whilst the standard of protection downstream of this point was 1 in 10 years. It 
recognised that there were areas of functional floodplain within the town centre, some 
of which were developed, for instance as car parks. It stated that CBC’s policy was in 
line with PPS25 and that they would only permit water-compatible or essential 
infrastructure for flood zone 3b (which is functional floodplain). 
                                                
44 By Defra. 
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In the meantime, the CBC planned to create a new Local Plan for the years 2001–2011 
and published a draft Local Plan. This draft was withdrawn in 2003 in order to 
commence the preparation of an LDF in accordance with new planning regulations. The 
Core Strategy of the LDF was adopted in February 2008 (Chelmsford Borough Council 
2008i). The Core Strategy continued to emphasise the importance of sport and 
recreational facilities for Chelmsford. It promoted the enhancement of facilities to 
further develop Chelmsford’s role as a centre for arts, culture, sport and entertainment 
and aimed to stimulate the growth of sports clubs, including the cricket club 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008e). 
In addition, development was concentrated in existing built-up areas, such as 
regeneration areas in the town centre. Developing these sites was deemed crucial for the 
long-term sustainability of the town centre; however, many of these were located in 
flood zones. Therefore, new and existing development in the town centre had to be 
further protected from flooding. As on-site storage was not possible or viable on these 
sites, flood defence measures upstream in the rivers Can and Wid were necessary to 
ensure a 1-in-100-years standard of protection (Broyd 2008). In order to partially fund 
these measures, planning contributions from developments permitted in the town centre 
would be requested (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008e). In the meantime, if sites 
were to be put forward before the measures had been implemented, mitigation would be 
necessary and CBC would work closely with the EA to consider proposals (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2008i). 
The strategy also included a policy on green wedges, which were areas of open space 
along rivers. These areas were situated on the shallow river valleys, which had mostly 
remained free from development (Hall 2008), as they were used to store water in times 
of flood. Therefore, CBC resisted development in these green wedges (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2008i). 
6.2.3 First plans for the cricket ground development 
Around the time the Local Plan was published in the late 1990s, a major urban 
extension was built at the north-east boundary of Chelmsford (Hall 2008). The 
developers had an s106 agreement with the council that included the provision of sports 
facilities and they approached the cricket club to ask if they would be willing to relocate 
their cricket ground at the developers’ expense. The cricket club were interested, 
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because they wanted to improve their facilities and had started designing outline 
drawings for the new ground, but then found that the council did not want them to leave 
the town centre. The cricket club claimed that: 
At the time they [the council] became extremely obstructive and imposed 
a little known planning constraint on us called green wedge policy. 
Basically it meant that they considered us to be part of the green 
continuum along the river with the park opposite. But that effectively 
sterilised this development, which meant that we could not sell this 
ground and we could not assist with any of the reconstruction at an 
alternative ground. 
(Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview) 
The cricket club objected to being included in the green wedge and hired a planning 
consultant to support them (Consultant A 2012, interview). After two years, the council 
decided to not apply the green wedge designation to the cricket ground (Cricket Club 
Manager 2012, interview). This new stance was signalled first in a planning brief for 
development on the cricket ground, and later the LDF explicitly excluded the cricket 
ground from the green wedge policy.45 
Even though the interaction between the cricket club and CBC had been conflicted, it 
became the beginning of continuing discussions between the two parties about 
development of the cricket ground. In particular, the change of administration in the 
council in 2002 improved their relationship: 
The chief executive and chairman of the council changed and the 
approach and the attitude toward us completely changed as well. They 
were very understanding of our needs to develop and we started a sensible 
dialogue with them. They remained pretty adamant they wanted us to stay 
in the centre of town, but they confirmed they would work with us to 
make sure we would have everything we needed. 
(Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview) 
In the meantime, the cricket club’s need to improve their facilities grew further. Firstly, 
the facilities had become old and ‘very tired’ (Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview), 
whilst security was not sufficient.46 In addition, the current facilities did not comply 
with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as they were not accessible to wheelchair 
users and lacked changing facilities for females and under-18s. The cricket club’s 
governing body, the England and Wales Cricket Board, created new guidelines with 
which the club had to comply. It became designated as a Regional Centre of Excellence, 
                                                
45 This will be discussed in later sections. 
46 For instance, on the night before the interview there had been a break-in. 
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which meant that the club were expected to upgrade and extend their training facilities. 
To enable this, the cricket board stated that they supported any residential development 
at the regional centres (England and Wales Cricket Board n.d.). The cricket club was 
granted a period of time to achieve the standard, but renovation had to be carried out 
eventually. Finally, the club also wished to expand their conference facilities to be able 
to use the grounds on the days without games (Chelmsford Borough Council 2009e, 
Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview). 
Therefore, the club had multiple reasons for upgrading their facilities, but had to 
develop residential dwellings to fund this. In 2003, they created a master plan outline 
with ‘quite modest accommodation’ (Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview). However, 
there were a number of constraints, as it was a small and constricted site. Architects 
working on the plans realised early on that an adjacent council car park was needed to 
develop the site. In addition, the river Can caused a flood risk. Therefore, in the early 
stages of development flood risk consultants carried out a flood risk appraisal. 
In addition, the cricket club had early discussions with CBC over the possibility of 
redeveloping the area. It became apparent that the council wanted the cricket ground to 
stay in the town centre. The cricket club on their part informed the council that if they 
could not develop they would have to move away (Consultant A 2012, interview). 
Therefore, CBC decided they would work together towards development, even though 
the cricket ground was in an area at significant risk of flooding and the inclusion of a 
council car park was required. 
6.2.4 Planning brief for the cricket ground development 
To support the redevelopment of the cricket ground and communicate the council’s 
support, a planning brief was published in 2004 (Chelmsford Borough Council 2004). 
At the time, the planning brief had status as Supplementary Planning Guidance, which 
was later revoked when it was absorbed into the Core Strategy and Development Plan 
Documents. The planning brief stated that the cricket club needed to generate capital 
from commercial development, in order to expand their facilities and achieve long-term 
financial stability. The council claimed that retention of the cricket club was crucial for 
the town centre’s variety and vitality. Therefore, CBC decided to: 
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positively support radical change and development of the County Ground 
to achieve a viable, national-standard cricket centre [and] support 
appropriate development that will help finance the Cricket Ground. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2004: 3) 
Apart from renewing cricket facilities and increasing seating capacity from 5,000 to 
8,000, a cricket school, restaurant, bar and improved parking facilities were planned at a 
cost of £10 million. Residential dwellings on the riverbank would generate the funds 
needed. The plan was to build dwellings that were similar to the development on the 
former bowling greens, which comprised four-storey apartments with undercroft 
parking facing the river. The cricket club redevelopment also included the use of a 
public car park owned by the council to create sufficient space for commercial 
development. 
 
Figure 25: Concept plan for cricket ground redevelopment 
Source: Chelmsford Borough Council 2004: 31 
The planning brief also stated that the majority of the site was within the river Can’s 
floodplain and was not protected against flooding, unlike the development on the former 
bowling greens. It was possible for the cricket pitch to flood via routes under the stand 
and future development would have to take this into account. Residential development 
would not be able to have ground level accommodation and it was suggested to include 
an undercroft car park to create flood capacity. However, even though the site had a 
large flood risk issue, CBC found that there was no other land viable for a spectator 
sports centre that had less flood risk. The EA, on the other hand, highlighted the 
unsuitability of the site for housing due to flood risk (Environment Agency 2009b). 
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After the planning brief was published, the cricket club started to select a development 
partner with the help of the planning consultant who had assisted them in the objection 
to the green wedge designation. The chosen developers selected a new flood risk 
consultant to continue work on the flood risk issues on site (Consultant A 2012, 
interview). 
6.2.5 Inclusion of the cricket ground in the Town Centre Area Action Plan 
In August 2008, the Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan (AAP) was published 
to guide development in the town centre (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008b). The 
AAP included a strategy to promote sport and leisure within the town centre and to 
improve facilities at two major schemes, one of which was the cricket club. The cricket 
club was described as a ‘major sporting asset deserving a higher profile in the town’ 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008b: 21). It also designated a green wedge area within 
the town centre along the river, but with two exception sites. One of these was the 
cricket ground, which meant that development on this site took precedence over the 
green wedge designation (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008c). 
The plan incorporated the new data from the EA’s flood risk study (Environment 
Agency 2006), which increased flood risk figures for the town centre. In total, 20 of the 
37 sites allocated in the AAP were wholly or partly within flood zones 2 and 3, 
including the cricket ground. At first, the AAP did not include sequential and exception 
tests for the sites at risk of flooding. However, after the EA indicated the AAP needed 
to conform to the draft of PPS25, these two tests were later performed (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2006, Environment Agency 2009b). The sequential and exception 
tests for the cricket ground showed that both the council and the club wished to remain 
on that site and they considered it a sustainable location (Chelmsford Borough Council 
2009d). As the club did not own any other land, they had to develop on that site to raise 
finances to improve their current facilities. Two alternative sites were considered, but 
dismissed as they were either too remote or had too many constraints. 
The flood risk issues with the cricket ground were also discussed. Both the ground and 
the council’s car park were located in a 1-in-20-years flood risk zone. The tests 
acknowledged that the uses that were planned here were inappropriate within the flood 
risk zone and should not normally be permitted there (Environment Agency 2009b). 
The tests recommended the building of a raised defence if development were to take 
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place, but the site would still have a high level of residual risk47 (Chelmsford Borough 
Council 2008c). However, the development was considered to be sustainable, due to its 
location within the town centre and its contribution to revitalising the town (Entec UK 
2006). Therefore, as wider sustainability benefits outweighed the flood risk, the site 
passed the exception test (Chelmsford Borough Council 2007b). 
After consultation regarding the AAP, responses were summarised in a document by the 
council. There were no objections to the plans for the cricket ground, although some 
responses were that the building heights could be raised and that the residential capacity 
of the site could be increased (Chelmsford Borough Council 2007a). The EA also did 
not object to the AAP as the sequential test showed that the estimated number of 100 
dwellings were planned outside the functional floodplain (Chelmsford Borough Council 
2007b, EA Officer E 2012, interview). They recognised the importance of regeneration 
in the town centre, but also wanted to ensure the development was in accordance with 
PPS25 (Environment Agency 2009b). To enable development in the centre, CBC and 
the EA agreed on a protocol to work together. This protocol was signed in August 2007 
and revised in March 2008. It stated that: 
While new development proposals must pay proper regard to flood risk, it 
would be contrary to the interests of the town to delay formulation of 
development proposals for key regeneration sites, pending a flood 
alleviation scheme. The Environment Agency and Chelmsford Borough 
Council therefore jointly wish to ensure planning permissions address the 
anticipated flood risks of the location before and after the alleviation 
scheme is completed and help to generate funding for the alleviation 
project. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008g: 11) 
For developments that were completed before the flood alleviation scheme, CBC and 
the EA required a contribution. For developments to be completed after the scheme, 
they allowed flood risk levels to be based on the post-construction situation 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008d, Chelmsford Borough Council and Environment 
Agency 2008). Furthermore, the council and the EA would cooperate with developers to 
ensure ‘a satisfactory working relationship to bring forward development on town 
centre sites in Flood Zones 2 and 3’ (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008g: 6) and the 
EA would discuss objections to development proposals with the council in order to 
avoid applications being called in and to prevent delays to regeneration plans. 
                                                
47 Residual risk is the probability and consequence of breaching or overtopping of a raised defence, the 
ease of providing safe pedestrian egress, the flood hazard rating based on depth and velocity and the 
impact of mitigation on flood risk upstream or downstream (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008e). 
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In the AAP, the residential development that was planned in order to finance the cricket 
ground redevelopment had an estimated capacity of 100 dwellings and was limited to a 
building height of three to five storeys. This capacity was derived from the Urban 
Capacity Study of 2007. This study had identified the ground as a potential residential 
site with an estimated capacity of 80 dwellings (Halcrow Group 2007), but this was then 
increased to 100 for the AAP. However, in March 2008, the residential capacity for the 
cricket ground was raised again through a new policy document that covered the 
council’s vision on housing (Chelmsford Borough Council 2008a). The cricket ground 
was described as: 
a unique opportunity to improve the existing facilities whilst also 
enabling new facilities to be provided at the site. This will include new 
sport facilities and approximately 300 new homes at a location close to 
the town centre. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008a: 23) 
One of the drivers behind increasing the number of residential dwelling on site was 
development pressure. The cricket club had become one of seven key sites in the policy 
document, which were designated to help to contribute 7,200 new homes between 2008 
and 2021 as part of regional growth targets. As a result, the cricket ground’s capacity 
was trebled. 
In the meantime, knowledge of flood risk continued to develop. In 2009, the EA 
produced a Catchment Flood Management Plan (CFMP) for North Essex (Environment 
Agency 2009f). This CFMP covered the catchment area of four major rivers: the 
Chelmer, Blackwater, Colne and Stour. This area covered four urban settlements: 
Chelmsford, Colchester, Braintree and Sudbury. It was estimated that in Chelmsford, 
366 properties – representing 692 people – had a 1-in-100-years probability of flooding. 
The plan predicted that this flood risk would worsen in the future. If there was a 10% 
increase in urban area and a 20% increase in peak flow in all watercourses due to 
climate change, but flood defences remained the same, then by the year 2100 a total of 
649 properties – representing 1,187 people – would be at risk of flooding. The plan also 
claimed that the embankments of the river Can provided protection from a 1-in-10-years 
to a 1-in-50-years probability. 
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6.2.6 Planning application for cricket ground development 
In the second half of 2007 and approximately 12 months before the application was 
submitted, pre-application discussions took place between the planning department and 
the applicants, in which they went through various designs (Developer B 2012, 
interview). Flood risk consultants working for the developer requested data from the EA 
to calculate flood risk on site (EA Officer D 2012, interview). Flood risk was also 
discussed directly between principal parties, for instance in a meeting in May 2008 
between the council, the EA, the architect and the flood risk consultants. The council 
confirmed that their current stance was to fully support redevelopment of the site. The 
EA pointed out that they would not agree to development within the functional 
floodplain (flood zone 3b) and there were discussions on overcoming the issue of 
developing in a functional floodplain. The consultants suggested reviewing the 
hydraulic modelling to see if flood levels might be lowered. The council suggested 
redefining the functional floodplain within the council’s SFRA or starting discussions 
with DCLG to argue that the development was an exceptional case (Environment 
Agency 2009b). 
In the meantime, the cricket club and developers were keen to have the application 
ready for the summer of 2008, so that there would be minimum disruption to the cricket 
club. As a result, the application was submitted in July 2008 (Chelmsford Borough 
Council 2008f, 2008h). The application proposed to demolish existing buildings and 
redevelop the cricket ground and the council’s car park48 in order to provide: 
• A new cricket pavilion, cricket centre and stands with a capacity of 8,000 
spectators and with ancillary catering, retail and office functions, new media 
centre, floodlighting and groundsman’s facilities; 
• A multi-storey car park with 307 spaces; 
• 1,800 m2 for retail (A1) and catering (A3/A4) uses; 
• 426 residential units, comprising 302 flats in three blocks with undercroft 
parking at the riverside, 109 flats to the east and 15 units of town houses with 
flats at the site entrance to the south; 
• A public piazza and a new footbridge over the river (Chelmsford Borough 
Council 2008f). 
                                                
48 See Figure 26 and Appendix N for photographs of the development site. 
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Three blocks of flats of 8, 12 and 19 storeys situated on the riverbank formed the major 
part of the residential development. Flood risk was calculated using a revised model 
developed by the flood risk consultants. In addition, they added the benefits of the 
future flood alleviation scheme into their calculations. To address flood risk issues, 
habitable floor levels were raised above the 1-in-100-years modelled flood level with an 
allowance for climate change. Additionally, flood storage was provided by an 
undercroft parking area and other storage areas. A SuDS-based surface water drainage 
scheme was provided as well, including underground storage attenuation tanks and 
infiltration systems. Furthermore, the s106 agreement included a contribution of 
£500,000 by the applicants towards flood defence measures, which was offset by a 
lower allowance for affordable housing and lower highway contributions (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2009a, Cushman and Wakefield 2008b, 2009b). 
 
Figure 26: Development site for residential dwellings at the cricket ground 
Source: Author 2012 
After submission, the EA responded formally to the planning application in a letter 
dated August 2008 (Environment Agency 2008). The first issue they raised was that the 
application conflicted with the town centre AAP. The application did not reflect the true 
aspirations of the site allocation, which had an estimated capacity of 100 dwellings, 
significantly fewer than the 426 dwellings applied for. As a result, dwellings were now 
planned in the functional floodplain. They also objected in principle to locating 
development in flood zone 3b, as it was not compliant with PPS25. In addition, they did 
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not agree with the future flood alleviation scheme being used to lower flood risk on the 
site, because according to the EA the site would still be partially flooded in a 1-in-20-
years event. Lastly, there were some issues with technical aspects of the FRA, such as 
the need for higher floor levels, the safety of the undercroft parking, the ability of 
floodwater to flow back into the river and the need for a detailed flood evacuation plan 
(Environment Agency 2009b). 
In addition, the EA raised issues with the FRA, in which consultants had developed a 
flood risk model, resulting in a flood risk that was lower than the EA’s model. The 
consultants replied that they applied their own modelling because they found that the 
EA’s models lacked detail; therefore, the consultants argued they improved it: 
We take their coarse model and then refine it, so it is better for our local 
purposes. Because their model is coarse it is often conservative; it 
exaggerates the reality. When we refine it, knock out the various 
assumptions that go into their model and replace those assumptions with 
facts, we end up with the flood level coming down. 
(Consultant B 2012, interview) 
The EA did not accept the consultants’ revised model and felt it did not reflect reality. It 
excluded historical flood events from 1947 and 1958, resulting in a lower flood risk and 
a smaller functional floodplain that was outside the built environment (Environment 
Agency 2009h). The EA also did not agree with other methods to calculate flood risk; 
for instance, the current volume of flood storage was underestimated, because buildings 
that allowed water to flow through were seen as solid structures (Environment Agency 
2009g). One EA officer believed that: 
The consultants who they [the developers] had appointed clearly had a 
brief to deliver something regardless of how they did it … They were 
obviously trying to get an answer for the site in terms of the flood risk by 
coming up with an approach to hydrology to give them the answer they 
wanted. 
(EA Officer C 2012, interview) 
Another EA officer felt the consultants were trying to carry out a deception, with the 
EA constantly trying to uncover it: 
My opinion was that they were trying to achieve their own goals. In a 
way – maybe it is a bit of a strong word – they were trying to cheat to do 
that. 
(EA Officer D 2012, interview) 
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The consultants believed that the EA was reluctant to change their modelling, because it 
meant that flood levels used to design the flood alleviation scheme in Chelmsford were 
wrong. If flood risk was lower than expected, the cost-benefit analysis for implementing 
the scheme would be affected (Consultant B 2012, interview). The EA, on the other 
hand, stated that the flood levels on and off site were, in reality, higher than the 
consultants suggested, and not enough floodplain compensation was provided for 
(Environment Agency 2009a). However, the EA decided to review their own data to 
check if their flood risk levels were right. As a result, the EA revised the flood risk, and 
their flow levels were slightly lower than before, but still not as low as the consultants’ 
levels (Environment Agency 2009h). 
The consultants also argued that the development area should not be defined as flood 
zone 3b, because, technically, it was not a functional floodplain. Their interpretation of 
PPS25 was that functional floodplain had to be a natural, undeveloped corridor, never 
an already developed area (Consultant B 2012, interview). As the site was within an 
existing developed area the site should not be classified as a functional floodplain (PBA 
2009) and development would not be prohibited by PPS25. The EA disagreed and 
argued that PPS25 does not differentiate between developed and undeveloped areas. 
Furthermore, the developers’ emergency plan assumed there would be a flood warning 
24 hours in advance, but the EA argued they could only provide two to four hours 
advance warning. The car park would suffer potential water depths of 1.7 metres in a 1- 
in-100-years flood event, taking into account the possible effects of climate change, 
which could cause unsafe situations if people tried to move their cars. The EA 
acknowledged that the car park would be closed during flooding and could not be 
accessed, but they were concerned about people bypassing this system. In addition, the 
EA had other concerns over the loss of floodplain that was not compensated level for 
level on site, which might affect flood levels on and off site. 
Lastly, the EA also objected to the applicants’ use of the sequential test as performed in 
the AAP. In an interview, one of the EA officers said that during pre-application 
meetings the consultants were still indicating that 100 dwellings were going to be built, 
but when the application was submitted they found out that the number of dwellings had 
been increased to over 400 (EA Officer E 2012, interview). Therefore, the sequential 
test was no longer relevant and further work should be undertaken to identify the 
amount of residential development within flood zones. 
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In response to feedback given by the EA, the flood risk consultants revised the FRA 
four times (EA Officer D 2012, interview). According to the EA, the consultants 
suggested a compromise, which entailed that the consultants would adopt the 1-in-100-
years flood levels from the EA model if the EA were to adopt the 1-in-20-years flood 
levels from the consultants’ model. The EA declined to do so, claiming there was no 
logical reason to use results from two different models (Environment Agency 2009h). 
Therefore, the EA did not accept the consultants’ FRA. 
 
Figure 27: Flood risk in Chelmsford, including the cricket ground  
Source: Environment Agency 2013 
In the meantime, local residents had become involved in the planning process. They 
decided to object to the planning application, mainly because they thought the 
development would cause overlooking and too much traffic. They reported not to be 
against the development in principle, but felt the site was being overdeveloped and was 
causing harm. In addition, there were some concerns that the site was within a 
floodplain and should not be developed on (Local Residents’ Group 2009f, 2009h). In 
total, CBC received 29 letters of objection and a petition with 33 signatures 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008g). 
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6.2.7 Discussion of the cricket ground development in planning committee 
The applicants were keen to have the application discussed as soon as possible in the 
planning committee, stating that a delay would be likely to jeopardise the project. The 
cricket club wanted the preliminary works to commence in January 2009 to enable a 
timely return to the ground. As the EA had not given a final response it would not be 
possible to achieve resolution on flood risk issues, but it was decided to put the 
application before the committee to discuss all other issues, whilst keeping flood risk 
issues for a later date (Planning Officer C 2012, interview). 
 
Figure 28: Artist’s impression of cricket ground development 
Copyright: MCD 
Source: MCD and ECCC 2012: 1 
The application was examined in committee on 30 September 2008 (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2008g). The committee noted that the application would achieve an 
important council objective by retaining the sporting venue in the centre, whilst 
enabling the cricket club to upgrade their facilities. A local ward member expressed his 
concerns about issues of overlooking, but the committee felt the relationship between 
the development and existing properties was acceptable. The committee concluded that 
they were minded to grant the application permission, subject to the EA’s objection 
being withdrawn. 
  154 
However, the EA did not withdraw their objection in their final response and the 
application was put forward to the committee again in January 2009 (Chelmsford 
Borough Council 2009c). The EA indicated that if the committee was minded to 
recommend the development, it would have to be referred to the SoS in accordance with 
the requirements of the Flooding Direction. The committee commented that the EA’s 
objection was one made in principle, which would be sustained even if the EA accepted 
the developer’s latest FRA. The committee also felt that the development met 
sustainable planning criteria in terms of location and travel patterns, intensification of 
town centres and provision of public facilities. The committee voted on the application, 
but as there was no majority for approval or refusal, the chair used his casting vote and 
decided to recommend the application for approval (Local Residents’ Group 2009e). 
The reason provided was that: 
Given the wider importance of the development and that it is designed to 
maintain the function of the floodplain, water flows are not impeded, 
flood risk is not materially increased elsewhere and the occupiers should 
be safe for the lifetime of the development, it is considered that these 
factors outweigh the in principle concerns of the Environment Agency 
and the development is acceptable. 
(Chelmsford Borough Council 2008g: 26) 
As a result, the application was referred to the Government Office for the East of 
England, which decided the application should be referred to the SoS (Cushman and 
Wakefield 2009a). 
6.2.8 Discussion of the cricket ground development in the public inquiry 
The SoS decided to call in the application and hold a public inquiry in July and August 
2009. To be discussed were the accordance of the development with the development 
plan, the quality of design, whether it was consistent with PPS3 (housing), PPS6 
(planning for town centres), PPS9 (biodiversity and geological conservation), PPS25 
(flood risk), planning conditions and the s106 agreement (Cushman and Wakefield 
2009b, Lyon 2009a). 
To try to resolve any issues before the inquiry, regular meetings took place between the 
EA, the applicants and the council (Chelmsford Borough Council and Cushman and 
Wakefield 2009, EA Officer D 2012, interview). These parties also set out Statements 
of Common Ground. The EA and the council agreed that part of the site was within 
functional floodplain, but the applicants sustained their argument that it was not (Flood 
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Risk Consultant for Chelmsford Borough Council 2009). However, the council 
indicated that they supported the development plans and disagreed with the EA’s 
objection to the sequential and exception tests and the adequacy of the FRA, but agreed 
on finished floor levels, access and egress, river flows and ecology. In addition, no 
agreement was reached on flood storage issues and whether the FRA was adequate and 
appropriate (ECCC et al. 2009, Scott Wilson 2009). The residents disagreed with the 
cricket club and the council on the density and appropriateness of the proposal, design, 
effects on residential amenities and traffic, appropriateness of the s106 scheme and 
viability of the scheme (Lyon 2009b). There were no other planning issues between the 
parties (Cushman and Wakefield 2009a). 
The applicants’ architect, planning officers and local residents – the last of which were 
concerned with issues of overlooking – also held regular meetings. As a result, the 
applicants adapted their plans by reducing one of the blocks close to existing properties 
from three storeys to two storeys. The position was also changed by one metre and the 
number of units was reduced from eight to five, making the total number of residential 
units on the whole development 424 (MCD 2008, Chelmsford Borough Council 2009e, 
2009f). The inquiry that took place was based on these revised plans. 
A few months before the inquiry, in February 2009, severe flood warnings were issued 
for the centre of Chelmsford and the rivers Chelmer and Can overflowed (Environment 
Agency 2009b). The apartments that were built on the former bowling greens suffered a 
power cut because of rising water, which also meant that there was no water supply. 
The area where the new development was planned partially flooded as well (Figure 29). 
This event was estimated by the EA as being a 1-in-12-years event (Scott Wilson 2009). 
During the inquiry, the EA reiterated their main concerns. They claimed the sequential 
test performed for the AAP was not valid anymore, as it was based on 100 dwellings as 
opposed to over 400. The EA argued that they could not have reasonably expected the 
development to grow by over 300 dwellings, which meant their previous approval of the 
sequential testing for the site in the AAP was retracted. The sequential test should be 
failed, whilst, in accordance with PPS25, the exception test could not be applied to 
residential development in flood zone 3b. Moreover, the EA accepted that the council 
was entitled to take other material considerations into account to decide on 
development, but did not accept they could be used to override PPS25. Furthermore, the 
EA believed the FRA was inadequate and difficult to understand: 
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Its piecemeal presentation has impacted on the ability of the EA and 
others to interpret it, which affects its intelligibility. Different 
assumptions have been made at different times and for different purposes 
and it has not always been possible to tell exactly what has been taken 
into account because of the way in which the data has been presented. In 
particular, criticism is levelled at the flood storage compensation 
proposals and the information relating to flood storage calculations. 
(Lyon 2009b: 10) 
 
Figure 29: Flooding on cricket ground development site 
Source: Local Residents’ Group 2009c, 2009d 
According to the EA, the development also did not provide adequate flood storage and 
increased flood risk at a number of existing residential properties. In addition, the FRA 
had adopted the EA’s flood levels and flows without adopting the most up-to-date 
LiDAR ground level data, resulting in a slightly raised ground level that was incorrect 
(Environment Agency 2008). Lastly, the EA believed the development would increase 
flood risk. The car park would be expected to flood at a 1-in-12-years event, which 
might cause dangerous situations if people tried to rescue their cars: 
All allocated car park areas for the residents’ vehicles, including the multi 
storey car park, will become ‘unsafe’ for all events from the 1 in 50 year 
to the 1 in 100 year fluvial events inclusive of climate change. They will 
be highly hazardous areas in flood risk terms for residents and operatives 
as they will be covered by deep depths of floodwater (up to 2m) and have 
floating vehicles. 
(Environment Agency 2009b: 4) 
Residents were also present at the inquiry to present their case under Rule 6 of the 
Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000. A Local 
Residents’ Group (LRG) was formed ‘by a group of local residents who live in a range 
of residential properties close to the Cricket Club and who will be directly affected by 
the proposed development’ (Local Residents’ Group 2009f). The LRG was a well-
organised group: one of the residents had a developing and planning background, whilst 
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a barrister also helped them for part of the inquiry (LRG A 2012, interview; LRG B 
2012, interview). The residents mainly wanted to raise the issues of overlooking and 
noise, but also used the flood risk issue to strengthen their objection (Essex Chronicle 
2009, Local Residents’ Group 2009a, 2009g). 
For flood risk evidence, the residents mostly relied on the EA, as they lacked the 
expertise. They did relay personal experience with flooding to highlight the problems a 
new development would cause. One of the residents who lived in the apartments on the 
former bowling greens gave a statement on how the recent flooding had affected the 
inhabitants of the flats. They stated they were not given enough notice in order to 
prepare for a flood: 
Amongst the disruption there was also confusion. The night before the 
flooding we went outside in the rain to look at our river and it was rising. 
We looked at the Environment Agency website and it said ‘flood watch’. 
That’s reassuring, the lowest level of alert. I’m told it changed at 3am, but 
I was asleep. I got up at 6am – the river had burst its banks. 
 (Local Residents’ Group 2009f: 4) 
When contacting the council to request sandbags, they heard there were none left. The 
floodwaters caused the power supply to fail and they were left without power and water 
for several days. Elderly residents could not leave their apartments as the lifts were out 
of order and were brought bottled water by neighbours instead (Local Residents’ Group 
2009f). The residents had to pay to reinstate the electricity. This experience caused the 
LRG to conclude: 
Future flooding depends on many things. The emergency services and the 
council were tested in February and were unable to cope with the existing 
population. Building large blocks of flats in an already densely populated 
area will make flooding more severe and more frequent. This makes 
awful become appalling, horrific and frankly inexcusable. 
(Local Residents’ Group 2009f: 4) 
At the inquiry the LRG also stated they were unhappy with the planning process. They 
felt that the scheme was rushed into the planning committee and some issues were 
unresolved when it was presented to the councillors. Furthermore, they felt that 
residents and a councillor opposing the scheme were not granted enough time to present 
their views. To overcome this, the residents had prepared one long statement which was 
divided between residents, with every person using their speaking time to deliver their 
allocated part of the same speech (LRG A 2012, interview; LRG B 2012, interview). 
Furthermore, one of the residents reported hearing a conversation between a councillor 
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and a planning officer, with the councillor mentioning that it had already been decided 
that the development would go ahead (Local Residents’ Group 2009h). They felt that 
planning officers had not been allowed to delay the referral to the committee or to be 
objective when assessing the development’s compliance with local policy (Local 
Residents’ Group 2009f). The LRG’s conclusion was that the council’s desire to retain 
the cricket club in the centre of the town had clouded judgement, whilst the cricket club 
was overdeveloping the site: 
Greed has motivated the Cricket Ground to wish to build so many homes 
on this site. The number of homes proposed should be reduced or 
removed from the scheme altogether, to take account of the impact of the 
risk of flooding on people’s lives. 
(Local Residents’ Group 2009b: 1) 
When CBC gave their statement, they claimed that the sequential test in the AAP had 
concluded that development would not normally be permitted in flood zone 3b. The 
word ‘normally’ recognised the fact that there may be special circumstances under 
which development would be allowed. The special circumstances were that the 
redevelopment would contribute to ‘an urban renaissance for Chelmsford’ (Lyon 2009b: 
17). The council also believed that when an estimated capacity for a site is given, it is 
common for sites to gain permission for substantially more development. Therefore, 
they supported the development. 
The cricket club also believed that the AAP allowed development in flood zone 3b in 
special circumstances. They claimed that without this development the cricket club 
would: ‘wither on the vine; but with this development, there would be an increase of 
over 50% in expenditure in the local economy and an increase in jobs of nearly 50%’ 
(Lyon 2009b: 34). If they were only allowed to build outside flood zone 3b, they could 
only develop 127 units, which would not produce sufficient value. Nevertheless, the 
cricket club and consultants stated that the site did not in fact contain any functional 
floodplain. They argued that a functional floodplain in PPS25 comprised land where 
water had to flow or be stored in times of flood. In their case, the floodplain was only a 
localised low spot where the water had no flow and that could easily be relocated (Flood 
Risk Consultant for Chelmsford Borough Council 2009, Lyon 2009b, Consultant B 
2012, interview). 
The club then went into very detailed discussions on the sequential test and the flood 
risk calculations; for instance, how they felt they had used more accurate data than 
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LiDAR. They also claimed that even though the site had flooded a few months before, 
the flood water was shallow and slow flowing and would be manageable in the new 
development within the car parks (Scott Wilson 2009). 
After the parties made their case, the inspector concluded that it was not realistic to 
accept that an indicative capacity of 100 dwellings could include the figure of 424. This 
indicative capacity was the reason that the EA had originally withdrawn its objection to 
the AAP. Therefore, the inspector concluded that the application was in conflict with 
the town centre AAP in regard to the quantum of the residential element. The site also 
failed the sequential test and was therefore in conflict with the AAP in regard to its 
location within flood zone 3b. 
Furthermore, the inspector found that the site was partly within flood zone 3b, or 
functional floodplain, because it had a 1-in-20-years probability of flooding. With 
regard to the FRA, the inspector concluded that it was: 
presented in a form that required close examination and interpretation, 
including making a judgement on volumes from the areas shown on plan. 
Whilst the information is provided in a form that is not always easy to 
command, I do believe that sufficient information is present to render 
FRA an acceptable Flood Risk Assessment. 
(Lyon 2009b: 47) 
The levels given by the FRA differed only slightly from the EA and had a minor effect 
on potential impacts, which were compensated by the additional flood storage. 
Additionally, the development did not materially affect the flood risk to existing 
properties. Therefore, the inspector believed the FRA was sufficient and the 
development took flood risk into account sufficiently. Lastly, the inspector disagreed 
with the EA that flood risk outweighed other interests: 
My understanding of the EA case as it is put is that PPS25 considerations 
‘trump’ any other considerations; if anything fails the tests in PPS25, 
there is nothing that could outweigh that failure. This must be wrong, as 
PPS25 is just one strand of Government policy, it is one of the material 
considerations that may form part of a planning judgment. 
(Lyon 2009b: 48) 
The inspector therefore argued that the development was crucial to the economic and 
social state of the cricket club and Chelmsford, which outweighed flood risk 
considerations: 
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Stagnation of the club would not only harm the club but the loss of its 
potential is likely to harm the vitality of the town centre … Full 
regeneration of the club and associated benefits would require the project 
as applied for, or something very close to it. 
(Lyon 2009b: 56) 
The inspector did find the harm to the amenity of existing residents unacceptable. The 
distances between new and old buildings were too small, causing overlooking from the 
new buildings and from lorries and coaches on the new access road. The inspector 
considered that the proposal had a significantly harmful effect on the living conditions 
of residents at the entrance of the site by way of loss of privacy, overlooking and noise 
and disturbance contrary. 
In conclusion, the inspector found that the benefits of the scheme outweighed the 
inconsistency with PPS25 and believed flood risk was taken sufficiently into account 
into the development. However, he did think the existing scheme would harm the 
amenity of residents and he therefore recommended refusal. 
6.2.9 Decision on the cricket ground development after the public inquiry 
After the public inquiry, the application was referred to the SoS. However, his decision 
was delayed because the government was going through political change and a new SoS 
was appointed. In addition, the applicants submitted an amended scheme for the SoS to 
consider and letters were sent to all Rule 6 parties requesting comments. 
Correspondence followed between the applicants, the planning consultants, the 
residents, CBC and the SoS. As a result of these discussions, eight houses and five 
apartments were removed at the entrance of the site (Chelmsford Borough Council 
2009b) and the SoS considered the application on this amended scheme. 
The SoS agreed that the site was, in part, in flood zone 3b and, therefore, the proposal 
conflicted with PPS25. The SoS placed significant weight on PPS25 and considered that 
exceptions to policies on floodplain development would rarely be justified. However, 
the SoS believed that the application took flood risk and the consequences of flooding 
into account and the development was adequately defended against flooding. 
Additionally, the development would bring benefits that outweighed the risk from 
flooding. 
The SoS concluded that the scheme that was considered at the inquiry would have a 
significantly harmful effect on the living conditions of the residents at the entrance of 
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the site, but as the amended scheme had removed dwellings and realigned the access 
road further away from their homes, any remaining harm to the amenity of residents 
would not be significant enough to refuse planning permission. Therefore, the SoS 
granted permission for the development that included a total of 413 dwellings, with 302 
units on the riverside (Pitt 2010). 
In January 2011 and May 2012, Chelmsford was again flooded, affecting open spaces, 
roads and gardens. In the meantime, work was progressing on the flood alleviation 
scheme. As described in the water cycle study for Chelmsford (Halcrow Group 2010) 
new research showed that flood storage would provide protection to the town centre 
with a 1-in-75-years standard. The preferred option to achieve this was to build flood 
storage near Margaretting on the river Wid (Environment Agency 2012a). To increase 
the standard of protection, further works were planned for the future, which might 
include defences within the town centre, defences north of the town, or a combination 
of both on the river Chelmer (Halcrow Group 2011). 
In 2013, work on the cricket ground development started. In January, an agreement was 
signed between the council, the cricket club and the developers to start the first phase: 
the first tower block on the riverside. So far49, 90% of these flats have been sold, which 
has generated the funds for the rest of the project, which includes a new media centre, 
pavilion and improved conferencing facilities (Brentwood Gazette 2013, ECCC 2013). 
The new cricket facilities are expected to be built in 2015 (Cricket Club Manager 2012, 
interview). 
6.3 Summary 
The idea to redevelop Chelmsford’s cricket ground started when the cricket club wanted 
to renovate their facilities. From around 2003, the cricket club started meeting with 
CBC to discuss options for redeveloping the cricket ground. They indicated that they 
needed funds to redevelop, generated from additional development around the cricket 
site. The council signalled that they wanted the grounds to remain in the town centre, as 
they thought the cricket club was vital to Chelmsford. Therefore, they supported 
development by working towards an approved planning application and by including a 
council car park into the plans. However, because the cricket ground was adjacent to the 
                                                
49 As of March 2013. 
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river Can and partially within the functional floodplain, development was at risk of 
flooding. 
The redevelopment was first included in a planning brief and later became part of an 
AAP. At the time, the estimated number of residential dwellings was 100. The EA was 
consulted on these plans and they required sequential and exception tests to be 
undertaken to address flood risk issues. As the 100 dwellings would not be located 
within the functional floodplain, they did not object to the tests. 
The cricket club selected a development partner for the site. The agreement was that the 
cricket club would fund part of the development, but would in turn receive part of the 
proceeds from the sale of the residential dwellings (ECCC 2013). When the cricket club 
and developers applied for planning permission, the number of residential dwellings had 
increased to over 400, with a large proportion of these planned to be within the 
functional floodplain. Even though the planning committee recommended the 
application for approval, the EA objected to the principle of building residential 
accommodation within functional floodplain, based on PPS25. 
Due to the Flooding Direction, the application was referred to the SoS, who called in the 
application and held a public inquiry. In this inquiry, flood risk was discussed, but also 
issues of the development affecting the amenity of residents. Ultimately, the inspector 
stated that the benefits of development outweighed the flood risks, which he believed 
were mitigated sufficiently. However, he found that the development caused harm to the 
amenity of existing residents and refused the application on these grounds. When the 
application was referred back to the SoS, the applicants submitted revised plans, which 
decreased the effects on amenity. The SoS therefore permitted the development, arguing 
that the social and economic advantages were more important than the principle of 
building within functional floodplain. 
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Chapter 7 Network governance in local planning processes 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the findings from the cases are discussed and in particular, the 
functioning of the governance networks is examined. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 apply the 
theoretical framework (see Figure 30) to the findings of both case studies. 
 
Figure 30: Functioning of governance networks 
After this, section 7.4 discusses the key factors that influence FRM. Following this, 
section 7.5 relates the findings to the wider debate on governance. Lastly, conclusions 
are drawn. 
7.2 Newcastle Great Park 
This section discusses the governance network for FRM in Newcastle Great Park. The 
following elements are included: how the governance network was formed and around 
what policy problem the network was formed, the actors that were present in the 
governance network, their characteristics, their interactions with each other and the 
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interactions between the network and the wider context. The functioning of the 
governance network is visualised in Figure 31 on page 177. 
7.2.1 Formation of the governance network 
The governance network of FRM in NGP was formed voluntarily and informally in the 
1980s, when there was no legal or policy requirement to do so. The governance network 
was established firstly between planning officers and the EA to resolve flood risk and 
drainage issues in the early stages of planning for NGP. In this early stage, the idea to 
use SuDS as a type of FRM was also formed. Later, other actors became involved, such 
as the developers and the WaSC. Some of the involvement was mandated, such as the 
consultation of the airport, but other interactions were voluntary. For instance, the 
community was more involved than regulations prescribed. 
7.2.2 The policy problem 
The network was formed around the problem of flood risk. NGP had a fluvial flood risk 
from the rivers Ouseburn and Letch and a pluvial flood risk from surface water. 
Moreover, NGP could exacerbate flood risk in surrounding areas. The policy problem 
was understood in part when the network was formed, due to past experiences with 
flooding of the Ouseburn and the regular occurrence of surface water flooding in parts 
of NGP. The EA had also held surveys of flood risk along the river, which helped the 
identification of the policy problem and the extent of the flood risk. 
Knowledge about the exact problem developed over the years as more research was 
conducted and flood events took place, which provided more information. As a result, 
the problem definition also continued to develop. For instance, in recent years actors 
have gained understanding of the potential of NGP to aggravate pluvial flood risk in 
Kingston Park. This is a new problem that requires the actors to develop new 
knowledge and new solutions. 
Therefore, the policy problem has been influenced by flood events in combination with 
knowledge developed by the EA. Developing knowledge of the policy problem has in 
turn influenced the policy outcome, because actors take decisions based on their 
understanding of the problem. However, the complexity and uncertainty of the problem 
have also complicated decision making, as changing flood risk meant that solutions had 
  165 
to be adapted. In addition, there are differences between some of the actors’ perceptions 
of the flood problem, which will be explained in the next section. 
7.2.3 Actors, characteristics and interactions 
The actors present in the governance networks were in the first instance the planning 
officers and the EA, joined later by the developers, the WaSC, residents and councillors, 
the CAA and airport and other organisations that were consulted as part of the planning 
process. In this section, these actors and their characteristics and interactions are 
described. 
Newcastle City Council, planning officers and engineers: The planning officers’ interest 
was to implement planning policy, such as the UDP, which focused on achieving 
economic growth, stabilising population numbers and working towards the long-term 
goal of sustainability without compromising on economic vitality (Newcastle City 
Council 1998c). To achieve these aims, NGP was planned as an upper-market, 
sustainable development in green belt land, because it was marketed with the wealthier 
population in mind, but also to mitigate the use of green belt land. The WaSC officer 
stated that the emphasis on sustainability was also done to mitigate objections from 
residents: 
The Great Park met a lot of public objection. There was a lot of resistance 
to what was seen as development of the green belt. It was the Great Park 
consortium and the city council who had a major task in terms of making 
a green picture, to almost saying: ‘look this is sustainable development’ 
… Therefore, they talked about the concept of SuDS and lots of green 
space and that it would not be like looking at a housing site. 
(WaSC Officer 2012, interview) 
The use of SuDS therefore fitted well within the concept of NGP. However, when the 
idea of using SuDS was conceived, there was a lack of legislation, policy and guidance. 
As SuDS were not commonly used, it was the influence of a single planning officer that 
was crucial. This planning officer decided to take an idea from an EA officer forward, 
as it fitted within his perception of NGP. The EA officer stated that the influence of the 
planning officer was crucial: ‘he was very green in his approach, so if it had been a 
different planner it might have been completely different’ (EA Officer B 2012, 
interview). One developer also recognised the importance of the planning officer in the 
development of SuDS. He explained that the planning officer: 
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was a bit of a ‘greeny’ at the end of the day, who was required to 
undertake a project that perhaps cut through some of his morals. We are 
where we are and [the planning officer] was actually instrumental in it. 
(Developer A 2012, interview) 
Therefore, the planning officer preferred a solution to flood risk that was sustainable 
and he used his agency to drive the idea forward, even though he did not have much 
support initially: 
My boss, the chief planning officer, took an interest to a certain extent, 
because he had to. However, within the council there was no one 
particularly driving this, until quite a lot later down the road when 
flooding became more of a public issue, because there were actual floods. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
To achieve their goals, the council used their resources that enabled them to designate 
land and give permission for development. They used this resource to exercise power 
over the developer, with the aim to include SuDS in the development and receive 
money to fund them. However, knowledge about flood risk was limited. In the past, the 
council had acted as an agent for the water board, but when that changed, the drainage 
experts moved out of the council: 
There might be one or two people doing highway stuff, but there was no 
one to go to ask for help and advice. Our engineers at that point were not 
that interested, so when the design and the calculations [on the SuDS] 
came, we realised we did not have anyone who could advise us. 
Therefore, we took on external consultants to help us judge each 
submission on each of these ponds in terms of capacity. 
 (Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
The council hired consultants to overcome the lack of knowledge, but the planning 
officer felt that they did not stay on long enough. He claimed that if there had been 
more expertise, the design and the location of the SuDS could have been influenced 
further. In addition, instead of just storing water, they could have also improved water 
quality, but the consultants were only able to look at the capacity of the ponds (Planning 
Officer B 2012, interview). Even when in 2005 a drainage engineer, who also worked 
on the SuDS in NGP, returned to the council, the council relied heavily on the EA: 
Who has got the skills, the expertise and the technical stuff about flood 
risk? It is the people at the Environment Agency … There is no point in 
us duplicating that; we just fall back on their expertise. 
(Planning Officer A 2012, interview) 
The financial resources for FRM were limited. No public funding was used to develop 
NGP; instead the developers purchased the land and financed the build. NCC also 
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needed to secure money though the s106 agreement to fund their work on the SuDS. A 
planning officer noted that the council perhaps did not secure enough money, not only 
due to the planning chief being eager to sign an agreement with the developers and go 
ahead with the development, but also because of a lack in knowledge on maintenance 
costs: 
The planning boss at that time wanted to be seen doing and agreeing 
things. Most of the planning staff thought he had rushed this agreement 
through, so the money to cover open space and maintenance of these 
areas was not enough … That was the lesson: make sure that you look at 
not just the design, but also the management maintenance implications of 
taking these things [SuDS] on … We did quite a bit of calculations on the 
possible management and maintenance but I think some more expert 
input at that point would have been useful. Almost inevitably, we would 
probably have put on a more realistic cost and made sure we had secured 
that. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
At the same time, the developer claimed that the council was asking for too much 
money for the management, which was more than the developers had spent during the 
eight years they had maintained the SuDS. As the developer said: 
The future maintenance of them [the SuDS] and who takes responsibility 
is more complicated than the actual mechanics of SuDS … The council 
does not want to take liability and I do not blame them, they have no 
money. 
(Developer A 2012, interview). 
Environment Agency, North East office: From the beginning of the NGP project until 
recently, two EA officers have usually been involved in the governance network. 
According to the council engineer, because the same people have been involved for a 
long time, this built commitment, understanding and knowledge amongst actors, which 
also meant that everyone remained aware of any issues (Council Engineer 2012, 
interview). This stable involvement therefore helped to promote a good working 
relationship. 
The EA’s interests are derived from the Environment Act 1995: they exercise a general 
supervision over all matters relating to flood defence and aim to achieve sustainable 
development. In this governance network, they therefore wanted, above all, to manage 
flood risk and preferably in a sustainable manner. However, in the early stages of 
planning for NGP, there was no legislation, policy or guidance on using SuDS. The EA 
officer had learned about the existence and use of SuDS through a conference abroad 
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and believed NGP would be a suitable development to implement SuDS. As one 
planning officer said: ‘By chance the person we talked to in the NRA and the EA was 
quite progressive and keen to push sustainable drainage’ (Planning Officer B 2012, 
interview). 
The EA’s perceptions of flood risk were mainly based on the research they conducted or 
commissioned. However, their knowledge of SuDS was limited, as they had not been 
applied often in the UK and therefore, they used examples from other countries. As 
knowledge on FRM developed, some adjustments had to be made to the flood risk 
measures. For instance, land in Cell G was raised and the SuDS were linked with the 
Ouseburn to provide wider flood risk benefits. 
In this governance network, the EA did not have the resource of the Flooding Direction, 
as this legislation only came into force in 2007. One EA officer also found that there 
were no guidelines or legislation they could use to promote the use of SuDS. Therefore, 
they used persuasion (EA Officer B 2012, interview). After the decision was made 
between actors to use sustainable drainage, it became embedded within binding 
agreements with the council, developers and the EA. The EA also did not have the 
financial or regulatory resources to support the maintenance of these SuDS, which 
meant this issue had to be resolved between the developers and the council. 
Consortium of private developers: The consortium was composed of multiple private 
developers. The developers’ interest was to produce a profit from purchasing land and 
selling houses; therefore, they were interested in all issues affecting this profit. 
However, to be able to develop, they had to obtain planning permission. Therefore, the 
management of flood risk was important to them in order to gain planning permission 
and increase the attractiveness of the development. According to an EA officer: 
The developers took a little bit of persuasion, but I think they were 
generally happy if they knew that these features [SuDS] were going to be 
taken off their hands. 
(EA Officer B 2012, interview) 
The developers agreed to use SuDS, because they were planned in areas that were not 
designated for housing, so they would not lose any developable land and profits: 
We worked with the council to produce a development brief and the 
development brief said: ‘this is the drainage and we want to bring SuDS 
into it’. It was not an absolute requirement, but I think we bought into it. 
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How could you not buy into SuDS, when you are building on half of the 
site and the other half is open space for a variety of uses? 
(Developer A 2012, interview) 
Furthermore, SuDS were financially attractive. A development the size of NGP would 
need an extensive network of underground pipes and tanks. SuDS were cheaper to 
construct, they provided an attractive landscape for the development and houses 
overlooking water increased in value. However, the developers agreed only to use end-
of-pipe storage ponds and did not accept more dispersed or property-based source 
control, as this would be more costly and would need to be located in development land. 
The developers held the financial resources to fund the SuDS, which meant they could 
exercise power over NCC. This for instance resulted in the use of SuDS that were less 
sustainable than imagined by the planning officer and the EA officer in the early stages 
of the development. The developers’ knowledge of flood risk was derived from research 
conducted by the EA and by their own organisation and consultants. There was no 
disagreement between the council, the EA and the developers on the levels of flood risk 
and how they should be mitigated. 
Water and Sewerage Company: Usually one particular officer represented the WaSC, 
who became involved in 1999/2000; therefore, actor presence was quite stable. The 
WaSC’s responsibilities were set out in legislation, in particular in the Water Industry 
Act 1991, which required them to provide and improve the sewer system to drain an 
area effectively. They were responsible for underground systems, such as pipes and 
tanks, but not for water that was stored on the surface. The WaSC officer indicated that 
the consortium had asked them if they would adopt the SuDS, but they were unable to. 
Their only responsibility was for the pipes leading to the SuDS, which had to remain in 
good working order. Therefore, a legal agreement was created between NCC and the 
WaSC to guarantee right of outfall, performance and long-term management of those 
areas where underground pipes connected to ponds (Newcastle Great Park Advisory 
Committee 2004a). 
The perceptions of the WaSC were derived from their own research on drainage and 
sewer systems. Their definition of the policy problem focused on the interaction 
between drainage and the sewerage systems and did not extend to SuDS. However, they 
did consider SuDS as a favourable solution, because it relieved the sewerage system. 
They were therefore in favour of SuDS, but were unable to contribute to their 
development. Moreover, the WaSC officer would have liked to have seen more source 
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control in NGP, but Ofwat limited how much they could invest. In addition, customers 
were not interested in individually investing in, for instance, rainwater harvesting 
systems, because the returns were small for them (WaSC Officer 2012, interview). 
Civil Aviation Authority and airport: Local planning authorities were required to 
consult the CAA before granting an application within a 13-kilometre radius of an 
aerodrome. The SuDS, therefore, needed the formal approval of the CAA (Newcastle 
Great Park Sub-Committee 2001d). From 2003 onwards, the airports took over the role 
of statutory consultee as part of the Town and Country (Safeguarded Aerodromes, 
Technical Sites and Military Explosives Storage Areas) Direction 2002. The difference 
between the CAA and the airport is that the CAA is a non-departmental public body and 
the airport is a private company. However, their duties concerning aerodrome safety are 
similar. Bodies of open water attract large birds, which create a bird strike hazard. As a 
result, the CAA and the airport were against any large areas of open water within the 
SuDS, but were satisfied that the reed beds prevented this. There was also an agreement 
that a warden at NGP would look out for any large birds on the development (Airport 
Officer 2012, pers. comm.). The airport had an added interest in that they welcomed the 
development as it might bring them more revenue (Newcastle City Council 1999c). 
Ecology interest group: In a formal consultation on the DSSS for Cell I, an interest 
group involved in a project on otters expressed a concern on the SuDS. They felt there 
was not enough flood storage and that the watercourse and SuDS had limited wildlife 
value. However, the adaptations for improving the SuDS for wildlife benefits conflicted 
with the requirements to discourage birds of the CAA and airport (Newcastle Great Park 
Sub-Committee 2001e). Therefore, the council was limited in addressing their concerns. 
Highways Agency: The Highways Agency played a small role in FRM issues in NGP. 
Their interest was to control runoff from the A1 and there was a discussion to connect 
runoff to one of the SuDS ponds if the A1 was widened. However, there was very little 
interaction with the Highways Agency as the widening programme was delayed (EA 
Officer A 2012, pers. comm.). 
Councillors: Councillors from the areas surrounding NGP were involved through 
consultation and committees; for instance, the NGP Advisory Committee, where 
councillors could discuss issues directly with council officers, the EA and developers. 
At first, some councillors were opposed to the development and did not wish to become 
involved in planning for NGP. When they found it was going ahead, they became 
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involved in order to influence the details. The councillors’ interest was also to solve any 
flood risk issues for the residents in their area. 
The councillors interviewed had similar perceptions and preferences on FRM to the 
planning officers and the EA. They understood that flooding in their areas was not 
caused by NGP and they interacted with residents to inform them of this (Councillor A 
2012, interview, Councillor B 2012, interview, Councillor C 2012, interview). 
Residents outside NGP: Residents living near NGP were involved in the planning 
process through formal consultation procedures, but the council also developed informal 
consultation; for instance, exhibitions on the revised master plan that took place before 
formal procedures commenced (Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001c). In 
addition, panels were created to give community representatives from the wards 
surrounding the new development the opportunity to shape the development at an early 
stage (Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001a, 2001b). One of these panels 
focused on drainage issues. The panels only existed for a few years, because they were 
being organised by a coordinator whose post was time-limited due to funding 
(Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee 2006b). However, the council also 
acknowledged there were limits to public consultation, as it was the developers’ 
prerogative to devise plans for their land (Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001a). 
The residents’ interests were to protect and enhance their wellbeing and reduce or 
prevent potential flood risks to their own property; therefore, there was much at stake 
for them. However, as they were not directly involved in interaction between the 
decision makers, they did not share the same information sources. Instead, they received 
information through public meetings. They did have personal experience of flood 
events, and some members of the public had had their streets, gardens, garages or 
properties flooded. Therefore, their perceptions were, for an important part, based on 
personal experience and some had a predisposition to be suspicious of the council, 
developers and the EA and the research conducted. 
The perceptions of the residents caused some conflict between them and the council, 
developers and the EA. As a result, these actors attempted network management aimed 
at changing the residents’ perceptions. They did this by holding ‘meeting after meeting, 
after meeting’ (Councillor A 2012, interview). They shared information with residents 
and increased transparency in the way flood risk was managed. There were mixed 
feelings amongst the other actors whether this successfully changed perceptions. The 
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NGP Advisory Committee felt that it had increased public confidence in the SuDS 
(Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee 2001f, Newcastle Great Park Advisory 
Committee 2006a). One councillor also found that the meetings were successful and 
that they had created understanding of the real cause of flooding (Councillor A 2012, 
interview). Another councillor argued that: 
basically people want two things: they want confidence there is a strategy 
or plan and clear accountability. Secondly, they want decent 
communications. 
(Councillor C 2012, interview). 
 
By holding regular meetings with residents, the councillor felt that both points were 
addressed and people now understood the real flood risks in their area and the causes of 
this. However, one planning officer stated that: 
As early as 2000 there was a lot of suspicion growing and we had 
meetings and explained it, but I am not sure most people accepted what 
we said. It is not easy; at the end of the day a lot of it has to do with 
technical work on figures. Obviously you can go and explain exactly how 
you go through working the figures even if you do not go through the 
technicalities, but if someone is sitting there not willing to believe what 
you will say, it becomes quite difficult. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
In short, residents were only part of the governance network in a very limited way. 
Through the panel of residents they were able to have the most influence on decision 
making, but this was only short lived and it is unclear whether this had any influence on 
FRM. Residents also had limited influence through other consultation exercises. They 
lacked resources and therefore the power to influence FRM. 
Residents within NGP: Future residents of developments are not usually involved in the 
planning process, because at that time they are unknown. As NGP was built in phases, 
some residents were involved in the implementation stage. Their interest was to obtain a 
high-quality living environment. However, some residents voiced concerns over the 
SuDS, especially when the ponds overflowed (Newcastle Great Park Advisory 
Committee 2004c). They were concerned the ponds were not functioning sufficiently. In 
addition, they felt that they had not been informed about the operation of the SuDS, 
even though they considered them to be attractive features (LRA Chair 2012, 
interview). Residents also felt that the process of adoption and maintenance of the SuDS 
was unclear and they were unaware of who held responsibility. Some were under the 
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impression that the council did not adopt the ponds. Therefore, there was much 
confusion regarding accountability for the SuDS (LRA Chair 2012, interview). 
Residents have also experienced flooding from the Ouseburn to the rear of houses and 
there were drainage issues in gardens. In addition, drains in roads were blocked 
frequently due to the building activity in the area. Furthermore, they had concerns over 
the management fee that they pay and the unsuccessful attempts to communicate with 
the management company. They do not have much trust in the developers or the 
management company to resolve issues quickly (LRA Chair 2012, interview). 
7.2.4 Wider context 
The wider context entails structures and agents that influenced the governance network, 
such as formal and informal institutions and flood events. The most relevant influences 
are now described. 
Formal institutions: During the early stages of NGP, the influence of the formal setting 
was characterised by the lack of regulations and guidance on FRM and sustainable 
drainage and the absence of standards for flood protection. On the one hand, this meant 
that there were issues with adoption and maintenance: 
As soon as PPG25 started talking about the use of SuDS, they needed to 
be clear who was going to own and maintain, because it has just been too 
easy for everybody to say: ‘It is definitely not us’. As a private water and 
sewerage company we are certainly not going to take responsibility for 
something that our industry regulator Ofwat does not fund or support. 
From the city council’s perspective, they are looking at grounds 
maintenance costs, which is a long-term liability. The developer is saying: 
‘I want to build houses and move on to the next site; I do not want long-
term surface water responsibilities’. What is missing is that X will adopt 
them and this is how they will get their funding to do that. 
(WaSC Officer 2012, interview) 
On the other hand, one EA officer claimed that the lack in legislation actually helped 
them to develop the sustainable drainage: 
Because there were no strict criteria about how you would do things, it 
probably gave us a bit of a freer hand to try something. Sometimes if you 
are constrained by what the legislation says, it probably stops you doing 
some things you may do otherwise. 
(EA Officer B 2012, interview) 
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Informal institutions: The informal institutional setting is shaped by the regular 
interaction between actors. In the case of NGP, this was the council, the EA, the WaSC 
and the developers. The personnel who have worked on the project mostly stayed the 
same, which enabled a close working relationship, with decisions often taken 
informally: 
We were starting to build good working relationships with the 
Environment Agency and water company and those relationships have 
continued to develop. We know and trust each other and we are all doing 
the best we can to work together to get the outcomes that people expect 
from us. It is not always possible, because there are limits and points 
where their responsibilities finish. However, we are working together and 
we have to get to the point where we do trust the information that we are 
being given, otherwise we could spend all our lives checking each other 
and nothing would happen. 
 (Council Engineer 2012, interview) 
However, one of the EA officers found that the council should have carried out more 
compliance checks to ensure the SuDS were built according to the conditions: 
‘Newcastle City Council are quite quick to discharge conditions without having the 
evidence and I find that a little bit unsettling’ (EA Officer A 2012, interview). 
The council and the developers had a fairly good relationship with each other: 
I think it is fair to say that there is a pretty good working relationship 
between the various parties involved, which allows that informal meeting 
and governance to happen rather than having to go through some formal 
decision-making structure every time. They [the developers] try to fix 
things as quickly as possible through informal communication. 
Sometimes there may be need for some formal action to be taken, 
whether that is serving notice or because it [SuDS] is not doing 
something it ought to be doing, but it is very rare that that happens. 
Usually things get sorted out on an informal basis. 
(Planning Officer A 2012, interview) 
You are all officers and we are sort of friends as well, because I do not 
get away with murder. They understand the commercial realities of life 
and I understand what controls have to be put in place. 
 (Developer A 2012, interview) 
However, the developer does explain that ‘we have had episodes on the Great Park 
where we have not trusted one another, but I think that is years ago’ (Developer A 2012, 
interview), which most likely refers to a breakdown in communications between 
developers and the council in 2003 due to changes in the ownership and direction of the 
consortium. The council wished to revise the master plan, whilst the developers wished 
to develop each cell incrementally on the basis of the old master plan. The consortium 
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at that time had also stopped pre-application discussions with planning officers 
(Gosforth and North Newcastle Area Committee 2003). The relationship improved 
when the council did not register a planning application submitted by the consortium 
and communication between parties started again. 
One planning officer stated that even when there were disagreements between the 
council and developers, there was always consensus about the principle of using SuDS: 
There were never any arguments about the broad principle; there were 
issues around some of the details and the capacity and the design of the 
outfalls and that sort of thing later on. That was not an issue of principle, 
that was an issue of detail. The solution we went for suited them … But 
when it got down to the details for these ponds and when we requested 
calculations and figures, it usually took quite a long time … It was 
sometimes not very easy to get the information you needed and then quite 
often they would do what they wanted to do anyway and then hope that it 
would be approved. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
In addition, the council and the developer seemed to point the finger at each other to 
explain the delays in adoption. One planning officer claimed the developers ‘dragged 
their feet a lot’ (Planning Officer B 2012, interview), whilst the developers blamed the 
council for not being willing to adopting a SuDS pond, even though everything went by 
the book (Developer A 2012, interview). 
Furthermore, councillors and residents had their own opinions on the actors within the 
network. A councillor interviewed found that there was a discrepancy between the EA 
being a national, semi-public organisation and the local responsibilities they had: 
I do feel sometimes that the EA is being managed through a completely 
different structure, which is not democratically accountable, because it 
goes through to government in London. 
(Councillor A 2012, interview) 
Some were also concerned about the status of the WaSC: 
[The WaSCs] are privatised and perhaps they should not have been. They 
are very reluctant to spend capital … I think their reluctance to invest 
from about 1995–1996 onwards until 2005–2006 when they absolutely 
had to, was a real issue. If you are saying what would I have done 
differently, I probably would not have privatised. 
 (Councillor C 2012, interview) 
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There is a fundamental contradiction between a natural resource that 
affects everybody and its private ownership, in this case its ownership by 
a corporation thousands of miles away. 
(Green Party Representative 2012, interview) 
In addition, some councillors felt that the management company should not have been 
made private: 
We did try to make the management company to be a cooperative and 
non-profit-making business and they [the developers] all nearly fainted 
and fell around laughing and said: ‘No, it is a money-making venture’. 
That is the problem; it would have been wonderful if the residents were 
paying the money in and then they decided how all of that money was 
spent. It would have been real hands on, ‘this is our park’, as opposed to 
‘we pay and you decide’. 
(Councillor C 2012, interview) 
Lastly, residents within NGP did not seem to have much trust in the developers, as some 
issues were taking a very long time to resolve, and in some gardens water would not 
drain because of building rubble. The chair of the LRA believed the builders had no 
conscience and therefore did not trust some of the flood risk measures that have been 
put in place, such as the piles upon which the houses in Cell G are constructed. 
However, the residents did trust the EA to check the FRM measures carefully, as the EA 
were perceived to maintain tight control (LRA Chair 2012, interview). Residents were 
also looking to the council to manage flood risk, but the council was limited in what 
they were allowed to do. As one councillor said: 
You have to have a clear leadership role for the council in dealing with 
flood management, with powers as well, because otherwise you have this 
tripartite responsibility that in practice depends on the individual making 
it work. The general public does not think much of it, because the general 
public wants a solution to the problem. 
 (Councillor A 2012, interview) 
Other structures: The environment was of importance through the layout of the site 
with large open spaces along the river that could provide space for storage ponds. This 
meant that the development became suitable for SuDS, whilst it also did not interfere 
with the developers’ interest of making profits. 
Changes and events: One crucial event is that an EA officer attended a conference on 
sustainable drainage and then used his agency to introduce this idea to a planning 
officer. SuDS were not well known in England at the time, and without this event SuDS 
might not have become part of NGP. 
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Other important influences were flood events in the area. As flooding had occurred in 
the past, the local authority and the EA were aware it was an issue for NGP. Flood 
events after the outline planning permission meant that knowledge on flood risks and on 
the SuDS developed, leading to some adaptations to the development and SuDS. It also 
instigated more research into flood risks caused by NGP, which confirmed that the 
measures taken in NGP worked sufficiently. However, as one planning officer stated, 
there were still many uncertainties: 
It is not an exact science. I thought it was all going to be fairly exact, but 
then you realise the EA and others have little rules of thumb and cut a few 
corners. 
(Planning Officer B 2012, interview) 
7.2.5 Flood risk management 
Flood risk in NGP is managed through the use of sustainable drainage, being one of the 
first developments in England to use SuDS. This outcome may be explained by the 
actions of two actors who drove forward the use of sustainable drainage. In addition, the 
character of the development itself formed an opportunity for the use of SuDS. 
However, the SuDS were limited to end-of-pipe ponds, because the developers only 
agreed to this type of drainage. 
 
Figure 31: Functioning of governance network of Newcastle Great Park 
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Due to a lack of regulations, policies and guidance, in combination with the 
inexperience of the actors in implementing SuDS and constantly changing flood risk 
knowledge, FRM was adapted over time. Firstly, as the Ouseburn’s floodplain became 
wider, Cell G needed to be adapted. Secondly, some SuDS were adapted after flood 
events. As one council engineer explained: 
People did take the best decisions and provided the best information at the 
time. However, through reviews that have been done along the way, there 
is evidence to show that our estimates were a little bit a way off the mark. 
We are doing our best to manage the situation. As we develop the site and 
our information and data improves, the quality improves. 
(Council Engineer 2012, interview) 
When the actors were asked if they were happy with the SuDS, mixed reactions were 
given. The planning officer and EA officer, who were involved from the start and who 
were important driving forces, indicated that they would have liked more sustainable 
forms of drainage within individual development cells and within properties. However, 
they also indicated that even though this option was raised, the developers discarded it 
as it might have impacted on their profits (Planning Officer B 2012, interview, EA 
Officer B 2012, interview). The WaSC officer agreed and found that the ideas in the 
early stages of planning had not become reality: 
All that vision early on and all of the vision that was in the Environmental 
Statement just has not happened. Within the master plan it talks of all the 
different SuDS that could be used, but they actually have not been used. 
(WaSC Officer 2012, interview) 
The developer had mixed feelings: 
It is just doing what it says; the ponds work. But SuDS are a pain, which 
is all I can describe them as. Especially compared to more traditional 
piped solutions, which are big pipes in the ground that builders can put in 
and then they just get on with it. But I cannot say it is the wrong thing and 
I do have other projects with them in. 
(Developer A 2012, interview) 
Lastly, there was an issue with maintenance and adoption. Due to lack of regulations to 
support the use of SuDS, it was unclear who would adopt them. The developer said on 
this matter: 
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We had [the WaSC] saying: ‘We are not responsible for it’, we had the 
Environment Agency saying: ‘Yes, it is all great, but it is not ours, and us 
saying: ‘That is fine, it is our open space’. The council under the legal 
agreement were obliged to adopt the open space including the SuDS, but 
the council did not have any experience. 
(Developer A 2012, interview) 
The decision was made that the developers would establish a private management 
company, funded by the residents paying annual management fees. This solved the 
problem with maintenance costs, but the residents in NGP and councillors were 
concerned about transparency and any consequences of a private company taking on 
public services (LRA Chair 2012, interview, Councillor B 2012, interview). 
7.3 Chelmsford cricket ground development 
This section discusses the governance network for FRM for the Chelmsford cricket 
ground development, following the same structure as in the previous section on NGP. 
The functioning of the governance network is visualised in Figure 32 on page 192. 
7.3.1 Formation of the governance network 
The governance network was formed when the cricket club started discussing ideas to 
redevelop their ground with the council. At first, these were informal discussions, which 
eventually led to the creation of a planning brief that signalled the council’s intent to 
approve redevelopment. These two actors therefore formed a voluntary network. When 
the planning application was submitted, the EA, residents and councillors became 
involved through formal consultation. At this point, the network expanded through 
mandate. Ultimately, the governance network was unable to reach a decision, because 
the EA blocked the council’s power to approve the application. The governance 
network failed and the decision was referred to the SoS. 
7.3.2 The policy problem 
The governance network was formed around the problem of flood risk on the site of the 
proposed development. The site is adjacent to the river Can and forms part of a 
functional floodplain. In the early stages of the development, when it was part of the 
planning brief and the AAP, this flood risk was not in conflict with development 
aspirations to build approximately 100 dwellings. The EA did not object to the 
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development, because they thought there would be no development taking place within 
the functional floodplain. However, when the application was submitted, the number of 
dwellings had risen to over 400, with a proportion of the dwellings planned within the 
functional floodplain. At that point, the problem definition differed between actors, as 
explained in the next section. 
7.3.3 Actors, characteristics and interactions 
The actors who were part of the governance network were the council, the cricket club, 
the developers, the EA, planning and flood risk consultants, residents and councillors. 
This section describes the characteristics of these actors in more detail. 
Chelmsford Borough Council and planning officers: The council found it crucial that 
the cricket club stayed in their current location in the centre of the town. In the Local 
Plan of 1997, policies were formed to ensure sports facilities in the centre alongside the 
river Can remained there. In particular, the football club and cricket club were 
considered to contribute to the attractiveness of the town (Chelmsford Borough Council 
1997). However, not long after the Local Plan was published, the football club left the 
site and a planning application was submitted for residential development. The council 
refused permission, based on their Local Plan, but in a public enquiry the decision was 
made to grant permission, as it was deemed to be more beneficial to the area than 
refusal (Rowlands 1999). The loss of the football club might have contributed to the 
efforts by the council to retain the cricket club. 
As the council wanted the cricket club to remain in their current location, they 
supported their plans for redevelopment. For instance, they included a council car park 
to enable development and agreed to bring the application forward even though there 
were some issues, such as a higher quantity of development than first expected, 
development in a functional floodplain and problems with overlooking. One planning 
officer felt that there was much pressure from the club and their development partner on 
their consultants to get the application in, whereas it would have benefited from more 
pre-application discussions. Even though the planning officer thought that flood risk 
was addressed sufficiently when the application was submitted, they felt uncomfortable 
with the relation of the development to existing housing (Planning Officer C 2012, 
interview). Residents also felt the application was being rushed through, without 
sufficient regard to a fair planning process: 
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There was a sense that they [the planning officers] had already made up 
their mind and they were effectively being blackmailed by the cricket 
club: ‘If you do not give the planning permission, we will move the out of 
Chelmsford’. 
(LRG B 2012, interview) 
Some interviewees indicated that there was not only pressure from the cricket club and 
developers, but also from political leaders in the council to approve the application, 
despite outstanding issues such as flood risk: 
I think the planners from a technical point of view were certainly 
cognisant and they understood all the issues of flood risk. Politically, they 
were taken down a route, which was saying it had to happen. Therefore, 
from their point of view they had to try to deliver what the political 
council said should happen. 
(EA Officer C 2012, interview) 
However, even apart from this application the council’s perception of flood risk was 
that it was an important consideration, but it should not prevent regeneration of the town 
centre, as shown in the Core Strategy and the AAP. One planning officer described it as 
follows: 
This is the historic centre of the borough; it is a Roman city and it has 
been here a long time. It makes a lot of sense logically to collect your new 
development next to existing shops, houses, transport links and so forth. 
There is such a large imperative to put it here that flood risk becomes one 
of those constraints that you have to deal with, rather than using it as an 
issue to stop, frustrate or put development somewhere else. The line that 
we would take, as long as things are safe and we do not make the 
situation worse elsewhere, we will carry on. 
 (Planning Officer D 2012, interview) 
The council did not have any financial resources to mitigate flood risk on site, because 
it was a private development, but they were able to provide a plot of land to enable 
development. Furthermore, they had some in-house knowledge of flood risk, which 
developed on an ad hoc basis by responding to circumstances. Due to a significant flood 
risk in the town, and the council’s responsibility for local flood risk, CBC felt that there 
had to be a planning officer involved who was specialised in flood risk (Planning 
Officer D 2012, interview). However, one planning officer conceded that even though 
they had some expertise, they would never have the knowledge that the EA possessed 
(Planning Officer D 2012, interview). The flood risk consultant, who had worked with 
the council and the EA, also claimed that: ‘planning officers are often very open to ideas 
from us, but they do not have the expertise and are not competent in flooding matters’ 
(Consultant B 2012, interview). 
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Cricket club and planning consultants: The cricket club wanted to renew their facilities, 
comply with cricket regulations and generate more income from new facilities such as a 
conference centre. They were content with their current location in the town centre, but 
would have moved if necessary. However, because the council was opposed to them 
moving away from the centre, they decided to create plans for a redevelopment on site. 
To generate sufficient income for redevelopment, they selected a developer to build 
residential dwellings. The cricket club had some financial resources to invest in the 
application. Before building commenced, they had invested £500,000 and they were 
generating income from the leasing of land used for residential development (ECCC 
2013). They did not have planning expertise and therefore hired a planning consultant, 
whilst flood risk issues were left to the developer and flood risk consultants. 
The cricket club did not believe there was a large flood risk on site, because in their 
experience there had only been shallow, slow moving water. They also trusted in the 
flood risk measures designed for the development. They did find that flood risk posed a 
major obstacle to development and even more so after the EA became a statutory 
consultee, which meant the application was referred and thereby delayed (Cricket Club 
Manager 2012, interview). Ideally, the cricket club wanted the application to be 
approved quickly, so that it would not interrupt the cricket season. An EA officer, a 
councillor and residents felt that, as a consequence, the cricket club had placed 
considerable pressure on planning officers and the planning committee. For instance, 
one councillor stated that: 
The consultation time on the application was very short, especially for the 
scale and significance of the application. This was due to pressures that 
were really vocal and really hard by the cricket club, who were speaking 
most unreasonably to the councillors and the planning committee when 
doing public questions … The club representatives at the committee made 
threats to the committee: ‘If you do not approve, we will be forced to 
leave Chelmsford’, which was actually stated during a meeting. 
(Councillor D 2013, interview) 
Developers and flood risk consultants: The developers were selected by the cricket club 
to plan and implement the residential development. The developers had invested in the 
development and therefore had an interest in gaining approval. Their perception of flood 
risk was that it formed a constraint to development. To address this constraint, the 
consultants developed their own model to calculate flood risk and disagreed with the 
EA on risk levels: 
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There was a lot of debate and discussion about what the flood levels 
actually were. As I discovered through the process, it is not a science, it is 
an art. You can take various readings and then you have to extrapolate 
those readings as best as you can. What we found was that the EA were 
extrapolating readings very differently from how we would have 
extrapolated them. There was a big question as to what the flood levels 
were actually going to be. 
 (Developer B 2012, interview) 
An EA officer, on the other hand, argued that the reason the consultants developed their 
own model was to reduce flood risk and enable development, but they were not 
addressing the flood and safety issues sufficiently (EA Officer C 2012, interview). One 
councillor stated that: ‘The developer only seemed to react to the possibility of a refusal 
or permission; that was the only thing that conditioned the applicant’s attitude’ 
(Councillor D 2013, interview). Some EA officers felt that the consultants were only 
trying to achieve their own goals and were not going to compromise with the EA. 
Moreover, one EA officer felt that the consultants were trying to cheat to have the 
application approved (EA Officer D 2012, interview). 
Environment Agency: The EA were involved in assessing flood risk for development as 
part of the AAP and through the planning application. For the application, three 
different teams were involved (EA Officer C 2012, interview). Their perception of flood 
risk was based on their risk models. Their knowledge of flood risk is constantly 
developing as techniques improve and new flood events provide more information. 
The EA’s interest was to ensure flood risk did not increase for existing properties and 
they were therefore against the principle of developing in functional floodplain, based 
on PPS25. Even though the EA also had some issues with the way flood risk was 
managed, they believed they would have been able to resolve these, but were clear that 
they could never agree to properties being built in the functional floodplain: ‘on that 
policy side there was not much scope for negotiation, but on the flood risk management 
side of things there was some’ (EA Officer E 2012, interview). They therefore objected 
to the application and decided to sustain their objection, because they were concerned 
that it would set a precedent (EA Officer E 2012, interview). 
One planning officer stated that the EA also did not consider flood risk mitigation for 
future development, but only for existing properties. This is a result of how they fund 
new flood risk measures, which is based on the value of existing built development: 
‘they did not see themselves as drivers of economic growth, but as simply protecting 
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property and the environment’ (Planning Officer D 2012, interview). This therefore 
differed from the council’s perception, in which reducing flood risk was an important 
measure to enable regeneration. 
Overall, the cricket club, developers and flood risk consultants had difficulty with the 
EA’s attitude in the decision-making process. They found that the EA were not 
pragmatic and tried to stop the development because of their principles. For instance, 
the developers claimed that: ‘the EA were very pedantic and they did not seem to live in 
the real world’ (Developer B 2012, interview). The flood risk consultant described the 
EA’s approach as follows: 
They have policies saying they will not support anything that increases 
the number of people at risk of flooding. How they interpret that is quite 
zealous and they do not need to be flexible in their opinion, because they 
are only interested in flooding; they have no interest in other planning 
criteria. 
 (Consultant B 2012, interview) 
However, the consultants and a planning officer believe that the EA have become more 
flexible in recent years. The planning officer said that: 
They are interested in making sure you do not make the situation worse 
and there is no harm to other sensitive parts of the city centre. However, 
they are a lot more relaxed about it than they were a few years ago, when 
they said ‘no’ in capital letters … The cricket club application approval 
sent a nasty shock to their organisations. I think they had several appeals 
at the same time. They often talk about that as an organisation it was quite 
a traumatic experience to lose; they did not expect it. 
 (Planning Officer D 2012, interview) 
However, the EA are still holding on to some principles, which became apparent more 
recently in planning new flood risk measures for Chelmsford: 
They were very adamant there should be no loss of functional floodplain 
and you started to get quite contrived solutions. Odd suggestions came 
forward, even if you could prove that the loss of that floodplain did not do 
harm anywhere. They were absolutely adamant that it should not be 
sacrificed. 
(Planning Officer D 2012, interview) 
Residents: Residents became involved through the planning application, with concerns 
about overlooking and traffic. They had some concerns about flood risk as well, 
especially after experiencing a flood in 2009. Their perception of flood risk was 
therefore mainly based on their own experiences, whilst also using it as one of the 
arguments for objecting to the development. One of the flood risk consultants felt that: 
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Local residents will pick up on what the EA is saying and use it as 
ammunition to make their case … When the EA makes an objection, 
residents will often use flooding as a reason to object irrespective of the 
fact they will not be negatively impacted by flooding. 
 (Consultant B 2012, interview) 
In the public inquiry, residents left the technical aspects of flood risk to the EA, as they 
lacked the expertise. They did however describe the consequences of flooding for 
residents in a block of flats near the application site, when they lost their electricity and 
water supplies and some elderly residents were unable to leave their apartments. They 
therefore placed their trust in the EA, whilst being sceptical of the developer’s 
intentions. They did not trust the mitigation measures the developer included in their 
plans; for instance, they felt the warning system was inadequate and egress unsafe 
(LRG A 2012, interview, LRG B 2012, interview). 
Residents also believed the planning process had been unfair, because the planning 
officers ‘were not applying even-handedly their own policies and they were not 
interrogating the proposals by the developers to the right degree’ (LRG B 2012, 
interview). The residents complained to the council through their complaints procedure, 
but because the residents felt the council had not resolved their complaint, they carried 
it forward to the Local Government Ombudsman (Local Residents’ Group 2009f). 
However, the residents found that the complaints process took so long that by the time 
they could refer it to the Ombudsman, the application had been called in by the SoS 
(LRG B 2012, interview). As a result, the Ombudsman reported that they would not be 
investigating the complaint, as ‘in the absence of a decision it could not be determined 
that a sufficient injustice had taken place’ (Local Residents’ Group 2009f: 42). 
Councillors: Councillors were involved in this process by representing residents, being 
part of the planning committee and, in the case of one councillor, being part of the 
public inquiry. The councillor involved in the public inquiry believed that those 
councillors who sat on the planning committee were under pressure from the cricket 
club, council leaders and lead planning officers to approve the application (Councillor D 
2013, interview). Residents also believed that these councillors had predetermined to 
approve the application without considering the issues sufficiently, whilst some were 
also members of the cricket club (LRG A 2012, interview, LRG B 2012, interview). 
According to one EA officer, the members were caught between their loyalty to the 
cricket club and the opposition they experienced from the residents; therefore, they did 
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not want to take the decision themselves, rather preferring to leave it to the SoS (EA 
Officer C 2012, interview). 
7.3.4 Wider context 
The wider context entails structures and agents that have influenced the governance 
network, such as formal and informal institutions, flood events, and any influential 
outside networks or agents. The key structures will now be described. 
Formal institutions: The formal institutional framework was mainly composed of 
national policies and regulations on flood risk and planning. The governance network 
was established when FRM was part of the planning system through PPS25 and when 
flood risk was a material consideration. Regulations also meant that the EA had become 
a statutory consultee and the Flooding Direction was created. This meant that the EA 
now had strong resources to achieve their interests, which they used to exert power over 
the other actors by blocking local decision making. Local policies also influenced the 
network. The council had policies to achieve regeneration of the town centre, in 
combination with retaining the cricket club in its town-centre location. 
Informal institutions: Interaction between the council and the cricket club started in the 
early 2000s, whilst the developer joined the network later. The EA received a request 
for data in the pre-application phase, but was formally consulted after the application 
was submitted. There were regular discussions between the council, the flood risk 
consultants and the EA to resolve the objections from the EA. 
The interaction between the council and the cricket club, developers and consultants 
was considered positive: 
The council was very understanding of our needs to develop and we 
started a sensible dialogue with them. They remained adamant they 
wanted us to stay in the centre of town and confirmed they would work 
with us to make sure we would have everything we needed to facilitate 
our build here. 
(Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview) 
Therefore, this positive working relationship was influenced by the council’s desire for 
the cricket club to stay within the town centre (Consultant A 2012, interview, 
Councillor D 2013, interview). One councillor described the decision to approve the 
application as being a: 
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high-level council decision rather than a planning decision. There was a 
little bit of grey, more than a little bit of grey, in the mix of how this 
whole thing was treated. 
(Councillor D 2013, interview). 
As a result, there was pressure on planning officers to approve the application. For 
example, one planning officer said that the application was submitted too soon and it 
would have been better to object to the parts of the application that caused overlooking 
for some existing residents (Planning Officer C 2012, interview). 
The interaction between the cricket club, developers, consultants and the EA was 
conflicted. All three EA officers interviewed stated that the flood risk consultants hired 
by the developer were difficult to work with. The discussions were not friendly: 
The consultants who they [the developers] appointed clearly had a brief to 
deliver something regardless of how they did it, but they were really quite 
unpleasant about it. It got to a point where on a number of occasions I 
actually put the phone down on the consultants, because they were just 
being totally unreasonable and being actually vaguely abusive. 
 (EA Officer C 2012, interview) 
The relationship between the EA and the consultants was very strained and the process 
of negotiation went from awkward to impossible. This relationship affected the 
interaction: 
It makes you not very keen to adopt a flexible approach when you have a 
consultant who is clearly himself inflexible and is trying to get a result 
regardless of what is reasonable. In many instances, if there is something 
on site to how you can solve a problem, we will suggest it. But why am I 
going to help them, why am I going to help the developers to develop 
then? 
(EA Officer C 2012, interview) 
The planning consultants found the opposite: they claimed that the EA were 
uncooperative and that every time the consultants solved a problem, the EA came up 
with a new one. The EA were unreasonable and were not prepared to concede 
(Consultant A 2012, interview). The developers also found that the EA were very 
frustrating to work with and would not agree with their flood risk results: 
In the end we had to compromise with them and pretty much take their 
readings, because there was very little movement from their end. But 
ultimately we designed a scheme which everybody agreed was safe, it 
was appropriate and caused no additional flood issues to any of the 
neighbouring properties, but still the EA refused to accept it. 
(Developer A 2012, interview) 
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The cricket club and the flood risk consultants also found that the EA were not 
cooperating: 
The difficulty I had was that there was no level of flexibility; it was either 
yes or no, black or white. There was no creativity in terms of' ‘let’s see if 
we can work with you to see how we can manage the development’ … 
The obstruction was the fact that the EA was digging in on a policy issue 
rather than a safety issue, because we could demonstrate that in the event 
of a flood this site would be safe. 
 (Cricket Club Manager 2012, interview) 
They worked with us, they did not ignore us, but they were very much 
against everything we tried to do. One particular gentleman of the EA 
appeared to take it very personally, to the extent that I did not allow my 
staff to liaise with him anymore, because he was particularly rude to 
them. I had to take over on the liaison with that particular officer. 
 (Consultant B 2012, interview) 
The flood risk consultant believed that this was a common attitude from the EA, as this 
negative interaction was repeated during other applications as well: 
It is often a confrontational situation between the EA and us. That is a 
shame, but we have to do the best for our client. That means the most 
accurate and realistic assessment of flood risk, which the EA do not 
always like, because they like to take a more conservative approach. 
 (Consultant B 2012, interview) 
The relationship between the council and the EA had been good prior to the application; 
they had been in regular contact to discuss flood risk in developments in the town centre 
for the Core Strategy and the AAP. Therefore, when the council and the EA disagreed 
over the planning application, one of the planning officers felt uncomfortable doing so 
and was worried it had affected their relationship permanently: 
I always felt uncomfortable with the way we were not working with the 
EA on this one. We are used to a collaborative approach with such a key 
consultee. I was concerned how this would affect wider relationships with 
them to be honest. 
 (Planning Officer C 2012, interview) 
In spite of this, one EA officer stated that the process had not altered their working 
relationship: 
The council felt the application should be approved and we felt it should 
not, because it is contrary to policy. We worked very well up to a point 
and we work well with them again now. 
 (EA Officer E 2012, interview) 
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However, the flood risk consultants thought the relationship between the EA and the 
planning officers was worse than they admitted: 
The planning officers are often torn between what we say and what the 
EA say when they are two different things. The EA is the competent 
authority that is there to advise them, so theoretically they should take the 
EA’s position in preference to ours … They will listen to the EA and us 
and often try to work with the EA to get them to be more pragmatic. 
There are plenty of situations when planning officers are feeling 
frustrated and let down by what is seen as an intransigent and zealous 
approach by the EA. 
 (Consultant B 2012, interview). 
Moreover, some residents and a councillor lost their trust in CBC’s planning process 
over this application. They were critical of the process and believed that the application 
had not been discussed sufficiently. They claimed that leaders of the council, lead 
planning officers and councillors used their power to have the application approved and 
some of them were members of the cricket club: 
I almost lost complete confidence in the process as a result … The 
council leader and lead officers found the means to pacify, placate and 
accede to the terms of the cricket club and the applicant. 
(Councillor D 2012, interview) 
You can have any process you want, but if you want to get a decision 
through, it is who you know, not what you know. Therefore, my view of 
the planning process is tainted: there is no true justice in the process. 
(LRG A 2012, interview) 
So long as you have politically motivated individuals, who are guided by 
senior officers, who may have an agenda that is outside planning policy, 
you are going to have situations like this. 
(LRG B 2012, interview) 
The differences between parties were also apparent during the public inquiry. Prior to 
the inquiry, mediators attempted to help the parties to resolve their issues, but they were 
unsuccessful. During the inquiry, CBC and the developers hired barristers from the 
same practice to make their case. The residents and the EA felt the developers’ barrister 
was aggressive and tried to discredit them and their professional judgement: 
The barrister was clearly trying to show everybody as being a total idiot; 
not trying to actually consider the issues, but just to show the people he 
was combating that they did not know what they were talking about. He 
would deliberately try and get you to say things that bluntly would 
contradict what you were trying to say. It was not a pleasant approach. 
(EA Officer C 2012, interview) 
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The developers on the other hand, found that the barrister had helped to make clear that 
the EA did not have a case: 
The EA was very pedantic and they did not seem to live in the real world. 
Particularly in the public inquiry, when they were being cross-examined 
by the barrister, it became painfully clear that they were attempting to 
apply the letter of the law as they had interpreted it. They were using no 
common sense whatsoever. 
 (Developer A 2012, interview) 
Some actors also felt that the change of SoS had influenced the outcome. The residents 
stated that the SoS was a resident of Essex and a supporter of the cricket club and was 
therefore partial to the application being approved (LRG A 2012, interview, LRG B 
2012, interview), whilst one EA officer claimed that: 
As soon as [Eric] Pickles [the new SoS] came in, he just agreed to 
anything concerned with development. Every single inquiry for the first 
many months he would just let through on the basis that it was 
development and development was good. It was a very disappointing time 
in that respect. 
 (Planning Officer C 2012, interview) 
Flood events: Flood events played an important role. Firstly, due to historic flooding, 
Chelmsford had protected its town centre against flooding, thereby stimulating more 
development to take place along the river. Secondly, as flood risk was an important 
issue in Chelmsford, but the council also wanted to regenerate areas at risk of flooding, 
a planner was appointed who had expertise in flood risk. This increased the council’s 
knowledge on flood risk and this might have contributed to the reason why the EA 
became involved in the application at a later stage. Thirdly, flood events allowed actors 
to gain knowledge on flood risk. Recent floods showed that the flood risk to the site was 
higher than expected and a flood just before the public inquiry showed the real risk of 
flooding to the site. This event was used by both sides in the public inquiry: by the 
objectors to show that flood risk was real and had many consequences for residents, and 
by the applicants to show that the extent of flooding on the development site was not 
great and unlikely to cause any danger. 
Pre-existing relationships: Pre-existing relationships were also an influential factor. For 
instance, the cricket club did not have a good relationship with the council in the 1990s, 
when the council was trying to block the club from moving by designating the grounds 
as a green wedge, which prohibited development. When the council went through a 
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political change, the relationship became more positive when CBC supported the cricket 
club in their development needs. 
In addition, one of the flood risk consultants claimed that he had experienced 
confrontational situations with the EA on multiple occasions. Therefore, when such 
actors meet in new governance networks, they may anticipate conflict and will adapt 
their behaviour accordingly. For instance, instead of attempting cooperation from the 
onset, they may develop strategies to increase their power over the other actor to try to 
reach their goals. 
Central government as decision maker: The local governance network was not able to 
reach resolution and the application was referred through the Flooding Direction. It was 
discussed in a public inquiry, where the inspector recommended refusal. After the 
public inquiry, the decision was delayed when central government went through a 
political change. A new SoS made the final decision and he granted permission based 
on an amended scheme. This SoS wanted to stimulate development in the country and 
therefore prioritised the social and economic benefits of the application over the 
principle of not building in a floodplain. There can only be speculation about whether 
the previous SoS would have judged the case differently, but the national political 
change might have been influential. 
7.3.5 Flood risk management 
The local governance network was unable to reach a decision, and instead, the actors 
were required to make their case in a public inquiry. Subsequently, a national actor took 
the final decision to approve the development, with no changes to the flood risk 
mitigation plans that the developers had submitted in the original planning application. 
As a result, residential development within the functional floodplain was approved. The 
flood risk measures taken were partly structural, such as flood storage provided by an 
undercroft car park and improved flood defences. Other measures were non-structural, 
such as flood awareness, flood warnings and flood insurance. 
The EA stated that they were still unhappy with the decision. One EA officer 
emphasised that some issues with FRM had not been resolved; for instance, the fact that 
they were not able to provide a flood risk warning more than three hours in advance. He 
feared that if the site floods it would cause chaos (EA Officer D 2012, interview). 
Another officer was grateful that the inspector agreed with the majority of their issues: 
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If the inspector had said: ‘I do not agree with you on the application 
sequential test or the definition of functional floodplain’, that could have 
had far wider consequences. Because of the fact that he said: ‘I accept all 
your arguments, however there is a real economic and social driver in 
terms of the cricket ground, in that case I feel that those things outweigh 
the flood risk’, it does not set the same precedent as it could have done. 
We are obviously really disappointed not to get that decision but that is 
the way the process works. 
(EA Officer E 2012, interview) 
The flood risk consultants believed that common sense prevailed, but thought that the 
process to get there was unnecessarily long-winded and expensive: 
It was not necessary, because it was clear at the outset that this could be 
made safe. This unnecessary preoccupation with concentrating on specific 
wording, irrespective of the practical or pragmatic aspects of the 
development and flood risk issues, is just not helpful. 
(Consultant B 2012, interview) 
 
Figure 32: Functioning of governance network of cricket ground development 
Through the approval of this development, the economic and social benefits of the 
cricket club remaining in Chelmsford’s town centre have outweighed the principle of 
developing within a functional floodplain. CBC, the cricket club and the developers 
have been able to achieve their interests, but the interests of the EA have not been met. 
Some officers feel that a future flood could be costly in terms of damage and potentially 
harmful to residents’ wellbeing. 
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7.4 Key factors that influence flood risk management 
The case studies show that decisions on FRM have been taken in governance networks. 
The shift from government to governance and neo-liberal governmentalities have 
caused a plurality of actors to become involved in FRM, from the public, private, semi-
public and community sectors. The main actors were planning officers, the EA, 
developers, residents and councillors. These actors interacted together in a network 
arrangement; they had some discretion in making decisions on FRM, within limits 
produced by hierarchical and market arrangements. Therefore, the nature of network 
governance influences FRM. This section further discusses the specific key factors 
within network governance that have influenced FRM. 
7.4.1 Formation of the governance network 
The governance networks from both case studies started voluntarily and became larger 
through time through informal and formal consultation. Two influential actors, 
including an officer from the EA who wanted to integrate development and FRM, 
formed the NGP network. The council and the applicants formed the cricket ground 
development network voluntarily with the aim of bringing forward development. The 
EA were involved at a later stage as part of the consultation process. Some literature 
suggests that early involvement of actors stimulates joint decision making and prevents 
their making use of the power of veto (Edelenbos and Klijn 2005); therefore, it may be 
that the earlier the EA become part of a governance network, the more likely that there 
will be cooperation and an agreed outcome, thereby preventing the referral of the 
application to the SoS. This would suggest that the formation of the governance 
network is a key factor that influences FRM, but on the other hand, this formation may 
also be influenced by other elements such as pre-existing relationships and actor 
characteristics. 
The community was involved formally and informally. In both cases, the community 
felt that the management of flood risk was inadequate. In particular, they felt they could 
not trust developers and other private actors to manage flood risk sufficiently, because 
their main interest was to make a profit. Furthermore, residents in and around NGP 
were distrustful of the council, the EA and the WaSC, partly because flood risks were 
adjusted several times. The community’s perceptions of flood risk were also strongly 
linked to flood experience and they did not have direct access to flood risk information. 
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Instead, they had to rely on other actors to inform them. In the cricket ground 
development, the residents trusted the EA to manage flood risk, but they criticised the 
council for not managing flood risk sufficiently. 
7.4.2 Hierarchical influence 
Hierarchical influence differs in each case: it was low in NGP, as there was a lack of 
regulations and policies regarding SuDS, but high in the cricket ground development. 
The existence of formal institutions such as the Flooding Direction enabled the EA to 
use this resource and to exert power, which meant that decision making in the network 
was blocked. As a result, the application was referred to and decided by central 
government. The actors also disagreed on how to interpret flood risk policy, for instance 
on the definition of a functional floodplain and the requirements for conducting an 
exception test. This showed that policy was open to interpretation, which the actors 
could use to argue for their preferred outcome. 
7.4.3 Market influence 
Within the governance networks, strong market influences were present. Developers 
had a significant influence on FRM by adapting the flood risk measures to their interests 
and, in the cricket ground development, also by producing knowledge that differed from 
the EA. However, in NGP this desired outcome was compatible with the preferences of 
the other key actors, whilst in the cricket ground development the EA’s stance was 
incompatible with the applicants’ development aspirations. 
In NGP, the strong market influence, combined with the lack of a supporting framework 
for SuDS and limited public funding, meant that a private company became responsible 
for maintaining the SuDS. This is in line with a neo-liberal perspective. The 
management company is not democratically accountable, but the SuDS serve an 
important public purpose inside and outside NGP. This conflict between public purpose 
and private responsibility may cause conflicts in the future. 
7.4.4 Actor characteristics 
The actors’ perceptions, preferences and resources differed in each network, which 
influenced interaction, because the more orientations differ, the more difficult 
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interaction between actors becomes (Scharpf 1994). A governance network has 
opportunities to realign preferences if the actors work together to do so, but this requires 
a good working relationship, such as in NGP. In this case, there were problems with 
implementing FRM, distribution costs and responsibility, but the actors were able to 
overcome these. Even though there were some conflicts between actors, overall they 
were able to sustain the network and achieve an outcome. In the cricket ground 
development, the relationship between the EA and the flood risk consultants was 
already strained from previous experiences and their interaction was conflicted. They 
were unable to align their preferences and failed to reach an outcome. 
Therefore, the actors’ perceptions are a key factor. In NGP, the actors had compatible 
perceptions of flood risk and FRM, as they all supported the use of SuDS. In the cricket 
ground development, the actors did not agree on their perception of flood risk, because 
there was a conflict of power between the EA and the consultants in calculating flood 
risks. In addition, there was a crucial difference in perception of the ability to balance 
flood risk and development. The actors were unable to realign their perceptions and the 
network failed to make a decision. 
7.4.5 Knowledge as a resource 
Knowledge is an important resource in FRM governance networks. Knowledge on flood 
risk is strongly linked to flood events; a flood event can heighten the flood risk for an 
area, which then influences FRM. Uncertainty of knowledge also plays an important 
role. In both case studies, actors found that calculating flood risk was not an exact 
science. Many assumptions have to be made and knowledge can change after new 
research is conducted into climate change, or after more detailed or reliable information 
on local circumstances, such as ground levels, is produced. 
Actors can use this uncertainty to contest the information from other actors, and to 
produce knowledge that aids in achieving their interests. Actors can therefore use 
knowledge to exert power. For example, in the cricket ground development the 
applicants challenged the EA’s models and calculations. Their flood risk information 
supported their preferences to develop, but central government trusted the information 
they provided. Therefore, they were successful in contesting the EA’s flood risk 
information. 
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7.4.6 Flood events 
Another important influence was flood events in the local area, which affected 
knowledge and perceptions. In both case studies, flooding had occurred in the past and 
the local authority and the EA were aware it was an issue for the new development. 
Simultaneously, flood events provided the EA with more information on flood risk, 
which meant that flood risk levels had to be increased. In addition, flood experiences by 
residents increased the involvement of the community in the planning process. 
Residents of areas near to the planned development were concerned that their flood risk 
might increase as a result of the new scheme. However, the community also used flood 
events as a way to exert power over other actors, in an attempt to achieve their aim of 
influencing the development. 
Richards’ research findings (2005) showed that flood experience increases the number 
of stakeholders involved in the planning process. In the case studies in this research, 
flood experience seemed to activate community involvement. At the same time, there 
was no relationship between flood experience and development in flood risk areas, as 
NGP was planned outside the floodplain and the cricket ground development inside. 
This may be explained by the third factor Richards mentioned, which is development 
pressure. Both cases had development pressure, but NGP had the space to leave the 
floodplains undeveloped, whilst in Chelmsford much of the town centre was located 
within flood zones. 
7.4.7 The influence of agency 
Agency has been an important influence in the governance networks. In NGP, the 
planning officer and the EA officer used their individual skills and their authority to 
persuade the developers to adopt SuDS. They preferred the most sustainable form of 
drainage, but did not have the resources and power to achieve this. Instead, the 
developers were able to realise their preferred solution, which did not interfere with 
their interests. Therefore, as the actors’ preferences aligned, their interaction was 
positive and cooperative. They were able to harmonise their interests into a common 
goal and worked together to solve any issues. Even though there was a lack of structure 
to achieve their goals, they were able to contribute to creating a new structure for the 
development of SuDS in England. They did, however, affirm the neo-liberal structure 
through the creation of a private management company paid for by residents. This has 
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not been in the interest of the residents, but residents did not have the power to stop this 
decision. Instead, they are using their agency to organise themselves into a residents’ 
association and achieve more transparency. 
In the cricket ground development, agency has been a crucial factor as well. Even 
though PPS25 indicated that this development would not be allowed, the actors 
involved used their agency to push the development forward. The EA used all the power 
they had, derived from legislation, to try to stop the development, but they were 
overruled. The influence of agency in rejecting structures meant that some actors found 
the process unfair. These actors attempted to use their agency to stop the development, 
but did not have the power to make the ultimate decision, which was made by a central 
government actor. 
7.4.8 The relationship between structure and agency 
The decision-making process was influenced by both structure and agency. Structures 
that were in place needed to be taken up by agents in order to influence decision 
making. This occurred to achieve a common or an individual goal, thereby creating 
cooperation or conflict. In addition, structures were purposely rejected in order to 
achieve a goal. Moreover, if there was a lack of structure, actors were able to find 
solutions or help to create new structures. It is impossible to separate the influence of 
structure from the influence of agency, which supports theories such as structuration 
theory by Giddens (1984) or approaches to studying networks such as by Marsh and 
Smith (2000). 
7.4.9 Influence of outcome 
Lastly, there is a feedback loop from the governance network outcome to the actors and 
the wider context. In NGP, actors learned a significant amount about how to implement 
SuDS. This not only influenced FRM in the later stages of the project, but their 
experiences also helped other projects and the formation of regulations and guidance on 
SuDS. In Chelmsford, there were concerns that approval would set a precedent of 
developing within floodplains. In addition, after the EA experienced that national actors 
prioritise development, they now compromise on this core principle. They have changed 
their stance and are now seen as more cooperative and less inclined to sustain objections 
that lead to public inquiries. Lastly, some residents have lost trust in the council to make 
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fair decisions on development, whilst others have lost faith in the council, the EA and 
the WaSC to manage flood risk sufficiently. 
7.5 The governance debate in the light of the findings 
Some of the issues addressed in the governance debate in Chapter 2 have also been part 
of the governance networks studied in this research. Firstly, this research has shown that 
there has been a shift from government to governance in FRM and decisions are now 
made within governance networks. However, this shift does not mean the influences of 
hierarchy and market are absent. Rather, governance of FRM is a hybrid form, in which 
central government directly and indirectly affects the network and the private sector is 
able to influence the outcome of FRM. 
The governance of FRM is a Type II multi-level governance. According to Hooghe and 
Marks (2003, 2010), this type of governance has a large number of authorities who 
operate at diverse territorial scales and whose jurisdictions are functionally specific. For 
instance, in NGP a multitude of actors shared responsibility for FRM, such as the local 
authority, the EA, the developers, the WaSC and the airport. The authorities’ 
jurisdictions in the Type II multi-level governance are intended to be flexible, adapting 
to changing citizen preferences and functional requirements. However, in FRM this 
flexibility is undermined by hierarchical rule. Central government influences some of 
the authorities with specific FRM tasks, whilst it also sets regulations that limit the 
behaviour of others. For example, in NGP the WaSC was unable to adopt SuDS as this 
was contrary to the Water Industry Act 1991, which the WaSC has to adhere to. The 
authorities are, therefore, bound by the institutional framework and cannot easily adapt 
to changing preferences or situations. In addition, Hooghe and Marks describe that in 
this type of governance, residents are not served by ‘the’ government, but by a variety 
of authorities. The case studies have shown that this can affect residents’ trust in 
authorities. For example, amongst residents living in and near NGP there was confusion 
about which authority was responsible for FRM and they were uncertain if flood risk 
was managed sufficiently. Attempts by the authorities to inform residents of the causes 
of flood risk and the effectiveness of flood risk measures were not completely 
successful. In short, the disadvantage of Type II governance is that it may be a barrier to 
effective FRM. 
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In order to analyse the functioning of governance networks, Marsh and Smith’s 
dialectical model (2000) can be applied. Even though it examines the roles networks 
play in policy development and implementation, as opposed to networks being treated 
as a new form of governance, it can be adapted. By including a key factor, which is the 
type of governance that shapes the formation and the functioning, the model can be 
applied to examine governance networks. The type of governance is identified by using 
concepts from multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010), Foucault’s 
governmentality (e.g. Foucault et al. 1988) and research on hybrid forms of governance 
(e.g. Scharpf 1994, Jessop 1999, Whitehead 2003, Bache and Flinders 2004, 
Swyngedouw 2005, Grix and Phillpots 2011, Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). 
In addition, the dialectical model’s relationships between the structure of the network 
and the agents, between the network and the context within which it operates and 
between the network and the policy outcome can be applied. For instance, the 
relationship between the structure of the network and the agents was visible in both case 
studies. NGP’s governance network was considered successful by the actors, as there 
was cooperation and an agreed outcome was implemented. This confirms research by 
Healey (1998), Toke and Marsh (2003) and Edelenbos et al. (2013), in which strong and 
resilient governance network structures create a high level of institutional capacity and 
develop formal and informal rules for interaction. As a consequence, actors trust each 
other, share information and knowledge and are able to take joint action, resulting in an 
agreed outcome. For example, in NGP actors worked together and, as a result, were able 
to include SuDS into the development. This outcome would not have been feasible 
without mutual cooperation and the exchange of resources. 
However, governance networks may also experience much conflict and fail to reach 
agreements. Actors distrust each other and any behaviour is perceived by others to be a 
promotion of self-interest or purposely adversarial. This was evident in the cricket 
ground case, where there was much conflict between the EA and the flood risk 
consultants working for the developers. The EA found that the consultants were 
intentionally adapting flood risk calculations to enable development, whilst the 
consultant found that the EA was uncooperative and not pragmatic. The two actors did 
not trust each other’s intentions and were unwilling to make concessions. When there is 
distrust in a network, no institutional capacity is created (Healey 1998). 
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An explanation of the failure of the governance network may be found in Scharpf’s 
statement that the more orientations differ, the more difficult interaction between actors 
becomes (Scharpf 1997). Actors are unwilling to adjust their orientations as they find 
that network failure would be a better result for their interests than reaching a 
compromised outcome. Scharpf’s statement can also be applied to community 
involvement. In the case of FRM, residents may be concerned that a development will 
exacerbate their flood risk, causing the interaction between these residents and the FRM 
authorities to be conflicted. Authorities directly involved in FRM often share the same 
FRM knowledge, but residents do not have access to this. In addition, they lack the 
expertise to understand or calculate flood risks and depend on the authorities to relay 
the information, which they may distrust. Moreover, they are heavily influenced by their 
own experience of flooding, which is often a stressful and emotional situation that the 
authorities do not share. As a result, a tension between the ‘facts’ and the ‘feelings’ of 
flood risk arises. 
Applying network management or meta-governance may solve a situation of conflict. 
For instance, FRM authorities may attempt to solve the conflicted situation between 
them and residents by changing the residents’ perceptions. This is an example of 
network structuring (Klijn et al. 1995). The NGP case showed that FRM authorities 
increased interaction with residents and shared information and knowledge in order to 
create understanding about the causes of flooding. In the cricket ground case, central 
government applied process management. When decision making was referred to 
central government, a mediator was appointed who tried to resolve the conflict between 
the actors, but the attempt was unsuccessful. 
The other two relations from Marsh and Smith’s dialectical model (2000) were also 
observed in this research. The relationship between the network and the context within 
which it operates is visible in how the actors address structures and changes in the 
context. Structures exist independently from the actors, but only become relevant when 
acknowledged by them. The research has shown examples of actors using or 
challenging structures to achieve their interest or trying to create new ones. The 
relationship between the governance network and the policy outcome was also clear: the 
characteristics of the actors affected their interactions, which in turn affected the 
outcome of FRM. This research therefore confirms the mutual influence of structure and 
agency. 
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Furthermore, understanding was gained of how the governance networks addressed a 
wicked problem. The actors in the governance networks were uncertain about the nature 
of the problem; there were discrepancies between some of the actors’ definitions of the 
problem; there was no true solution available; and decisions were taken within various 
policy fields and governmental levels. However, the governance networks also showed 
that another factor was important as identified by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004): the 
actors’ strategic choices, causing strategic uncertainty that influenced the problem-
solving process. Actors responded to uncertainty by collecting more information and 
conducting more research. However, some actors were exploiting the uncertainty to 
achieve their own goals. Therefore, actors in governance networks may increase the 
wickedness of a problem out of self-interest. On the other hand, governance networks 
may also be effective in dealing with wicked problems. Actors may create innovative 
solutions and adjust to any conflicts or complexities that occur during the process 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001, Parker 2007, Sørensen and Torfing 2007, Brownill and 
Carpenter 2009, Klijn et al. 2010a). How well a governance network is able to address a 
wicked problem seems related to the institutional capacity of that network. The higher 
this capacity, the more able actors are to overcome problems. 
Finally, this research has also shown how power is exercised in governance networks. 
The first dimension of power according to Lukes (2005, Hayward and Lukes 2008), 
comprises an observable form of power, which actors derive from resources, such as 
financial resources or knowledge. In the cases, these resources and power were 
dispersed amongst actors, with mainly the local planning authority, the EA and 
developers holding important resources used in negotiation. The influence of private 
developers using financial resources to exert power showed the influence of the free 
market in FRM and planning. This research has also shown that actors actively 
attempted to reduce the power of other actors. For instance, an important resource of the 
EA was their expertise and knowledge, but the developers, by creating their own 
knowledge, which was approved by government as being reliable, were able to reduce 
the power of the EA. 
The second dimension of power comprises influence over the governance network 
structure, the agenda and the rules. In the cases, central government had significant 
power in this dimension, by setting enforceable regulations and policies. Some of these 
rules provided central government with the power to decide on applications referred 
through the Flooding Direction; this power was observable in the first dimension. Some 
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of these rules also provided the EA with resources to exert power over others. In 
addition, local government had the power to control participation and set the agenda to 
some extent, which was part of the second dimension of power. Other actors who 
observed this power found that the decision-making process was unfair and to their 
disadvantage. 
The third dimension of power is hidden from direct observation and is difficult to 
identify. In governance networks, actors are interdependent and their behaviour is partly 
influenced by the power of other actors, even if it is not exerted. In addition, the third 
dimension of power is part of the governance of governance, where each outcome that 
is in harmony with the governmentality strengthens it. This type of power has been 
discussed by Foucault (for instance 1991).50 In the case of FRM, if governance 
networks decide that the benefits of development outweigh the costs and the principle of 
developing in a flood zone, the perceptions and preferences of all actors may be 
affected. For instance, actors may perceive development pressure to be a priority and 
development in flood risk zones may become the norm. Residents of new developments 
may then accept that they need to live with flood risk and be resilient. Furthermore, this 
research has shown that the EA has now changed their strategy within governance 
networks by reducing their sustained objections under pressure from a central 
government that is in favour of sustainable development. In this way, central 
government has the power to influence perceptions and preferences on the role of FRM 
in sustainable development. 
Therefore, by examining power in three dimensions, the power relationships between 
actors become visible. Power in the first dimension may seem fairly equally distributed 
and government seems an equal actor amongst others, as stated by Jessop (1999). 
However, when power in the second and third dimensions is included, the underlying 
hierarchical power structure becomes visible and asymmetrical network governance can 
be identified, as argued by Grix and Phillpots (2011). 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the data collected from two case studies by applying the 
theoretical framework. As a result, the key factors that influenced FRM were identified, 
which are derived from both structure and agency. These factors are: formation of the 
                                                
50 See sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.3. 
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governance network, hierarchical and market influence, actor characteristics, 
knowledge, flood events, and agency. In addition, the relationship between structure and 
agency is a key factor. Moreover, the outcomes of the networks are expected to 
influence future decision making on FRM. 
Firstly, the formation of a governance network is an important factor: in particular, 
which actors are involved and whether the network is formed voluntarily or through 
mandate. For example, if the EA are voluntarily involved in the early stages of the 
decision-making process, cooperation may be stimulated. The EA’s sole interest is to 
manage flood risk, which may conflict with other interests, and in addition, they hold 
veto power. 
Secondly, various structures influenced FRM, such as flood events that changed the 
governance network through interests, perceptions, preferences and resources. For 
instance, they contributed to knowledge development. However, flood risk is a wicked 
problem, with much uncertainty, which can cause problems within networks. In NGP, 
actors dealt with this uncertainty together, whilst in the cricket ground development, 
actors used this uncertainty to exert power. Furthermore, private developers had much 
influence in FRM. They were responsible for assessing and mitigating flood risk on site, 
with the council and the EA overseeing the process. Even though safety had priority, in 
both cases FRM was adapted to suit the development. 
Thirdly, agents, and in particular, individuals, played an important role. In NGP, the 
involvement of a different EA officer or planning officer might have resulted in a 
different FRM outcome. In the cricket ground development, agents used their resources 
to force decisions to be made that were close to their preferred outcomes: the council by 
using their decision-making power; the cricket club by stating they would leave their 
current location if they were not allowed to develop; the developers by developing 
knowledge to overcome the barrier of flood risk; the EA by using their power to refer an 
application; and the residents by organising themselves into a Local Residents’ Group. 
Moreover, the involvement of particular individuals may have exacerbated the conflict 
between the EA and the flood risk consultants, who were unable to negotiate a shared 
outcome. 
Fourthly, the case studies showed that agents affirmed, rejected and developed 
structures to achieve a common or individual goal. Most structures, such as flood 
events, existed independently from the actors. However, it was only the actors’ changes 
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in behaviour that caused these structures to become relevant. Therefore, the influences 
of structure and agency are inseparable. 
Finally, the outcomes of the governance networks have influenced the actors and FRM 
in general. Some of the actors have learned to adapt their behaviour within other 
governance networks, such as those who expect cooperation or conflict from other 
actors, thereby adapting their behaviour in anticipation when they encounter these actors 
in other networks. In addition, the outcomes of FRM have set examples in England; for 
instance, through promoting the use of SuDS, or by addressing the conflict between 
development pressure and flood risk. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis. Section 8.2 addresses the research questions and 
section 8.3 explains the contribution this thesis has made to research. This is followed 
by the limitations of the research in section 8.4. Finally, section 8.5 makes 
recommendations for future research. 
8.2 Addressing the research questions 
The overarching aim of this research was to explore the nature of network governance 
in FRM in local planning processes in England and its influence on the outcome of 
FRM. This was addressed by focusing on three questions as follows: 
1) How has network governance of FRM developed? 
Chapter 3 described developments in the governance system of FRM. In the past, FRM 
was the responsibility of regional water authorities funded by central government, with 
little influence from local authorities. This hierarchical system gradually changed over 
time. As a result, the provision of water and sewerage was transferred to the private 
sector, national FRM became the responsibility of a non-departmental public body 
(NDPB) and local authorities became responsible for local FRM. In addition, funding 
for FRM measures has changed. Central government has an agreement with private 
insurance companies, so that households can take out and pay for flood risk insurance to 
cover flood damage. Central government also attracts private investment to fund flood 
defence measures and allows communities take control of local FRM by providing 
funding. Individuals and communities are therefore encouraged to live with flood risk 
and to take their own measures to manage this risk. 
Moreover, FRM was traditionally aimed at controlling floods by implementing 
structural measures, but from the 1990s onwards, the focus shifted to managing flood 
risk by a combination of measures. Growing environmental awareness and 
understanding of the effects of climate change meant that FRM was now aimed at 
accepting flood risk, but managing the probability and the consequences of flooding 
using structural and non-structural measures. In addition, flood events created a sense of 
  206 
urgency to change the institutional setting of FRM. For instance, after the 2007 floods 
in England, the Pitt Review identified the need for change, resulting in the Flood and 
Water Management Act 2010. Through this Act, local authorities gained responsibility 
for all sources of local flooding and in the near future, the number of statutory 
consultees involved in drainage issues will be increased. As a result, the governance of 
FRM is a Type II governance, in which responsibility and accountability is dispersed 
amongst multiple authorities on various spatial levels (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010). 
This means that network arrangements play an important role, but simultaneously, 
hierarchical and market influences are present as well, resulting in a hybrid governance 
system. 
Moreover, planning became an important part of FRM as a non-structural measure. The 
inclusion of planning in FRM through the formal institutional framework started with a 
government circular released in 1947, stimulating interaction between planning and 
water authorities. Over the years, further circulars were released, but their 
implementation was limited. FRM became more important by its inclusion in PPG, later 
followed by PPSs and the NPPF. In addition, the EA gained more influence in the 
planning process by becoming a statutory consultee and by the introduction of the 
Flooding Direction. As a consequence, important decisions on FRM now take place 
within the planning system. The planning system has also experienced a shift from 
government to a hybrid form of governance. Public, semi-public and private actors are 
involved in the planning process, with central government currently increasing the role 
of the market and the community. 
In conclusion, the shift towards network governance in FRM has taken place within the 
FRM field itself and within the planning system of which it has increasingly become 
part. Multiple actors are involved in planning for FRM, who make decisions within 
governance networks. These governance networks have the key characteristics 
mentioned by Sørensen and Torfing (2007, 2009). Firstly, the networks are relatively 
stable, as the same composite actors and in some cases, the same individual actors are 
responsible for making decisions on FRM. The actors are operationally autonomous, but 
are dependent on each other to make decisions on FRM, because responsibilities and 
resources are dispersed. Secondly, the actors are from the public, semi-public and 
private sectors and from civil society. Thirdly, the actors interact through negotiations; 
this research has shown that often actors make concessions to meet each other’s 
interests, in order to achieve an agreed outcome. Fourthly, the governance network 
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operates within a formal and informal institutional framework. Fifthly, the network is 
self-regulating within limits set by external agencies, such as policies and regulations 
set by central government that govern the governance. Additionally, decisions are taken 
at a distance from central government; however, it retains the power to take over 
decision making under certain conditions. Finally, the network contributes to the 
production of public purpose, which is the management of flood risk. 
2) How do governance networks in FRM function? 
This question was divided into five sub-questions. These sub-questions all contained 
elements from the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. 
2a) How do governance networks in FRM form? 
Chapter 3 explained the development of network governance in FRM, which also 
covered the formation of governance networks in FRM. Governance networks can be 
formed for a variety of reasons: as a response to an urgent flood issue, voluntarily, or as 
a result of direct or indirect governmental direction. This research showed that 
governance networks were formed in stages and for a variety of reasons. At first, a 
small network was formed voluntarily, after which the network expanded. This 
expansion was at times voluntary but mostly through mandate, by the inclusion of 
statutory consultees in the planning process. 
For example, in the case of NGP, the network formed between the local planning 
authority and the EA. Later, the developers joined the network, in order to discuss 
development options and the WaSC became part of the network to discuss drainage 
issues. Councillors and residents became part of the network, not only through mandate, 
but also as part of a committee the local authority had created to discuss NGP and 
through informal consultation. In the case of the cricket ground, the network was 
formed voluntarily between the local planning authority and the cricket club. Later, the 
developers joined the network to discuss development options. Consultants became part 
of the network by working for the cricket club and developers on planning and flood 
risk issues. The EA, residents and councillors joined the network as part of the formal 
planning process through mandate. 
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2b) What actors are present? 
Chapter 3 identified a large group of key actors who may become involved in 
governance networks, from a variety of spatial levels and sectors. These actors have 
complex interrelationships within and outside governance networks. The issues the 
governance network addresses influences the involvement of actors, as different actors 
have different responsibilities and interests and operate on various spatial levels. 
Firstly, there are governmental actors on various spatial levels who develop regulations 
and policies on FRM. The EU produces directives, which state members have to 
transpose into national regulations. Central government develops these transposed 
regulations and also any additional regulations on FRM. In addition, Defra formulates 
FRM policy, provides funding and oversees the Environment Agency, whilst DCLG 
forms planning policy that affects FRM. The Secretary of State (SoS) is another 
influence on FRM, as he or she decides on planning applications that have been called 
in. On the local level, local government is responsible for local flood risk. It produces 
policies and plans aimed at managing flood risk and it is the decision maker for most 
planning applications. Local councillors are also involved in the planning process. 
Government does not hold all responsibility, as some outside agencies also have FRM 
functions. The Environment Agency, an NDPB, has the national strategic overview of 
flood risk, whilst private water and sewerage companies are responsible for the 
functioning of foul and surface water sewers. In some areas, Internal Drainage Boards 
oversee the drainage of land. Others, such as highway authorities, navigation 
authorities, emergency services and the Marine Management Organisation also manage 
flood risk as part of their specific responsibility. 
As flood damages to properties and businesses are covered by private insurance, 
insurance companies also play an important role in FRM. They have an interest in the 
reduction of flood risks and they therefore regularly interact with the government on 
this issue. Another national actor is CIRIA, who develops guidance for the construction 
sector and has produced guidance on implementing sustainable drainage. 
Finally, on the local level, developers are responsible for assessing and managing flood 
risk in a development and are therefore able to influence the way flood risk is managed. 
The community also has a great interest in issues with flood risk. Not only are some 
directly affected by flooding, they are now also offered the opportunity to develop flood 
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risk measures with government funding. Communities are supported by a national 
charity that aims to reduce the consequences of flood risk, called the National Flood 
Forum. 
As mentioned, the involvement of these different actors depends on the issue within the 
governance network. The two case studies showed that in the planning process for new 
development in England, the key actors involved are the local planning authority, the 
EA, developers, flood risk consultants, councillors and the community. In some cases, 
central government becomes involved, as well as other actors with an interest in FRM 
such as WaSCs and airports. 
2c) What are the characteristics of these actors (e.g. roles, responsibilities, interests, 
resources, perceptions and preferences)? 
Chapter 3 described some of the characteristics of the actors, but more detail on this was 
produced through the case studies. Firstly, the local authority has an interest in 
sustainable development, of which FRM is a part. The perception of flood risk differs 
by local authority, and is, for an important part, derived from their local policies. 
Resources differ by local authority as well. For instance, some authorities have flood 
risk experts in their planning department, which means they are better able to 
understand the technical language of flood risk and may be more able to influence FRM 
within development. 
Secondly, the EA’s interest is to manage flood risk, and they have great expertise in 
doing so. Their singular interest can conflict with the planning authority’s wider 
sustainability goals and with the developer’s interest in development. They have much 
expertise in and knowledge of flood risk, but developers may challenge this. 
Thirdly, the developers’ interest is to make profit by developing and they have the 
financial resources to do so. At the same time, they have to assess and manage flood 
risk. As flood risk calculations and models have a degree of uncertainty, they may 
attempt to challenge the flood risk calculations by the EA to achieve their interest. The 
government does not consider the EA as the only provider of reliable information and 
may accept alternative calculations from developers. 
Fourthly, the community is involved in the planning process: on some occasions the 
local authority invites them and on others they are part of mandated consultation. In 
some cases, councillors are directly involved in the decision-making process, whilst 
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others are part of the planning committee or are objecting to a particular scheme. If they 
are involved in the process, they share the same information and knowledge as the other 
actors involved, meaning their perception of flood risk is largely the same. However, 
when the councillors and the community are not directly involved, they do not share this 
knowledge. If a flood event occurs in their local area, their perception depends heavily 
on their flood experience. This research showed that residents are often concerned about 
new development exacerbating their flood risk and that these concerns are very 
persistent. They often mistrust other actors to effectively manage flood risk, such as the 
local authority and the WaSC, but mostly the developers. 
Fifthly, the WaSC becomes involved if underground drainage systems are involved in 
FRM. They support the development of sustainable forms of drainage, as this reduces 
pressure on the sewerage, but they are legally unable to adopt any features that are not 
underground pipes or tanks, whilst they also have to justify any investment to Ofwat. 
Therefore, their resources are limited. 
Finally, central government becomes involved if an application is referred and called in. 
This research has shown that this may occur if the EA sustains its objection to an 
application. If the application is discussed in a public inquiry and decided upon by the 
SoS, it is the SoS’s interest to follow national planning policy, which currently has a 
presumption in favour of sustainable development. 
2d) How do actors interact? 
Actors in governance networks meet formally and informally. They negotiate on 
development and FRM and go through processes of cooperation and conflict. At times, 
they are able to overcome conflict and to negotiate any issues, but at other times the 
network fails. The interaction is dependent on the actors’ characteristics and the 
network structure; for instance, actors that are able to align their perceptions and 
preferences, cooperate and combine their resources to reach an outcome. This 
cooperation creates a network structure with a high level of institutional capacity. 
However, if actors’ perceptions and preferences diverge, conflict may arise and the 
network structure will not enable fruitful negotiation. In addition, the wider context may 
influence interaction. 
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2e) How do the wider context and the governance network interact? 
Chapter 3 and the case studies showed that there are various structures and agents 
present in wider context that may affect the governance network: 
• Formal institutions: the governance network has to comply with regulations and 
policies on FRM. The lack of regulations can cause barriers to FRM, for 
instance on adoption and responsibility of SuDS. The presence of regulations 
can also be a barrier to some actors; for instance, the Flooding Direction is an 
important resource for the EA to achieve their goals, but can be a frustrating 
delay for the developer. In addition, policies may be open to interpretation, such 
as the weight of FRM policies versus planning policies on stimulating 
development. The actors can choose to affirm or reject formal structures, based 
on their preference. For instance, the lack of regulations can be overcome by 
making agreements amongst each other, whilst actors can also use ambiguity in 
policies to argue their case. 
• Government and policy change: development in government and policy means 
that the governance network has to adapt to new formal institutions or a new 
central government actor. 
• Climate change: central government and the EA are producing scientific 
evidence of the effects of climate change, whilst central government 
incorporates climate change into policies on FRM. Furthermore, climate change 
increases the uncertainty of flood risk. Local actors may have difficulty 
understanding the precise impacts of climate change in their local area. 
Translating the results of research conducted on climate change to a local area is 
complicated and there is much uncertainty involved. In addition, climate change 
effects are not easily measured, because individual weather events cannot be 
attributed to climate change. 
• Flood events: flooding has an important influence on governance networks in 
FRM. Firstly, it can affect actor participation. A flood event in the area of a 
proposed development causes a flood risk issue, which means more actors 
become involved, such as the EA and residents. Secondly, a flood event can 
change the characteristics of actors. It may increase the awareness and alter 
perceptions of flood risk, increasing the priority of FRM. It may also increase 
knowledge of flood risk, influencing FRM. Lastly, a national flood event may 
change the institutional framework of FRM, which affects the responsibilities, 
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roles and resources of actors. For example, the 2007 floods in England initiated 
the publication of the Pitt Review and the creation of the Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010. One of the results of the new Act was the establishment 
of Local Lead Flood Authorities,51 which became responsible for managing 
local flood risk. 
• Economic situation: the importance of development due to a recession or 
development pressure may outweigh the principle and cost of building in areas 
of flood risk. This research showed that in some cases the economic benefits of 
development are considered more important than FRM policy that prohibits 
residential development in floodplains, such as in the cricket ground 
development. 
• Governance: the governance system of FRM influences which actors are 
involved in the governance network and their roles, responsibilities and 
resources. Network governance arrangements play an important role, but these 
arrangements include hierarchical and market influences. Actors involved are 
from the public, semi-public and private sectors and from civil society, but 
responsibility, accountability and authority are fragmented. For instance, in the 
NGP case, there were issues with which authority would take on the 
responsibility for the adoption and maintenance of the SuDS. As a result, 
responsibility was divided: the local authority adopted the SuDS ponds, but a 
private management company established by the developers became responsible 
for their maintenance. 
3) What are the key factors in network governance that influence FRM? 
This research has shown that a variety of key factors, derived from the influence of 
structure and agency, have an effect on FRM. The first key factor is the type of network 
governance in FRM. There is a multitude of actors with varying roles and 
responsibilities in managing flood risk, who interact within the governance networks. At 
times, problems are caused over responsibilities for FRM or when interests conflict. In 
addition, governance networks have some discretion, but are influenced by the strategic 
line and the dominant governmentality. Central government issues regulations and 
policies, which governance networks are expected to comply with. Therefore, central 
government is able to exert power over actors. This power is not always directly 
observable, but may take place as part of the governance of governance. The private 
                                                
51 These are county councils or unitary authorities. 
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sector also plays an important role in the networks through the influence of developers. 
The resulting governance system is, therefore, hybrid with influences from networks, 
hierarchy and the market. 
Secondly, actor characteristics play an important role; not just the characteristics of the 
composite actor, but also individual traits. In particular, an actor’s perception is an 
important factor. Perceptions shape the actor’s definition of the policy problem, what 
type of outcome they can visualise and how they see other actors. Some actors’ 
perceptions are centred on development, whilst others focus on FRM. If a perception 
allows for development and FRM to be combined, the actors can cooperate and the 
network can work towards an agreed outcome. As actors cooperate over a longer period 
of time and develop mutual trust, the network develops institutional capacity, which 
helps actors to overcome conflict. However, if actors cannot visualise an outcome they 
all agree on, or when they do not wish to cooperate with others, conflict arises. Actors 
are able to adjust their perceptions, but will not do so when they do not trust other 
actors. Examples are residents insisting on believing that development increases their 
flood risk, or the EA not accepting alternative flood risk calculations. As a result, a 
network may fail to reach a decision, in particular if the actor with the objection has 
veto power. 
Perception is affected by various structures. An example is local planning policy for a 
local authority; if there is much emphasis on relieving development pressure in areas at 
risk of flooding, it is inclined to put greater weight on the benefits of development over 
the principle of building in flood zones. However, structures are not the only 
determinant; agency, such as individual skills and preferences, also matters. Individual 
actors can therefore influence FRM. 
In addition, resources such as financial resources and knowledge are important parts of 
the actors’ characteristics, which actors may use to exert power. Knowledge is dispersed 
amongst actors. Historically, the EA held the most expertise on flood risk, but now local 
authorities and flood risk consultants are developing their own knowledge. As flood risk 
predictions are open to interpretation, they may be manipulated to achieve a single 
interest and used to exert power over others. 
Thirdly, a crucial factor is formed by flood events, which affects actor participation, 
perceptions and knowledge. A proposed development that is in an area with flood 
experience activates a governance network with actors who have an interest in FRM; in 
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particular, community involvement may be increased. Flood experience also alters 
actors’ perceptions. On the one hand, it can increase the urgency of implementing FRM 
in a new development, stimulating cooperation between actors. On the other hand, it can 
increase concerns that development enhances the risk of flooding and that the flood risk 
measures planned are not sufficient, therefore creating conflict between actors. Lastly, 
flood events also change knowledge on flood risk, often increasing the flood risk in an 
area, which may affect FRM. 
In conclusion, structures influence FRM, but each governance network exists in a 
specific temporal and spatial context, in which particular structures exist. The agents 
actively use these structures to achieve a collective or individual interest. They may 
affirm, reject or develop a structure. The agents also create the social structure of the 
governance network by institutionalised interaction. Agents also act within specific 
contexts, but have the ability to influence structures or use certain structures to 
influence other actors’ behaviour. Therefore, both structure and agency influence the 
outcome of FRM. 
8.3 Contribution to research 
This research has firstly contributed to the debate on network governance by developing 
a theoretical framework for analysis. This framework built on research by Sørensen and 
Torfing (2007) who provided a definition of governance networks. Even though this 
definition provided guiding elements to examine decision making in governance 
networks, it did not explain how these elements interrelated. Therefore, the framework 
showed the relationships between these elements and explained how they may influence 
the outcome of the governance network. Furthermore, this research has also contributed 
to a second generation of network governance research by examining the functioning of 
governance networks in practice. The theoretical framework showed different key 
elements that may explain the functioning and outcome of a governance network. These 
factors comprise structures and agents, which are internal or external to the network. As 
a result, knowledge of the functioning of governance networks may be gained. 
In addition, this research has shown that the dialectical model by Marsh and Smith 
(2000) can be applied to network governance research. By applying the dialectical 
relationships between the structure of the network and the agents, between the network 
and the context within which it operates and between the network and the policy 
  215 
outcome, the key factors that influence the outcome became clear. However, the model 
needed to be adapted to become suitable for analysing governance networks, for 
instance by including the influence of governance in the wider context. This resulted in 
the theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, this thesis has contributed to the debate on hybrid forms of governance, 
which include the influence of networks, hierarchy and the market (e.g. Scharpf 1994, 
Whitehead 2003, Bache and Flinders 2004, Swyngedouw 2005, Grix and Phillpots 
2011, Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). This thesis has also added to research on specific 
cases on hybrid forms of governance (e.g. Skelcher 2000, Laffin 2009). In the shift from 
government to governance, central government has retained some of its power and is 
able to directly and indirectly affect governance networks. Some forms of power are 
difficult to observe, in particular the power that is present in the third dimension (Lukes 
2005) and as part of the governmentality (e.g. Foucault et al. 1988). The theoretical 
framework enables the identification of all three dimensions of power through the 
relationships between the actors within the network and the relationship between the 
network and the wider environment. Moreover, this thesis provided examples of Type II 
multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2010), in which responsibility for 
FRM is fragmented, but it has shown that this type of governance is not as flexible as 
Hooghe and Marks suggest. 
This research has also contributed to FRM research. It confirms some findings of past 
research by Tunstall et al. (2009), which showed that actors in FRM may have 
diverging perceptions and definitions of flood risk. This research has expanded on this 
by examining the decision-making process in detail and finding explanations for these 
different perceptions and the influence this has on the outcome of FRM. Moreover, this 
research confirms some of the research findings by Pardoe et al. (2011), such as that 
FRM is decided on a case-by-case basis and that the actors negotiate to solve the 
conflict between land, water and people. However, the process of negotiation is not 
always ‘sensible’ (Pardoe et al. 2011: 2900) and the actors are not always able to make 
compromises. Finally, the research also showed in more detail how certain structures 
influence FRM, including those identified by Richards (2005) as stakeholder practice, 
development pressure and flood experience. Therefore, it has contributed to knowledge 
on governance networks in FRM. 
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8.4 Limitations of the research 
This research has examined two case studies, which means there are limitations to 
generalisation. There are some common key factors identified in both cases, which may 
also be applicable to other governance networks in FRM. However, each network is 
also completely different. The local situation, the period in which it took place and the 
presence of different individuals are only three of the factors that influence the network 
and the outcome. Both case studies do show the continuing conflict between 
development and FRM, which is not solved easily or uniformly. 
An important limitation in data collection was the openness of participants. Even though 
participants were guaranteed anonymity, some participants might have still withheld 
information, especially on sensitive issues such as conflict between actors or within the 
organisation. In particular, planning officers might have been sensitive to this, as their 
participation in planning processes is publicly available. Despite these limitations, it has 
been possible to address the research questions with the data that was available. 
Furthermore, as structures were of importance in the analysis, the researcher has had to 
judge which structures might have been influential and find a balance between a case 
becoming too narrow or too broad. As structures only exist within the temporal and 
spatial horizons of action pursued by actors, and actors always act within specific action 
contexts formed by institutions and the interaction of other social actors (Smith 2000, 
Jessop 2008), only structures that were relevant to the governance network and their 
related actors have been included. Documents and interviews were analysed and 
parallels between potential influential structures and agents were sought. National 
structures have only been included if this was found to be directly influential, such as a 
change in the SoS. As a consequence, all structures that mattered to the actors in the 
network were included. 
8.5 Recommendations for further research 
This research examined governance networks in FRM, which showed the various issues 
actors have to address when deciding on how to manage flood risk. FRM can at times 
be considered to be a barrier to development, however some of the solutions provided in 
the case studies were innovative and showed that it is possible to integrate the two. 
Even then, issues can arise with adoption, maintenance or responsibility of flood risk 
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measures. However, a governance network with a high degree of institutional capacity 
has much potential to find solutions to these problems. 
This research has shown two contrasting governance networks. In one network, a group 
of actors worked together, overcame barriers, developed new structures and 
implemented innovative flood risk measures. In the other network, there was a strong 
conflict between development and flood risk and the actors were unable to come to an 
agreed solution. As a result, the outcomes of these two networks were very different. 
However, each network outcome influences how people live and how they experience 
flooding in the future. Therefore, it is important to consider how the role of FRM in 
sustainable development is defined. 
Future research may therefore take place in the fields of network governance and FRM. 
Firstly, more understanding may be developed of the functioning of governance 
networks. The theoretical framework developed can be applied to future network 
governance research outside the FRM field, to test its suitability. By identifying key 
factors that influence governance network outcomes in other fields, understanding of 
the relationships between agents, structures and the wider context can develop. In 
particular, comparative research on successful and unsuccessful networks may explain 
how actors are able to develop institutional capacity. In that way, recommendations may 
be developed for actors in governance networks to stimulate cooperation and prevent 
network failure. 
In addition, more research can be conducted on FRM governance networks. More 
understanding can be developed of decision making between actors involved in FRM 
and how they respond to the conflict between development and flood risk. Research 
may also be aimed at network management, to improve interaction in those cases where 
there is much conflict, or to investigate how to align residents’ perceptions of flood risk 
with the perceptions of experts. Finally, research may focus on the outcomes of the 
governance networks that decide on FRM and the short- and long-term effects on the 
probability and consequences of flooding.
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Appendix A Key regulations on flood risk management and planning 
in England 
This appendix provides the key regulations that are relevant to FRM and planning in 
England.52 These are visualised in Figure 33. 
European legislation 
The main purpose of the EU Floods Directive of 2007 is to protect inland surface 
waters, coastal waters and groundwater; the management of floods and droughts is 
considered a sub-goal. The Directive was transposed into English law through the Flood 
Risk Regulations 2009. The Directive requires Preliminary Flood Risk Assessments to 
be published for river basin districts with the aim of identifying areas at significant risk 
of flooding. These were completed in 2011 by the Environment Agency (EA) for 
flooding from main rivers, the sea and reservoirs, and by Lead Local Flood Authorities 
(LLFAs) for local flood risk of ordinary watercourses, surface water and groundwater. 
For river basin districts at risk of flooding, flood hazard maps and flood risk maps were 
completed in December 2013, whilst FRM plans are due to be completed in 2015 
(European Commission 2007). 
The Water Framework Directive of 2000 focuses on water quality of groundwater and 
inland and coastal water in water basin districts. It also aims to prevent the deterioration 
and enhance the status of aquatic ecosystems (European Commission 2000, 2003). With 
regard to flood risk, the Directive states that it ‘contributes to mitigating the effects of 
floods and droughts’ (European Commission 2000: 5), but only if this affects water 
quality or the aquatic environment. For example, flood defence schemes, such as 
changes to floodplains, may adversely affect plants and fish (Davis and Cunningham 
2004). In addition, if surface or sewer floodwaters spill into watercourses or infiltrate 
into groundwater, deterioration of water quality may occur. The Directive was 
transposed into English law through the Water Environment (Water Framework 
Directive) Regulations 2003 and the EA has become responsible for developing river 
basin management plans to comply with this Directive. 
 
 
                                                
52 As of December 2013. 
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National legislation 
The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires regional and local planning 
authorities to exercise their functions with the objective of contributing to the 
achievement of sustainable development. 
The Land Drainage Act 1991 describes the Internal Drainage Boards (IDBs). These are 
independent bodies responsible for land drainage in areas of special drainage need. The 
Act states that IDBs, and local authorities where there is no IDB, may maintain or 
construct watercourses or drainage works on watercourses, apart from main rivers, to 
prevent flooding or mitigating any damage caused by flooding, as necessary. 
The Environment Act 1995 describes the establishment of the EA, which took over 
functions such as flood defence from the National Rivers Authority. The objective of 
the EA is to protect or enhance the environment and to make a contribution towards 
sustainable development. 
The Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, as 
amended in 2006, makes the EA a statutory consultee for developments where flood 
risk is an issue. This is where a major development53 is proposed in a flood zone 2 or 3, 
a development in a flood zone 1 where there are critical drainage problems, any 
development larger than one hectare, a development 20 metres from the bank top of a 
main river and any culverting operation or development which controls the flow of any 
river or stream. 
The Flood and Water Management Bill 2010 describes the role and responsibilities for 
risk management authorities, which are the EA, local authorities, IDBs, water 
companies and highway authorities. The EA now exercises a general supervision over 
all matters relating to flood and coastal erosion risk management and formulates a 
National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy (Defra and 
Environment Agency 2011). The LLFAs (the unitary authority for the area, or the 
county council) develop a local FRM strategy. They are responsible for flood and water 
management, but may delegate functions to other risk management authorities. In the 
                                                
53 A major development is a residential development with more than ten dwellings or a site area of more 
than 0.5 hectares, or a non-residential development where the floor space is 1,000 m2 or more, or the site 
area is one hectare or more. 
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future,54 the LLFAs will also be responsible for adopting and maintaining SuDS through 
their SuDS Approval Bodies (SABs), except for single properties and roads. 
National planning policy 
The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) has, at its heart, a presumption in 
favour of sustainable development. This means that local planning authorities should 
positively seek opportunities to meet the development needs of their area, whilst taking 
economic, social and environmental dimensions into account. Regarding FRM, one of 
the policies in the NPPF is to meet the challenge of climate, flooding and coastal 
change. Local authorities should take full account of flood risk and should direct 
development away from areas at the highest risk of flooding. If development is 
necessary, development should be made safe without increasing flood risk elsewhere. 
To achieve this, local plans should apply a sequential test to plan development away 
from flood zones and an exception test to determine if development in a flood zone is 
necessary. Local plans should be informed by a Strategic Flood Risk Assessment 
(SFRA), whilst developments with a flood risk should conduct a site-specific flood risk 
assessment (DCLG 2012a). 
The NPPF Technical Guidance goes into more detail on how to conduct an SFRA and 
sequential and exception tests. It describes the flood zones, which determine if a site-
specific flood risk assessment is necessary and what development would be appropriate. 
Flood zone 1 has a low probability of flooding, which is less than 0.1% annually. Flood 
zone 2 has a medium probability of flooding, for river flooding between 0.1% and 1% 
annually and for coastal flooding between 0.1% and 0.5% annually. Highly vulnerable 
development such as emergency services, caravans and hazardous storage are only 
permitted if they pass the exception test. Flood zone 3a has a high probability, which is 
more than 1% annually for river flooding and more than 0.5% annually for coastal 
flooding. Highly vulnerable development is not allowed, but more vulnerable 
development, such as hospitals, care homes and landfill sites and essential infrastructure 
such as evacuation routes and electricity and water provisions are permitted if the 
exception test is passed. Flood zone 3b is a functional floodplain, where water has to 
flow or be stored in times of flood. Only water-compatible uses are allowed and 
essential infrastructure needs to pass the exception test. 
 
                                                
54 As of December 2013, this was expected in 2014. 
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Other plans 
Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs) are created by the EA and include an 
overview of flood risk across a river catchment. They also recommend ways of 
managing those risks now and over the next 50–100 years. The EA also develops 
Shoreline Management Plans, which are an assessment of the risks associated with 
coastal processes.  
Finally, Surface Water Management Plans outline the preferred surface water 
management strategy in a local area, conducted by local actors, such as the local 
authority, water and sewerage companies, the EA and IDBs. This plan is not required by 
legislation, but is developed voluntarily.  
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Figure 33: Current regulations on flood risk management and planning 
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Appendix B Key events in flood risk management in England 
Year Event 
1427 Sewers Act Establishment of commissioners of sewers, the first drainage authorities 
1909 Planning Act First Act allowing local authorities to prepare planning schemes 
1947 Thames floods Fluvial flooding 
   ″ Circular on development in floodplains First policy that converged FRM and planning; local planning authorities to liaise 
with river boards in order to prevent development in floodplains 
1953 East coast of England floods Coastal flooding; led to construction of Thames Barrier 
1962  Circular on development in floodplains Aimed at strengthening liaison processes between local planning authorities and 
water authorities and preventing development in floodplains 
1968 Town and Country Planning Act 1968 New system of structure plans and local plans 
1969 Circular on development in floodplains Aimed at strengthening liaison processes between local planning authorities and 
water authorities and preventing development in floodplains 
1982 Circular on development in floodplains Aimed at strengthening liaison processes between local planning authorities and 
water authorities and preventing development in floodplains 
1989 Water Act 1989 Privatisation of water companies and establishment of the National Rivers Authority 
1992 Circular on development in areas at risk of flooding Local authorities to liaise with the NRA and to restrict development in flood risk 
areas 
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Year Event 
1995 Environment Act 1995 Establishment of the Environment Agency to replace the NRA 
1998 Flooding in various parts of England Fluvial and pluvial flooding 
2000 Flooding in various parts of England Mainly fluvial flooding 
2001 Planning Policy Guidance 25 PPG on development and flood risk 
2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 Establishment of LDFs and statutory duty in planning to contribute towards 
sustainable development 
2005 Making Space for Water Government document developing comprehensive approach to manage future floods 
   ″ Floods in Cumbria Fluvial flooding 
2006 Planning Policy Statement 25 PPS on development and flood risk to replace PPG25 
   ″ EA statutory consultee in planning process EA is a statutory consultee if development is in flood zones 2 and 3, if the area has 
critical drainage problems, if it is one hectare or more or near a main river 
2007 Floods in various parts of England Included widespread pluvial flooding 
   ″ Flooding Direction If a local authority intents to approve a planning application against the EA’s advice, 
it has to be referred to the Secretary of State 
2008 PPS25 Practice Guide Practice guide to accompany PPS25, providing guidelines on how to implement 
development and flood risk policies 
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Year Event 
   ″ Pitt Review Independent review on the 2007 floods 
2009 Floods in Cumbria Mainly fluvial flooding 
2010 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 Establishment of LLFAs and national strategy for flooding 
2012 Floods in various parts of England Heavy rainfall events and fluvial, pluvial, sewer and groundwater flooding 
   ″ NPPF National Planning Policy Framework and Technical Guidance 
2013 Consultation on Flood Re New insurance system for flooding damage 
2014 Schedule 3 Flood and Water Management Act 2010  Estimated implementation date55 of Schedule 3, which establishes SuDS Approving 
Bodies 
Table 6: Key events in flood risk management in England 
 
                                                
55 As of December 2013. 
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Appendix C  Key actors in flood risk management in England 
Actor Type Role in planning 
process 
Interest Scale of action 
EU Public Legislator Managing flood risk in EU in public interest Directives are transposed into 
British law, influencing national 
and local policy 
Central government Public Legislator, policy 
maker and 
implementer 
Managing flood risk in England in public 
interest and plan for sustainable 
development 
Policy formation on national level; 
directly and indirectly policy 
formation and implementation on 
local level 
Local government Public Legislator, policy 
maker and 
implementer 
Managing flood risk in local area in public 
interest and plan for sustainable 
development 
Policy formation and 
implementation on local level 
Environment Agency NDPB Statutory consultee56 Managing flood risk and water quality Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Water and sewerage 
companies 
Private Consultee Managing water provision and sewerage; 
profit for shareholders 
Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
                                                
56 The EA becomes a statutory consultee when certain conditions have been met; see for instance Appendix A. 
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Actor Type Role in planning 
process 
Interest Scale of action 
Internal Drainage 
Boards 
NDPB Consultee Managing drainage Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Highway authorities Various Statutory consultee57 Managing roads (incl. run off) Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Canal & River Trust Not for profit Statutory consultee58 Managing canals and rivers Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Navigation authorities Various Consultee Managing waterways etc. Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Marine Management 
Organisation 
NDPB Consultee Managing the marine environment Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
                                                
57 The Highway Agency becomes a statutory consultee when a development is likely to affect the strategic road network, or under certain other conditions. The local highway 
authority becomes a statutory consultee when a development involves a new access to the highway network or an increase in traffic movements. 
58 The Canal & River Trust become a statutory consultee when a development is likely to affect canals or nearby areas. 
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Actor Type Role in planning 
process 
Interest Scale of action 
Emergency services Various Consultee Managing emergencies (incl. flooding) Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Insurance companies Private Provide flood 
insurance 
Providing private insurance (incl. flood 
insurance); profit for shareholders 
Policy formation on national level 
CIRIA Not for profit Research and 
guidance for 
construction industry 
Providing business improvement services 
and research activities for members 
Policy formation on national level 
and indirect influence on policy 
implementation  
Communities Private / civil 
society 
Consultation, 
involvement 
Individual and community interest Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
Developers Private Applicant Realising development / profit Policy formation and 
implementation on national and 
local level 
National Flood Forum Not for profit Consultee Lobbying on behalf of communities Policy formation on national and 
local level (through Community 
Groups) 
Table 7: Actors, roles and interests involved in flood risk management 
Source: DCLG 2009, 2013, Flood and Water Management Act 2010: Chapter 29  2010 
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Appendix D Shortlist of case options  
Name of 
project 
 
Location Develop-
ment 
Application 
start 
Interaction Approval/
Objection 
EA 
Compliance 
with FRM 
policy 
Network Flood issue Planning 
stage 
Newcastle 
Great Park 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
Mixed; 1200 
acres 
1999 Cooperation EA 
approves 
Outline 
application 
before 
PPS25 
Large: 
residents, 
council, EA, 
developers, 
water 
company 
Flood 
experience 
Being built 
Cricket club 
grounds 
Chelmsford, 
Essex 
Mixed; 413 
dwellings, 
cricket club, 
retail, offices 
2008 Conflict EA objects Conflicts 
with PPS25 
Large: 
residents, 
council, EA, 
developers, 
cricket club, 
SoS 
Flood 
experience, 
political 
Approved 
by SoS 
Cleevelands Bishops Cleeve, 
Tewkesbury, 
Gloucestershire 
Housing; 550  2010 Conflict EA 
approves, 
parish 
council 
objects 
Complies 
with PPS25 
Medium: 
parish 
council, 
district 
council, 
residents, 
EA, 
developer 
Flood 
experience 
Decision 
not taken 
yet 
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Name of 
project 
 
Location Develop-
ment 
Application 
start 
Interaction Approval/
Objection 
EA 
Compliance 
with FRM 
policy 
Network Flood issue Planning 
stage 
Brigg Brigg, North 
Lincolnshire 
Housing; 60  2010 Conflict EA 
approves, 
town 
council 
objects 
Complies 
with PPS25 
Medium: 
town council, 
district 
council, EA, 
developer 
Flood 
experience 
Approved 
by 
committee 
Broad Street Portsmouth Housing; 17 2007 Conflict EA objects Conflicts 
with PPS25 
Medium: 
council, EA, 
developer, 
SoS 
Flood zone 
and 
development 
pressure 
Referred to 
SoS 
Tipner Portsmouth Mixed; 518 
dwellings 
2010 Cooperation EA 
approves 
Complies 
with PPS25 
Medium Flood zone 
and 
development 
pressure 
Decision 
not taken 
yet 
Scottish & 
Southern 
Energy Depot 
Portsmouth Housing; 162 2009 Cooperation EA objects Conflicts 
with PPS25; 
insufficient 
FRA 
Medium Flood zone 
and 
development 
pressure 
Decision 
not taken 
yet 
Brent Cross 
regeneration 
London Mixed 2010 Cooperation EA 
approves 
Complies 
with PPS25 
Medium Flood zone 
and 
development 
pressure 
Being built 
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Name of 
project 
 
Location Develop-
ment 
Application 
start 
Interaction Approval/
Objection 
EA 
Compliance 
with FRM 
policy 
Network Flood issue Planning 
stage 
Thames 
Gateway / 
Northfleet 
Embankment 
 
Kent Mixed; 2670 
dwellings, 
154,000 m2 
office 
2009 Cooperation EA 
approves 
Complies 
with PPS25 
Medium Flood zone 
and 
development 
pressure 
Being built 
Table 8: Shortlist of cases 
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Appendix E Documents collected on Newcastle Great Park 
Note: In some document titles, names have been replaced by the function of the person, 
e.g. Planning Officer, for ethical reasons. 
 
Planning application documents 
Draft master plan for the Northern Development Area,  Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners (1999) Environmental Statement, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Proposal: Outline planning application 
OUT/01/1200/98, 4 November, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1999) Outline application for Newcastle Great Park 
99/1300/01/OUT, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2000) Section 106 agreement, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2004) 'Sustainable drainage' in Development Site Strategy 
Statement for Cell G, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council, 36–46. 
Newcastle City Council (2010) Section 106 agreement, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Newcastle City Council. 
 
Policy documents and associated reports 
DoE (1989) Regional Planning Guidance: Strategic guidance for Tyne and Wear, 
London: HMSO. 
Government Office for the North East (2007) North East of England Regional Spatial 
Strategy, London: TSO. 
Hollox, R. (1996) City of Newcastle upon Tyne Unitary Development Plan: Report of 
the public local inquiry November 1994 – June 1995, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
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Newcastle City Council (1992) Draft Unitary Development plan: Report on a) public 
consultation b) public opinion survey c) list of consultees, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1993) Unitary Development Plan: Deposit stage, Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Master Plan and Supplementary Planning Document for 
Newcastle Great Park, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Master plan for the Northern Development Area, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Newcastle upon Tyne Unitary Development Plan, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2006) Newcastle Great Park Revised Master Plan and 
Sustainability Appraisal: Statement of consultation and representations, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2006) Newcastle Great Park Supplementary Planning 
Document: Final sustainability report, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2006) Revised Master Plan and Supplementary Planning 
Document for Newcastle Great Park, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
 
Newcastle Great Park other documents 
Bryant Homes, Swan Hill, Leech Homes and CIN LaSalle (1998) Northern 
Development Area Invitation: Exhibitions and public meeting May–June 1998, 
Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Councillor (n.d.) Letter to residents of Newcastle, unpublished. 
Developer (n.d.) Newcastle Great Park SuDS summary, unpublished. 
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Newcastle City Council (1999) Northern Development Area: Publicity for public 
inquiry and pre-inquiry meeting, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council.!
Newcastle City Council (2003) Newcastle Great Park Newsletter, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Northern Development Area response sheet, Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1998) Northern Development Area proposals, 21 August, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (1999) Northern Development Area: Publicity for public 
inquiry and pre-inquiry meeting, 25 May, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
Newcastle City Council (dates between 28 January 1998 – December 2001) Northern 
Development Area: Northern Development Area Bulletins Number 1–8, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2000) Newcastle Great Park Phase 1 works, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (dates between 2007 – 2009) Newcastle Great Park Community 
News, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2013) Newcastle Great Park West development and capacity 
framework, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle City Council (n.d.) Plan of Newcastle Great Park, unpublished. 
Newcastle Great Park Consortium (n.d.) Newcastle Great Park stormwater 
management, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Newcastle Great Park Project Office (2003) Great News: A round up of 2003 and 
what’s coming up, Issue 1, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Newcastle Great Park Project Office (2013) Newcastle Great Park’ [online], available: 
http://www.newcastlegreatpark.com [accessed 15 December 2013]. 
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Newcastle Liberal Democrats (1999) Focus on Newcastle Great Park (Northern 
Development Area): A message from your Liberal Democrat councillors, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle Liberal Democrats. 
 
Flood risk management reports 
AECOM (2009) Newcastle Gateshead Surface Water Management Plan, Gateshead and 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Gateshead Borough & Newcastle City Councils. 
AECOM (2010) Newcastle Gateshead Outline Water Cycle Study, Gateshead and 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Gateshead Borough & Newcastle City Councils. 
Association of North East Councils and JBA (2010) North East Regional Flood Risk 
Appraisal, Newcastle upon Tyne: Association of North East Councils. 
Climate North East (2008) The North East climate change adaptation study: Case 
3 North Gosforth/Ouseburn Integrated Urban Drainage, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Association of North East Councils. 
JBA (2010) Newcastle SFRA: Level 1, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Kennedy, M. and Hyslop, N. (2012) 'Tyneside sustainable sewerage pilot study: 
Development of an integrated, partnership approach to the provision of 
sustainable sewerage' [online], available: 
http://www.waterprojectsonline.com/case_studies/2012/Northumbrian_Tyneside_
Sewerage_2012.pdf [accessed 2 April 2013]. 
Newcastle City Council (2008) Note on flood risk and integrated water management, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Ouseburn Catchment Steering Group (2009) Public engagement: A report on the public 
engagement activities in the upper Ouseburn, Newcastle upon Tyne: Ouseburn 
Catchment Steering Group. 
PURE Ouseburn (2006) Draft Ouseburn Catchment Plan, Newcastle upon Tyne: PURE 
Ouseburn. 
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Minutes of meetings and associated reports 
Development Control Committee (1998) Minutes from 20 November, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Development Control Committee (1999) Minutes from 30 November, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Development Control Committee (2002) Minutes from 1 February, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Development Control Committee (2002) Newcastle Great Park – amendment to section 
106 agreement, 17 May, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Development Control Committee (2005) Minutes from 28 October, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Gosforth and North Newcastle Area Committee (2003) Minutes extract from 20 
November, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Melbury & Warkworth Woods Residents' Association (dates between 28 April 2010 – 
31 May 2011) Minutes of meetings, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
Newcastle City Council (2007) Regeneration Scrutiny Panel: Newcastle Great Park: 
Current position, 19 March, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee (dates between 10 June 2002 – 21 March 
2011) Minutes of meetings and associated reports, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Newcastle City Council. 
Newcastle Great Park Sub-Committee (dates between 19 July 2001 – 13 May 2002) 
Minutes of meetings and associated reports, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle 
City Council. 
Northern Development Area Officer Working Group (dates between 17 November 1997 
– 16 March 1998) Minutes of meetings, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
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Northern Development Area Sub Committee (dates between 26 March 1998 – 12 
November 2001) Minutes of meetings, Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle City 
Council. 
 
Residents’ Association reports 
Residents' Association (2012) Annual General Meeting, Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Residents' Association. 
Residents' Association (2012) List of issues, Newcastle upon Tyne: Residents' 
Association. 
 
Newspaper articles and other media 
Ashby, R. (2004) ‘Focus on Newcastle Great Park’, The Journal, 1 September. 
Evans, T. (2004) ‘A development showing the way to success with mixed-use formula’, 
The Journal, 1 September. 
Hedley, J. (2001) 'Great Park homes 'will not face flooding risk'', The Journal, 7 July. 
Hughes, A. (2011) ‘Over 50 Taylor Wimpey homes at Great Park, Newcastle built 
illegally’, 23 April, The Journal [online], available: 
http://www.thejournal.co.uk/news/north-east-news/over-50-taylor-wimpey-
homes-4435181#ixzz1KKbffH3I [accessed 23 March 2013]. 
Northern Echo (2004) ‘Great Park may generate 30,000 jobs’, 10 November [online], 
available: 
http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/archive/2004/11/10/6972208.Great_Park_may
_generate_30_000_jobs/?ref=arc [accessed 23 January 2014]. 
Northern Echo (2004) ‘Developing a future where people can work, rest and play’, 30 
November [online], available: 
http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/archive/2004/11/30/6969878.Developing_a_fu
ture_where_people_can_work__rest_and_play [accessed 23 January 2014]. 
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Northern Echo (2005) ‘Park will redress housing balance’ [online], available: 
http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/archive/2005/10/04/7146410.Park_will__redre
ss_housing_balance [accessed 23 January 2014]. 
Wilson, K. (2003) ‘Great Park scheme now making quick progress’, The Journal, 26 
June. 
Woodhouse, R. (n.d.) ‘Acomb Crescent Flood Alleviation: CSO & overflow pipework 
removes properties off flood register, Wastewater Treatment & Sewerage’ 
[online], available: 
http://www.waterprojectsonline.com/case_studies/2008/Northumbrian%20Acomb
%20CrescentFAS%202008.pdf [accessed 23 January 2014]. 
Woods, N. (2000) ‘Prescott gives go-ahead for £100m Great Park’, The Journal, 2 June. 
 
Miscellaneous documents 
Green Party Newcastle and Gateshead (n.d.) One Core Strategy: Formal objection from 
the Green Parties of Newcastle & Gateshead, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Newcastle Action Group to Save the Green Belt (1993) ‘Your greenbelt under threat’, 
Newsletter 3, 1–4. 
SUME (2011) 'SUME – Sustainable Urban Metabolism for Europe: Output of the 
SUME project', [online], available: http://www.sume.at/project_downloads 
[accessed 6 April 2013]. 
TCPA (2007) ‘Best practice in urban extensions and new settlements: A report on 
emerging good practice’ [online], available: 
http://www.tcpa.org.uk/data/files/nsue.pdf [accessed 6 January 2014]. 
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Appendix F Documents collected on cricket ground development 
Note: In some document titles, names have been replaced by the function of the person, 
e.g. Planning Officer, for ethical reasons. 
 
Planning application documents 
Chelmsford Borough Council (1998) 98/00633/FUL: Decision notice, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) 08/00236/SCOPE EIA Scoping Opinion, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Demolition of existing buildings and 
redevelopment of the Essex County Cricket Club Ford county ground and 
adjoining New Writtle Street car park 08/01235/EIA, Chelmsford: Chelmsford 
Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Notice of application for planning permission, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2009) Agreement under Section 278 of the Highways Act 
1980 and Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2009) Decision made by the Director of Sustainable 
Communities: Supplemental agreement to S106 agreement dated 19th August 
2009, Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2009) List of conditions: As revised 09/07/09, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2009) PPS25 Sequential test & exception test, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council, ECCC, Essex County Council and MCD (2010) 
Supplementary agreement under Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990, Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
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Chelmsford City Football Club (2000) Statement in support of an outline planning 
application for proposed new football stadium and associated development 
incorporating function suite, training and community facilities, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford City Football Club. 
Cushman and Wakefield (2008) Essex County Cricket Club Chelmsford: Planning 
statement, London: Cushman and Wakefield. 
Cushman and Wakefield (2008) Essex County Cricket Club Environmental Impact 
Assessment: Non-technical summary, Volume 1 and appendices, London: 
Cushman and Wakefield. 
ECCC and MCD (2008) Application forms 08/01235/EIA. Chelmsford. 
ECCC and MCD (2008) Environmental Assessment, Chelmsford: MCD. 
ECCC and MCD (2008) Submitted drawings 08/01235/EIA, Chelmsford: MCD. 
ECCC and MCD (2008) Design & Access Statement, Chelmsford: MCD. 
Environment Agency (2008) ‘Consultation response’, 11 August [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Environment Agency (2008) ‘Consultation response’, 14 October [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Environment Agency (2008) ‘Consultation response’, 26 January [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Environment Agency (2008) ‘Consultation response’, 8 October [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
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Environment Agency (2008) ‘Consultation response’, 8 October [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Environment Agency (2009) ‘Consultation response’, 19 January [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Essex County Fire and Rescue Service (2009) ‘Consultation response’, 30 January 
[online], available: http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Essex Police (2009) ‘Consultation response’, 4 March [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
Hamiltons (2009) Emergency services and flood warning and evacuation plan, 
Chelmsford: Hamiltons. 
PBA (2009) Flood risk assessment and appendices, London: PBA. 
Residents (2009) ‘Consultation responses’ [online], available: 
http://publicaccess.chelmsford.gov.uk/online-
applications/simpleSearchResults.do;jsessionid=21633FA95D1348F1F7BF86D4
E441B096?action=firstPage [accessed 21 January 2014].] 
 
Policy documents and associated reports 
Chelmsford Borough Council (1997) Chelmsford Borough Local Plan, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
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Chelmsford Borough Council (2004) Planning Brief: Essex County Cricket Ground, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2006) Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan DPD: 
Regulation 26 Preferred Options consultation: Stakeholder responses: Summaries 
and assessments, Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2007) Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan: 
Regulation 31 Statement summary of main issues raised in representations, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2007) Sequential test & exception test for proposed site 
allocations in Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Annual monitoring report: Local Development 
Framework: Covering the period 1st April 2007 – 31st March 2008, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Chelmsford tomorrow: Delivering new homes 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan: Topic 
paper 1: The strategy for Chelmsford town centre, Chelmsford: Chelmsford 
Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan: Topic 
paper 5: Managing flood risk, Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Core Strategy and Development Control Policies: 
Chelmsford Borough Local Development Framework 2001–2021, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Reg 28 Area Action Plan list of representations by 
rep no, Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
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Chelmsford Borough Council (2008) Strategic Housing Market Assessment, 
Chelmsford: Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council (2010) Chelmsford hotel investment fact file, Chelmsford: 
Chelmsford Borough Council. 
Chelmsford Borough Council and Environment Agency (2008) ‘Chelmsford Town 
Centre Area Action Plan Public Examination: Statement of common ground’, 
[online], available: 
http://www.chelmsford.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/files/EB258%20-
%20CTCAAP%20Examination%20Statement%20of%20Common%20Ground%2
03.pdf [accessed 20 January 2014]. 
Entec UK (2006) SEA/SA of Chelmsford LDF: Volumes 1 and 2: Sustainability 
appraisal report of the Chelmsford Town Centre Area Action Plan: Second 
edition, Chelmsford: Entec UK. 
Entec UK (2006) The Sustainability Appraisal of the Chelmsford Town Centre Area 
Action Plan Submission Development Plan Document: Non-technical summary, 
Chelmsford: Entec UK. 
Entec UK (2006) The Sustainability Appraisal of the Chelmsford Town Centre 
Preferred Options Consultation Document: Non-technical summary, Chelmsford: 
Entec UK. 
Government Office for the East of England (2008) East of England Plan: The revision 
to the Regional Spatial Strategy for the East of England, London: TSO. 
Halcrow Group (2007) Refreshing Chelmsford’s Revised Urban Capacity Study: Final 
report, Peterborough: Halcrow Group. 
 
Flood risk management reports 
Environment Agency (2006) River Chelmer flood study: Project appraisal report, 
Peterborough: Environment Agency. 
Environment Agency (2009) North Essex Catchment Flood Management Plan: 
Summary report, Peterborough: Environment Agency. 
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Environment Agency (2012) Chelmsford Flood Alleviation Scheme: Stage A works: 
Margaretting, Peterborough: Environment Agency. 
Environment Agency (n.d.) ‘Chelmsford: Case study of partnership working in 
Chelmsford’ [online], available: http://a0768b4a8a31e106d8b0-
50dc802554eb38a24458b98ff72d550b.r19.cf3.rackcdn.com/flho0312bwds-e-
e.pdf [accessed 23 January 2014]. 
Halcrow Group (2010) Chelmsford Water Cycle Study – Phases 1: Technical report –
 Update, Peterborough: Halcrow Group. 
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Appendix G List of interviews 
Case Job description 
 
Organisation Date interviewed Additional personal 
communication  
Referenced 
Councillor Newcastle City Council 27 January 2012  Councillor A 
Planning Officer Newcastle City Council 2 February 2012  Planning Officer A 
Engineer Newcastle City Council 2 February 2012 2 August 2012 Council Engineer 
Project Leader Consortium of developers 3 February 2012  Developer A 
Planning Officer Newcastle City Council 6 February 2012  Planning Officer B 
Flood Risk Officer Environment Agency 8 February 2012 30 March 2012 
9 July 2012 
EA Officer A 
Manager Water and sewerage company 17 February 2012  WaSC Officer 
Newcastle 
Great Park 
Flood Risk Officer Environment Agency 16 March 2012  EA Officer B 
  
256 
Case Job description 
 
Organisation Date interviewed Additional personal 
communication  
Referenced 
Planning Officer Newcastle Airport 30 March 201259  Airport Officer 
Party Representative Newcastle Green Party 6 June 2012 1 May 2012 
9 May 2012 
Green Party 
Representative 
Chair Local Residents’ Association 
NGP 
12 July 2012 5 August 2012 LRA Chair  
Councillor Newcastle City Council 31 July 2012  Councillor B 
 
Councillor Newcastle City Council 31 July 2012  Councillor C 
Table 9: List of conducted interviews for Newcastle Great Park case 
                                                
59 The Airport Officer’s interview was a written interview by email, due to time constraints posed by the participant. 
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Case Job description 
 
Organisation Date interviewed Additional personal 
communication  
Referenced 
Planning Officer Chelmsford City Council 21 May 2012  Planning Officer C 
Flood Risk Officer Environment Agency 22 May 2012  EA Officer C 
Local 
Resident/member 
Local Residents’ Group 22 May 2012  LRG A 
Local 
Resident/member 
Local Residents’ Group 22 May 2012  LRG B 
Planning Consultant Planning Consultancy 23 May 2012  Consultant A 
Senior Manager Cricket Club 25 May 2012  Cricket Club 
Manager 
Project Leader Development Company 5 July 2012  Developer B 
Chelmsford 
cricket 
ground 
development 
Flood Risk Consultant Flood Risk Consultancy 12 July 2012  Consultant B 
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Case Job description 
 
Organisation Date interviewed Additional personal 
communication  
Referenced 
Flood Risk Officer Environment Agency 3 August 2012  13 July 2012 
3 August 2012 
EA Officer D 
Flood Risk Officer Environment Agency 3 August 2012 3 August 2012 EA Officer E 
Planning Officer Chelmsford City Council 21 August 2012  Planning Officer D 
 
Councillor Chelmsford City Council 22 July 2013 25 July 2013 Councillor D 
Table 10: List of conducted interviews for Chelmsford cricket ground case 
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Appendix H NVivo coding for Newcastle Great Park committee documents 
Node category Node name Node name subcategory Number of references 
Aviation  1 
Consortium  19 
Councillors  4 
EA  44 
Newcastle City Council  19 
Newcastle Great Park Advisory Committee  104 
Newcastle University  1 
North Gosforth Parish Council  1 
WaSC  23 
Actors 
Ouseburn Steering Group  1 
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Node category Node name Node name subcategory Number of references 
Public  38 
Fawdon Ward Sub Committee  1 
Highway Agency  3 
 
Flood risk consultant  1 
Perceptions  38 
Consultation  12 
Interaction 
Interaction  17 
Climate change  1 
Drainage  17 
EU and national policy developments  10 
FRM 
Floodplain  12 
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Node category Node name Node name subcategory Number of references 
Flood risk  40 
Flooding  37 
Local policy  13 
Research  6 
Role and responsibility  40 
SuDS maintenance  3 
 
SuDS  102 
Local planning policy  1 
Masterplan revised  21 
National policy developments  4 
Planning 
Section 106 agreement  7 
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Node category Node name Node name subcategory Number of references 
Cell B 6 
Cell C 20 
Cell G 46 
Cell H 14 
Cell I 22 
 Cells 
Planning application 16 
2001  13 
2002  5 
2003  4 
2004  16 
Year 
2005  24 
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Node category Node name Node name subcategory Number of references 
2006  12 
2007  8 
2008  9 
2009  6 
2010  7 
 
2011  3 
Table 11: NVivo coding for Newcastle Great Park documents 
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Appendix I Questions derived from theoretical framework 
Question Sub-question 
1 What is the flood risk issue in this development? 1.1 What is the development project? 
1.2 What is the flood risk? 
1.3 What is the problem (does problem differ amongst actors/over time)? 
2 What is the relevant formal institutional setting? 2.1 What are relevant national regulations and policies? 
2.2 What are the regional regulations and policies if relevant? 
2.3 What are the local regulations and policies? 
2.4 What influence did these have on the agents or process? 
  
265 
Question Sub-question 
3 What is the informal institutional setting / network structure? 3.1 What are the actors’ norms and values? 
3.2 Have the actors met before? 
3.3 Are there any formal/informal rules in the network? 
3.4 How does this structure influence the agents or process? 
4 What relevant events have occurred? 4.1 Have there been flood crises in the development or in the local area? 
4.2 Have there been changes in the national, regional or local political 
context? 
4.3 Have there been any other relevant events? 
4.4 What influences have these events had on the agents and process? 
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Question Sub-question 
5 What other structures are relevant? 5.1 Have there been any other structures of influence? 
5.2 How have these influenced the agents and process? 
6 What are the characteristics of the actors? 6.1 What actors have been involved in the process? 
6.2 What are the perceptions of actors on risk of flooding, solutions to flood 
risk and priority of flood risk? 
6.3 What preferred policy outcomes do actors have? 
6.4 What resources do actors have and what interdependencies does this 
cause?  
6.5 What influence do the actor characteristics have on the process? 
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Question Sub-question 
7 What are the characteristics of the actor interactions? 7.1 Has there been cooperation or conflict? 
7.2 Has there been any network management and by whom? 
7.3 What influence do the interactions have on the process? 
8 What is the policy outcome? 8.1 What flood risk measures have been taken in the development? 
8.2 Have there been any other effects of the outcome on the wider setting or 
environment? 
8.3 Are the actors content with the outcome? 
8.4 What has influenced the outcome? 
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Question Sub-question 
9 What are the dialectical relationships in this case? 9.1 What is the dialectical relationship between network and wider context? 
9.2 What is the dialectical relationship between network and agents? 
9.3 What is the dialectical relationship between network and outcome? 
10 What have been the key factors influencing the outcome in 
the case? 
10.1 What have been the key factors influencing the outcome? 
 
Table 12: Questions derived from theoretical framework
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Appendix J Informed consent form Informed)Consent)Form) )
   
Title research:  Governance of flood risk management 
Researcher:  Ellen Bekker 
  School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape 
  Newcastle University 
  [Email address removed] 
 
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate): 
 
1. I understand the information about the project and the purpose of the 
interview. 
 
! 
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my 
participation. 
 
! 
3. I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. 
 ! 
4. I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I 
will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I 
have withdrawn. 
 
! 
5. The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. 
use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. 
 
! 
6. If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other 
forms of data collection have been explained and provided to me. 
 
! 
7. The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been 
explained to me. 
 
! 
 
 
Participant:  
 
 
 
________________________ ___________________ _______  
Name of Participant  Signature    Date 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
________________________ ___________________ _______ 
Name of Researcher  Signature    Date 
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Appendix K Standard interview guide Newcastle Great Park 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to an interview. The information provided by you will be kept 
anonymous. The interview will be voice recorded but these recordings will be deleted 
later and kept entirely anonymous.  
My research is about how flood risk management is governed through the planning 
process for new urban developments. I am looking at which actors are involved, their 
characteristics, how they make decisions and what has influenced these decisions. One 
of my cases is Newcastle Great Park (NGP), which is why I asked to interview you to 
find out more about the decision-making process. 
Questions 
General 
1. Can you please describe the work you do? 
2. When were you involved with the NGP project? 
Flood issues 
3. What are the main flood risk issues for NGP? 
4. Do you think flood risk is an important problem for NGP? 
5. How did the idea of using sustainable drainage come about? 
Process  
6. What is your responsibility concerning flood risk matters in NGP? 
7. What is your role in deciding on flood risk management? 
8. What resources do you have to support flood risk management? 
9. Who have been involved in deciding on what flood risk measures to take in 
NGP? 
10. How do you meet them? How often do you meet them? 
11. Do you meet them outside the NGP project as well? 
12. What are the main issues in deciding on how to manage flood risk? 
13. Are there any differences between how you want to manage flood risk and how 
others want to do it? Others being: 
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• Planners 
• Environment Agency 
• Developers 
• Northumbrian Water 
• Councillors 
14. Do any of the above take the lead in the decision-making process? 
15. How is decision making characterised? Does everyone try to find a solution 
together, is it more about compromising or does everyone try to reach their own 
goals? 
16. How are decisions made; through negotiated agreement, or is it one person or 
organisation taking the ultimate decision? 
17. Are you content with how decisions have been made? What would you like to 
change? 
18. What input do you have in decision making? 
19. Who do you feel has the largest input? 
20. Do you trust the other actors to want to effectively tackle flood risk in NGP? 
21. Do you trust the information on flood risk in NGP? 
22. What would you like to change in your role or in your resources for managing 
flood risk in new developments? 
Environment 
23. What are the most important factors influencing the decision-making process? 
24. How do you think national regulations and policies help or hinder the 
implementation of flood risk measures in NGP? 
25. Has flooding in neighbourhoods near NGP had an impact on the decision-
making process? 
Outcomes 
26. Are you happy with the flood risk measures that have been put in place? 
27. What would you change? 
28. What have you learned from this process? 
Conclusion 
• Thank you for the interview.  
• Do you have any questions or would you like to add anything? 
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• Can I email you if I need to clarify something? 
• Would you like me to send you my research findings?  
• Do you know of other people whom I can talk to, which would be helpful for my 
research? 
• Would you please sign this consent form, which I need to show that ethical 
issues have been taken into account in my research? 
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Appendix L Standard interview guide cricket ground development 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to an interview. The information provided by you will be kept 
anonymous. The interview will be recorded, but only with your permission, and these 
recordings will be deleted later and kept entirely anonymous.  
My research is about how flood risk management is governed through the planning 
process for new urban developments. I am looking at which actors are involved, their 
characteristics, how they make decisions and what has influenced these decisions. One 
of my cases is the redevelopment of the Essex County Cricket ground, which is why I 
asked to interview you to find out more about the decision-making process. 
Questions 
General 
1. Can you please describe the work you do? 
2. When and how did you become involved with the Cricket Club redevelopment? 
3. How did the idea of this redevelopment come about? 
4. Can you please talk me through the decision-making process up until permission 
was granted? 
Flood issues 
5. What do you perceive as the main flood risk issues for the development? 
6. Do you think flood risk is an important problem for the development? (versus 
development benefits) 
Process  
7. What was your responsibility concerning flood risk matters in the development? 
8. What was your role in deciding on flood risk management? 
9. What resources did you have to support flood risk management? 
10. Were there any differences between how you wanted to manage flood risk and 
how others want to do it? Others being: 
• Planning officers 
• Environment Agency 
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• Cricket club 
• Residents 
11. How would you meet these others to make decisions? 
12. Did you meet them outside this project as well? 
13. How was decision making characterised? Did everyone try to find a solution 
together, was it more about compromising or did everyone try to reach their own 
goals? 
14. Who do you feel had the largest input? 
15. Did you trust the other actors to want to effectively manage flood risk? 
16. Are you content with how decisions were made? What would you like to have 
changed? 
17. What were the most important factors influencing the decision-making process? 
18. How do you think national regulations and policies helped or hindered the 
implementation of flood risk measures in the development? 
19. Is there anything you would like to change in your role or in your resources for 
managing flood risk in developments? 
Outcomes 
20. Are you happy with the flood risk measures that have been put in place? 
21. What would you change? 
22. What have you learned from this process? 
Conclusion 
• Thank you for the interview.  
• Do you have any questions or would you like to add anything? 
• Can I email you if I need to clarify something? 
• Would you like me to send you my research findings?  
• Do you know of other people whom I can talk to, which would be helpful for my 
research? 
• Would you like to sign this consent form, which I need to show that ethical 
issues have been taken into account in my research? 
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Appendix M Photographs of Newcastle Great Park SuDS 
 
Figure 34: Ouseburn and SuDS in Cell G, Newcastle Great Park60 
Source: Author 2012 
 
Figure 35: Outlet into SuDS in Cell G, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
                                                
60 The pictures of the SuDS in Cell G were taken after heavy rainfall, July 2012. 
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Figure 36: SuDS in Cell C, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
 
Figure 37: Letch in Cell C, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
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Figure 38: Outlet into SuDS in Cell H, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
 
Figure 39: SuDS and open space in Cell H, Newcastle Great Park 
Source: Author 2012 
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Appendix N Photographs of Chelmsford cricket ground 
 
Figure 40: River Can and development site, Chelmsford 
Source: Author 2012 
 
Figure 41: Existing development adjacent to the development site, Chelmsford 
Source: Author 2012 
  279 
 
Figure 42: Development site from across the river Can, Chelmsford 
Source: Author 2012 
 
Figure 43: Development site, Chelmsford 
Source: Author 2012 
  280 
 
References 
Adaptation) Sub5Committee) (2011)) Adapting) to) climate) change) in) the) UK)–)measuring)
progress:) Adaptation) Sub9Commitee)progress) report,) London:) Climate) Change)Committee.))Adaptation) Sub5Committee) (2012))Climate) change)–)is) the)UK) preparing) for) flooding) and)
water) scarcity?) Adaptation) Sub9Committee) Progress) Report) 2012,) London:)Committee)on)Climate)Change.))Agranoff,) R.) and) McGuire,) M.) (2001)) 'Big) questions) in) public) network) management)research',)Journal)of)Public)Administration)Research)and)Theory,)11(3),)295–326.))Arnstein,)S.)R.)(1969))'A)ladder)of)citizen)participation',)Journal)of)the)American)Institute)of)
Planners,)35(4),)216–224.))Association)of)British) Insurers) (2008))The) summer) floods)2007:)One)year)on)and)beyond,)London:)ABI.))Association)of)British)Insurers)(2010))Fighting)flood)risk)together,)London:)ABI.))Association) of) Drainage) Authorities) (n.d.)) An) introduction) to)Internal) Drainage) Boards)
(IDBs),)London:)ADA.))Atkins)(2006))Ouseburn)pre9feasibility)study,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Atkins.))Bache,)I.)and)Flinders,)M.)(2004))'Multi5level)governance)and)British)politics')in)Multi9level)
governance,)Oxford:)OUP,)93–106.))Bassett,) K.) (1996)) 'Partnerships,) business) elites) and) urban) politics:) New) forms) of)governance)in)an)English)city?',)Urban)Studies,)33(3),)539–555.))BBC) News) (2005)) 'Cumbria:) Year) in) review) 2005',) [online],) available:)http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cumbria/4507042.stm) [accessed) 21) March)2013].))BBC) News) (2009a)) 'Body) found) in) Cumbria) flood) is) missing) Pc,) say) police',) [online],)available:)http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8370865.stm)[accessed)31)October)2013].))BBC) News) (2009b)) 'Cumbrian) floods) 2009',) [online],) available:)http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/cumbria/hi/people_and_places/newsid_8378000/8378388.stm)[accessed)21)March)2013].))
  281 
BBC)News)(2012)) 'Brussels)demands) fines)over)London)and)Whitburn)sewage',) [online],)available:)http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk5england5london519995530)[accessed)2)April)2013].))Bennett,)A.)and)Elman,)C.)(2006))'Qualitative)research:)Recent)developments)in)case)study)methods',)Annual)Review)of)Political)Science,)9,)455–476.))Benneworth,)P.)and)Vigar,)G.)(2007))'Strategic)planning)in)practice:)The)case)of)North)East)England') in) Dimitriou,) H.) and) Thompson,) R.,) eds.,) Strategic) planning) for) regional)
development) in) the) UK:) A) review) of) principles) and) practices,) London:) Routledge,)271–290.))Bevir,) M.) and) Rhodes,) R.) A.) W.) (2001)) 'Decentering) tradition:) Interpreting) British)government',)Administration)&)Society,)33(2),)107–132.))Bevir,) M.) and) Richards,) D.) (2009)) 'Decentring) policy) networks:) A) theoretical) agenda',)
Public)Administration,)87(1),)3–14.))Bhaskar,)R.)(1975))A)realist)theory)of)science,)New)York:)Routledge.))Binnie,) Black) and) Veatch) (2001)) Flood) report:) 2001:) Executive) summary,) Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Black)and)Veatch)(2006))River)Chelmer)flood)risk)study,)Chelmsford.))Bogason,)P.)and)Zølner,)M.)(2007))Methods)in)democratic)network)governance,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.))Booth,)R.) (2013)) 'Welcome) to)Rain) Square,)where) the) answer) to) rising) flooding) is:) let) it)flow',) The) Guardian) [online],) available:)http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/14/rain5square5flooding)[accessed)25)March)2013].))Bowers,)J.)(1998))'Inter5war)land)drainage)and)policy)in)England)and)Wales',)Agricultural)
History)Review,)46(I),)64–80.))Bradford,)R.)A.,)O’Sullivan,)J.)J.)and)Van)der)Craats,)I.)M.)(2012))'Risk)perception)–)issues)for)flood) management) in) Europe',) Natural) Hazards) and) Earth) System) Sciences,) 12,)2299–2309.))
Brentwood) Gazette) (2013)) 'Spring) start) for) cricket) ground) work,) January) 16',) [online],)available:) http://www.thisistotalessex.co.uk/Spring5start5cricket5ground5work/story5178713415detail/story.html#axzz2XPzIsNUw) [accessed) 16) June)2013].))
  282 
British) Geological) Survey) (2012)) 'UK) geohazard) note:) Groundwater) flooding',) [online],)available:) www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start.cfm?id=2496) [accessed) 3) October)2013].))Brownill,) S.) and) Carpenter,) J.) (2009)) 'Governance) and) 'integrated') planning:) The) case) of)sustainable) communities) in) the)Thames)Gateway,)England',)Urban)Studies,) 46(2),)251–274.))Broyd,) I.) (2008))Report)on) the)Examination) into) the)Chelmsford)Town)Centre)Area)Action)
Plan)Development)Plan)Document:)Inspector’s)report,)Bristol.))Bulkeley,)H.) and)Betsill,)M.)M.) (2003))Cities)and)climate) change:)Urban) sustainability)and)
global)environmental)governance,)London:)Routledge.))Burchell,)G.)(1996))'Liberal)government)and)techniques)of)the)self')in)Barry,)A.,)Osborne,)T.)and) Rose,) N.,) eds.,) Foucault) and) political) reason:) Liberalism,) neo9liberalism,) and)
rationalities)of)government,)London:)UCL)Press,)19–36.))Butler,) C.) and) Pidgeon,) N.) (2011)) 'From) 'flood) defence') to) 'flood) risk) management':)Exploring) governance,) responsibility,) and) blame',) Environment) and) Planning) C:)
Government)and)Policy,)29,)533–547.))Bye,)P.)and)Horner,)M.)W.)(1998))1998)Easter)Floods:)Final)assessment)by)the)Independent)
Review)Team)–)Volume)1,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Börzel,)T.)A.)(1998))'Organizing)Babylon:)On)the)different)conceptions)of)policy)networks',)
Public)Administration,)76(2),)253–273.))Cahill,) J.) (2000)) 'The) best) laid) plans',) The) Lawyer) [online],) available:)http://www.thelawyer.com/the5best5laid5plans/99683.article) [accessed) 11)August)2011].))Cameron,) S.) (2003)) 'Gentrification,) housing) redifferentiation) and) urban) regeneration:)‘Going)for)Growth’)in)Newcastle)upon)Tyne',)Urban)Studies,)40(12),)2367–2382.))Carmona,) M.) (2003)) Delivering) new) homes:) Planning,) processes) and) providers,) London:)Routledge.))Chatterton,)J.,)Viavattene,)C.,)Morris,)J.,)Penning5Rowsell,)E.)and)Tapsell,)S.)(2010))The)costs)
of)the)summer)2007)floods)in)England,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (1997)) Chelmsford) Borough) Local) Plan,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (1998)) 98/00633/FUL:) Decision) notice,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.)
  283 
)Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2002)) Minutes) of) the) Planning) Committee)21) January,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2004)) Planning) Brief:) Essex) County) Cricket) Ground,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2006)) Chelmsford) Town) Centre) Area) Action) Plan) DPD:)
Regulation) 26) Preferred) Options) consultation:) Stakeholder) responses:) Summaries)
and)assessments,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council)(2007a))Chelmsford)Town)Centre)Area)Action)Plan:)Regulation)
31) statement) summary) of) main) issues) raised) in) representations,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2007b)) Sequential) test) &) exception) test) for) proposed) site)
allocations) in) Chelmsford) Town) Centre) Area) Action) Plan,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008a)) Chelmsford) tomorrow:) Delivering) new) homes,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008b)) Chelmsford) Town) Centre) Area) Action) Plan,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008c)) Chelmsford) Town) Centre) Area) Action) Plan:) Topic)
paper)1:)The)strategy)for)Chelmsford)town)centre,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008d)) Chelmsford) Town) Centre) Area) Action) Plan:) Topic)
paper)5:)Managing)flood)risk,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008e)) Core) Strategy) and) Development) Control) Policies:)
Chelmsford) Borough) Local) Development) Framework) 2001–2021,) Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council)(2008f))Demolition)of)existing)buildings)and)redevelopment)of)
the)Essex)County)Cricket)Club)Ford)county)ground)and)adjoining)New)Writtle)Street)
car)park)08/01235/EIA,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008g))Minutes) of) the) Planning) Committee) 30) September,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008h)) Notice) of) application) for) planning) permission,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))
  284 
Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2008i)) Strategic) Housing) Market) Assessment,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2009a))Agreement) under) Section) 278) of) the) Highways) Act)
1980) and) Section) 106) of) the) Town) and) Country) Planning) Act) 1990)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2009b)) Decision) made) by) the) Director) of) Sustainable)
Communities:)Supplemental)agreement)to)S106)agreement)dated)19th)August)2009,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2009c)) Minutes) of) the) Planning) Committee) 28) January,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council) (2009d))PPS25)Sequential) test)&)exception)test,)Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)Borough)Council.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council)(2009e))Proof)of)evidence)by)planning)officer,)unpublished.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council)(2009f))Rebuttal)proof)of)planning)officer,)unpublished.))Chelmsford) Borough) Council) and) Cushman) and)Wakefield) (2009)) Statement) of) common)
ground,)unpublished.))Chelmsford)Borough)Council) and)Environment)Agency) (2008)) 'Chelmsford)Town)Centre)Area) Action) Plan) Public) Examination:) Statement) of) common) ground',) [online],)available:)http://www.chelmsford.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/files/EB258%205%20CTCAAP%20Examination%20Statement%20of%20Common%20Ground%203.pdf)[accessed)20)January)2014].))Chelmsford) City) Football) Club) (2000)) Statement) in) support) of) an) outline) planning)
application) for) proposed) new) football) stadium) and) associated) development)
incorporating) function) suite,) training) and) community) facilities,) Chelmsford:)Chelmsford)City)Football)Club.))Climate)North)East)(2008))'The)North)East)climate)change)adaptation)study:)Case)3)North)Gosforth/Ouseburn) Integrated) Urban) Drainage',) [online],) available:)http://www.climatenortheast.com/manageContent.aspx?object.id=11060)[accessed)11)April)2013].))Compston,) H.) (2009)) 'Networks,) resources,) political) strategy) and) climate) policy',)
Environmental)Politics,)18(5),)727–746.))Cowell,)R.)and)Murdoch,)J.)(1999))'Land)use)and)the)limits)to)(regional))governance:)Some)lessons)from)planning)for)housing)and)minerals)in)England',)International)Journal)
of)Urban)and)Regional)Research,)23(4),)654–669.)
  285 
)Crozier,) M.) and) Thoenig,) J.) C.) (1976)) 'Regulation) of) complex) organized) systems',)
Administrative)Science)Quarterly,)21(4),)547–570.))Cushman)and)Wakefield)(2008a))Essex)County)Cricket)Club)Chelmsford:)Planning)statement,)unpublished.))Cushman) and) Wakefield) (2008b)) Essex) County) Cricket) Club) Environmental) Impact)
Assessment:)Volume)1,)London:)Cushman)and)Wakefield.))Cushman)and)Wakefield)(2009a))Statement)of)common)ground,)unpublished.))Cushman) and) Wakefield) (2009b)) Statement) under) Rule) 6) on) behalf) of) the) applicants,)unpublished.))Danermark,) B.,) Ekström,) M.,) Jakobsen,) L.) and) Karlsson,) J.) C.) (2002)) Explaining) society:)
Critical)realism)in)the)social)sciences,)London:)Routledge.))Davies,)J.)S.)(2002))'Urban)regime)theory:)A)normative5empirical)critique',)Journal)of)Urban)
Affairs,)24(1),)1–17.))Davies,)J.)S.)(2003))'Partnerships)versus)regimes:)Why)regime)theory)cannot)explain)urban)coalitions)in)the)UK',)Journal)of)Urban)Affairs,)25(3),)253–269.))Davies,) J.) S.) (2011))Challenging) governance) theory:) From) networks) to) hegemony,) Bristol:)Policy)Press.))Davies,) J.)S.) (2012)) 'Network)governance)theory:)A)Gramscian)critique',)Environment)and)
Planning)A,)44,)2687–2704.))Davis,)R.)and)Cunningham,)R.)(2004))The)Water)Framework)and)Flooding:)Implications)for)
flood)defence)and)coastal)management)policy)in)England)&)Wales,)Sandy:)RSPB.))Davoudi,)S.)(2000))'Planning)for)waste)management:)Changing)discourses)and)institutional)relationships',)Progress)in)Planning,)53,)165–216.))Davoudi,)S.)(2011))'Localism)and)the)reform)of)the)planning)system)in)England',)disP)9)The)
Planning)Review,)47(4),)92–94.))Davoudi,) S.) (2012)) 'Resilience:)A) bridging) concept) or) a) dead) end?',)Planning)Theory) and)
Practice,)13(2),)299–307.))Davoudi,)S.)and)Evans,)N.)(2005))'The)challenge)of)governance)in)regional)waste)planning',)
Environment)and)Planning)C:)Government)and)Policy,)23,)493–517.)
  286 
)Davoudi,)S.)and)Madanipour,)A.) (2013)) 'Localism)and)neo5liberal)governmentality',)Town)
Planning)Review,)84(5),)551–561.))DCLG)(2006))Planning)Policy)Statement)25:)Development)and)flood)risk,)London:)TSO.))DCLG) (2007)) Planning) Policy) Statement) 1:) Planning) and) climate) change) supplement,)London:)DCLG.))DCLG) (2008a)) Planning) Policy) Statement) 12:) Creating) strong) safe) and) prosperous)
communities)through)local)spatial)planning,)London:)TSO.))DCLG) (2008b)) Planning) Policy) Statement) 25:) Development) and) flood) risk) practice) guide,)London:)DCLG.))DCLG)(2009))Comprehensive)list)of)nationally)defined)consultees)in)the)planning)application)
process)–)information)report:)Draft)for)consultation,)London:)DCLG.))DCLG)(2012a))National)Planning)Policy)Framework,)London:)DCLG.))DCLG) (2012b)) Technical) guidance) to) the) National) Planning) Policy) Framework,) London:)DCLG.))DCLG) (2013)) 'Consultation) and) pre5decision) matters',) [online],) available:)http://planningguidance.planningportal.gov.uk/blog/guidance/consultation5and5pre5decision5matters/table515statutory5publicity5requirements5for5planning5and5heritage5applications/#paragraph_030)[accessed)4)November)2013].))De)Mul,)J.)(1995))'Poet)after)the)death)of)god')in)Shetter,)W.)Z.)and)Van)der)Cruysse,)I.,)eds.,)
Contemporary) explorations) in) the) culture) of) the) low) countries:) Publications) of) the)
American) Association) for) Netherlandic) Studies,) London:) University) Press) of)America,)49–68.))De)Roo,) G.) (2007))Fuzzy) planning:) The) role) of) actors) in) a) fuzzy) governance) environment,)Farnham:)Ashgate.))Dean,)M.)(1999))Governmentality:)Power)and)rule)in)modern)society,)London:)Sage.))Defra)(2005a))Making)space)for)water:)Taking)forward)a)new)government)strategy)for)flood)
and)coastal)erosion)risk)management)in)England,)London:)Defra.))Defra) (2005b)) Securing) the) future:) Delivering) UK) sustainable) development) strategy,)London:)TSO.))
  287 
Defra)(2011))National)standards)for)sustainable)drainage)systems:)Designing,)constructing,)
operating)and)maintaining)drainage)for)surface)runoff,)London:)Defra.))Defra)(2012))'Written)ministerial)statement:)Update)on)managing)the)impacts)of)flooding',)[online],) available:) http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons5vote5office/July_2012/11507512/5.DEFRA5Update5on5managing5the5impact5of5flooding.pdf)[accessed)20)January)2014].))Defra)(2013a))Commentary)on)proposed)flood)insurance)amendments,)London:)Defra.))Defra)(2013b))'Consultation)outcome:)Insurance)in)areas)of)flood)risk)',)[online],)available:)https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/insurance5in5areas5of5flood5risk)[accessed)11)November)2013].))Defra) (2013c)) 'Funding',) [online],) available:)http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/flooding/funding5outcomes5insurance/funding)[accessed)26)March)2013].))Defra) (2013d)) 'Sustainable)drainage) systems',) [online],) available:)http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/sewage/sustainable5drainage)[accessed)21)March)2013].))Defra)and)Environment)Agency)(2011))Understanding)the)risks,)empowering)communities,)
building)resilience:)The)national)flood)and)coastal)erosion)risk)management)strategy)
for)England,)London:)TSO.))Defra) and) Environment) Agency) (2012)) Principles) for) implementing) flood) and)
coastal)resilience)funding)partnerships,)Bristol:)EA.))Delafons,)J.)(1998))'Reforming)the)British)planning)system)1964–5:)The)Planning)Advisory)Group)and) the)genesis)of) the)Planning)Act)of)1968',)Planning)Perspectives,) 13(4),)373–387.))Deputy) Prime) Minister's) Office) (2012)) 'Results) of) Diamond) Jubilee) Civic) Honours)competition) announced',) [online],) available:)http://www.dpm.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/results5diamond5jubilee5civic5honours5competition5announced)[accessed)9)August)2012].))Development) Control) Committee) (1998)) Minutes) from) 20) November,) Newcastle) upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Development)Control)Committee)(1999))Minutes)from)30)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Development)Control)Committee)(2002a))Minutes)from)1)February,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  288 
)Development) Control) Committee) (2002b))Newcastle) Great) Park) –) amendment) to) Section)
106)agreement)17)May,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Development)Control)Committee)(2005))Minutes) from)28)October,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))DiGaetano,) A.) and) Klemanski,) J.) S.) (1999)) Power) and) city) governance:) Comparative)
perspectives)on)urban)development,)London:)University)of)Minnesota)Press.))Dion,) D.) (1998)) 'Evidence) and) inference) in) the) comparative) case) study',) Comparative)
Politics,)30(2),)127–145.))DoE) (1989))Regional) Planning) Guidance:) Strategic) guidance) for) Tyne) and)Wear,) London:)HMSO.))DoE,)Ministry)of)Agriculture,)Fisheries)and)Food)and)Welsh)Office)(1992))Development)and)
Flood)Risk)Circular)30/92,)London:)DoE.))Dooris,)M.)(1999))'Healthy)cities)and)Local)Agenda)21:)the)UK)experience)–)challenges)for)the)new)millennium',)Health)Promotion)International,)14(4),)365–375.))
Draft)master)plan)for)the)Northern)Development)Area,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne.))Duxbury,) R.) and) Telling,) A.) (2006)) Telling) and) Duxbury's) planning) law) and) procedure,)Oxford:)OUP.))Easton,) G.) (2010)) 'Critical) realism) in) case) study) research',) Industrial) Marketing)
Management,)39(1),)118–128.))ECCC) (2013)) Annual) report) and) statement) of) accounts:) Year) ended) 31) December) 2012,)Chelmsford:)ECCC.))ECCC,)Chelmsford)Borough)Council)and)Environment)Agency)(2009))Statement)of)common)
ground,)unpublished.))ECCC)and)MCD)(2008))Submitted)drawings)08/01235/EIA,)Chelmsford.))Economic)and)Social)Research)Council)(2012))'ESRC)Framework)for)Research)Ethics)(FRE))2010:)Updated) September) 2012)',) [online],) available:)http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Framework5for5Research5Ethics_tcm854586.pdf)[accessed)1)November)2013].))Edelenbos,) J.,) Bressers,) N.) and) Scholten,) P.) (2013)) 'Introduction:)Conceptualizing)connective)capacity) in) water) governance') in) Edelenbos,) J.,)
  289 
Bressers,) N.) and) Scholten,) P.,) eds.,) Water) governance) as) connective) capacity,)Farnham:)Ashgate,)1–26.))Edelenbos,) J.) and) Klijn,) E.) H.) (2005)) 'Managing) stakeholder) involvement) in) decision)making:) A) comparative) analysis) of) six) interactive) processes) in) the) Netherlands',)
Journal)of)Public)Administration)Research)and)Theory,)16,)417–446.))Eisenhardt,) K.) M.) (1989)) 'Building) theories) from) case) study) research',) Academy) of)
Management)Review,)14(4),)532–550.))Elder5Vass,) D.) (2010)) The) causal) power) of) social) structures:) Emergence,) structure) and)
agency,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))Enderlein,) H.,)Wälti,) S.) and) Zürn,)M.) (2010)) 'Introduction') in) Enderlein,) H.,)Wälti,) S.) and)Zürn,)M.,)eds.,)Handbook)on)multi9level)governance,)Cheltenham:)Edward)Elgar.))England)and)Wales)Cricket)Board)(2000))National)Facilities)Strategy:)A)strategic)plan) for)
facility)and)investment)provision)within)the)development)of)cricket,)London:)England)and)Wales)Cricket)Board.))England)and)Wales)Cricket)Board)(n.d.))TS1)–)Facility)provision) for) test,) international)and)
first)class,)London:)England)and)Wales)Cricket)Board.))Entec)UK)(2006))SEA/SA)of)Chelmsford)LDF:)Volume)2:)Sustainability)appraisal)report)of)the)
Chelmsford)Town)Centre)Area)Action)Plan:)Second)edition,)Chelmsford:)Entec)UK.))Environment) Agency) (1997)) Best) practice) in) planning) liaison,) Bristol:) Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2006)) River) Chelmer) flood) study:) Project) appraisal) report,)Peterborough:)Environment)Agency.))Environment)Agency)(2008))Consultation)response)08/01235/EIA)11)August,)unpublished.))Environment)Agency)(2009a))Chelmsford)statement,)unpublished.))Environment)Agency)(2009b))ECCC)Planning)Proof)of)Evidence,)unpublished.))Environment) Agency) (2009c)) Flooding) in)England:) A) national) assessment) of) flood) risk,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Environment)Agency) (2009d))High) level) target) 5:)Development) and) flood) risk) in) England)
2007/08,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))
  290 
Environment)Agency)(2009e))Investing)for)the)future:)Flood)and)coastal)risk)management)
in)England:)A)long9term)investment)strategy,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2009f))North) Essex) Catchment) Flood)Management) Plan:) Summary)
report,)Peterborough:)Environment)Agency.))Environment)Agency)(2009g))Planning)application)–)Summary)of)evidence,)unpublished.))Environment)Agency)(2009h))Proof)of)evidence,)unpublished.))Environment) Agency) (2010)) Development) and) flood) risk) in) England) report) 2008–2009,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2011)) Development) and) flood) risk) in) England) annual) monitoring)
report)2009–2010,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2012a)) Chelmsford) Flood) Alleviation) Scheme:) Stage) A) works:)
Margaretting,)Peterborough:)Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2012b))Development) and) flood) risk) in)England) annual) monitoring)
report)2010–2011,)Bristol:)Environment)Agency.))Environment) Agency) (2012c)) 'Living) on) the) edge:) A) guide) to) your) rights) and)responsibilities)of)riverside)ownership',)))Environment)Agency) (2013)) 'Flood)maps',) [online],) available:) http://www.environment5agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/37837.aspx)[accessed)10)June)2013].))
Essex)Chronicle)(2009))'Increased)flood)risk,)12)February',)Essex)Chronicle,)4.))Essex) Cricket) (n.d)) 'History',) [online],) available:)http://www.essexcricket.org.uk/team/history)[accessed)9)August)2012].))European)Commission)(2000)) 'Directive)2000/60/EC)of) the)European)Parliament)and)of)the)Council)of)23)October)2000)establishing)a)framework)for)community)action)in)the)field)of)water)policy',)Official)Journal)of)the)European)Union,)L)327/1–72.))European)Commission)(2007)) 'Directive)2007/60/EC)of) the)European)Parliament)and)of)the)Council)of)23)October)2007)on)the)assessment)and)management)of)flood)risks)',)Official)Journal)of)the)European)Union,)L)288/27–34.))Evans,) E.,) Ashley,) R.,) Hall,) J.,) Penning5Roswell,) E.,) Saul,) P.,) Sayers,) P.,) Thorne,) C.) and)Watkinson,)A.) (2004))Foresight:)Future) flooding:)Volume) I)and)Volume) II,)London:)Office)of)Science)and)Technology.)
  291 
)Evans,) E.,) Simm,) J.) D.,) Thorne,) C.) R.) and) Arnell,) N.)W.) (2008))An) update) of) the) Foresight)
Future)Flooding)2004)qualitative)risk)analysis:)An)independent)review)by)Sir)Michael)
Pitt,)London:)Cabinet)Office.))Evans,)M.) (2001)) 'Understanding) dialectics) in) policy) network) analysis',)Political) Studies,)49(3),)542–550.))Fawcett,)P.)(2011)) 'Metagovernance)and)the)British)State',) in)Contemporary)Challenges)of)
Politics)Research)Workshop,)Coogee,)1–23.))Find) (2013)) 'Sketchmap',) [online],) available:) http://sketchmap.co.uk) [accessed) 11)November)2013].))Flood) Risk) Consultant) for) Chelmsford) Borough) Council) (2009)) Proof) of) evidence,)unpublished.))Flyvbjerg,) B.) (2006)) 'Five) misunderstandings) about) case5study) research',) Qualitative)
Inquiry,)12(2),)219–245.))Foucault,)M.) (1991)) 'Governmentality') in)Burchell,) G.,) Gordon,) C.) and)Miller,) P.,) eds.,)The)
Foucault) effect:) Studies) in) governmentality,) Chicago:) University) of) Chicago) Press,)87–104.))Foucault,)M.,)Martin,)L.)H.,)Gutman,)H.)and)Hutton,)P.)H.)(1988))Technologies)of)the)self:)A)
seminar)with)Michel)Foucault,)London:)Tavistock.))Fuller,) A.) and) Home,) R.) (2007)) 'On) the) planning) history) of) Chelmsford',) Papers) in) Land)
Management,)9,)1–26.))Giddens,) A.) (1984)) The) constitution) of) society:) Outline) of) the) theory) of) structuration,)Berkeley:)University)of)California)Press.))Gomm,)R.,)Hammersley,)M.)and)Foster,)P.) (2000))Case)study)method:)Key) issues,)key)texts,)London:)Sage.))Goodwin,)M.)and)Grix,) J.) (2011)) 'Bringing)structures)back) in:)The) 'governance)narrative',)the)'decentred)approach')and)'asymmetrical)network)governance')in)the)education)and)sport)policy)communities',)Public)Administration,)89(2),)537–556.))Google)Maps)(2011))'Google)Maps',)[online],)available:)http://maps.google.co.uk)[accessed)23)August)2011].))Gosforth)and)North)Newcastle)Area)Committee)(2003))Minutes)extract)from)20)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  292 
)Great)Britain)(2003))'The)Water)Environment)(Water)Framework)Directive)(England)and)Wales))Regulations)2003',)3242,)))Green,)C.)and)Penning5Rowsell,)E.)(2004))'Flood)insurance)and)government:)'Parasitic')and)'Symbiotic') relations',) The) Geneva) Papers) on) Risk) and) Insurance) 9) Issues) and)
Practice,)29(3),)518–539.))Grix,) J.) and) Phillpots,) L.) (2011)) 'Revisiting) the) 'governance) narrative':) 'Asymmetrical)network)governance')and)the)deviant)case)of)the)sports)policy)sector',)Public)Policy)
and)Administration,)26(3),)3–19.))Halcrow)Group)(2007))Refreshing)Chelmsford’s)Revised)Urban)Capacity)Study:)Final)report,)Peterborough:)Halcrow)Group.))Halcrow)Group)(2010))Chelmsford)Water)Cycle)Study)–)Phase)1:)Technical)report)–)Update,)Peterborough:)Halcrow)Group.))Halcrow) Group) (2011)) Chelmsford) Water) Cycle) Study)–)Phase) 2:) Technical) report,)Peterborough:)Halcrow)Group.))Hall,) A.) (2008)) Turning) a) town) around:) A) proactive) approach) to) urban) design,) Oxford:)Blackwell.))Hamel,)J.,)Dufour,)S.)and)Fortin,)D.)(1993))Case)study)methods,)London:)Sage.))Hayward,) C.) and) Lukes,) S.) (2008)) 'Nobody) to) shoot?) Power,) structure,) and) agency:) A)dialogue',)Journal)of)Power,)1(1),)5–20.))Healey,) P.) (1998)) 'Building) institutional) capacity) through) collaborative)approaches) to)urban)planning)',)Environment)and)Planning)A,)30(9),)1531–1546.))Hedley,)J.)(2001))'Great)Park)homes)'will)not)face)flooding)risk'',)The)Journal,)7)July,)4.))Helderman,) J.) K.) (2007))Bringing) the) market) back) in?) Institutional) complementarity) and)
hierarchy)in)Dutch)housing)and)healthcare,)unpublished)thesis)Erasmus)University.))Hertting,) N.) (2007)) 'Mechanisms) of) governance) network) formation:) A) contextual) choice)perspective') in) Sørensen,) E.) and) Torfing,) J.,) eds.,) Theories) of) democratic) network)
governance,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan,)43–60.))HM)Government) (2010))The) Coalition:) our) programme) for) government,) London:)Cabinet)Office.))
  293 
HM)Government)and)Association)of)British) Insurers) (2008))ABI)/)Government)Statement)
on)flooding)and)insurance)for)England,)London.))Hoff,) J.) (2003)) 'A)constructivist) bottom5up) approach)') in) Bang,) H.) P.,) ed.) Governance) as)
social)and)political)communication,)Manchester:)Manchester)University)Press,)41–60.))Hollox,) R.) (1996)) City) of) Newcastle) upon) Tyne) Unitary) Development) Plan:) Report) of) the)
public)local)inquiry)November)1994)–)June)1995,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne.))Hooghe,) L.) and)Marks,)G.) (2003)) 'Unraveling) the) central) state,) but) how?)Types)of)multi5level)governance',)American)Political)Science)Review,)97(2),)233–243.))Hooghe,)L.)and)Marks,)G.)(2010))'Types)of)multi5level)governance')in)Enderlein,)H.,)Wälti,)S.)and)Zürn,)M.,)eds.,)Handbook)on)multi9level)governance,)Cheltenham:)Edward)Elgar,)17–31.))Horner,)M.)and)Walsh,)P.)(2000))'Easter)1998)Floods',)Journal)of)the)Chartered)Institution)
of)Water)and)Environmental)Management,)14(6),)415–418.))Howe,) J.)and)White,) I.)(2001)) 'Flooding:)Are)we)ignoring)the)real)problem)and)solution?',)
Regional)Studies,)35(4),)368–370.))Howe,)J.)and)White,)I.)(2004))'Like)a)fish)out)of)water:)The)relationship)between)planning)and)flood)risk)management)in)the)UK)',)Planning)Practice)and)Research,)19(4),)415–425.))Howes,)H.)(2007))Strategic)planning)for)water,)London:)Taylor)&)Francis.))Hughes,)A.)(2011))'Over)50)Taylor)Wimpey)homes)at)Great)Park,)Newcastle)built)illegally,)23) April',) The) Journal) [online],) available:)http://www.thejournal.co.uk/news/north5east5news/over5505taylor5wimpey5homes54435181#ixzz1KKbffH3I)[accessed)23)March)2013].))Imbroscio,)D.)L.)(1998))'Reformulating)urban)regime)theory:)The)division)of)labor)between)state)and)market)reconsidered',)Journal)of)Urban)Affairs,)20(3),)233–248.))International)Risk)Governance)Council)(2005))'White)paper)on)risk)governance:)Towards)an)integrative)approach',)))IPCC) (2007a)) Contribution) of) Working) Group) II) to) the) Fourth) Assessment) Report) of) the)
Intergovernmental) Panel) on) Climate) Change,) Cambridge:) Cambridge) University)Press.))IPCC)(2007b)) 'Summary) for)policy)makers') in)Solomon,)S.,)Qin,)D.,)Manning,)M.,)Chen,)Z.,)Marquis,)M.,)Averyt,)K.)B.,) Tignor,)M.) and)Miller,)H.) L.,) eds.,)Climate) change)2007:)
  294 
The)physical)science)basis:)Contribution)of)Working)Group)I)to)the)Fourth)Assessment)
Report) of) the) Intergovernmental) Panel) on) Climate) Change,) Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))IPCC)(2011)) 'Summary) for)policy)makers') in)Field,)C.)B.,)Barros,)V.,)Stocker,)T.)F.,)Qin,)D.,)Dokken,)D.) J.,)Ebi,)K.)L.,)Mastrandrea,)M.)D.,)Mach,)K.) J.,)Plattner,)G.5K.,)Allen,)S.)K.,)Tignor,) M.) and) Midgley,) P.) M.,) eds.,) Intergovernmental) Panel) on) Climate) Change)
special) report) on) managing) the) risks) of) extreme) events) and) disasters) to) advance)
climate)change)adaptation,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))IPCC)(2012))Managing)the)risks)of)extreme)events)and)disasters)to)advance)climate)change)
adaptation:)Summary)for)policy)makers,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))IPCC)(2013)) 'Summary)for)policy)makers') in)Stocker,)T.)F.,)Qin,)D.,)Plattner,)G.5K.,)Tignor,)M.,) Allen,) S.) K.,) Boschung,) J.,) Nauels,) A.,) Xia,) Y.,) Bex,) V.) and) Midgley,) P.) M.,) eds.,)
Climate)change)2013:)The)physical)science)basis:)Contribution)of)Working)Group)I)to)
the) Fifth) Assessment) Report) of) the) Intergovernmental) Panel) on) Climate) Change,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))Iwakabe,)S.)and)Gazzola,)N.)(2009))'From)single5case)studies)to)practice5based)knowledge:)Aggregating)and)synthesizing)case)studies',)Psychotherapy)Research,)19(4–5),)601–611.))Jenkins,) G.,) Perry,)M.) and) Prior,) J.) (2009))The) climate) of) the) United) Kingdom) and) recent)
trends,)Exeter:)Met)Office)Hadley)Centre.))Jessop,) B.) (1995a)) 'The) regulation) approach,) governance,) and) Post5Fordism:) Alternative)perspectives)on)economic)and)political)change?',)Economy)and)Society,)24(3),)307–333.))Jessop,)B.)(1995b))'Towards)a)Schumpeterian)workforce)regime)in)Britain:)Reflections)on)regulation,) governance) and) welfare) state',) Environment) and) Planning) A,) 27(10),)1613–1626.))Jessop,) B.) (1999)) 'The) governance) of) complexity) and) the) complexity) of) governance:)Preliminary) remarks) on) some) problems) and) limits) of) economic) guidance',)available:) http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Jessop5Governance5of5Complexity.pdf)[accessed)10)January)2013].))Jessop,)B.)(2008))State)power:)A)strategic9relational)approach,)Cambridge:)Polity.))Jessop,)B.) (2009)) 'Governance)and)metagovernance:)On)reflexivity,) requisite)variety,)and)requisite) irony') in)Bang,)H.,) ed.)Governance)as) social)and)political) communication,)Manchester:)Manchester)University)Press,)101–116.))Jessop,) B.) and) Sum,) N.5L.) (2006)) Beyond) the) regulation) approach:) Putting) capitalist)
economies)in)their)place,)Cheltenham:)Edward)Elgar.)
  295 
)Jha,)A.)K.,)Bloch,)R.)and)Lamond,)J.)(2012))Cities)and)flooding:)A)guide)to)integrated)urban)
flood)risk)management)for)the)21st)century,)Washington)DC:)International)Bank)for)Reconstruction)and)Development.))John,)P.)(1998))Analysing)public)policy,)London:)Pinter.))Johnson,)C.)and)Priest,)S.)(2008))'Flood)risk)management)in)England:)A)changing)landscape)of)risk)responsibility?',)Water)Resources)Development,)24(4),)513–525.))Judge,)D.,)Stoker,)G.)and)Wolman,)H.)(1995))Theories)of)urban)politics,)London:)Sage.))Kelman,) I.) (2001)) 'The)autumn)2000)floods) in)England)and)flood)management',)Weather,)56(10),)346–360.))Kennedy,) M.) and) Hyslop,) N.) (2012)) 'Tyneside) sustainable) sewerage) pilot) study:)Development) of) an) integrated,) partnership) approach) to) the) provision) of)sustainable) sewerage',) [online],) available:)http://www.waterprojectsonline.com/case_studies/2012/Northumbrian_Tyneside_Sewerage_2012.pdf)[accessed)2)April)2013].))Kickert,)W.,)Klijn,)E.)H.)and)Koppenjan,)J.)(1997))Managing)complex)networks:)Strategies)for)
the)public)sector,)London:)SAGE.))Kjær,)A.)M.)(2004))Governance,)Cambridge:)Polity.))Klijn,)E.)H.,)Edelenbos,)J.)and)Steijn,)B.)(2010a))'Trust)in)governance)networks:)Its)impacts)on)outcomes',)Administration)&)Society,)42(2),)193–221.))Klijn,) E.) H.) and) Koppenjan,) J.) (2012)) 'Governance) network) theory:) Past,) present) and)future',)Policy)&)Politics,)40(4),)587–606.))Klijn,)E.)H.,)Koppenjan,)J.)and)Termeer,)C.)(1995))'Managing)networks)in)the)public)sector:)A) theoretical) study) of) management) strategies) in) policy) networks',) Public)
Administration,)73(3),)437–454.))Klijn,) E.)H.,) Steijn,) B.) and)Edelenbos,) J.) (2010b)) 'The) impact) of) network)management) on)outcome)in)governance)networks',)Public)Administration,)88(4),)1063–1082.))Knight,) A.) and) Ruddock,) L.) (2009)) Advanced) research) methods) in) the) built) environment,)Chichester:)Blackwell.))Knight)Frank)(2008))'Esh)Plaza',)[online],)available:)http://www.newcastlegreatpark.com)[accessed)26)November)2013].))
  296 
Kohler5Koch,)B.)and)Eising,)R.)(1999))'Introduction:)Network)governance)in)the)European)Union') in)Kohler5Koch,)B.)and)Eising,)R.,)eds.,)The)transformation)of)governance)in)
the)European)Union,)London:)Routledge,)3–12.))Koppenjan,) J.) and) Klĳn,) E.) H.) (2004)) Managing) uncertainties) in) networks:) A) network)
approach)to)problem)solving)and)decision)making,)London:)Routledge.))Kouwenaar,)G.)(1958))Het)gebruik)van)woorden:)Gedichten,)Zaandijk:)J.)Heijnis)Tsz.))Laffin,)M.)(2009)) 'The) limits)of) local)governance:)Has) local)social)housing)provision)been)nationalised) in) England?',) in) European) Group) of) Public) Administration) Annual)
Conference,)Malta,)155)September,)EGPA,)1–18.))Lamond,) J.) E.,) Proverbs,) D.) G.) and) Hammond,) F.) N.) (2009)) 'Accessibility) of) flood) risk)insurance) in) the) UK:) Confusion,) competition) and) complacency',) Journal) of) Risk)
Research,)12(6),)825–841.))Lemke,) T.) (2001)) ''The) birth) of) bio5politics':)Michel) Foucault's) lecture) at) the) College) de)France)on)neo5liberal)governmentality',)Economy)and)Society,)30(2),)190–207.))Lewis,) J.) (2011)) 'The) future) of) network) governance) research:) Strength) in) diversity) and)synthesis',)Public)Administration,)89(4),)1221–1234.))Local) Government) Association) (2013)) 'FlowNet',) [online],) available:)https://knowledgehub.local.gov.uk/web/flownet)[accessed)3)March)2011].))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009a))Evidence)in)chief)notes)on)flood)risk,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009b))Flood)risk)considerations,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009c))Flooding)on)proposed)development)site)B,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009d))Flooding)on)proposed)development)site)A,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009e))Letter)to)Chronicle,)February,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009f))Local)Residents)Group)(LRG))objections:)For)presentation)at)
public)inquiry,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009g))Proof)of)evidence,)unpublished.))Local)Residents’)Group)(2009h))Proof)of)evidence:)Appendix)12.10,)unpublished.))Lukes,)S.)(2005))Power:)A)radical)view,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.)
  297 
)Lyon,)R.)(2009a))Minutes)of)a)pre9inquiry)meeting,)10)June,)unpublished.))Lyon,)R.) (2009b))Report) to) the)Secretary)of)State) for)Communities)and)Local)Government:)
Town) and) Country) Planning) Act) 1990) Chelmsford) Borough) Council) application,)London.))Macdonald,)D.,)Dixon,)A.,)Newell,)A.)and)Hallaways,)A.)(2012))'Groundwater)flooding)within)an)urbanised)flood)plain',)Journal)of)Flood)Risk)Management,)5(1),)68–80.))Maloney,)W.)and)Richardson,)J.)(1995))'Water)policy5making)in)England)and)Wales:)Policy)communities) under) pressure?') in) Bressers,) H.,) O'Toole,) L.,) Jr.) and) Richardson,) J.,)eds.,) Networks) for) water) policy:) A) comparative) perspective,) London:) Frank) Cass,)110–138.))Mangen,)S.)(1999)) 'Qualitative)research)methods)in)cross)national)settings',)International)
Journal)of)Social)Research)Methodology,)2(2),)109–124.))Marcussen,) M.) and) Torfing,) J.) (2006)) Democratic) network) governance) in) Europe,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.))Marks,)G.)(1993))'Structural)policy)and)multi5level)governance)in)the)EC')in)Cafruny,)A.)W.)and) Rosenthal,) G.) G.,) eds.,)The) state) of) the) European) Community:) The) Maastricht)
debates)and)beyond,)Boulder,)CO:)Lynne)Riener,)391–410.))Marsh,) D.) and) Smith,) M.) (2000)) 'Understanding) policy) networks:) Towards) a) dialectical)approach',)Political)Studies,)48(1),)4–21.))Marsh,)J.)G.)and)Olsen,)J.)P.)(2006))'The)logic)of)appropriateness')in)Moran,)M.,)Rein,)M.)and)Goodin,)R.)E.,)eds.,)The)Oxford)handbook)of)public)policy,)Oxford:)OUP,)689–708.))Maxwell,)J.)(1996))Qualitative)research)design:)An)interpretive)approach,)London:)Sage.))Mayntz,)R.)(2003))'New)challenges)to)governance)theory)')in)Bang,)H.)P.,)ed.)Governance)as)
social)and)political)communication,)Manchester:)Manchester)University)Press,)27–40.))MCD) (2008)) New) Writtle) Street:) Design) changes:) The) Ford) county) ground,) Chelmsford,)Birmingham.))MCD) and) ECCC) (2012)) 'A) great) catch) for) Essex) CCC...',) [online],) available:)http://www.essexcricket.org.uk/wp5content/uploads/2012/12/Essex5Development5Brochure.pdf)[accessed)23)January)2014].))McDonald,)M.)(1997))'The)impact)of)the)plan)led)system',)in)Joint)Planning)Law)Conference,)Oxford,)JPLC,)45–50.)
  298 
)McGuire,) M.) and) Agranoff,) R.) (2011)) 'The) limitations) of) public) management) networks',)
Public)Administration,)89(2),)265–284.))Met) Office) (2012)) 'Floods) in) Carlisle)–)January) 2005',) [online],) available:)http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/interesting/jan2005floods)[accessed)21)March)2013].))Met) Office) (2013)) 'Annual) 2012',) [online],) available:)http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/2012/annual.html) [accessed) 3) October)2013].))Met) Office) and) JBA) Risk)Management) (2012)) 'UK) Flooding) April) to) July) 2012',) [online],)available:)http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/e/s/JBA_and_Met_Office_Bulletin_UK_Flooding_April_July_2012.pdf)[accessed)1)November)2013].))Meyer,)V.,) Priest,) S.) and)Kuhlicke,) C.) (2012)) 'Economic) evaluation)of) structural) and)non5structural) flood) risk) management) measures:) Examples) from) the) Mulde) River',)
Natural)Hazards,)62(2),)301–324.))Mingers,) J.) (2004)) 'Real5izing) information) systems:) Critical) realism) as) an) underpinning)philosophy)forinformation)systems',)Information)and)Organization,)14,)87–103.))Moore,)V.)(2007))A)practical)approach)to)planning)law,)10)ed.,)Oxford:)OUP.))Morriss,) P.) (2002)) Power:) A) philosophical) analysis,) Manchester:)Manchester) University)Press.))Mossberger,)K.)and)Stoker,)G.)(2001))'The)evolution)of)urban)regime)theory:)The)challenge)of)conceptualization',)Urban)Affairs)Review,)36(6),)810–835.))Murphy,) J.,) Sexton,)D.,) Jenkins,) G.) and)Boorman,) P.) (2010))UK) climate) projections) science)
report:)Climate)change)projections:)Version)3,)Exeter:)Met)Office)Hadley)Centre.))Nathaniel)Lichfield)and)Partners)(1999))Environmental)Statement,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))National) Archives) (2012)) 'Archive) of) the)Southern)Water) Authority',) [online],) available:)http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/records.aspx?cat=1795swa&cid=0#0)[accessed)1)November)2012].))Neuvel,)J.)M.)M.)and)van)der)Knaap,)W.)(2010))'A)spatial)planning)perspective)for)measures)concerning) flood) risk) management',) International) Journal) of) Water) Resources)
Development,)26(2),)283–296.))
  299 
Newcastle) Action) Group) to) Save) the) Green) Belt) (1993)) 'Your) greenbelt) under) threat',)
Newsletter)3,)1–4.))Newcastle) City) Council) (1992)) Draft) Unitary) Development) Plan:) Report) on) a)) public)
consultation) b)) public) opinion) survey) c)) list) of) consultees,) Newcastle) upon) Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City)Council) (1993))Unitary)Development)Plan:)Deposit) stage,)Newcastle) upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (1998a))Master) Plan) and) Supplementary) Planning) Document) for)
Newcastle)Great)Park,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(1998b))Master)plan)for)the)Northern)Development)Area,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(1998c))Newcastle)upon)Tyne)Unitary)Development)Plan,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(1998d))Northern)Development)Area:)NDA)Bulletin)no.)3,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(1999a))Northern)Development)Area:)NDA)Bulletin)no.)4,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (1999b))Northern) Development) Area:) Publicity) for) public) inquiry)
and)pre9inquiry)meeting,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (1999c)) Outline) application) for) Newcastle) Great) Park)
99/1300/01/OUT,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(2000a))Newcastle)Great)Park:)NGP)Bulletin)no.)6,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(2000b))Section)106)agreement,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council) (2001))Newcastle)Great)Park:)NGP)Bulletin)no.)8,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (2003)) Newcastle) Great) Park) Newsletter,) Newcastle) upon) Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (2004)) 'Sustainable) drainage') in) Development) Site) Strategy)
Statement)for)Cell)G,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council,)36–46.)
  300 
)Newcastle)City)Council)(2006))Revised)Master)Plan)and)Supplementary)Planning)Document)
for)Newcastle)Great)Park,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(2007))Regeneration)Scrutiny)Panel:)Newcastle)Great)Park:)Current)
position,)19)March,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (2010)) Section) 106) agreement,) Newcastle) upon) Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) City) Council) (2013a)) Newcastle) Great) Park) West:) Development) and) capacity)
framework,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(2013b))Summer)2012)flooding)in)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:))A)report)on)
the)experiences)of)residents)and)non9residential)property)managers,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)City)Council)(n.d.))Plan)of)Newcastle)Great)Park,)unpublished.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2001a))Minutes) from)12)February,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2001b))Minutes) from) 21) January,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)upon)Tyne.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2001c)) Revised) Master) Plan) for) Newcastle)
Great)Park,)9)July,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2003a)) Development) update,) 10) November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2003b))Minutes)from)13)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2004a)) Action) list,) 8) November,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004b))Development)update)9)Cells)B,)C)and)G,)
10)May,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2004c)) Development) update,) 13) September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004d))Drainage)issues)update,)13)December,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  301 
)Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004e))Minutes) from)8)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2004f))Minutes) from) 9) February,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004g))Minutes)from)10)May,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2004h))Minutes) from) 11)October,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004i))Minutes)from)13)December,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2004j))Sustainable)drainage)issues,)11)October,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005a))Action)list)June,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005b))Draft)revised)master)plan:)Consultation)
responses,)5)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2005c)) Drainage) issues,) 9) May,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005d))Minutes) from)9)May,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2005e))Minutes) from) 10) October,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005f))Minutes)from)12)December,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005g))Minutes)from)13)June,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2005h))Minutes)from)14)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2006a))Minutes) from)13)February,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  302 
)Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2006b))Minutes)from)24)July,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2007a))Minutes)from)10)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2007b))North)Gosforth)/)Ouseburn)IUD)report,)
10)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2008a))Minutes)from)8)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2008b))Minutes)from)10)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2009a)) Current) planning) applications,) 21)
September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2009b))Minutes)from)11)May,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Advisory)Committee)(2009c))Minutes)from)16)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2009d))Minutes) from)19) January)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Advisory) Committee) (2010))Minutes) from) 18) January,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Consortium) (n.d.))Newcastle) Great) Park) stormwater)management,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Sub5Committee) (2001a)) Consultation) procedure,) 10) September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Sub5Committee)(2001b))Developing)the)consultation)strategy)for)the)
Newcastle)Great)Park,)12)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Sub5Committee)(2001c))Minutes)from)10)September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Sub5Committee)(2001d))Minutes)from)12)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  303 
)Newcastle) Great) Park) Sub5Committee) (2001e)) Newcastle) Great) Park)–)Cell) I)–
)Development)update,)12)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) Great) Park) Sub5Committee) (2001f)) Responsibilities) and) actions) on) water)
management,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle)Great)Park)Sub5Committee) (2001g))Revised)master)plan)update,)12)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Newcastle) University) (2012)) 'Consent) form',) [online],) available:)http://www.ncl.ac.uk/res/research/ethics_governance/ethics/toolkit/consent/consent_form.htm)[accessed)1)November)2013].))Nicholson,)Z.)(2012))'Chelmsford)granted)city)status)–)the)news)we)have)been)waiting)for',)
This) is) total) Essex) [online],) available:)http://www.essexchronicle.co.uk/Chelmsford5granted5city5status5news5waiting/story5155181545detail/story.html)[accessed)14)March)2013].))Noor,)K.)B.)M.)(2008))'Case)study:)A)strategic)research)methodology',)American)Journal)of)
Applied)Sciences,)5(11),)1602–1604.))North,)D.)C.)(1998))Institutions,)institutional)change)and)economic)performance,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))Northern)Development)Area)Officer)Working)Group) (1997a))Minutes) from)16)December,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern)Development)Area)Officer)Working)Group) (1997b))Minutes) from)17)November,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern) Development) Area) Officer) Working) Group) (1998)) Minutes) from) 9) March,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern) Development) Area) Sub) Committee) (1998a))Minutes) from) 9) March,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern)Development)Area)Sub)Committee)(1998b))Minutes)from)12)October,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern)Development)Area)Sub)Committee) (1998c))Minutes) from)17)August,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern) Development) Area) Sub) Committee) (1998d)) Minutes) from) 24) September,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.)
  304 
)Northern)Development)Area) Sub)Committee) (1998e))Minutes) from)26)March,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern) Development) Area) Sub) Committee) (1998f))Minutes) from) February,) Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))Northern)Development)Area)Sub)Committee)(2000))Minutes)from)10)July,)Newcastle)upon)Tyne:)Newcastle)City)Council.))O'Neill,)D.) (2011))Research)brief:)Under9pricing)of) the) flood)element)of)home) insurance) for)
domestic)customers)at)significant)risk,)London:)ABI.))ODPM)(2000))Planning)Policy)Guidance)3:)Housing,)London:)HMSO.))ODPM)(2004))The)planning)response)to)climate)change:)Advice)on)better)practice,)London:)ODPM.))ODPM) (2005)) Planning) Policy) Statement) 1:)Delivering) sustainable) development,) London:)ODPM.))Office) for)National) Statistics) (2012)) 'Table)P07)2011)Census:)Number)of)usual) residents)living) in) households) and) communal) establishments,) local) authorities) in) England)and) Wales',) [online],) available:) http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re5reference5tables.html?edition=tcm:775257414)[accessed)9)August)2012].))Ofwat)(2011))Future)impacts)on)sewer)systems)in)England)and)Wales,)Birmingham:)Ofwat.))Ofwat) and)Defra) (2006)) 'The)development)of) the)water) industry) in)England)and)Wales',)[online],) available:)http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/commissioned/rpt_com_devwatindust270106.pdf)[accessed)1)November)2012].))Osborne,)S.)P.)(2010))The)new)public)governance?)Emerging)perspectives)on)the)theory)and)
practice)of)public)governance,)London:)Routledge.))Ouseburn) Catchment) Steering) Group) (2009)) Public) engagement:) A) report) on) the) public)
engagement) activities) in) the) upper) Ouseburn,) Newcastle) upon) Tyne:) Ouseburn)Catchment)Steering)Group.))Pardoe,)J.,)Penning5Rowsell,)E.)and)Tunstall,)S.)(2011))'Floodplain)conflicts:)regulation)and)negotiation',)Natural)Hazards)and)Earth)System)Sciences,)11(10),)288952902.))Parker,) D.) J.) (1995)) 'Floodplain) development) policy) in) England) and) Wales',) Applied)
Geography,)15(4),)341–363.)
  305 
)Parker,)J.)(2000))Structuration,)Buckingham:)Open)University.))Parker,) R.) (2007)) 'Networked) governance) or) just) networks?) Local) governance) of) the)knowledge) economy) in) Limerick) (Ireland)) and) Karlskrona) (Sweden)',) Political)
Studies,)55(1),)113–132.))PBA)(2009))Flood)risk)assessment,)London:)PBA.))Penning5Rowsell,) E.) and)Handmer,) J.)W.) (1988)) 'Flood)hazard)management) in)Britain:)A)changing)scene',)Geographical)Journal,)154(2),)209–220.))Peters,) B.) G.) and) Pierre,) J.) (2004)) 'Multi5level) governance) and) democracy:) A) Faustian)bargain?') in) Bache,) I.) and) Flinders,)M.,) eds.,)Multi9level) Governance,)Oxford:) OUP,)75–89.))Peterson,)T.)C.,)Hoerling,)M.)P.,)Stott,)P.)A.)and)Herring,)S.)C.)(2013))'The)extreme)European)summer)2012,)in)'Explaining)extreme)events)of)2012)from)a)climate)perspective'',)
Bulletin)of)the)American)Meteorological)Society,)94(9),)28–32.))Pierre,) J.)(2005)) 'Comparative)urban)governance:)Uncovering)complex)causalities',)Urban)
Affairs)Review,)40(4),)446–462.))Pitt,)J.)(2010))Letter)from)CLG)to)Cushman)and)Wakefield,)London:)DCLG.))Pitt,) M.) (2008)) The) Pitt)Review:) Learning) lessons) from) the) 2007) floods:) An) independent)
review)by)Sir)Michael)Pitt:)Final)report,)London:)Cabinet)Office.))Porter,) J.) and) Demeritt,) D.) (2012)) 'Flood5risk)management,)mapping,) and) planning:) The)institutional)politics)of)decision)support)in)England',)Environment)and)Planning)A,)44(10),)2359–2378.))PURE) Ouseburn) (2006)) Draft) Ouseburn) Catchment) Plan,) Newcastle) upon) Tyne:) PURE)Ouseburn.))Raab,) C.) D.) (2001)) 'Understanding) policy) networks:) A) comment) on) Marsh) and) Smith',)
Political)Studies,)49(3),)551–556.))Ragin,) C.) C.) and) Becker,) H.) S.) (1992))What) is) a) case?) Exploring) the) foundations) of) social)
inquiry,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press.))Ramsbottom,) D.,) Sayers,) P.) and) Panzeri,) M.) (2012)) UK) 2012:) Climate) change) risk)
assessment:)Climate)change)risk)assessment)for)the)floods)and)coastal)erosion)sector,)London:)Defra.))
  306 
Remenyi,) D.,) Money,) A.,) Price,) D.) and) Bannister,) F.) (2002)) 'The) creation) of) knowledge)through)case)study)research',)The)Irish)Journal)of)Management,)23(2),)1–17.))Renn,) O.) (2008)) Risk) governance:) Coping) with) uncertainty) in) a) complex) world,) London:)Earthscan.))Rhodes,)R.)A.)W.) (1996)) 'The)new)governance:)Governing)without) government',)Political)
Studies,)44(4),)652–667.))Rhodes,)R.)A.)W.)(1997))Understanding)governance:)Policy)networks,)governance,)reflexivity)
and)accountability,)Buckingham:)Open)University)Press.))Rhodes,)R.)A.)W.)(2006))'Policy)network)analysis')in)Moran,)M.,)Rein,)M.)and)Goodin,)R.)E.,)eds.,)The)Oxford)handbook)of)public)policy,)Oxford:)OUP,)425–447.))Richards,) J.) (2005)) The) treatment) of) inland) flood) risk) in) Development) Plans) and)
Development)Control)in)England,)unpublished)thesis)University)of)Manchester.))Richards,)J.)(2007))'The)English)planning)system)and)flood)risk)management')in)Ashley,)R.,)Garvin,) S.,) Pasche,) E.,) Vassilopoulos,) A.) and) Zevenbergen,) C.,) eds.,)
Advances)in)urban)flood)management,)London:)Taylor)&)Francis,)473–482.))Rittel,)H.)W.)J.)and)Webber,)M.)M.)(1973))'Dilemmas)in)a)general)theory)of)planning',)Policy)
Sciences,)4(2),)155–169.))River) Stour) (Kent)) Internal) Drainage) Board) (2009)) 'History',) [online],) available:)http://www.riverstouridb.org.uk/history.php)[accessed)2)November)2012].))Rose,) G.) (1997)) 'Situating) knowledges:) Positionality,) reflexivities) and) other) tactics',)
Progress)in)Human)Geography,)21(3),)305–320.))Rotzoll,) K.) and) Fletcher,) C.) H.) (2013)) 'Assessment) of) groundwater) inundation) as)a)consequence)of)sea5level)rise)',)Nature)Climate)Change,)3,)477–481.))Rowlands,)H.)G.) (1999))Town)and)Country)Planning)Act)1990,) Section)78)and)Schedule)6:)
Appeal)by)countryside)properties)(commercial))PLC:)Application)NO:)98/01285/FUL,)Chelmsford:)))Saal,) D.) S.) and) Parker,) D.) (2001)) 'Productivity) and) price) performance) in) the) privatized)water) and) sewerage) companies) of) England) and) Wales',) Journal) of) Regulatory)
Economics,)20(1),)61–90.))Sayer,)R.)A.)(2000))Realism)and)social)science,)London:)Sage.))
  307 
Scharpf,)F.)W.)(1994))'Games)real)actors)could)play:)Positive)and)negative)coordination)in)embedded)negotiations',)Journal)of)Theoretical)Politics,)6(1),)27–53.))Scharpf,) F.) W.) (1997)) Games) real) actors) play:) Actor9centered) institutionalism) in) policy)
research,)Oxford:)WestviewPress.))Scott)Wilson) (2007))Mid)Essex) Strategic)Flood)Risk)Assessment:)Main) report,) Chelmsford:)Scott)Wilson.))Scott) Wilson) (2008)) Strategic) Flood) Risk) Assessment:) Appendix) B:) Chelmsford)
supplementary)report,)Chelmsford:)Scott)Wilson.))Scott)Wilson)(2009))Proof)of)evidence)in)respect)of)flood)risk,)unpublished.))Skelcher,)C.) (2000)) 'Changing) images)of) the) state:)Overloaded,)hollowed5out,) congested',)
Public)Policy)and)Administration,)15(3),)3–19.))Smith,)M.)J.)(2000))Rethinking)state)theory,)London:)Routledge.))Somekh,)B.)and)Lewin,)C.)(2005))Research)methods)in)the)social)sciences,)London:)Sage.))Stake,)R.)E.)(1978))'The)case)study)method)in)social)inquiry',)Educational)Researcher,)7(2),)5–8.))Stoker,)G.) (1998a)) 'Governance)as) theory:)Five)propositions',) International)Social)Science)
Journal,)50(1),)17–28.))Stoker,) G.) (1998b)) 'Theory) and) urban) politics',) International) Political) Science) Review,)19(2),)119–129.))Stone,) C.) N.) (1989))Regime) politics:) Governing) Atlanta,) 1946–1988,) Lawrence:)University)Press)of)Kansas.))Stone,)C.)N.)(2005)) 'Looking)back)to) look)forward:)Reflections)on)urban)regime)analysis',)
Urban)Affairs)Review,)40(3),)309–341.))Sullivan,) H.) and) Skelcher,) C.) (2002))Working) across) boundaries:) Collaboration) in) public)
services,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.))SUME) (2011)) 'SUME)–)Sustainable) Urban)Metabolism) for) Europe:)Output) of) the) SUME)project',) [online],) available:) http://www.sume.at/project_downloads) [accessed) 6)April)2013].))
  308 
Swyngedouw,) E.) (2005)) 'Governance) innovation) and) the) citizen:) The) Janus) face) of)governance5beyond5the5state',)Urban)Studies,)42(11),)1991–2006.))Sørensen,) E.) and) Torfing,) J.) (2007)) Theories)of) democratic)network) governance,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.))Sørensen,)E.)and)Torfing,)J.)(2009))'Making)governance)networks)effective)and)democratic)through)metagovernance',)Public)Administration,)87(2),)234–258.))Termeer,)C.,)Dewulf,)A.)and)Breeman,)G.)(2012))'Governance)of)wicked)climate)adaptation)problems') in) Knieling,) J.) and) Leal) Filho,) W.,) eds.,) Climate) change) governance,)London:)Springer,)27–40.))Tewdwr5Jones,)M.)(1997))'Plans,)policies)and)inter5governmental)relations:)Assessing)the)role) of) National) Planning) Guidance) in) England) and)Wales',)Urban) Studies,) 34(1),)141–162.))Tewdwr5Jones,) M.) (2012)) Spatial) planning) and) governance:) Understanding) UK) planning,)Basingstoke:)Palgrave)Macmillan.))Toke,) D.) and)Marsh,) D.) (2003)) 'Policy) networks) and) the) GM) crops) issue:) Assessing) the)utility)of)a)dialectical)model)of)policy)networks',)Public)Administration,)81(2),)229–251.))Torfing,) J.) (2005)) 'Governance)network) theory:)Towards) a) second) generation',)European)
Political)Science,)4,)305–315.))Torfing,) J.) (2012)) 'Governance) networks',) The) Oxford) handbook) of) governance) [online],)available:)http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com)[accessed)26)April)2013].))Tunstall,) S.,) Johnson,) C.) and) Penning) Rowsell,) E.) (2004)) 'Flood) Hazard) Management) in)England) and) Wales:) From) land) drainage) to) flood) risk) management',) in) World)
Congress)on)Natural)Disaster)Mitigation,)New)Delhi,)19521)February.,)))Tunstall,) S.,)McCarthy,) S.) and) Faulkner,)H.) (2009)) 'Flood) risk)management) and) planning)policy) in) a) time) of) policy) transition:) The) case) of) the) Wapshott) Road) planning)inquiry,)Surrey,)England',)Journal)of)Flood)Risk)Management,)2(3),)159–169.))Tunstall,) S.,) Tapsell,) S.,) Green,) C.,) Floyd,) P.) and) George,) C.) (2006)) 'The) health) effects) of)flooding:) Social) research) results) from)England) and)Wales)',) Journal) of)Water) and)
Health,)4(3),)365–380.))Van) Bueren,) E.,) Klijn,) E.) H.) and) Koppenjan,) J.) (2003)) 'Dealing) with) wicked) problems) in)networks:) Analyzing) an) environmental) debate) from) a) network) perspective',)
Journal)of)Public)Administration)Research)and)Theory,)13(2),)193–212.))
  309 
Van)Herk,)S.,)Zevenbergen,)C.,)Ashley,)R.)and)Rijke,)J.)(2011))'Learning)and)action)alliances)for) the) integration) of) flood) risk) management) into) urban) planning:) A) new)framework)from)empirical)evidence)from)the)Netherlands',)Environmental)Science)
&)Policy,)14,)543–554.))Van) Kersbergen,) K.) and) Van) Waarden,) F.) (2004)) ''Governance') as) a) bridge) between)disciplines:) Cross5disciplinary) inspiration) regarding) shifts) in) governance) and)problems) of) governability,) accountability) and) legitimacy',) European) Journal) of)
Political)Research,)43(2),)143–171.))Vigar,) G.,) Healey,) P.,) Hull,) A.) and) Davoudi,) S.) (2000)) Planning,)governance)and) spatial)
strategy)in)Britain:)An)institutionalist)perspective,)Basingstoke:)Macmillan.))Waddock,) S.) A.) (1989)) 'Understanding) social) partnerships:)An) evolutionary) model) of)partnership)organizations',)Administration)and)Society)))))21(1),)78–100.))Wainwright,) M.) (2007)) 'The) great) floods) of) 1947',) The) Guardian) [online],) available:)http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/25/weather.flooding1) [accessed) 22)March)2012].))Watson,) N.,) Deeming,) H.) and) Treffny,) R.) (2009)) 'Beyond) bureaucracy?) Assessing)institutional) change) in) the) governance) of) water) in) England',)Water) Alternatives,)2(3),)448–460.))Wheater,) H.) and) Evans,) E.) (2009)) 'Land) use,) water) management) and) future) flood) risk',)
Land)Use)Policy,)26,)S2515S264.))White,) I.) (2010))Water)and) the) city:)Risk,) resilience)and)planning) for)a) sustainable) future,)London:)Routledge.))White,)I.)and)Richards,)J.)(2007))'Planning)policy)and)flood)risk:)The)translation)of)national)guidance)into)local)policy',)Planning,)Practice)&)Research,)22(4),)513–534.))Whitehead,)M.)(2003)) ''In) the)shadow)of)hierarchy':)Meta5governance,)policy)reform)and)urban)regeneration)in)the)West)Midlands',)Area,)35(1),)6–14.))Whittle,)R.,)Medd,)W.,)Deeming,)H.,)Kashefi,)E.,)Mort,)M.,)Twigger)Ross,)C.,)Walker,)G.)and)Watson,)N.)(2010))After)the)Rain)–)learning)the)lessons)from)flood)recovery)in)Hull:,)Lancaster:)Lancaster)University.))Wilson,) E.) (2006a)) 'Adapting) to) climate) change) at) the) local) level:) The) spatial) planning)response',)Local)Environment)11(6),)609–625.))Wilson,)E.) (2006b)) 'Developing)UK)spatial)planning)policy)to)respond)to)climate)change',)
Journal)of)Environmental)Policy)&)Planning,)8(1),)9–26.))
  310 
Wilson,) E.) (2009)) 'Multiple) scales) for) environmental)intervention:) Spatial) planning) and)the)environment) under) New) Labour',) Planning) Practice) &) Research,) 24(1),) 119–138.))Woods,)N.)(2000))'Prescott)give)go5ahead)for)£100m)Great)Park',)The)Journal,)2)June,)10.))Woods5Ballard,)B.,)Kellagher,)R.,)Martin,)P.,)Jefferies,)C.,)Bray,)R.)and)Shaffer,)P.)(2007))The)
SUDS)manual,)London:)CIRIA.))Yeung,) H.) W.) C.) (1997)) 'Critical) realism) and) realist) research) in) human) geography:) A)method) or) a) philosophy) in) search) of) a)method?',)Progress) in) Human) Geography,)21(1),)51–74.))Yin,)R.)K.)(2009))Case)study)research:)Design)and)methods,)London:)Sage.)))
 
